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Summary 
 
The functions of family courts in England and Wales in making decisions about children are 
identified as processing disputes and protecting vulnerable individuals, with latent functions 
of applying and influencing social policy. The thesis explores why family courts have been 
singled out for particular criticism in undertaking these functions. Two issues are examined: 
complaints that family court proceedings are held in secret and that a court is not the 
appropriate place for resolving disputes about children. The methods used are historical 
analysis, a comparison with courts in Australia, and applying the theories of Habermas. 
According to Habermas, when systems are maintained for their own sake without being 
anchored in people's values and needs, or operate without rational discourse, institutions can 
lose their legitimacy. The historical analysis shows that as social policy developed over the 
past 60 years, court structures were trapped in a dual jurisdiction which made it difficult to 
adapt to changing expectations. Since the 1970s, there have been calls for a unified family 
court to better meet families‘ requirements. However, a comparison with such a court, the 
Family Court of Australia, reveals another set of dualities which undermine its legitimacy.   
The claim that family courts do not function effectively because they are closed and secret is 
examined. The law is set out in the context of concepts of secrecy, privacy, openness and 
transparency. It is argued that children have a particular right to privacy which is 
marginalised in the current debate, and that a recent consultation process undertaken to 
reform the law on media access to court proceedings was not undertaken in a transparent 
manner. 
Attempts to introduce alternative dispute resolution and remove disputes about child care and 
upbringing to mediation and other non-legal alternatives are also shown as likely to fail 
unless formulated through rational discourse.  
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This thesis explores the functions of the family courts in England and Wales, with regard to 
decisions made about children. It starts from the observation that these courts have become 
subject to particular criticism, additional to dissatisfaction that is expressed with judicial 
systems in general. This study will show how our current system struggles to accomplish new 
tasks without having escaped from those of the past, because courts that deal with family 
matters have operated within a series of categorisations supported by false assumptions and 
conceptual divisions which continually work against public comprehension and acceptance.    
     
In this thesis I will argue that the further the distance between the policy-making process and 
open, accessible and fully-informed debate, the less likely the result is to reflect people‘s 
understanding of the values they attribute to social relationships. The less an institution 
operates according to consensus in the public sphere, the less legitimate, and more despised, 
it becomes. The concepts of ‗communicative action‘ and the ‗ideal speech situation‘, 
developed by Habermas, suggest that a conversation where all participants express 
themselves to genuinely reflect their motivations contributes to decisions that are based on 
reason, and hence more likely to be workable and accepted.            
 
The way family courts operate has been characterised as problematic and in need of reform 
for at least four decades. The thesis presented here is that this is because the courts fail to 
achieve ‗legitimacy‘, in a particular sense that is used by Habermas. I will show how 
numerous attempts at reform and review have been undertaken to address the problems 
identified at different times, but how none has adequately tackled them because opportunities 
for open, informed public debate are continually reduced to polarised over-simplification.   
 
In 2011, the year that this thesis was completed, observers of the family courts could 
reasonably anticipate some radical changes to the way these institutions exercise their 
functions. A comprehensive review of family justice was published, by way of an interim 
report in March and a final report in November.
1
  In parallel, a Parliamentary committee 
undertook its third inquiry in ten years into family courts, reporting in July.
2
 Unlike earlier 
initiatives, cited in this thesis, these two investigations concentrated on almost all aspects of 
the family courts‘ functions relating to children.  It appeared that, at last, issues were being 
discussed openly and seriously, still influenced, but not dominated, by gender politics, vested 
                                                 
1
 Family Justice Review, Interim Report; Final Report (Ministry of Justice, 2011) (hereafter ‗FJR‘) 
2
 HC Justice Committee Operation of the Family Courts (2010-12 HC 518-1) (hereafter ‗Parliamentary  report‘) 
3 
 
interests, short-term economic gains and media distortion.  Disappointingly, the product of 
the serious work put in by both groups has been lost amidst allegations of gender bias, self-
interest, incompetence, and scorn for the very professionals on whom the future of the family 
justice system depends.
3
 One of the concerns noted by the FJR was that current structures are 
so fragmented they cannot truthfully be described as ‗a system‘.4 Its report therefore strives to 
draw together the disparate parts into a coherent vision.   
 
However, rather than take an overview, the overwhelming reaction to the FJR is a 
preoccupation with a single issue. The media and politicians have seized on just one aspect of 
the comprehensive reports. This is the question of substantive change in the law to enforce a 
‘50:50‘ parenting arrangement for children of separated couples.5 It is remarkable that 
amongst a list of recommendations that fills 11 pages of the FJR Final Report, just this one 
features in hundreds of news stories, some of which describe it as the ‗main‘ 
recommendation‘.6 This is a classic example of distorted communication. Although ‗shared 
parenting‘ was thoroughly scrutinised and evaluated by both the FJR and the Parliamentary 
report, it now seems that the government is reluctant to follow their recommendations.  
 
Secondly, the Government has, irrespective of the reports, introduced a bill in Parliament
7
 
which will largely remove access to legal representation in family cases, with a predicted loss 
of specialist lawyers, leaving judges to cope with increased numbers of litigants in person. 
Many court buildings are being closed and access to the public restricted in others.
8
 These 
actions are all being taken explicitly within the political claim of necessity to reduce public 
expenditure for macro-economic reasons, unrelated to the interests of children. It therefore 
seems unlikely that there will be funding for the investment in IT, research and training on 
which the FJR recommendations for an integrated service are premised.
9
 The Bill is being 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, O Bowcott, ‗Family justice report author criticises plan to change divorce and custody law‘ 
Guardian3 February 2012; Interview with K Clarke, Lord Chancellor, given to the International Bar Association 
http://ilegal.org.uk/index.cgi?board=reformnews&action=display&thread=4061  
<Accessed 25 November 2011>  
4
 Family Justice Review Final Report (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 3; 6 
5
 An internet search on press coverage of the FJR on 3 February 2012 revealed 222 news items, all on this one 
point. 
6
 For example, D Pearse, ‗Divorced fathers to get more contact with their children‘ Guardian 3 February 2012 
7
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill 2011 Schedule Part 1  
8
 The Vale of Glamorgan Council v The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice [2011] EWHC 1532 
(Admin);  Robin Murray & Co, R (on the application of) v The Lord Chancellor [2011] EWHC 1528 (Admin)  
 
9
 Family Justice Review Final Report (Ministry of Justice, 2011) 179-181 
4 
 
pushed through Parliament at speed despite considerable opposition and even doubts that it 
will reduce public expenditure.
10
 Cookson writes of the Bill: 
 
Releasing the underlying assumptions and analysis which has been used to inform the 
projections in the Government‘s Impact Assessments would be particularly useful. It 
would increase transparency and allow the public to understand the question the basis 
of these assumptions.
11
  
 
This illustrates the risks Habermas identifies, that policies developed in a closed circle are 
less likely to be accepted by the wider public. If reducing access to justice by restricting legal 
is not a genuine cost-saving exercise, this must raise suspicions of underlying ideological 
motives to reduce the role of the State in supporting the least powerful individuals, those who 
fail to be self-sufficient, whether through bad luck or bad judgment. Families are expected to 
find private solutions, in a society which disparages the public interest in nurturing children 
and young people, while paradoxically valuing childhood as an investment in the future of 
the economy.  
 
It is symptomatic of the nature of the discourse on family courts that the economic and 
ideological power of the popular media and successive governments combine to repress the 
interests of children in the pretence of ‗fairness‘. Recourse to court is ‗unfair‘ on the 
taxpayer; the well-behaved citizen can sort out his/her own domestic life.  Imposing an 
artificial notion of equal parenting is ‗fair‘ to fathers. One might ask how policies based on 
notions of ‗fairness‘ can require the subordination of the welfare of children to the wishes of 
fathers, and jealously guard the courts‘ dispute resolution function as a precious resource.  
 
The government elected in 2010 is not the first to try to reduce public spending. Complaints 
that courts are insufficiently funded are not new. My contention is that the closer the 
agreement on family courts‘ functions, the stronger the mandate for planned investment. 
Family courts are subject to unique criticisms and pressures, in addition to those  shared with 
other systems of civil and criminal justice. Applying theories on the public sphere and 
communicative action, I suggest that the courts could enjoy more popular support, which 
would justify increased funding, if their operations were perceived as being grounded in 
consensus reached through rational discussion in the public sphere that connects values to 
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systems. A glimmer of this possibility is found in the new Modernisation Programme arising 
from the FJR: change ‗will need a strong consensus.‘12 It remains to be seen whether such a 
consensus will emerge. 
 
DUALITY IN THE HISTORY OF FAMILY COURTS  
             
Language is important; the categorisation of aspects of family law and policy as ‗public‘ or 
‗private‘ is a fundamental barrier to improvement. Discussion on the extent to which the state 
is mandated to intervene in private lives in the public interest is characteristic of a democratic 
society and Habermas‘ theories help to show why ‗public‘ cannot be completely separated 
from ‗private‘. Recognising the interaction between public and private would be helpful in 
leading to objectives that set criteria for promoting children‘s safety and well-being, so that 
the family justice system
13
 could be re-built to manage specialised resources to address the 
needs of those children who become involved in disputes at the right levels of support and 
intervention.          
 
This false dichotomy between public and private is not the only instance of the complexity of 
family courts being misleadingly divided into two alternatives.  This study will show that a 
series of ‗either/or‘ definitions and dual systems has predominated over time and place. 
Individuals experience a fragmented and dispersed patchwork in which they are directed into 
a ‗system polarised by pathways.‘14 Such a reductionist approach hampers debate. 
 
The UK was traditionally seen as different from other western European countries by not 
having a ‗family policy‘, unless it was implicitly one of non-intervention.15 This changed in 
the late 1990s with the incoming Labour government taking a more pro-active approach,
16
 
which is now reflected across the political spectrum.
17
 However, state interference in family 
life remains circumscribed, and has to be justified according to a consensus of values and 
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norms.
18
  The criteria for such intervention are reflected in the functions of the family courts 
which reflect the relationship between families and the state. Confusion between the 
state/family boundary and the public/private boundary underlies the ongoing problem of our 
expectations of the family courts. As discussed below, the regulation of family relationships 
is legitimate if it tries to balance the public interest with respect for privacy. The language of 
‗public‘ and ‗private‘ dominates family law discourse but should not be equated with ‗state‘ 
and ‗family‘.  
 
Applications to court involving children are customarily categorised as either ‗public law‘ or 
‗private law‘ cases. A public law case is one where parental care has failed to the extent that 
the State takes action through local authority children‘s services. It is defined as such because 
a public sector agency is involved as a party in the case. However, protecting children is in 
the public interest, while the court is acting to protect private individuals. A private law case 
relates to disputes between family members, usually between parents who cannot agree post-
separation parenting arrangements. They therefore approach state agencies for help, but the 
extent to which such help is a matter of public interest is less clear-cut than in public law 
cases, because there is variation in how the adults here are perceived: from reasonable and 
competent parents who may deserve some assistance to dangerous litigants who have lost 
sight of their children‘s best interests. The number of court applications by parents greatly 
outnumbers those by local authorities.
19
 The predominance of private law cases accounts for 
another distinguishing characteristic of family courts, that they are the site of gender-based 
conflict (although mothers are more likely to be parties in care proceedings than fathers.
20
)  
This stratification means that those involved in family courts can become enmeshed in power 
relations that differ from less gendercentric proceedings, despite the way legislation attempts 
to be gender neutral,
21
   and they may suffer the impact of ideological battles between groups 
with which they do not even identify. It follows that research questions necessarily raise 
feminist issues. 
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The terminology of public and private in the family courts suggests that there are different 
functions being undertaken between public law and private law cases. Under the current law, 
applications by local authorities and by family members are differentiated by the provisions 
of the Children Act 1989, although the terms public and private do not appear in the 
legislation.  However, the fundamental principles of the Act apply to both types of case, in 
which the court can consider a range of orders. This unification of some aspects of public and 
private law came about through consensus reached during open policy discussions during the 
1980s.
22
 It was recognised that all children‘s welfare and rights were of public concern, not 
just those where local authorities became involved.
23
 The Act encourages courts to apply the 
same normative model of family life in both public and private applications. Of course, 
different families experience court processes differently, but these will depend on a complex 
network of power relations and structural inequalities, not literally on whether the application 
is made by the local authority or an individual. Arguments for substantive legal reform will 
not be made here, because there is scope under the Act to deconstruct the boundary between 
public and private law when necessary in the child‘s best interests. It is the way the courts 
function to meet policy that maintains that boundary and produces problems unique to family 
courts.  
 
The appropriation of the terms public and private in these proceedings conjures up a    
theoretical public-private distinction which keeps the family home and relationships within 
the private realm. The nature and effects of this distinction have been subject to much critical 
review because of its implicit (or even explicit) subjugation of women and children.
24
 The 
prevailing view now is that mothers and, increasingly, children are separate rights-holders in 
the public realm. The tensions are instead between citizens and the state, with courts facing a 
crisis of legitimacy, not because families are private, in the sense of separated from civil 
society, but private in questioning or resisting regulation. Such regulation, like the law in 
general, is legitimate only if it is in the public interest. ‗Crisis of legitimacy‘ means the 
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questioning of authority to the extent that acceptance of government and its institutions 
begins to be undermined. This is a concept developed by Habermas from Weber‘s theories of 
the legitimation of domination and power. A state can exercise dominance over individuals if 
they generally accept that this is in their interests; this acceptance legitimates the actions 
taken on behalf of its institutions.
25
    
 
Popular usage of the terms ‗public law‘ for legal intervention in child protection matters and 
‗private law‘ for inter-parental disputes makes their use as descriptors unavoidable. Therefore 
they will be used here in that context, although they do not reflect a valid distinction between 
these categories of legal proceedings. Galanter and Lande observe that, in civil justice, courts 
cannot be divided between public and private by the nature of the cases they hear, but all 
have varying ‗dimensions of publicness and privateness‘.26 These dimensions become more 
complex in family courts.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Two broad questions can be identified. Firstly, why are family courts widely criticised? 
Secondly, what alternative systems are proposed?  
 
The first step requires analysis of the current system. Initially, we might see a problem 
articulated in the level of complaints, but some of these reflect wider discontent about 
expense, delay and injustice, and can be ascribed to economic factors and/or perceptions of 
the rightness of one‘s own case, and are not unique to family courts. The emotive nature of 
private family disputes and public discourse on family values makes it difficult to cut through 
the rhetoric to identify whether there is anything uniquely dysfunctional in family courts.
27
 In 
the absence of large-scale empirical research into the experiences of families,
28
 one cannot 
judge the validity of a claim that the courts do not satisfy most users, or whether the minority 
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of chronic litigators
29
 dominate the discourse, or whether the courts‘ failings are a popular 
myth, encouraged by publicity seekers.
30
 I therefore start from the premise that whichever is 
true, the negative perception of these courts is damaging.       
 
For the FJR, ‗delay‘ was the first and foremost problem, to which it either subordinates others 
or cites them as contributors to delay.
31
 However, this is an inadequate basis for analysis. 
Lengthy processes reflect a rationing of resources because there is no agreement for 
investment in the system. Conversely, one could predict that unlimited resources would 
indulge more scope for delay, but most delay at present is caused by inactivity and waiting, 
not generated by over-activity. Either way, an objective that engages public support and 
investment cannot be based on opaque or obsolete policies. If the courts cannot fully escape 
from the series of conceptual boundaries that have perpetuated throughout the courts‘ history, 
at least acknowledging them would be a step toward rational policies. 
 
The FJR also identified the use of adjudication rather than other forms of dispute resolution 
as problematic. This is a more complex claim because it may contribute to delay but has other 
features which are pursued in Chapter Seven. It will be shown that this theme that family 
matters are by their nature unsuited to a court process has recurred throughout the 
development of family courts, with an accompanying assumption that taking responsibility 
for resolving these privately, through some form of alternative dispute resolution must be 
better.
32
 But how ‗private‘ is mediation when it is an enforced, not voluntary, process? And 
how can it fulfil the protective functions of the law, described below? It will be argued that 
the very fact that it is presented as a cost-saving exercise undermines its legitimacy. 
 
Secondly, the most loudly declared complaint in the 2000s has been that family courts 
operate in secret, in denial of principles of open justice. This issue was excluded from the 
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remit of the FJR but was examined by the Parliamentary inquiry. It is usually presented as 
another polarisation – between ‗secrecy‘ and ‗openness‘.  
 
I therefore want to follow two key questions: How did courts become the ‗wrong‘ place‘ for 
family cases? Why are courts ‗secret‘ and should they be open?  I will examine how these 
questions arose, alternatives that have been proposed and whether analysis of the relevant 
history and the way alternatives were produced can help us to evaluate the options.  
 
The thesis suggests that if these complaints about process were resolved, then, arguably, 
issues such as delay could also be remedied because the public, being confident in a 
legitimate court system, would accept sufficient resources being applied to it. Although 
complaints of miscarriages of justice and gender bias may never disappear a system that 
enjoyed stronger public support would be more resilient to these endemic to family policy. 
 
Concepts of public and private are highly relevant to both these questions. The objective to 
divert families from the court arena is usually couched in terms of their being enabled to 
make private decisions. However, we need to ask whether alternative processes are in truth 
more legitimate than a court and whether they will serve the public interest by achieving the 
best outcomes for children. With regard to secrecy, the nature of publicity and privacy must 
be addressed to ensure the public interest in protecting the privacy of individuals within 
legitimate processes. 
 
These two most pressing issues for family courts produce an interesting paradox: more 
privacy (in the sense of freedom from state control) for families who can be persuaded to 
come to their own agreements; less privacy (protection from the public gaze) for those who 
cannot.    
 
METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
 
It is suggested here that the two issues of the drive to avoid proceedings and allegations of 
secrecy both stem from a lack of legitimacy. I will argue that they can be addressed by 
examining the ways in which categorising aspects of family courts as either public or private 
have distracted us from coherent policy and practice. The theoretical framework is set out in 
Chapter Two.   
11 
 
 
Awareness of our place in history is essential to an understanding of social problems.
33
 A 
study of family courts in the 21st century should be informed by an understanding of the 
historical context. When social policy emerged with welfare state provision in the 1940s, the 
only explicit connection to family courts was the provision of legal aid, which enabled the 
divorce rate to escalate. There is however an earlier link between social policy and the family 
courts, from the poor laws of the 17th century and the origins of the magistrates courts‘ 
family jurisdiction in the 19th
 
century.
34
  The National Assistance Act 1948, replacing the 
poor laws, formed a new relationship between citizen and state. Since the late 1970s, 
successive UK governments have pursued policies of reducing direct state control of most 
institutions, by ‗rolling back the welfare state‘.35 The present government shows little sign of 
conceding its plans to remove legal aid from large proportions of the population and, more 
widely, reducing welfare benefits.
36
 Social policy is therefore now more about rationing than 
provision.    
 
The development of the court system will be set out in two sections, before and since the 
1940s. Chapter Three explains the legacy that had to be adapted to the new relationship 
between citizen and state. Chapter Four relates the courts to social policy and the ideological 
and economic reasons for the move toward alternatives to court. Court systems inherited from 
the pre-war period, hardly changed since the mid 19th century, were not adapting to social 
change, and by the late 1960s the call for a unified specialist family court was strong.
37
 The 
Finer Report, published in 1974, explains how the dual jurisdiction based on courts‘ pre-war 
functions, was failing.
38
 This dichotomy stemmed from the different functions of a High 
Court with divorce jurisdiction, and the magistrates courts which dealt with crime and 
destitution.     
 
This will be followed by a comparative case study of the family courts in Australia in Chapter 
Five. Aspects of the Australian system have been cited as worthy of emulation, often 
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uncritically, over the past 35 years. A radical community-based model, which appears to have 
potential to remove parental disputes from courts to a better-received system, has recently 
been introduced. However, the Australian courts perpetuate a public/private structural 
division with greater disparity than English courts between dispute resolution and protection. 
The similar legal culture between the two countries make this a valid comparative study: 
there are differences in institutions, but values and systems inherited from a shared history 
mean that patterns of social behaviour relating to the law are recognisable in both the UK and 
Australia. Issues of openness and formality have also figured in the history of Australian 
courts, so it is useful to consider these in a comparative context. In 2011 both the FJR and the 
Parliamentary Committee were greatly assisted by evidence from Australia about the 
unintended consequences of parts of the Family Law (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 
2006.
39
 Subsequently, it appears that even this evidence has failed to get  the two reports 
taken seriously by media and politicians obsessed by ‗shared parenting‘ and thus it becomes 
even more important to follow the outcomes in Australia closely.         
 
Having set the courts‘ functions in their policy context, the argument will then move on to 
consider the problem of secrecy in Chapter Six. This is approached by examining the values 
and rights of secrecy, privacy, openness and transparency and how these relate to the law on 
privacy and publicity.  It will be seen here that theories of open communication to achieve an 
agreed understanding of law and policy can help explain why this problem has become 
intractable.    
 
Chapter Seven returns to the topic of court being ‗the wrong place‘, by pulling together the 
historical and current themes of informal justice and alternative dispute resolution. 
 
A range of sources from legal, social sciences, and philosophical disciplines has been 
reviewed for this thesis. The application of family law by the courts has to be seen in 
historical and sociological context, in order to arrive at an understanding and critical 
evaluation of the connections between law and social policy. Policy on both publicity in 
courts and on alternative dispute resolution has been subject to considerable change during 
the period this thesis was written (2004-2011), alongside an incremental conflation of public 
and private aspects of the work of family courts.   
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The theories of Jurgen Habermas (1929- ) help with the theoretical framework. As will be 
explained, the work of Habermas has not previously been used in socio-legal studies of 
decision-making about children. It is used here mainly in terms of his ideas about reaching 
agreement in the public sphere through undistorted communication. Habermas argues that 
institutions lose legitimacy if they are driven by systems of money and power to the extent 
that they lose touch with the values and norms of society. Legitimacy can be maintained if 
the rationale for systems is openly argued in the public sphere, with those who wish to 
contribute feeling they have an opportunity to fully participate, whatever their status.      
 
CURRENT FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY COURTS 
 
First, this Introduction will identify the current functions of the courts. If courts are ‗not 
working‘, then we need to know what they can be observed to be doing. Family law is of 
course more than law about children. I am looking only at decision making about children‘s 
future care, which has evolved to form a large part of the courts‘ work relatively recently. 
Decisions about financial support were largely transferred to an administrative body 20 years 
ago.
40
 
 
A function is an observable task or action. In social theory, the term describes a contribution 
to society by one of its constituent parts. So for example, a court could be observed to 
function either as a means of processing applications, or, ideally, as resolving disputes 
between individuals for the greater benefit of society.  In terms of functionalist theory, to be 
discussed in Chapter 2, Talcott Parsons saw all functions as empirically identifiable in terms 
of their effect on the integration of society. He analysed systems from the point of view of 
what they did, and how this contributed to the equilibrium of the greater system, that is, 
society as a whole.
41
 However, Robert Merton differentiated between ‗manifest‘ and ‗latent‘ 
functions, meaning respectively the surface and underlying nature of social actions. This 
concept distinguishes   motivation from objective consequences, some of the latter often 
being unintended.
42
 Therefore, the manifest function of a court is to process cases on behalf 
of parties, which may reach the outcome of a court order or other settlement. Simultaneously, 
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it performs a latent function of imposing norms of family life. Parsons would see the courts‘ 
functions in terms of their contribution to stabilising society, while Merton might identify a 
subjective intended function, in what participants believe they are doing, but attributing 
greater meaning to the objective consequences of social control.   
 
FUNCTIONS OF A COURT 
The manifest function of a civil court in our jurisdiction is applying the law to resolve 
disputes. Traditionally, this has been undertaken through adjudication, but increasingly 
through alternatives such as arbitration and conciliation. The English civil courts have seen 
substantial procedural reforms following the Woolf recommendations to avoid litigation 
where possible, reduce adversarialism and complexity of proceedings and enhance the role of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
43
 Similar ideas have existed for many years in family 
courts both here and Australia, as will be discussed.  
 
Thus, the court‘s functions have been modified since Roger Cotterrell cited comparative 
functional studies
44
 of judicial behaviour to produce a universal court model as: an impartial 
process, using legal doctrine to resolve disputes, with an independent judge applying pre-
existing norms after adversarial proceedings to achieve a decision that finds one party right 
and one wrong.
45
 These can be observed as manifest functions.  
 
Cotterrell drew on a wider synthesis of views of a court‘s functions as: legitimation of 
political authority and the rule of law; dispute processing (the five points listed above); 
developing legal doctrine to inform administration; and elaborating and maintaining 
ideology
46
 All but the second item in this list could be described as the court‘s latent 
functions. Cotterrell concluded that almost all writers on the sociology of law saw dispute 
resolution as central to the law‘s integrative function, and equated this with the function of 
the courts.
47
 He went on to argue, however, that only a small proportion of the court‘s work is 
active dispute resolution. Most court work is administrative processing and enforcement, with 
only a small number of cases reaching higher courts, and much bargaining going on ‗in the 
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shadow of the law‘.48 The court‘s adjudication function is only one facet of dispute 
resolution, and a great deal of regulation is going on throughout society in conscious or 
unconscious awareness of the existence of court processes, or ‗juridification‘ (as discussed in 
Chapter Two). 
  
Therefore, courts have a wider ideological function than dispute resolution. Rather than 
define courts by the explicit actions of judges, administrators or court users, Cotterrell 
suggested that they should be seen in terms of their contribution to the social and political 
progress of the state. Courts apply doctrine and maintain policy to regulate social order. Most 
litigated disputes are routinely processed through the lower courts, with no publicly declared 
judicial interpretation of the law. Despite this, he argued that they reaffirm shared 
understandings and publicly accepted definitions of the law, to maintain the stability of 
existing social and economic institutions and the equilibrium of the wider social system.
49
 
Therefore we can see that the courts are a sub-system that both validates and reflects social 
policy.  
 
As will be explored in Chapters Four and Seven, adversarialism is often described as unsuited 
to family disputes.
50
 The concept of parental responsibility, as introduced in legislation both 
here and in Australia, was an attempt to get away from the ‗winner takes all‘ outcome of 
custody and access disputes.
51
 However, mothers usually exercise more day-to-day 
responsibility for children than fathers do, for social and economic reasons, so this change in 
the law has failed to impose norms of shared, co-operative parenting, and some parents still 
resort to court. As will be discussed, ADR is promoted, but perhaps only underwritten by the 
symbolic power of the adjudicatory adversarial court.    
 
FUNCTIONS OF FAMILY COURTS  
Family courts‘ dispute resolution processes therefore rely on the normative behaviour of their 
actors, as much as on the body of ‗family law.‘ Applying a functionalist approach in 1978, 
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John Eekelaar
52
 suggested that the functions of family law were: adjusting to family 
breakdown; protection from family violence,
53
 and support for family life. 
 
John Dewar‘s critique of 1998 reflected the subsequent falling into disfavour of functionalist 
theories; taking a functionalist approach was interesting in the 1970s but might not be taken 
seriously twenty years later.
54
 Feminism and constructivism had exposed the conservatism of 
the functionalist model. This is exemplified by Fiona Williams‘ revision of social policy 
theory to pay attention to gender, race and class stratification.
55
  Dewar drew on Beck‘s ideas 
of fragmentation and contradiction to locate family law in a permanent state of chaos, 
although not crisis.
56
 As he put it: who is now in a position to describe or judge what the 
law‘s functions are?  So Dewar thinks it may have been acceptable, and even radical, for 
Eekelaar to describe these three functions of family law in the 1970s, but by the end of the 
20th century there were too many contradictions in ideas of family relations and how the law 
deals with them to analyse family law as an integrated system. In his second edition, Eekelaar 
does acknowledge that functionalism is open to criticism if it tries to turn empirical data into 
‗quasi biological truths.‘ However, he maintains that a functionalist framework that identifies 
the goals and objectives of laws must be valid in working toward an understanding of family 
law and policy, even if there are doubts about its application to the family as a social form.
57
 
Here, Eekelaar appears to be taking Merton‘s line on latent functions, examining the impact 
of policy on law, not just observing manifest functions that keep the processes moving. And 
we must acknowledge that Eekelaar was progressive in writing a book in the 1970s which 
promoted an argument for child-centred decision making in family law. 
 
Dewar, I think, was looking less at the relationship between law and policy (Eekelaar‘s aim) 
and more at the relationship between law and practice (Cotterrell‘s idea of routine 
administration). He acknowledged a distinction between the ‗chaos‘ of family law and the 
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‗stabilising practices‘ of its exponents.58 In other words, he separated substantive family law 
from law in action, whereas Eekelaar was trying to set law in a policy context.
59
 If Dewar 
identified functions of the courts through empirical observation of routine practice, this does 
not displace Eekelaar‘s three functions. Of course, Eekelaar‘s findings have been modified by 
events in the intervening years, such as the court‘s loss of a financial adjustment function 
when child support was transferred to an administrative process in the early 1990s.
60
  
 
Dewar argues that the inability of family law to guarantee certainty dissuades parties from 
exposing their position to public scrutiny (or at least to that of a judge). Thus, 
 
The task of the modern law is to set the tone for private ordering, or alternative 
dispute resolution, rather than to confer reasonable entitlements that one might expect 
to see enforced in a court of law.
61
   
 
In other words, the law has been adapted to recognise the ‗chaos‘ of family life, and rather 
than adjust, protect and support family members solely through actions in the court arena, 
family law provides a context in which individuals pursue a range of different avenues 
toward settlement.    
 
Uncertainty in the legal outcome is probably not the major disincentive to applying to court. 
The current furore around legislation aimed at minimising access to courts by excluding large 
numbers of people from access to legal aid indicates the extent to which the cost is 
inhibitory.
62
  Even in care cases where local authorities bear the brunt of expenditure, they 
are discouraged from using courts by statutory guidance.
63
 Reluctance to apply for care 
orders is still bolstered by resource restrictions even despite an increase in the rate of 
applications since 2008.
64
 Thus, courts are part of a family justice system which directs 
parties into a variety of methods of settlement. Although, symbolically, a ‗court‘ may still be 
a building in which a judge sits, dispensing justice, all the professionals linked to it are in the 
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odd position of having to ensure that the court‘s own participation in the process is kept to a 
minimum.
65
 However, this is not to say that layers of different professionals and 
bureaucracies, as described by Donzelot,
66
 are any less intrusive into family life than those 
within the court. Nevertheless, mediation is continually extolled as such.
67
 
 
In common with most Australian commentators on Anglo-Australian law, Dewar was writing 
in 1998 primarily on inter-parental disputes. He saw protection in English law as limited, 
because the Children Act 1989 ensures that children‘s welfare is only adjudicated on as a last 
resort, and thus ‗constructs law as harmful to children‘.68 Dewar claimed that the protective 
function of the law, noted by Eekelaar, is minimal because the law only intervenes when a 
risk indicator of parental conflict is presented in a private law case. (This is arguably no 
longer the case, as all adults in private law proceedings now have personal data about them 
scrutinised in pre-court safeguarding procedures.
69
) The law constructs a parent who is 
expected to be reasonable and mindful of others‘ interests, which minimises the need for 
law‘s powers to protect.70 However this follows ‗a logic of intervention/non-intervention that 
has more to do with the careful use of limited judicial resources than anything else.‘71 In 
other words, the law follows the economic imperative of the court system; the court does not 
serve the law.
72
 This fits exactly with Habermas‘ theory, discussed in Chapter Two, that 
systems created to serve society lose touch with that function when they are quantified in 
self-referential terms.            
 
Commenting on the increased diversion and delegalisation between 1998 and 2010, Dewar 
questions whether the state‘s withdrawal of courts in favour of a variety of other fora means 
that family law will cease to function, as the jurisprudence will fall away, with no provision 
for coherent and consistent interpretation of the law.
73
 However, presumably family law will 
still function for children of the wealthy. In public law, Welbourne raised concerns about a 
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move toward a two-tier system in care cases, with planning only for families in the most 
extreme situations coming within judicial scrutiny.
74
 One might now predict a split system 
with courts‘ functioning to make decisions about only the most and least financially 
advantaged children, replicating the historical distance between wardship and the poor laws.
75
   
 
Eekelaar‘s definitions of the functions of family law were reviewed by Dey and Wasoff in 
2006 as: protection; dispute resolution; regulation and guidance of conduct; and reflecting 
and creating public norms for private relationships.
 76
  His adjustive and supportive functions, 
according legal status and re-ordering relationships and enabling families to adapt to change, 
can be seen as a framework for dispute resolution, as well as regulation. The fourth function 
underlies the first three and, according to Dey and Wasoff, relies on a high degree of 
consensus in social attitudes. This need for consensus chimes with Habermas‘ theory that 
common understanding can be reached when individuals collaboratively interpret and define 
their situation through communicative rationality.
77
  The danger is that it is not always easy to 
know if the law is the moral compass of the community or just a means of controlling 
behaviour.
78
 Eekelaar‘s own later work argues strongly against using family law to impose 
approved behaviour.
79
 The thesis argues that these dangers can be guarded against when 
policies relating public norms to private relationships are more likely to be accepted because 
of the degree of transparency and extent of participation in their formulation. Only then is it 
right for them to be enforced by a court.
80
 
 
With reference to Cotterrell‘s manifest court functions,81 a family court would need to be 
seen objectively as impartial, with an independent judge, to be accepted as legitimate. The 
other elements in his list are less applicable. The adversarial approach is discouraged and 
application of legal doctrine may also be scarce. A winner-loser outcome is often 
inappropriate where family members, or families and agencies, need to work together in the 
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future. Even contact with the independent judge and his or her view of normative behaviour 
is being replaced by contact with social work professionals.
82
  
 
Dispute resolution is arguably a purpose for a court, rather than an observable function. It is 
more accurate to describe the function as dispute processing. The outcomes of the process 
might be agreement or adjudication within an adversarial framework. The court also has a 
latent function here as an influence on the decisions made by disputants who stop short of 
going to court – fearing the potential outcomes, delay, or cost.83 Whether the arrangements 
that ensue are truly a resolution is open to question. Although family courts have been driven 
by a settlement culture for many years, settlement is not synonymous with resolution.
84
 
Short-term resolution to address risk with protective action, such as a non-molestation or 
emergency protection order, may be achieved by a court, but the exercise of this protective 
function is easier to identify than long-term resolution. 
 
One function of family law is to protect, but the mere existence of family law cannot protect 
rights and welfare of family members; this requires a mechanism that assures that protection. 
In the worst cases, protection is obtained through the criminal courts, but family courts 
routinely make orders intended to protect individuals, at least in the short term. These include 
remedies for domestic violence and asserting rights to safely occupy the family home.
85
 
Public law cases are always about protection, although dispute resolution regarding care 
plans is also negotiated.
86
 Somewhat confusingly, the courts‘ social work advisory service, 
Cafcass, now sees itself as primarily a child protection agency in private law,
87
 while 
reducing its input in public law cases.
88
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 Nevertheless, courts do have both private and public functions in a wider sense. When the 
court applies the law to the cases before it, this reaffirms the legitimacy of policies that will 
apply more generally across the population, supporting their ideological basis. In this way, 
courts, as agencies of the state, are regulating both the private outcome for the family and the 
public outcome of a result to accord with society‘s expectations.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that the courts‘ manifest functions relate to private lives in 
dispute processing and protection, and their latent, public, function to integrate policy. This 
analysis can be applied to particular examples, as in Smart‘s description of the idealised post-
separation family, where the private dispute is resolved in the context of the public need to 
reproduce the intact family into a post-divorce family form.
89
 In another example, where a 
court enforces a contact order against a parent, the action confirms policies that promote post-
separation contact.  However, there is a high incidence of risk to individuals in this type of 
case.
90
 This raises a question as to whether the desirability to be seen to promote contact (for 
the public good) jeopardises private safety. The potential conflicts between resolution and 
protection lie at the heart of the ambiguity of the family courts.   
 
Lawyers’ views  
Practising lawyers rarely adopt an adversarial position in cases about children.
91
 In 2003, Mr 
Justice Wilson (as he then was) produced a list of the functions of the family court,  including 
the ‗conventional‘ forensic exercise (reflecting Cotterrell‘s description) but emphasising 11 
extra dimensions when deciding cases about the future of children, such as educating parents 
and allowing family members who are ‗losers‘ to feel they have been heard. He concluded 
that the family court had a quasi-therapeutic role.
92
 His detailed breakdown of characteristics 
of a proactive inquisitorial judicial model clearly reflects the latent function of incorporating 
social policy, but his attention to respect for the welfare as well as rights of individual family 
members, and his exhaustive list, appear unfashionable in the light of the recommendations 
by the FJR for ADR and time limited adjudication.
93
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More recently, in the context of increased pressure on resources, some members of the 
judiciary appear to be withdrawing from this interventionist model. In 2008, Mr Justice 
Ryder listed the functions of family courts as: protecting individual freedoms and rights; 
righting wrongs perpetrated against the individual; protecting the most vulnerable and 
making decisions relating to family life ‗by reference to the established or developing legal 
policy.‘94 
 
This suggests an even closer relationship between courts and policy, with courts having to 
take on board policies while they are still being formulated. In another speech a few months 
later, he explicitly described courts as representing state intervention in family life in three 
‗distinct‘ types of case: public law proceedings where the state is mandated to protect 
children by taking them into care; ‗public interest‘ proceedings for declaration of status such 
as a divorce decree; and private law proceedings between parents ‗where the state voluntarily 
intervenes in the guise of the court or occasionally a welfare agency, and at the request of one 
or both parties, to determine disputes which cannot be resolved by the individuals 
themselves.‘95  
 
These may be different types of procedural applications, but they are not distinct from each 
other as they all relate to the ‗established and developing legal policy‘ he mentioned earlier. 
In the third category, the state may have initially intervened at the request of a party, but the 
court then acquires a duty to safeguard children.
96
 However Ryder J wants the state to 
withdraw the courts from the third category, because this would promote individual 
autonomy. Such a proposal, ignoring the court‘s protective function, surely contradicts his 
earlier claims that courts ‗right wrongs‘. Ryder J has now been appointed as ‗Judge in Charge 
of the Modernisation of Family Justice‘ within an administrative committee, the Family 
Business Authority. His First Update
97
 in response to the FJR deals with compliance and 
management of resources. It contains no reference to functions.  
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Writing in Family Law a few months later than Wilson J, Cretney doubted that even such a 
non-adversarial approach countered the fact that courts were inappropriately involved in 
family relationships. He acknowledged that practice in family courts served a conciliation 
and possibly therapeutic function, but felt this failed to address the common perception of 
courts‘ association with crime and punishment: ‗Statute provides that the courts‘ defining 
function is to deploy the coercive power of the state.‘98 
 
It can be argued that coercion is no more a defining function of a court than of any other state 
body. One can see Cretney‘s point about a disparity between the personal nature of 
relationship breakdown and a law-enforcement institution but, as Habermas points out, even 
democratic societies depend on our routine interaction with institutions that exercise state 
power.
99
 Citizens‘ acceptance of the legitimacy of state power involves compromise and 
exchange, meaning that we view state agencies (including courts) as coercive only inasmuch 
as we want them to maintain social order. Habermas sees a danger in this leading to passivity 
and therefore welcomes social movements in resistance. The point here is that all the state‘s 
agencies are part of systems of regulation, and out-sourcing dispute resolution from the courts 
to other processes does not mean a loss of coercive power.
100
 Ultimately, as Lord Neuberger 
reminds us, although the courts are part of the state,   civil justice is not a service, in the same 
way as the NHS, but is part of the judicial branch of the constitutional separation of powers 
and can therefore never become completely replaced by mediation.
101
   
 
If one could redesign the system overnight, it would be logical to process both marriage/civil 
partnership and dissolution in a Registry Office. However, a function akin to the present 
family court in processing disputes about children, where the coercive element was 
unavoidable, would still be required. Cretney marginalises the courts‘ protective function in 
this short article, assuming that parents are the best judges of their children‘s welfare. He 
wrote this in the context of lawyers‘ frustration with the government‘s decision to abandon 
no-fault divorce in 2000. It is interesting that his objections to a court-based dispute 
resolution process were based on a dissonance between the perception in the public sphere of 
                                                 
98
 S Cretney, 'Private ordering and divorce. How far can we go?' (2003) 33 Family Law 399, repeated in 
‗Conciliation, Reconciliation and Mediation: The Historical Context‘ in J Westcott (ed) Family Mediation: Past 
present and Future (Jordans, Bristol 2004) 
99
 J Sitton, Habermas and Contemporary Society (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2003) 76-77 
100
 J Crowe and R Field, ‗The Problem of Legitimacy in Mediation‘ (2007) Contemporary Issues in Law 48-60  
101
 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury MR ‗Has mediation had its day?‘ The Gordon Slynn Memorial Lecture, 16 
November 2010 
24 
 
adult relationship breakdown as a private tragedy and a court as a place of punishment. 
Although it may appear that Ryder J follows a similar theme, he is basing his argument on 
economic necessity, not moral autonomy.              
 
A more compelling argument about coercion belying respect for family privacy was made by 
Day Sclater and Piper, who called the courts‘ power to imprison mothers in contact disputes 
an ‗explicitly coercive strategy‘ pursued within the ideology that children‘s interests are best 
served by having contact with both parents.
102
 They argued that although courts may rarely 
threaten or impose imprisonment in these circumstances, their power to do so reinforces their 
function in maintaining this particular policy.
 
This contradicts the courts‘ protective function 
and resonates today in the light of enforcement provisions in the Children and Adoption Act 
2006. These provisions are held out as coercing reluctant mothers into allowing contact, not 
reluctant fathers into maintaining contact. The power of the judge to punish is surely more 
visible here than in granting a divorce decree. The test would be whether parents see judicial 
power as more than symbolic. 
 
Mr Justice Ryder‘s task to modernise the system was set by the President of the Family 
Division, Sir Nicholas Wall. The contemporary judicial view may therefore be sought in the 
President‘s recent speech on case management.103 He emphasises the limitations placed by 
the rules of evidence on an inquisitorial approach and that the function of removing a child 
from their parents into state care or adoption can only be a judicial one. He rejects the FJR 
recommendation for a new Family Justice Service and instead suggests that an administrative 
committee within the court service can assume responsibility for the ‗operational functions 
listed in the FJR‘.104 These include the social work advisory services provided by Cafcass 
and, in due course, mediation; expert witnesses and children‘s representation. The function of 
judge as independent arbiter is now combined with that of case manager. This emphasis on 
throughput supports my contention that the court‘s function is dispute processing rather than 
dispute resolution.                
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Courts users’ views  
The President observes in his November 2011 speech that family courts are ‗quasi-
inquisitorial‘.105 However, the image painted in an Australian policy document, Finding a 
Better Way: A bold departure from the traditional common law approach to the conduct of 
legal proceedings,
106
 is of a traditional adversarial court (from which the Australian court is 
now claimed to be breaking away) where the judge weighs up the quality of untrammelled 
legal argument. A polarised ‗winner-loser‘ scenario may well exacerbate feelings of 
powerlessness against the state machine that has condoned injustice. In this sense, the ‗loser‘ 
may not accept the court as legitimate. In care proceedings, the likelihood of a parent 
‗winning‘ is remote; cases are almost always brought to court at a stage when all prospects of 
parental care have failed.
107
 Parents here are very likely to feel punished and alienated by a 
perceived collusion of state agencies.
108
 Recent research suggests that lawyers have an 
essential function in enabling parents to accept that the outcome is fair.
109
 In private law 
cases, parents can become exhausted with the system or run out of money before reaching an 
adjudicated outcome, so may still feel aggrieved after what is may appear as a settlement.
110
  
 
The small proportion of separating parents
111
 who come to court may not be Dewar‘s 
‗reasonable‘ parents,112 and those in child protection proceedings tend to have multiple 
problems.
113
 It falls to the court to persist in maintaining the construct of the reasonable 
parent until a point where coercive measures are the only option. Alternatively, parties may 
feel that a court should function to enforce reasonable entitlements. Disappointment when it 
does not, leads to a loss of legitimacy.
114
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The Ministry of Justice has published statistics that state that between 37% and 47% of court 
users (including professionals) in child and family cases in 2009-2010 were ‗very satisfied‘ 
with their experience.
115
 Empirical research on parents‘ and children‘s experiences of court is 
limited. A recent comprehensive review of parents‘ perspectives on their experiences in court 
found that a general response of feeling traumatised and alienated by family court 
proceedings and the associated agencies was not necessarily ameliorated by the use of 
conciliation processes. However it was notable that poor experiences of the process were not 
always linked to ‗losing‘ the case. The court environment was simply experienced as formal 
and forbidding, and some parents did not accept the legitimacy of the local authority and/or 
the pervading settlement culture.
116
     
 
There are a number of campaigns claiming that family courts are inherently dysfunctional, 
rather than just taking place in unsuitable buildings. Some of these claims are driven by 
aggrieved individuals, but there is a certain amount of bandwagon-jumping by politicians and 
the media. In particular, coverage of the fathers‘ rights movement has had a significant 
impact on the law.
117
 As Smart points out, it is currently difficult to identify a genuinely 
positive shift on fatherhood amidst the problematic patriarchal attitudes toward women and 
children expressed in this movement.
118
  As will be shown in Chapter Six, changes in the law 
regarding media access have been almost entirely attributable to a small number of 
campaigners, rather than the number of court users they represent.   
 
In the absence of hard data, it is difficult to argue against claims that public confidence in the 
family court system in England and Wales is low, especially as these are promulgated in the 
Ministry‘s own publications.119 ‗Secrecy‘ and the inappropriateness of the court as a venue 
are complaints that get considerable exposure as reasons that flawed decision making 
flourishes. In the following chapters I will show that throughout history the interface between 
family members and the courts is subject to processes that have grown, not through 
                                                 
115
 HM Courts Service, Court User Survey 2009-2010 Statistics Bulletin  (Ministry of Justice, 2010) 15 
116
 J Hunt,  Parental Perspectives on the Family Justice System in England and Wales: a review of research 
(Family Justice Council, London 2010) 
117
 R Collier, ‗ ―The Outlaw Fathers Fight Back‖: Fathers‘ Rights Groups, Fathers 4 Justice and the Politics of 
Family Law Reform – Reflections on the UK Experience‘ in R Collier and S Sheldon (eds) Fathers’ Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart, Oxford 2006)   
118
 C Smart, ‗The Ethic of Justice Strikes Back: Changing Narratives of Fatherhood‘ in A Diduck and K 
O‘Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London 2006), 136 
119
 See for example, Department for Constitutional Affairs, Confidence and confidentiality: Improving 
transparency and privacy in family courts (CP 11/06, 2006) discussed in Chapter Six.  
27 
 
engagement with informed public opinion and societal values, but from distorted 
communication. The discourse is too often dominated by the forces of money and power. 
This lack of consensus on the functions of the courts means that the wider issue of delay, 
identified by the FJR as so central to the crisis in the system, and which is primarily resource-
based, has little chance of resolution, as public support for expenditure will not be 
forthcoming.  
 
Policy views  
The most worrying current example of distorted communication is the way in which all 
rational arguments made against the removal of legal aid from vulnerable people are batted 
away by a political claim that the country cannot afford it.
120
 This sabotages any chance of 
arriving at a fully-informed policy.  
 
Unlike the Australian court,
121
 the family court system here has not always been subject to 
opprobrium. In the 1970s, the Finer Committee attributed all problems to the operation of 
magistrates courts, specifically commenting that it had received no evidence of complaints 
from other levels of court, apart from the expense of lawyers.
122
 The fathers‘ rights 
movement had not materialised; the mother was valued as the primary carer. Institutions were 
less subject to demands for transparency of process. Wider unpopularity has been articulated 
over the last 40 years and this debate in the public sphere indicates social problems to which 
we expect the state to respond. Changes in the lifeworld necessitate adaptation of systems. 
Increasingly, this has taken the form of deflecting disputes from court. The UK may have had 
explicit family policies since 1997 but statements emanating from the Ministry of Justice and 
its predecessors consistently marginalise the role of courts in settling family disputes.
123
 
There is no statement on the functions of family courts available on the websites of the 
Ministry of Justice or its agency, HM Courts and Tribunal Service. The government 
information portal, ‗directgov‘, rather than describing what family courts do, provides links 
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to several advice resources such as ADR, guidance on completing a divorce petition and so 
on.
124
 
 
Neither does the Family Justice Council website
125
 define the courts‘ functions but states that 
the aims of the family justice system are: (1) to provide ways to resolve family disputes and 
(2) to protect family members, in accordance with three principles: children's welfare; justice 
and fairness; and respect for human rights. The FJR report also consciously addresses the 
family justice system rather than identifying specific functions for courts.
126
 Similarly, the 
latest Parliamentary Committee enquiry, despite being entitled: ‗Operation of the Family 
Courts‘ begins its report with analysis of the family justice system.127 This reflects the inter-
disciplinarity identified by Murch and Hooper in 1992,
128
 and ensures that the relationships 
between law and social policy are integral to the debate.  
 
It will disappoint some, therefore, to now find the recommendations from the FJR being 
referred to a committee of lawyers and civil servants.
129
 At the same time, Cafcass is 
publicising the way it has extended its remit in private law from advising the court into one of 
wholesale child protection.
130
 It therefore seems that the historical tensions between law and 
social work described in this thesis are due to return.         
 
However, the FJR concludes that the system is so haphazard as to ‗not be a system at all‘131 
and the Committee complains that its primary difficulty was to ‗form a clear picture of trends 
and changes‘ and that government has disappointingly had no ‗robust evidence base for the 
formulation of policy‘ for the past 15 years.132 The Committee reported in July 2011, 
welcoming the FJR interim report, in anticipation of the FJR final report. Rather than address 
the Committee‘s conclusions and recommendations, Government merely responded that the 
outcome of the FJR was awaited.    
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The FJR emphasises the protective function of the courts in both public and private law 
through recommendations, on the one hand, to ensure that children‘s and adults‘ voices are 
heard in decision making and, on the other, to enable and encourage out-of-court 
resolution.
133
 Unsurprisingly, it fails to synthesise these aims by explaining how the courts‘ 
protective function can be enforced by mediation providers in the private and voluntary 
sectors. At the time of writing, the government is yet to publish its formal response to the 
FJR, but its recommendations have already been undermined by the drastic reductions in 
access to legal aid in family cases already referred to. Whatever the government thinks the 
courts do, it could hardly be clearer that it believes that their role must be minimised.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
One clear function of family courts is that they process disputes. Other functions are not easy 
to specify, and as Dewar asked: who is qualified to tell us?
134
  A synthesis of the views 
outlined here suggests that family courts‘ functions regarding children incorporate public and 
private interests by: 
1. Processing disputes 
2. Making orders to protect vulnerable individuals 
3. Influencing the behaviour of the wider community  
4. Implementing social policy  
 
Despite continual rhetoric by politicians about the need to dissuade people from litigation, it 
is evident that the court has long been the forum of last resort, not only for resolving parental 
disputes, but also for child protection.
135
 Unfortunately, it is now impossible to separate the 
potential that ADR may hold for improving personal experiences or outcomes for families 
from the overwhelming message that it saves money. Values and norms have been colonised 
by the economic imperative. It is one thing to be stigmatised as deviant by resorting to court 
in a society where this is not deemed necessary for the ‗reasonable parent‘, but another when 
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the path to court is cut off for blatantly systemic reasons, namely reducing access to 
professional legal representation and to judges‘ time.    
 
Accepting a failure in parenting and handing over a decision to a court may feel unnatural 
but, once this happens, systems that are seen as attempting to reach a decision in the child‘s 
best interests, that a ‗reasonable‘ parent would want, might  meet expectations. In order for 
these systems to work, they must be based on policies formulated from principles and value 
commitments.
136
 This applies equally to families caught up in private law and public law 
cases. Despite an increase in the rate of care applications since Welbourne‘s analysis in 
2008,
137
 it is pressure on local authorities‘ budgets that dominate their policies, rather than 
principles of non-intervention.
138
   
 
Family courts are part of the state apparatus that implements social policy to address 
perceived failures in parenting, but very much as a last resort. Parties who expect the court to 
adjudicate on who is right and wrong may be disappointed in their search for justice. This 
thesis argues that, when opportunities exist for the implications of private decisions to be 
brought into the public sphere for debate, there is more likelihood of broad agreement on the 
values of family life than when families are denied access to legal remedies. If the court‘s 
interpretation of family life does not resonate with court users and commentators, courts will 
struggle to have their decisions accepted as legitimate, because of the appearance that these 
decisions serve the system rather than families. The danger is that we are becoming aware 
that our chances of getting anywhere near the dispute processing function of a court depend 
on the system only. Access to justice is something we are told we cannot afford, despite 
serious doubts as to whether the new legal aid budget will actually reduce public 
expenditure.
139
 At this stage, the impact of changes in family courts on children cannot be 
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isolated from the wider picture of removing legal aid in areas such as education; welfare 
benefits; immigration; and clinical negligence.
140
 
 
There is therefore vocal opposition to the current legal aid changes, but insufficient 
groundswell to support existing systems in family courts. The common complaints made 
about courts are that they take too long to decide cases and decide them in the wrong way. 
These faults are attributed to under-resourcing, gender bias, secret professional agendas or to 
the claim that courts are just ‗the wrong place‘. Under–resourcing and gender are of course 
major issues for family justice, but I examine these here only when money and power 
relations are the real driving forces behind policies and rhetoric that are dressed up as being 
‗good for families‘. I look at ‗secret courts‘ and ADR to ask these questions: would courts 
have greater legitimacy if proceedings were better publicised, or if their sphere of activity 
was reduced by a further shift from adjudication to alternative non-legal models?  This of 
course raises new concerns about how secretive or open out-of-court processes will be. Even 
if courts were not ‗secret‘ and most matters were openly resolved elsewhere, would new 
complaints emerge, because economic and gender politics will continue to skew the discourse 
and prevent adequate resourcing and communication? The way the comprehensive FJR and 
Parliamentary Committee reports have been received by the media and politicians is not 
promising. Complaints that courts are secretive and the wrong forum may be symptoms of 
the loss of legitimacy, rather than the cause. 
 
The thesis therefore seeks to examine how we have arrived at this position and what other 
options might be available. This will be done by tracing the courts‘ historical development, 
their inter-action with social policy, and comparing them to the courts in Australia. Our 
family justice system has grown through a series of dualities; more are emerging and it is 
probably impossible for a democratic society to arrive at fixed decisions on the extent to 
which private family relationships should be brought into the public sphere. But this thesis 
will show how applying Habermas‘ theories to the analysis of the key perceived problems of 
‗secrecy‘ and adversarialism of the family courts, supports the argument that policies reached 
though open and rational communication have more chance of being accepted than those 
driven by political expediency and economic motives. 
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SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF FAMILY COURTS  
 
Complaints are made about the operation of all types of court. Dissatisfaction with the 
outcome of an individual case or, more objectively, beliefs that courts are resource-starved 
can occur throughout the civil and criminal justice systems.
1
 There is a separate set of 
complaints made about family courts because of their particular functions. In the 
Introduction, it was concluded that the manifest functions of family courts are (1) to process 
disputes and (2) to protect individual family members. If the traditional adjudication model 
produces a ‗loser‘, then a substantial proportion of court users may be discontented. 
However, the extent to which ADR produces a higher satisfaction rate is arguable.
2
 
Something beyond the inevitable dissatisfaction and need for more investment in public 
services signifies a social problem. The high profile of allegations of secrecy, and the 
constant drive for ADR, are symptoms that the family court system has become pathologised. 
 
In contemporary democracies, any public expenditure has to be justified by policy, so a more 
focused investigation is needed as to what might underlie under-resourcing of family courts. 
If social policy relating to family courts could be settled and prioritised, an economic solution 
would be sought and more resources would be applied to fulfil it. The Family Justice Council 
may say that the system follows principles of welfare, fairness and rights,
3
 but in the absence 
of public consensus on how courts should achieve these, it is impossible to justify a higher 
level of expenditure. Why then, is there so much disagreement about what family courts 
should do?  
 
We can look to social theory to attempt to answer this question. The task of social theory is to 
explain how a society is organised, its historical context, and how its people form their 
identity.
4
 The characteristics of family justice reflect the importance society has attached to 
family life in different periods. Classical theorists such as Weber saw modernity as the age 
when individuals in Western society began to seek to interact with society to form a self-
awareness of identity. Our expectations of family justice therefore now differ greatly from the 
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period when the Church exercised control over legitimacy of family life and the relevant law. 
Regulation of the family is and always has been a means of social control, whether by Church 
or State. Weber and Marx saw the power of legal institutions as a form of domination, 
whereas post-Marxist and critical theorists such as Gramsci and Althusser saw them as a 
more covert form of coercion by the dominant classes. Foucault‘s ideas on the historical 
transformation of power relations are often deployed in attempts to analyse power relations 
between the state and family life, extended by Donzelot to the juridification of families. As 
has already been mentioned, Parsons analysed social structures, including the family, as 
functioning sub-systems, but the work of Beck, Bauman, Giddens, Parton and Smart saw 
systems as fragmented.  All these theorists have something to offer in answering questions 
about family courts. Despite the contribution of postmodernists, the discourse is still 
dominated by the language of public and private. This chapter will explain why the work of 
Habermas is particularly helpful in studying the way such dualities emerge.  
 
HABERMAS’ CRITICAL THEORY 
 
Habermas has produced a large amount of wide-ranging and densely-written work, which has 
generated an enormous range of responses, most often in the context of political theory.
5
 He 
has built on the work of earlier theorists to develop his ideas on the legitimacy of the post-
welfare state. He takes issue with post-modernism, calling modernity an unfinished project. 
However, he believes Western society faces a crisis because of the failure of the welfare state 
to address the inequalities of capitalism.   
 
The purpose of his early work was to explain late capitalism in western Europe from the 
viewpoint of critical theory, but he took a less fatalistic approach than the original Frankfurt 
school of Marxist theorists such as Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.  He returned to 
Weber‘s description of the secularisation of society and separation of the traditional and 
religious from the increasing influence of science and accounting, leading to an instrumental 
rationalisation of society. Weber saw law as becoming professionalised and value-free as it 
separated itself from morality (reflected in the loss of Church governance of the courts).  
Habermas believes that if rationality can be contained within its system boundaries, then 
progress from a primitive society regulated by myth to differentiation of our subjective, 
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objective and social worlds is an emancipation, not a threat. In this way, his work is useful 
when examining the history of the courts and of social policy. 
 
The title of a later work, Between Facts and Norms, reflects Habermas‘s view that while the 
‗fact‘ (the effectiveness) of law is a functioning system enforced by the state, it is only valid 
if it is ethically justified, coming from an accepted idea. As he expresses it, law‘s validity 
depends on ideas and values which give law capacity to make claims based on reasoned 
judgment.
6
    
 
Habermas‘ only direct reference to family law is an example of ‗juridification‘ by which the 
law extends into family arrangements and education to an extent that pathologises relations. 
He defined juridification in early work as the expansion of the law into formerly unregulated 
social matters.
7
 He later modified this position, in response to feminist critiques, recognising 
that law can assist women and children.
8
 Not all parts of his original argument stand up 
today, but they are reflected in the popular theories of Foucault and Donzelot on 
therapeutocracy, which have influenced a number of writers on state intervention and family 
law.
9
 Habermas complained that the replacement of the judge by the social worker is 
therapeutocracy and feels no more acceptable to us than being subject to positivist law.  
 
Habermas first attempted to explain late western capitalist society from the position of 
Marxism and critical theory. This led him to explore the nature of the welfare state and what 
was causing conflict and crisis.  Although he attributed the loss of freedom and loss of 
meaning experienced in modern society to the rationalisation of religion and the advance of 
science and bureaucracy, he distinguished Weber‘s concept of purposive rationality by 
separating instrumental from communicative rationality. He embraced the emancipating 
effects of science and technology. He went on to re-work Parsons‘ functionalist theories to 
explain differentiated structures in the sense of constant movement in a struggle to maintain 
stability. Like Durkheim, Parsons and Habermas both saw society as an organic solidarity. 
However, Parsons was concerned with social order, Habermas with legitimacy in the sense of 
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citizens experiencing institutions as just, working in their best interests and deserving of 
loyalty.
10
 The formulation and implementation of social policy can be then be legitimated. 
 
Parsons was one of the most dominant post-war theorists; he sought to explain the stability of 
social systems in terms of homeostasis, or maintaining equilibrium.  This model has 
subsequently been applied to court systems,
11
 and by Parsons himself to families. It has also 
been subject to considerable criticism of its conservativism, by post-Marxists and feminists.
12
 
Unsurprisingly, Parsons‘ concept of the family as a functioning system with assigned gender 
and age specific roles has been widely rejected.  For example, Morgan argued that the 
struggles family members experience while they develop identities both within and outside 
the modern family could be termed ‗contradictions‘ not ‗dysfunctions‘. Contradictions are 
built-in, a better description of the experience of continuous affirmation and negation, 
whereas a dysfunction connotes a pathogen that is to be removed. Contradictions are 
dynamic, indicative of change and development. They may not always be manifested as 
conflicts.
13
 Similarly, in other systems, contradictions can drive adaptation and growth as 
well as conflicts.  
 
Habermas also tried to map integrative functions, but rather than confine these to stabilising 
functions, he used a theory of communicative rationality to examine discourse.
14
 Parsons did 
not question the status quo. In contrast, Habermas does not follow a functional analysis in 
pursuit of equilibrium, but acknowledges instabilities that can lead to breakdown and crises in 
society. He disagrees with systems theory developed by Luhman from Parsons, that society 
breaks down only because structures stop functioning in objective self-referential systems; for 
Habermas a crisis in systems is accompanied by a subjective loss of value and freedom.
15
  
 
Habermas shows that the public/private distinction is a moveable construct, and the 
terminology conflates separate meanings. One way in which his theories assist is that he drew 
another distinction, between lifeworld and systems. The lifeworld is a philosophical concept 
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developed by Husserl in the 1930s, and refers to a shared unarticulated understanding of 
everyday life.
16
 The lifeworld consists of traditions, values and beliefs, which are latent or 
unsaid. Social integration is achieved in the lifeworld through people‘s experience of 
themselves and their relationships to each other.
17
 It has its origins in primitive belief and 
religion. In modernity, this common understanding has become dependent on social systems 
of the economy, controlled by money, and of administration, controlled by power. In other 
words, the lifeworld is supported by the system, not subservient to it. This system is needed 
to maintain a cohesive society but only exists as interdependent with the lifeworld.
18
  
 
Discussion of levels of state intervention are often expressed in terms of public and private, 
but for Habermas, the extent of state and economic intervention into both our public and 
private lives must be justified by a democratic communicative process that is anchored in 
value commitments in the lifeworld. Communication is the core integrative function of 
society, but has become increasingly disabled and distorted.
19
  
 
Although he describes his own work as empirical, Habermas‘s writing tends to be highly 
abstract. The concept of the lifeworld can appear hopelessly reactionary and incompatible 
with globalisation and individualisation. His work has been subject to critique, dialogue and 
subsequent revision, often in response to feminist commentaries. Nancy Fraser has been 
described as having ‗… done perhaps more than any other to open up productive lines of 
enquiry‘ on Habermas‘s work.20 Although both The Theory of Communicative Action and a 
later work, Between Facts and Norms, consider the law in relation to lifeworld and systems, 
direct references to family law and policy are few, and his ideas do not commonly appear in 
studies on these subjects.
21
 Habermas‘ theories about the public and private spheres; 
juridification; communication; and the inherent conflicts of the welfare state, may not appear 
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immediately attractive to the family lawyer. However, the following will inform the 
arguments about functions of family courts:  
 
1. The relationship between the public and private spheres and the state 
2. How the welfare state and its institutions attain or lose legitimacy 
3. The theory of communicative action applied to policy-making and legitimacy of 
process.   
 
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPHERES 
 
Habermas developed his vision of the public sphere from the 18th century coffeehouses in 
Western Europe, which were a venue for public inter-action of ideas, further promoted by the 
establishment of the free press. Unsurprisingly, this somewhat romantic image has been 
criticised on the ground that it was an exclusive ‗public‘ of wealthy European men which 
allowed the bourgeois to set themselves apart not only from the state but from the lower 
classes. Fraser suggests instead that there are ‗multiple  publics‘, including groups of 
campaigning women and workers.
22
 This can be seen in the groups (often women) who came 
together in social movements in the 19th century in philanthropic organisations in the early 
days of ‗child-saving‘.23 
 
This ideal of rational informed discussion of public policy was initially suggested in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) where Habermas warned of the 
weakening of critical publicity as information-giving media expanded more into public life. 
His view was that the press were forming public opinion instead of mediating it.
24
 As the 
state increased its activity, its organisation became both subject to, and manipulative of, 
publicity. We can see this argument reflected in much of the current debate about the 
globalisation of communications media, whether it be in the hands of multi-national 
corporations or non-accountable digital technology, and the acceptable level of state control. 
Technology now both enables and dis-empowers our understanding of, and contribution to, 
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the public sphere. An obvious example is the extent to which the internet, with its relative 
freedom of access, is a public space.
25
 
 
The Habermasian public sphere was an arena of public discourse, separate from and often 
critical of the state. Participants set aside their respective statuses and inequalities to work 
toward an open consensus. The post-war welfare state forged more interdependence between 
civil society and the state, and public opinion became corrupted by public relations and 
manipulation.
26
 The public sphere envisaged by Habermas is a discursive arena in which 
private persons come together to discuss public matters. Similarly, Mills had argued that 
social science required an engagement with the political public sphere to fulfil private needs 
and expectations.
27
  To qualify as ‗public‘, a question must be of concern to everyone and of 
common shared interest. The difficulty is in who decides what is of common concern. It is 
only possible to agree on what is public and private if minorities are allowed to participate in 
the discourse, which is free of domination and subordination. 
 
Both Habermas‘s public sphere and Rawls‘ ‗original position‘ as a basis for social justice are 
subject to criticism on their ignoring gender issues.
28
 A fundamental argument of second 
wave feminism was that separating the public and private spheres subjugated women in a 
patriarchal society, for example in keeping domestic violence hidden within the privacy of 
the home. Arendt had reverted to classical societies to elevate the public arena, the Greek 
‗polis‘, the place where (male) citizens engaged with  each other and developed civic society, 
while women, children and slaves were left at home. Feminists argued that ‗the personal is 
political‘ to symbolise both a claim of recognition of women‘s struggles in the public realm, 
and recognising that public policy affected women‘s lives.29 US feminists claim women‘s 
reproductive rights under privacy rights,
30
 but object to notions of privacy denying public 
support for victims of oppression within the home.
31
 For them, the term privacy has two very 
different meanings, one protective of bodily integrity and one oppressive, excluding women 
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from public life. Conflict still exists between notions of privacy that justify non-interference 
by the state in domestic violence and others that respect the wishes of women to choose how 
they access help or pursue legal remedies against abuse.
32
  
 
Similarly, Olsen pointed out that to talk of policies of non-intervention in private family life 
is meaningless; that non-intervention is a conscious public decision to allow the state to 
define what a family is and what behaviour is acceptable. The popular belief, when she wrote 
in 1985 about the US, was that a policy of non-intervention in family privacy was being 
followed, subject to exceptional circumstances where state intervention was acceptable to 
remove abused children. However, it was not the principle of protective intervention that 
should be a matter of public concern, but the lack of public commitment to the state 
empowering children to assert their autonomy.
33
       
 
In a recent critique on the ethics of confidentiality, Clark tries to differentiate between 
‗private as secluded‘ and ‗private as non-public‘. He argues that a fundamental right to 
privacy (in the sense of not being overlooked) extends to rights of non-interference by the 
state in home and family life, essential to life in a non-totalitarian society.
34
 But it is indeed 
that all-seeing state that may pose a threat to freedom, not the public sphere in which all of us 
have a right to participate.  
 
With regard to the law regarding children, Bainham wrote of the Children Act 1989 
‗privatising‘ children‘s interests,35 although he did not mean that child care was being out-
sourced to private enterprise. Rather, he was concerned that the Act symbolised a loss of 
public attention to children subject to private law disputes. He thought that fathers‘ rights 
would be better upheld if the courts were more interventionist.
36
 
 
These examples illustrate some of the confusion that arises from conflating ‗public‘ with the 
state. Gavison
37
 attempted to resolve the feminist dichotomy between privacy as both 
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protecting and oppressing women by re-classifying the public/private distinction as merely 
descriptive, not normative, but the latter persists. 
 
The state and its agencies have the potential to both promote and threaten the privacy of 
individuals and the quality of their family life. However, in all these situations, any state 
intervention required to enable individuals to flourish is mandated by the public interest in 
both protecting the individual and in enabling them to participate in society.  For Habermas, 
private autonomy is only possible through democratic participation in the state through public 
autonomy.
38
 There is therefore continuous movement between public and private in our 
engagement with society, and the state operates to support this process, underlying both the 
private and public spheres. The state is separate from but interdependent with the public and 
private spheres. Policy applied by the courts must therefore be based on the understanding 
reached in both private and public worlds about family life as it changes over time.  
 
Although Fraser has actively engaged with Habermas‘ ideas, she is clear that the first stage in 
any critique of The Transformation of the Public Sphere or The Theory Of Communicative 
Action is addressing his exclusion of gender.
39
  She does not conflate the state, the ‗official‘ 
economy (of paid work), and arenas of public discourse all into a public sphere, from which 
women are excluded. She emphasises that there are no natural boundaries between the public 
and private spheres, but describes the designations as cultural classifications and rhetorical 
labels used to delegitimise some interests and value others. For example, she argues that 
child-rearing should not be ‗enclaved from the rest of social labour‘. Habermas argues that 
late capitalism has turned citizens into clients of the welfare state by buying their loyalty with 
compensations in the form of relative affluence and an illusion of power through the election 
process, but Fraser points out that most clients of the welfare state (in the US) are women, 
seen as ‗domestic failures‘.  
 
Feminist arguments were supported in the 1990s by British scholars who objected to the 
effect of legal doctrine hiding family violence behind the principle of privacy.  Freeman, and 
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Rose, for example, wanted critical legal studies to transcend the public-private dichotomy.
40
 
The boundaries were not natural, but constructed by society. The state could not claim to be 
non-interventionist, because every decision on where to draw a boundary imposed the state‘s 
view on who and what were to be protected.
41
 
 
Habermas‘ earlier work has been rightly criticised for ignoring the position of women, but it 
can be argued that some of his ideas have a universal application in Western society. In 
particular, his re-working of public and private are helpful. An examination of the functions 
of family courts cannot avoid the gendered nature of the discourse, as will become evident in 
later chapters. This is foremost in private law cases, where most disputes are between fathers 
and mothers. Consequently, the extent of men and women‘s caring responsibilities of their 
children, the disparity in their economic position and the emotional aspects of their 
relationship breakdown all affect their experience of the legal process. In the great majority 
of public law cases, it is mothers with whom local authority children‘s services are engaging. 
These women have often grown up in households with abusive fathers and/or have adult 
relationships with violent men.
42
    
 
The exclusivity of Habermas‘ vision of the public sphere of the 18th century and the concept 
of bourgeois gentlemen discussing great ideas in the salon culture may today seem as rarefied 
as Arendt‘s Athenian citizens. However, the point of the ideal speech situation is that it is an 
ideal, against which the value of discourse can be measured.  It is challenging to envisage the 
possibility of an ideal speech situation in policy-making on family courts, where the voices of 
women and children struggle to be heard. The campaigns the media choose to pursue do not 
necessarily represent all marginalised groups affected by family courts. The fathers‘ rights 
movement has been promoted by the media as a redress for fathers who are unfairly 
prevented by the courts from having contact with their children, but a study of the different 
campaigning groups‘ websites found the most commonly expressed purposes to be to prevent 
men from being removed from the home; to place men at the centre of the family, and to gain 
control over women and their sexuality.
43
 Recent research in courts in England and Wales 
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suggests that claims of court bias against fathers are not substantiated.
44
 Nevertheless, the 
Children and Adoption Act 2006 was drafted in response to such claims; its implementation 
is a struggle because of the dissonance between its objectives of enforcing contact and the 
reality of lack of commitment and resources. In Australia, Graycar vividly described the 
disproportionate impact of anecdote on policy-making in 2000.
45
 This process was repeated 
in more recent legislative reform there, discussed in Chapter Five, and in amendments to 
media law in England and Wales (Chapter Six). These are typical of gaps between policy 
formulation and implementation
46
 which could be reduced or avoided if policy was reached 
by agreement through communicative action.  
 
THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS - LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEMS 
 
In primitive societies, the lifeworld and systems were not differentiated; their separation is a 
feature of late modernity. Although we need systems, they are not free-standing, but anchored 
and institutionalised in the lifeworld. It is when systems colonise or take over the values of 
the lifeworld that society is in crisis, described by Habermas as the uncoupling of the 
lifeworld.
 47
 As capitalism forces up the pressures and costs of system integration, the 
subsystems of the economy and administration begin to expand into the lifeworld, money 
turning us into consumers and the state turning us into its clients: ‗The rationalisation of the 
lifeworld makes possible the emergence and growth of subsystems whose independent 
imperatives turn back destructively upon the lifeworld itself.‘48   
 
Habermas reconsidered functionalism by adapting Parsons‘ concept of the AGIL diagram, 
that showed how systems functioned by four integrated sub-systems of interdependent supply 
and allocation of resources with agreed values and norms. 
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Parsons’ AGIL diagram:  
 
Adaptation (securing material 
resources) 
Goal attainment  (allocation of 
resources) 
 
Integration (developing norms) Latent pattern maintenance 
(ordered patterns of value 
commitments) 
 
This was revised by Habermas who re-cast the I and L functions (norms and values) as the 
lifeworld, and G and A (power and money) as the steering media or rationalised systems.
49
 
Therefore, in the diagram above, the upper layer (adaptation and goals) represent the system, 
legitimated by the lower layer, the lifeworld of norms and values.  Rational actions in the 
systems of economy and state are legitimated by communicative action in the lifeworld of 
norms and values. 
 
Habermas‘ version also shows the relationship between the public and private spheres. This is 
easier to see by rearranging the diagram: 
 
 
  
Public 
 
 
Private 
 
Rational action G – the 
administrative 
state, 
dependent on  
power 
 
A – the 
economy, 
dependent on  
money 
 
Systems,  
Material 
reproduction, 
legitimated by 
the lifeworld 
 
Communicative 
action 
I – integrative 
norms 
L – values 
 
 
 
Lifeworld,  
Symbolic 
reproduction, 
legitimates 
systems 
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It is important to note the double axis: the horizontal axis between systems and lifeworld, as 
well as the vertical axis between the public and private sphere. Both of these boundaries are 
permeable. The lifeworld is steered by the systems of the market economy and state power, 
which in turn are anchored in the values of the lifeworld. By looking at the vertical axis, the 
AGIL diagram can also be used to categorise norms and power as the public sphere, and 
values and money as the private sphere.
50
 This diagram captures the integration of lifeworld; 
systems; and the public and private spheres. 
 
The following simplified format shows the state system and agreement in civil society as 
public, and the market economy and our internal values as private.   
 
  
Public 
 
Private 
 
Systems      
 
The state 
 
The economy 
 
Lifeworld    
 
Norms 
 
Values 
 
Systems consist of elements that can be ‗counted‘ in terms of money and votes, but the 
constituents of the lifeworld cannot be quantified.
51
  However, the steering media of state 
power and the economy can only be accepted as legitimate if they reflect value commitments. 
Therefore when they become ends in themselves, unsupported by the lifeworld, they lose 
their validity. Common understandings of state power and the economy are reached in the 
lifeworld, not in themselves. It is communicative action that produces the lifeworld, which 
gives meaning to systems rationalised by science, technology and quantification. Resentment 
of an audit culture or ‗tick-box mentality‘ indicates disenchantment with a process-driven 
style of management that loses sight of the substance of what is being managed. Current 
research indicates that children and families are less supported by welfare services where 
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professionals are required to spend a substantial amount of time recording data.
52
 The concept 
of ‗McDonaldization‘ has been used to warn against the negative effects on services of 
relying only on efficiency, calculation, predictability and control.
53
 In Habermas‘ view this 
would be because services have lost touch with communication that originated in the 
lifeworld, becoming a ‗remote and unwelcome force of micro-management.‘54  
  
Habermas‘s idea was that, as the lifeworld and systems separated, language became the 
mechanism whereby we could agree our norms and values. He used hermeneutics, the 
science of interpretation, to argue that we arrive at a consensus in the lifeworld through 
‗communicative action‘. This draws on Mead‘s theory of symbolic interactionism, whereby 
society is explained by a series of interchanges between social actors, in contrast to the fixed 
structures of Parsons, where social actors were relegated to the sidelines. Communicative 
action means reaching a common understanding, which is only possible in norms and values 
(the I and L in the diagram) and not in money or the state (A and G). The latter must express 
the understandings that are reached by the former to be accepted as legitimate.  
 
Therefore state-made law is accepted when it derives from agreement reached in the 
lifeworld. Systems theory (such as Luhman‘s) that sees societies as objective structures only, 
cannot fully account for the acceptance (or not) of the law by individual citizens.
55 
Habermas‘s theory is that legitimacy of the law depends on subjective levels of commitment 
to it. Within the tension between the expansion and restriction of freedom by the welfare 
state, Habermas sees the law as a system that increasingly imposes its regulation on the way 
we live. Its origin is as a steering mechanism, and it should therefore serve the lifeworld, not 
become an end in itself. Excessive legislation and regulation does not accord with our 
instinctive sense of justice and morality.  However, the lifeworld is supported by our 
expectations that we can rely on stability and authority of law. 
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Habermas identified four types of social formation, as follows. The third is where we are 
now, and the fourth is to be strived for.  
 
1. Primitive: regulated by myth, where change comes about by natural or ecological 
factors 
2. Traditional: nation-states based on unstable class structures56 
3. Liberalist-capitalist: where exploitation of labour becomes de-politicised by economic 
reward
57
 
4. Universalistic: where society will form a consensus on its common interests.58  
 
Following Weber, the earliest forms of society were guided by myth, which blurred objective, 
social and subjective worlds. Tribal societies were structured by kinship relations.
59 These 
then evolved through system differentiation into early capitalist societies. Historically, the 
decline in tradition and myth has weakened the possibility of mutual understanding and 
consensus. At the same time the steering media of money and power were separated from the 
lifeworld and legitimated though law. Weber saw this triumph of purposive rationality as 
bureaucratisation leading to the ‗iron cage‘; Marx as the exploitation of the labour market; the 
Frankfurt school as instrumental reason leading to reification.  
 
In contrast, Habermas is more optimistic. Rather than the conflicts within capitalism 
inevitably bringing about its collapse, modern society can survive, provided its condition 
allows what he terms ‗communicative action‘. Modernity is signified by the emancipation of 
norms from tradition and Habermas recognises Weber‘s fear of the intrusion of increased 
bureaucracy, legalisation and regulation into social life. He calls this the ‗colonisation of the 
lifeworld‘. However, he envisages instrumental reason as containable within its system 
boundaries. Communicative action is an alternative, emancipating, form of rational action in 
the lifeworld which formulates systems. While acknowledging the ‗lifeworld‘ of traditional 
family forms, Habermas would say that modern social policy on the family is more like to be 
accepted if it comes from open communication and consensus, rather than an appeal to an 
image from an idealised past.  
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JURIDIFICATION 
 
Habermas offers the juridification of family law in Germany as an empirical example of his 
thesis of colonisation.
60
 He defines juridification as a tendency to increase formal positive 
law. Legal norms need to be capable of being substantively justified, not just accepted solely 
through procedure. Habermas sees the law as an ‗institution‘ based on moral principles, 
supported by law as a ‗medium‘ combined with those of money and power. Routinely, law is 
enforced procedurally, but if law is questioned, it cannot be legitimated just as a medium; it 
requires substantive justification in the lifeworld of informal norms of conduct.
61
 In the first 
wave of juridification, civil law was developed to allow private contracts; then citizens were 
given civic rights against the sovereign in a constitutional state; and the development of 
constitutional and democratic rights was then guaranteed by laws produced through political 
participation.
62
 Although the welfare state restricts the market economy and enforces welfare 
benefits for its citizens, these policies are ambivalent, both giving and taking away freedoms. 
As Habermas puts it, juridification of life-risks restructures interventions into the lifeworld of 
the recipients and regulation of benefits brings impersonal distant bureaucratic structures and 
social services offered by the therapeutocracy. Public welfare policy now uses the law as a 
medium to regulate social welfare relationships within the lifeworld. He sees the law being 
used increasingly to control previously informal aspects of the lifeworld, commodifying 
culture, recreation, and especially education; the school becoming a route for job prospects 
rather than a site for teaching in a traditional sense. Social policy now demands economic 
investment in childhood, but this is focused on producing the future citizen rather than 
promoting the value of childhood itself.
63
  
 
Habermas warned against therapeutocracy; over-reliance on experts and an invasion of 
family life by professionals.
64
 Reminiscent of Foucault and Donzelot,
65
 preventive science 
directs current policies of early intervention in family problems, producing the spectre of 
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Foucault‘s panopticon, tracking children by database.66 Donzelot conceptualised ‗the social 
sphere‘, where family life can be directed by public authorities. This has been distinguished 
from Habermas‘s visible ‗public sphere‘ where ideas are openly debated.67 In the 1970s, 
Habermas was suspicious of the juridification of German family law, establishing individual 
rights within families and dismantling the paterfamilias structure.
68
 More recently, he 
attributed the feminisation of poverty in the US to liberalisation of divorce.
69
  
 
Such observations undermine Habermas‘ claim to be progressive in welcoming social 
movements for change.
70
 His conservatism about family relations has been criticised because 
it did not acknowledge the benefits of legal protection to women and vulnerable family 
members.
71
 What he seems to be trying to argue is that over-regulation of social interaction 
turns relationships into objective encounters; administrative and judicial control should 
supplement the socially integrated legal context, but there is a danger of negative 
consequences if they take them over. His statement that: ‗The protection of the welfare of the 
child as a basic right can be implemented only by giving the state possibilities to intervene in 
parental privileges, once regarded as untouchable,‘72 might be read as a colluding with the 
laissez faire model of child care.
73
 However, it makes more sense as part of his wider 
argument that he believes individualisation and children‘s rights are part of the evolving 
lifeworld, and systems must adapt to meet these by way of rational consensus. Such an 
approach is reflected in Olsen‘s ‗myth of non-intervention‘ and by Dingwall, Eekelaar and 
Murray‘s description of the ‗liberal dilemma‘ of child protection.74 
 
Overall, Habermas‘ own attempt to use the juridification of family law as an example of 
colonisation is quite weak, relying largely on 1970s research in Germany that showed how 
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wardship subordinated children as objects of the proceedings rather than participants.
75
 (It is 
interesting to note a small group of researchers in Australia was very approving of the 
inquisitorial role of judges in Germany, suggesting that practice may have changed in the past 
30 years.
76
)  
 
A better example of juridification is given by Frank, who places relationships between health 
professionals and patients in the lifeworld, that is being colonised by insurance companies (in 
northern America) and governments (for example, in the UK) to produce a crisis in 
legitimacy, evidenced by the popularity of complementary medicine and the prevalence of 
clinical negligence actions. Communicative action would enable informed agreement to be 
reached about medical treatment, rather than resource-led decisions.
77
  We must acknowledge 
that attitudes to professional status and institutional care are changing, and adapt systems 
accordingly. Similarly, Fraser resists arguments that recognising the value to the economy of 
housework and child care are commodification, but instead takes them out of the private 
sphere into the public space.
78
  
 
It will be seen that fears of juridification, the law taking over, are intertwined with those of 
delegalisation, the law being replaced by other disciplines. While these might appear another 
example of duality, they are argued as two sides of the same claim: perhaps most vividly 
expressed by Donzelot‘s Russian doll motif, where the tutelary complex replaces the judicial 
model with an educative model, and the judge in court is enveloped by layers of other 
professionals in an ‗endless ramification of … powers‘.79 In Habermas‘ words: ‗…replacing 
the judge with the therapist is no panacea: the social worker is only another expert, and does 
not free the client of the welfare state bureaucracy from his or her position as an object.‘80  
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The state is expected to uphold theories of justice grounded in our norms and values but ‗the 
rationing motif dominates our civil justice system‘,81 driven by a reduction in legal aid 
expenditure as an end in itself, rather than arrived at through open discourse. Diversion 
policies will only work if they make sense within court users‘ understanding of what family 
life and adult-children relationships mean to them.  Our own experience and evaluation of the 
family (private) and the norms we expect other families to follow (public) are inter-twined in 
the lifeworld. Systems driven by economic and ideological forces will not be accepted if they 
do not reflect these. We take our private views into the public sphere to arrive at societal 
values. 
 
RESPONSES TO THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
 
Habermas‘s concept of the lifeworld as a heritage of shared experience does not find 
sympathy with some postmodern theorists. In the context of globalisation, the concept of a 
‗shared lifeworld‘ may seem distant, and Habermas unduly optimistic. He famously called 
modernity an ‗unfinished project‘,82 and took issue in the 1970s with the nihilism of some 
postmodern theorists. Although a critical theorist, he updated theories of functional systems 
to look for solutions and progress.  
 
Society and family life are now seen as fragmented, not integrated. Beck and Bauman believe 
that individualised biographies lie across the system and the lifeworld; subsystem boundaries 
pass through individual lives dependent on institutions; how one lives becomes a biographical 
solution to systemic contradictions. Beck describes social progress, a vision of a better future, 
as depending on our self-perception of our transience in a relatively unchanging environment, 
whereas in postmodern society it is the individual who feels static amidst an ever-changing 
world.
83
 Bauman sees the postmodern family as still adjusting to a society where men can no 
longer build their identity on the expectation of a vocation or a ‗job for life‘. Instead, we are 
encouraged to live episodic, fragmented lives: ‗the hub of postmodern life strategy is not 
identity-building but the avoidance of being fixed.‘84 Although Durkheim thought people 
aspire to detach themselves from the present because they need to believe their actions have 
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enduring consequences, we now feel that individuals are longer-lived than social institutions, 
that we have a right to happiness, and to live in the present. For Bauman, the lifeworld is now 
filled by surfing and drift, as we move through a ‗succession of nows‘.85 Giddens has 
described the phenomenon of successive relationships as ‗confluent love‘. 86 
 
This has an impact on family life. Individualisation and commodification produce 
uncertainties that lead us to attempt to protect children by ever-increasing surveillance. In 
Parton‘s interpretation, the loss of the previous security experienced by most people in a 
marriage partner for life has led us to invest all our visions for a better society in our children 
(our own, and ‗childhood‘ as a construct).87   
 
As Beck describes it, Habermas envisaged political decision making as based on the way the 
interventionist state ‗jumps into the functional gaps of the market‘ to improve material and 
intangible infrastructure. However, as the benevolent state becomes established, it loses its 
‗utopian energy‘, and its scope is attacked by external developments.88 However, Habermas 
wrote that it had always been misleading to assume that utopian ideas of emancipation and 
happiness coincided with increasing power and wealth, and that the Marxist notion of 
progress being made on the basis of labour power must now be viewed as historical.
89
 We 
benefit more from what can be achieved through communicative rationality than instrumental 
rationality. Although society is more than ever dependent on public discourse to achieve 
solutions, globalisation offers both new opportunities and threats to the concept of the ideal 
speech situation.     
 
21st century pluralism and recognition of diversity of cultures would seem to reject the notion 
of a shared sense of tradition and the universalism of the ideal speech situation, on the 
grounds that consensus is impossible to achieve. But political theorists still envisage the 
public sphere as an important frame of reference, an arena in which the possibility of 
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understanding an agreement is tested.
90
 As societies become more complex and more 
differentiated, the burden on communicative rationality grows heavier.
91
  
 
Applying the perspective of Habermas, the courts struggle to reconcile their historical 
structures with the imperatives of social policy, to deal with the diversity of family life and 
culture. For centuries, courts were accessed by only a minority of families at different ends of 
the social strata, and their economic and administrative systems were connected to separate 
societal expectations. As the lifeworld becomes more rationalised, we expect these systems to 
adapt, but instead they take on their own self-perpetuating nature. The result may be that we 
are prepared to give up on the courts ever functioning effectively, and instead turn to 
alternative dispute resolution. However, if values are still not agreed, new policies for dispute 
resolution will be based primarily in the spheres of economy and power, and may also fail to 
be accepted as legitimate.  
 
THE IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION 
 
Communicative rationality in the lifeworld is the means whereby private problems can be 
resolved in the public realm. Habermas contrasts instrumental or strategic (teleological or 
goal-oriented) actions which are purposively rational with communicative action, verbal and 
non-verbal inter-action between individuals who seek to reach an understanding about their 
action situation and their plans of action in order to co-ordinate their actions by way of 
agreement.
92
 Within the lifeworld, ‗value commitments are reaffirmed, and the basis of 
influence re-established‘93 
 
Unlike purposive rational action, communicative action is the process of reaching a common 
understanding. Although a communicative action has a rational basis, it cannot be unilaterally 
imposed, but must be capable of being challenged and validated. Therefore, communicative 
action underlies participatory democracy, rational discussion, and consensus based on 
universal values. Although Habermas believes that communicative rationality can be 
undermined by the power of the mechanisms of state and market, it continues to enable 
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democracy and participation. As Fraser explains, Habermas‘ theories about an inclusive 
space for the communicative generation of public opinion legitimises views that can 
withstand public scrutiny, gives a mandate to politicians and holds them accountable, and 
enables us to ask whether all citizens are participating.
94
   
 
The public sphere enjoys the freedom to engage in rational argument, communicative 
rationality, in contrast to instrumental rationality. The threat is that this discourse is distorted 
by state propaganda or the commercial interests of mass media. The ‗ideal speech situation‘ 
is an abstract concept where all contributors set aside their different status and have an equal 
right to be heard. This is used by Birkinshaw
95
 to support transparency in government affairs 
and freedom of information, and is particularly useful in examining the call for publicity of 
family court proceedings.
96
 
 
The call for more publicity to be given to the courts‘ operations could be seen as an 
opportunity for a public discourse to improve current systems. Complaints about alleged 
secrecy can be seen as an example of the need for open deliberation in the public sphere to 
legitimise law, in terms of Habermas‘s concept of the power of communicative action in an 
ideal speech situation. However, communication is distorted by the power of the economic 
forces that drive the press and broadcasting media. Habermas sees the makers of ‗public 
opinion‘ as in truth contemptuous of the public interest.97  
 
Moreover, responding to the more powerful and articulate members of society moves 
resources and attention away from children in care toward the children of the well-off. This is 
a class issue in that the children in most need are subject to neglect, linked to parental 
poverty, illness and drug use. However, these families do not have a strong voice and their 
interests are marginalised by pressure groups. Some of the loudest voices claim to represent 
fathers, but only narrowly in the ‗fathers‘ rights movement‘98 rather than in empowering 
fathers who are marginalised by professionals‘ child protection procedures.99  Other groups 
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have explicit agendas to discredit medical and/or social work practitioners.
100
 In this way, the 
public sphere comes to be dominated by those who do not reflect the private concerns of 
more than a few. 
 
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND FAMILY COURTS  
 
Fraser wrote: 
Habermas‘s account offers an important corrective to the standard dualistic 
approaches to the separation of public and private in capitalist societies. He 
conceptualises the problem as a relation among four terms: family, (official) 
economy, state and public sphere.
101
 
 
It will be argued that a standard dualistic approach, separating the interests of children into 
public and private family law, is unsustainable in the court setting. Instead, the values 
common in public and private law, which court systems serve, underlie the basis of 
legitimacy of process. Seeing the ‗the interinstitutional relations‘102 amongst the four 
concepts is more helpful in analysing what the courts‘ functions are,  whether these meet 
needs, and whether there are alternatives. 
 
In England and Wales, the overlap between public and private has been recognised to some 
extent in the central legislation, the Children Act 1989. (It will be seen that the position is 
more problematic in Australia.
103
) This Act arguably has achieved legitimacy though being a 
product of communicative action. It will be seen that, in contrast to some less successful 
legislation, the 1989 Act was the result of inclusive and considered consultation and 
debate.
104
 Some important steps were taken to unify the family courts under a combined 
jurisdiction; the principles relating to parental responsibility and children‘s welfare were 
applied to all matters brought to court under the Act.  
 
The primary difference that is still maintained is the level of children‘s representation.  
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This division was perpetuated in the Law Commission recommendation that children in 
private law proceedings (‗ordinary family disputes‘105) receive a lesser level of 
representation. There was some dissension from this point of view, at the time, from 
advocates of children‘s rights such as Judith Timms, who recently commented that she was 
told that ‗…public law parents are dysfunctional and private law parents aren‘t…‘106 The 
Act‘s philosophy of non-intervention in the exercise of parental responsibility applied both to 
private law disputes, where parents should not be stigmatised just because they were 
divorcing, and in public law, to keep in check unwarranted social services applications.  
 
Shortly after the Act was passed, Bainham pointed out that ‗total fusion [of public and private 
law] would be out of the question since state intervention in family life is of its nature quite 
different to private disputes between individual family members.‘ He thought the extent to 
which the same principles did apply through the Act was better described as ‗confluence‘.107 
Bainham‘s objection was that the non-interventionist principles in the Act amounted to an 
abandonment of public interest in children who were subject to private law disputes. He 
warned that fathers would be marginalised in a system that maintained the status quo in 
living and caring arrangements, rather than enquiring into the individual child‘s situation. 
Thus, any public duty to take children‘s welfare seriously would be trammelled by respect for 
parental agreements that (in his view) would most often favour mothers. While there is no 
evidence of this effect, a few years later, research by Rebecca Bailey-Harris and others found 
s 1(5) manifested as reluctance by courts to adjudicate in parental disputes, leading to a level 
of dissatisfaction for both parties, who had approached the court because they were unable to 
agree but were then pressured into ‗settlement‘.108 Bainham had criticised  
s 1(5) as devaluing the state‘s responsibility toward children by elevating parental autonomy. 
However, Bailey Harris et al. found that parents were still being coerced by the state.    
 
 This differentiation between the level of protection accorded to children has however been 
gradually modified, particularly in the past ten years, as policy moved more toward the idea 
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that children in private law cases also require attention. This has been influenced to some 
extent by research that shows a high level of distress in children in private law cases,
109
 and 
an increase in courts using a power to direct separate representation of children, often to avail 
themselves of a more in-depth investigation.
110
 There has also been an ideological drive to 
widen the net from ‗child protection‘ to ‗safeguarding‘, as exemplified by the transfer of 
inspection of Cafcass from the courts to Ofsted (education inspectors).
111
 The latter base their 
inspections on safeguarding children from harm in the context of improving educational 
attainment. This more interventionist approach may have been symptomatic of a wider move 
toward increased surveillance of children, a symptom of postmodern anxieties.
112
 There are 
already signs that the present government, intent on reducing public expenditure, will be 
moving from the ‗state paternalism‘ role back toward ‗laissez faire’.113 This is indicated in 
the emphasis on reducing the use of family court proceedings in both the Family Justice 
Review and the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill. The idea that ADR 
is the preferred option for resolving parental disputes has been revived, despite the failure to 
follow this through under the Family Law Act 1996.
114
  
 
Thus we have seen the pendulum swing between values of private family life being cited as 
the basis for non-intervention and ADR, to a rediscovery of the public interest in children‘s 
welfare and saving them from dysfunctional parenting. The question is whether these policies 
have developed through public discourse based on private experiences to inform decisions in 
the public good, or whether communication has been distorted by the media of power and the 
economy.  
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In child protection, measures have also been taken to decrease both the volume of public law 
cases that reach court, and the time and resources spent on them when they do.
115
 The first 
point was premised primarily on the Care Matters agenda, which encourages family 
placements even more strongly than provided for in the 1989 Act and has led to increased use 
of placement with family and friends both within and without court proceedings. The latter 
involves more use of residence and special guardianship (private law) orders than care orders. 
This policy was produced after responsibility for children‘s services in England was 
transferred to the government department responsible for education.
116
 Care Matters is 
explicit that children in care are an inefficient burden on public expenditure, because of the 
poor long-term outcomes, largely measured by low educational attainment.
117
 
 
Secondly, attempts have been made to reduce expenditure on those public law cases which do 
reach court with the aim of reducing both the cost of legal aid
118
 and of judicial time.
119
 The 
Public Law Outline, introduced in April 2008, includes a ‗pre-proceedings‘ stage, during 
which alternatives to applying for care orders are explored. Avoiding a court process by 
arriving at an intra-family solution might feel a more familiar and comfortable outcome, 
within the lifeworld.
120
 However, similarly to encouragement of ADR in private law, there is 
a risk of the systems failing to serve families who do not have protection available in their 
own personal network. There is a danger that this failure arises not from rational discourse 
about the state‘s role in support, but is skewed by cost-based and instrumental decision 
making.   
JURIDIFICATION OR DELEGALISATION? 
 
As noted above, in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas described juridification 
as the formality of legal process extending into the lifeworld with pathological effects. 
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Similarly, Cretney prefers the appeal of ‗private ordering‘ to a court, because it is inevitable 
that families will always identify courts with the coercive power of the state.
121
 However, our 
expectations of justice and welfare rely on the law; the interdependence of legal systems and 
the lifeworld they serve depends on a correct balance. If ‗informalism‘122 results in net-
widening, with families being regulated by non-legal professionals, this may not reflect the 
lifeworld either. The processes of the ‗therapeutocracy‘ are not universally trusted any more 
than the law. Donzelot begins with the 19th century movement to ‗medicalise‘ the family, 
which he traces through to the emergence of social work, a desire to educate instead of 
punish.
123
 These are modes of discipline as envisaged by Foucault as symptomatic of post-
structural power relations.  
 
The unequal relationship between social workers and ‗clients‘ created a danger that 
professionals could impose their pseudo-scientific theories in family work; this was 
exacerbated by fears in the post-Finer period up to the 1990s that de-legalisation weakened 
individuals‘ rights to representation and self-determination.124  Since then, the social work 
ethos (whether psychodynamic or family systems theories) common across local authorities, 
probation service and charities – of caseworking with parents – was replaced by a more 
instrumental target-based approach. Faith was placed in systems, not in people.
125
 The 
previous more personalised role might have been seen in Foucauldian terms as ‗normalising‘ 
the family, but the shift to technology-driven quantitative-based judgements seemed even 
more likely to produce a surveillance society.
126
 This is now recognised in Eileen Munro‘s 
review of child protection, but she fears that Government is wary of relaxing central control 
and trusting front-line workers.
127
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Where state intervention is required in cases of child abuse and neglect, care proceedings 
have long been ‗the last resort‘.128 Now, however, the courts are seen as being unable to cope 
with the volume of cases, and policies are continually produced to avoid their being involved. 
Welbourne argues that this may create a two-tier system.
129
 Families are increasingly forced 
to accept ‗private‘ arrangements of children being placed with extended family or foster 
carers outside the oversight of the court, but this diversion entangles families in processes no 
less alienating than adjudication. Arguably, children‘s welfare and parental rights are both 
more effectively upheld in the court process than by ‗informal‘ agreement,130 although 
judicial scrutiny may well diminish in the near future, again for economic reasons.
131
 
 
One example of an alternative in child protection cases is the family group conference, a 
meeting which facilitates family members to agree a safe plan for the child. Hayes and 
Houston utilise Habermas‘ theories in this example of melding public and private 
relationships. They see these conferences as an example of undistorted communication 
leading to better outcomes for children.
132
  
 
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas talks about ‗mediation‘ between the lifeworld and 
systems. This prompts one to think of his ideas on communicative rationality having 
something to offer mediation-type processes in family law. This terminology has indeed been 
drawn on in the field of international mediation, in the use of Habermasian discourse ethics 
re-connecting Kant with real world processes.
133
  Hayes and Houston‘s use of Habermas‘s 
concept to mediation in family group conferences is obviously a model of ADR with much in 
common with mediation in the sense of third party facilitation.
134
 Habermas argues that the 
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social worker is no less a symbol of juridification than the judge.
135
 Foucauldians would 
argue that the mediator is no less an agent of the state than the judge. Thus moving away 
from adjudication is rationally-purposive, a cost-cutting exercise in the guise of emancipation 
from state intervention.  
 
Sinclair also sees communication in child protection processes as distorted by ideology. Both 
studies place the family in the lifeworld and the social worker in a system.
136
 Social work 
systems have become process-driven and uncoupled from the lifeworld as the formality of the 
law dominates, a shift developing since the loss of faith in the welfare state and emphasis on 
risk since the 1980s.
137
 
 
LIFEWORLD, SYSTEM AND SOCIAL POLICY 
 
Political manoeuvring and distorted communication notwithstanding, successive governments 
attempt to meet popular demand by identifying social problems and formulating policies to 
address them.
138
 Contemporary society does not tolerate child abuse and neglect and 
consequently responds by constructing a system of child protection. Our moral values (in the 
lifeworld) dictate that the state should use systems that promote the interests of vulnerable 
children. This is a straightforward example of our private family values influencing public 
norms and being supported by the state and public finance, within the ambivalence in a 
democratic society about state intervention in families. Since Dingwall, Eekelaar and 
Murray
139
 identified the ‗liberal dilemma‘ of removing children from their birth families, the 
issue has become even more complex because it has emerged that removal to public care is 
not a complete answer. The government concluded in Care Matters that the cost of the care 
system could not be justified by the poor life outcomes of the children that system ostensibly 
protected.
140
 However, it is not always clear whether policies to avoid children acquiring the 
status of being ‗looked after‘ by local authorities are based on their welfare or on the financial 
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implications.
141
 The language now being used by Government, referring to local authorities‘ 
duties as ‗burdens‘, suggests the latter.142     Where the influence of cost considerations 
distorts language and circumscribes free debate, the legitimacy of new policies is jeopardised.  
 
Identifying the ‗social problem‘ in private law cases is more difficult. Parental separation is 
common and no longer stigmatising; but the courts are asked to deal with the most extreme 
situations. If this is because we are concerned about the emotional damage caused to children 
by inter-parental conflict, our motivation cannot be differentiated from public law. There is 
no rationale to maintain the public/private distinction here, if the courts‘ function is to 
‗safeguard‘ the child. Private law applications are initiated by parents, not the state, but not 
all parents see safeguarding their children as the primary issue.  Perhaps the social problem 
driving policy is a re-definition of parenthood that has only in the last 20-30 years impacted 
on the family court system to produce an unmanageable volume of contact applications. In 
the lifeworld we accept that the errant father who loses touch with his children, leaving the 
primacy of the maternal relationship undisturbed, is no longer the stereotype. However, while 
our systems are driven by unrepresentative media images, short-term political advantage, and 
cost-saving, little progress in reconstructing gendered parenting is apparent.   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
When the Children Act 1989 was drafted, a policy distinction was drawn between public and 
private law cases on the grounds that the former involved deviant or inadequate parents, 
whereas the latter did not. Public law cases necessitated state intervention because of a failure 
of parenting. If parents resort to court to make decisions about parenting it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that they also have failed. We feel discomfort, at the very least, about 
handing over such decisions to an institution. That dissonance stems from our experience of 
family relationships in the lifeworld; if the court systems are to steer us, they must be firmly 
rooted in the lifeworld to have any validity.  
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When family relations fail, individuals turn to courts and state agencies. The aggrieved father 
will pursue his right to contact with his children; victims of domestic violence will call in the 
police; the press will condemn the social worker who did not act quickly enough to remove a 
child from dangerous parents. These are all instances where we call on systems to extend into 
our lifeworld to remedy an imbalance in power relations, and are disappointed if legal 
procedures do not reflect our lifeworld assumptions about justice. We simultaneously resent 
institutional control of our position in society and our identity, while seeking ever-increasing 
recognition and protection of our rights to exert these. Meanwhile, government rejects the 
expanding cost of the court system, tries to divert parties into alternative processes, ostensibly 
to empower them to arrive at their own solutions.  
 
Habermas‘s work is pervaded by the theme of interdependence of autonomy in both the 
private and public spheres. In the private sphere, the potential for self-knowledge arises from 
communicative action. The ideal speech situation allows society to work toward agreed truth 
in shared values and at the same time enables the self-development of the individual.
143 The 
conditions of an ‗ideal communication community‘ would enable the individual to fully 
develop their moral autonomy beyond immediate restrictions to a universal identity, freed 
from convention. Secondly, it would enable self-realisation. Individuals assume an identity in 
both a social world, and a subjective world; the first is their relationship with society, the 
second their concept of themselves. The nature of the language used by the individual can 
reflect both self-determination and self-realisation.  
 
Wright Mills‘ sociological question of how social order is possible is answered by Habermas 
in constructing a theory of a lifeworld of shared understanding and communication, 
underpinned by instrumental and strategic actions by economic and administrative systems. 
Courts try to resolve disputes, whether by adjudication or overseeing alternative methods. In 
family proceedings, court operations are seen as seriously failing by varying sections of the 
community that have little else in common. This may lead to a conclusion that family 
disputes are not soluble by a legal system that has become ideologically and economically 
driven to the extent that it has separated from the values and beliefs of those it serves, and has 
therefore lost legitimacy. The system must therefore return to a public discourse on shared 
values that can reach a consensus on what is required. 
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EARLY JURISDICTION IN FAMILY CASES 
 
The description ‗family justice system‘1 now reflects the multi-disciplinary nature and range 
of stakeholders in family courts, but even the term ‗family court‘ did not exist in the 
extensive period covered in this chapter, from the middle ages to the 1940s. Adjudication on 
matrimonial causes; separation; divorce and the origins of youth justice and child protection 
became consolidated in two separate systems, the original duality in the history of family 
courts.  
 
References to children hardly appear in court records until the 20th century.
2
  Tracing the 
origins of family courts shows how systems that relegated the interests of women, and almost 
ignored those of children, were unsuited to the demands of social policy in the 20th century. 
This is starkly obvious in retrospect, but it seems extraordinarily difficult to succeed in 
making progress in adapting the courts. It can therefore be argued, in Habermas‘ terms, that 
systems created to serve earlier ideologies took on a life of their own and became self-
serving, rigid and slow to adapt to changing values and needs.      
 
The earliest family jurisdiction in England and Wales was exercised separately by 
ecclesiastical courts and justices of the peace (JPs); a division between spiritual and temporal 
law. The ecclesiastical courts‘ role was supplemented by actions in the common law courts 
and parliament from the 17th century; these were all consolidated in 1857. When the reforms 
were debated in the 1850s, these functions were being undertaken firstly by ecclesiastical 
courts and a Parliament with an active House of Lords, including many bishops; and secondly 
by JPs administering the poor law. The latter jurisdiction (now known as magistrates) 
remained separate until the late 20th century. This division was condemned as discriminatory 
and unfit, having survived for some 30 years after the establishment of the welfare state.
3
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ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS: ORIGINS 
 
In the early modern period, the common law was used in the state‘s courts, after the 
concurrent development with Roman (or civil law) and equity, but aspects of civil law 
remained influential in the ecclesiastical courts until these were abolished in the 19th century. 
The early history of family law has been described as a compound of Roman law, canon law, 
and legislation. Roman law was authoritative through much of Europe until canon law was 
established in the 5th and 6th centuries.
4
 Until 1857, the division in family law worked by 
ecclesiastical courts dealing with matrimonial causes, while common law dealt with any 
questions of property rights for widows, or questions of illegitimacy. If it was necessary to 
check on the validity of a marriage to determine such questions, the common law court would 
obtain a certificate from the relevant bishop.
5
 Equity had some limited influence on the 
separate rights of women and children, and its wardship jurisdiction was the origin of the 
concept of paramount consideration of children‘s welfare.6 
  
Church courts (originally the canon law courts of the Catholic Church but re-invented during 
the Protestant Reformation) held jurisdiction for all matrimonial causes because of the 
theological interpretation of marriage as indissoluble, both in natural (or God-given) law, and 
as set down in the Christian gospel.
7
 Natural law was additionally regulated by society-
imposed norms exercised by the Church, which ‗gave rise to a vast system of jurisprudence.‘8   
 
The validity of a marriage could be certified only by a bishop, each of whom operated 
through a Consistory Court. Despite the symbolic and legal status of marriage, interpretation 
of what constituted a marriage ceremony varied until reform in Lord Hardwicke‘s Marriage 
Act 1753, so there was considerable scope for disputes about validity. Although the Church 
accepted verbally contracted marriages outside its own buildings, it was customary for 
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marriages to be settled by parents and the wider family.
9
 Therefore, recognition in canon law 
during the Middle Ages of contracted and clandestine marriages contradicted both religious 
and secular norms, and the earliest records show that courts heard more applications to 
confirm a marriage than to end one. One explanation is that the Church had to be flexible 
about the ways in which a lawful marriage could be contracted, because any extra-marital 
sexual relationship was mortal sin.
10
 As McGregor put it in a commentary on his work with 
the Finer Committee: 
 
In medieval times, the Church maintained that marriage was indissoluble but so 
feared the eternal repercussions of sexual waywardness that canon lawyers turned it 
into a formless contract requiring little more than the clandestine consent of the 
parties, preceded or followed by sexual intercourse‘11  
 
So although theologians advance the belief that parties come together in a natural union, for 
the purposes of companionship and raising children, while conceding that society requires a 
system of formal recognition of this status,
12
  Stone and McGregor saw a pragmatic court 
system created to balance religious doctrine with human behaviour by governing the status of 
marriage.  
 
Rebecca Probert argues that it is a myth that unmarried cohabitation was rife before Lord 
Hardwicke‘s Act and the later development of Victorian sensibility; women would be 
anxious to establish their married status to be socially accepted and be ‗settled‘ to be eligible 
to rely on the poor laws for subsistence.
13
 In this way, we can perhaps discern the origins of 
the courts‘ protective function. The 1753 Act caused a growth of the courts‘ marriage 
licensing function, while the adjudication on the validity of the status of existing marriages 
diminished.
14
 Outhwaite describes the functions of the ecclesiastical courts as, firstly, 
verification and record, and secondly, corrective and adjudicative.
15
  The corrective function 
addressed crimes of adultery and fornication by imposing acts of penance.
16
 It could be 
argued that upholding morality was sufficient protection for family members. 
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Thus in pre-modern times, the church courts upheld married life as integral to the religious 
identity of the subject, before the secularisation and differentiation of the lifeworld, as 
explained by Habermas, based on Weber.
17
 The Finer Report also attributed rationalist 
motives; that the institution of marriage protected women and advanced men‘s interests.18 
The function of verification undertaken by the ecclesiastical courts protected some women‘s 
and children‘s need for economic support, but the overall impression from these historical 
accounts is one of  regulating social and moral order, the origin of persisting beliefs that 
courts must help to stabilise family life.  
 
Different procedures were followed by the parallel ecclesiastical and common law court 
systems. Each bishopric of Canterbury and York held a Consistory Court for several days 
about once a month in the cathedral building. The chief town in each diocese had three or 
four proctors, who combined the roles of solicitors and barristers and had trained in Roman 
and canon law at Oxford or Cambridge, admitted by application to the bishop. The procedure 
in matrimonial causes involved various pleadings by a proctor for each party. The defendant 
could propose interrogatories of the witnesses, who would then be questioned privately by a 
registrar or examiner who recorded the depositions.
19
  
 
After studying all the documents and listening to the arguments, the bishop‘s chancellor made 
a decree. He played a more dominant role than a judge in the common law court, and decided 
on all the facts without a jury.
20
 A study by Shepard and Spicksley of court records indicates 
that witnesses‘ testimony was valued in accordance with their personal wealth and status.21 
Findings already made by ecclesiastical courts were not challenged in the common law 
courts, which were concerned with civil claims for damages and were served by judges and 
barristers who had trained at the Inns of Court. Witnesses in common law courts were 
publicly cross examined, although the parties themselves only testified from 1851. The judge 
took a detached role, giving legal advice to a jury on the points made by the barristers. Juries 
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were originally used in civil as well as criminal cases, made up of lay men with property 
qualifications, and it was their role to reach a verdict.
22
 The common law courts were 
therefore primarily concerned with property rather than relationships, although they later 
extended their jurisdiction over marital issues in actions for criminal conversation, as will be 
discussed below.   
 
Adjudication of matters involving family relationships outside marriage was the province of 
the JPs. 
 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE: ORIGINS 
 
The JPs held a highly influential position associated with keeping the peace,    combining 
court duties with law-making powers. The earliest exercise of their jurisdiction in family 
matters was enforcing sanctions against parents of illegitimate children.
23
 This reflected the 
ecclesiastical courts‘ role in upholding public morality, supplemented by a local economic 
imperative. JPs had no powers regarding the validity of a marriage except when they replaced 
the church courts for a few years during the Interregnum.  
 
A royal edict of 1195 established ‗keepers of the peace‘ in an attempt by the king and his 
judges to impose order throughout the country. The term ‗justice of the peace‘ originated in 
the Justices of the Peace Act 1361; the alternative term ‗magistrate‘ coming into use during 
the 19th century. The JPs‘ functions were designated in the 1361 Act as restraining offenders, 
rioters and all other barrators,
24
 arresting and punishing them according to their offence.
25
   
 
JPs were members of the local gentry and minor aristocracy who could be relied on to 
maintain order in times of unrest. Their powers grew in piecemeal fashion amidst 
disagreements between localities and government, and some opposition from professional 
lawyers. Lander comments that by 1500 it was doubtful if even the Justices knew what their 
functions were.
26
 They were appointed by annual commissions issued by the King‘s Council. 
This long-standing institution of lay justice can be ascribed to the existence of a middle class 
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gentry, sympathetic to upholding the central rule of law in their local communities against the 
threat of over- exercise of powers by the feudal lords.
27
 It was extended to Wales by Henry 
VIII in the 16th century. Less successful attempts were made to introduce the institution in 
Ireland and Scotland, but systems were also established in the colonies.
28
 Their judicial and 
administrative functions made them, at the height of their power in the 16th to 18th centuries, 
‗the most influential class of men in England‘.29 
 
Skyrme's comprehensive history of JPs in the shires and towns and more far-flung outposts 
reveals a varied if not idiosyncratic application of justice. Even when writing in 1991, he 
admits to ‗some marked differences‘ in the composition and practice of benches across the 
country.
30
  
 
Eventually, commentators were to complain that the magistrates courts‘ jurisdiction in family 
matters was inappropriately placed in ‗police courts‘.31  Others maintained that JPs had 
wider, more integrative functions, from which we might trace the evolution of their family 
jurisdiction. Skyrme claims that: ‗The linking of the ordinary citizen with the administration 
of justice was part of the national heritage deeply ingrained in the way of life of the English 
people which could not be uprooted.‘ 32 The JPs‘ role in family law is discussed below. 
 
Following this introduction, the early jurisdiction of the church courts in matrimonial causes 
will now be considered, followed by the JPs. The interests of children were of course affected 
by both types of court but they did not feature in their own right until very recently, having 
being ‗hidden‘ behind their parents.33   
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CHURCH COURTS, PARLIAMENT AND DIVORCE  
 
Although most matrimonial causes heard in the church courts judged the validity of a 
marriage in order to define personal responsibilities, actions brought to achieve a separation 
were also property-related, because their main purpose was economic.
34
 Women and children 
had to be financially maintained by the head of the household, so an abandonment of this role 
led to a social problem. 
 
Prior to 1857 there were two types of ‗divorce‘: divortium a vinculo matrimonii obtainable by 
Act of Parliament, on the ground of adultery,
35
 and divortium a mensa et thoro (separation 
from bed and board) by an ecclesiastical court, on the grounds of adultery or life-threatening 
cruelty. Adultery by a wife was sufficient grounds for a remedy for a wronged husband, but a 
female petitioner had to also prove aggravated circumstances. Access to either procedure was 
very restricted by the nature of the facts to be established, often reliant on servants‘ evidence, 
and by the costs of doing so. Only a parliamentary divorce could allow the parties to re-
marry. 
 
A marriage could be ended by a church court only by granting a decree of nullity. It is now 
thought that earlier writers were mistaken in claiming that ‗canon law provided abundant 
opportunities‘ for annulments, of which there are few records.36 For example, the Finer 
Report claimed that the Church developed ‗an elaborate theory of nullity‘ by which 
applications could succeed because the breadth of prohibited degrees of consanguinity and 
affinity was utilised to trace an incestuous connection between parties living in small 
communities.
37
 This perception may have stemmed from Pollock and Maitland, who are 
extremely critical of the ecclesiastical courts‘ application of the rules against marriage within 
the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity: 
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Reckless of mundane consequences, the church while she treated marriage as a 
formless contract, multiplied impediments which made the formation of a valid 
marriage a matter of chance … a maze of flighty fancies and misapplied logic.38 
 
While the idea of ecclesiastical courts endlessly taken up with imaginative arguments on the 
validity of individual marriages may have popular appeal, it was perhaps encouraged by those 
who disliked the influence of the established Church.   Outhwaite‘s study presents a more 
mundane picture, of few marital suits of any type.
39
 
 
There were other non-judicial, socially accepted methods of separating: a private separation 
agreement; desertion; or wife-sale.
40
 These were ‗private ordering to a degree unknown 
today… outside the law.‘41 Only a declaration of nullity allowed re-marriage by either party. 
In other cases, any new ‗marital‘ relationship was adulterous or bigamous. The only way in 
which a party to a valid marriage could re-marry was by obtaining a divorce by a specific Act 
of Parliament, clearly an avenue open to only a few of the wealthiest husbands. (There were 
no female petitioners until 1801; four women successfully brought petitions between 1801 
and 1857.)  Only 317 parliamentary divorces were passed between 1690 and 1857, the 
highest number of petitions received in any one year being 12 in 1799 (ten of which 
succeeded).
42
  By 1850, about 50 orders for separation were being made annually by all the 
church courts.
43
 So when secular divorce jurisdiction was finally established in 1857, only 
about 60 couples per year were using a public legal procedure to effect a separation.  
Ingram suggests that the incidence of recognised separations was confined to the extremes of 
the social scale.
44
 Stone concedes this rarity before the 20th century to the extent that he is 
impelled to justify his historical study of divorce by its highly symbolic significance in 
society, ‗carrying a heavy baggage of passionately felt moral principles and symbolic 
meaning‘.45 Before 1857, there were simply no courts available in England and Wales which 
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could dissolve a valid marriage. The cultural and economic pressures on couples to stay 
together were such that marriages normally only ended on death, which occurred, on average, 
earlier than for adults in the 20th century.    
There is evidence that, between the 16th and 19th centuries, relatives and neighbours took it 
on themselves to intervene in marital troubles, and local communities might subject an erring 
spouse to public humiliation.
46
 Scolds and deserters might be subject to public penance in 
church, a dressing-down or even violence by neighbours, a Foucauldian ‗spectacle‘, now 
replaced by the ‗discipline‘ of the mediator or lawyer.47 Stone cites records as recent as the 
18th century of family and friends writing with unsolicited advice, and arranging ill-
conceived meetings to attempt reconciliations.
48
  
While careful to deny any association between relationship breakdown and ease of access to 
divorce in the 1990s, Stone concluded that:  
…there has been removed the ancient moral stigma that for centuries lay upon marital 
breakdown, end especially upon a public divorce…it has become so extremely 
common, familiarity has led not to contempt but to public indifference: divorce is thus 
sociologically reinforcing, like any other habit.
49
  
The religious legacy keeps the quest for marriage-saving in the public sphere, although there 
is some doubt as to how faithfully policy ideals of marriage reflect the morality of today‘s 
Christian believers.
50
 Although the doctrine of marriage as a sacrament was rejected by the 
Reformation, religion is the bedrock of the moral value of the binding and enduring nature of 
marriage. Church of England policy still affirms that marriage should be undertaken as a life-
long commitment although ‗recognises that when marriages break down, the civil law must 
deal with the consequences of that breakdown‘.51 Of course, other faiths which value 
marriage as an institution now co-exist in England and Wales but, overall, we have become 
more secular, with the accompanying rise of the companionate marriage.
52
 Occasionally, 
attempts are made to revive the religious symbolism: when the divorce rate rose after World 
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War II, it was suggested that couples who married in Register Offices needed to be reminded 
of the solemnity of the occasion and the obligations they were undertaking.
53
 (The format of 
the ceremony was amended accordingly). The next section examines the earliest attempts by 
the Church to deal with consequences of breakdown.  
MARITAL SEPARATION AND THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS - DIVORTIUM A 
MENSA ET THORO (SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD) 
 
Outhwaite‘s description of the church courts‘ functions as verification and adjudication 
covered applications to validate or nullify a marriage, for restitution of conjugal rights 
(whereby a wife might obtain alimony from a deserting husband) or jactitation.
54
 It was not 
until the 18th century that the number of applications for separation began to outnumber 
those relating to validity. The limited remedies available explain why few engaged with the 
cumbersome process. Separation applications might have been attempts to obtain higher 
maintenance than was privately agreed; to enable a husband to separate from an adulterous 
wife in a way that would shed his liability for maintenance; or as a collusive preparation for a 
parliamentary divorce.
55
 Procedures were slow and expensive, with lawyers having to travel 
to gather all the evidence in person. Although more efficient, the specialist London court, the 
Doctors‘ Commons, required a qualifying residential period of 21 days.56 Procedures 
depended on private written documents and professional examinations (held in private and 
written into further reports) of witnesses by lawyers. Different rules of evidence were used 
from the common law, and only the judge‘s decision would be given in open court.  
 
Stone criticises delay in the church courts, saying that although it was claimed in 1853 that an 
uncontested suit took two to five months, ‗in fact‘ they took four to nine months. A contested 
case could take up to two years.
57
 In contrast, Kiralfy states that the entire proceedings lasted 
about three months and ‗compare favourably in despatch with common law proceedings‘.58 
He does however list a number of problems. There were difficulties of enforcement, with 
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weak sanctions such as excommunication for failure to appear or breaching an order. Non-
conformist churches were able to conduct their own marriages under the Marriage Act 1836, 
but these were then regulated by courts of the established Church. Above all, he identifies the 
limited nature of the remedy to separation without re-marriage, and in common with Stone 
links this last factor with the wider injustice of parliamentary divorce being available only to 
‗the wealthiest‘.59 But the church courts were also expensive, and beyond the average 
person‘s reach; the most straightforward case would cost over £100 and costs could reach 
several thousand pounds. The Campbell Commission in 1853 estimated the normal cost of an 
undefended application as between £300 and £500.
60
 Although poor people might be 
exempted from paying court fees under the ‗poor persons‘ procedure‘, the other costs of 
bringing an action were high.
61
 An ancillary decree of alimony (usually one-third of his 
income) could be made where the husband had been found guilty of aggravated adultery (the 
only ground of separation available to women). The problem was that the church courts could 
offer no proprietary remedies, so could not enforce debts against the husband‘s property.62 
Husbands had a legal obligation to maintain their wives on the basis that men had to maintain 
themselves, and husband and wife were legally one. The common law courts did not 
recognise any corresponding right of the wife to enforce this obligation, or an alimony order, 
because all matters pertaining to marriage were within the ecclesiastical courts‘ jurisdiction: 
‗…for the common law to have entertained a claim for maintenance by the wife against her 
husband would have amounted to an invasion of the spiritual jurisdiction.‘63 Thus, the 
ecclesiastical and common law courts between them caused women and children to become 
destitute and throw themselves on the mercy of the poor laws.
 64
 To quote Lord Lyndhurst in 
the debate on the 1857 legislation: ‗From that moment the wife is almost in a state of 
outlawry. She may not enter into a contract…she is homeless, helpless, hopeless, and almost 
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destitute of civil rights. Liable to all manner of injustice …‘65 (The position of a wife 
divorced by Parliament was in theory better, as the bill would be passed on the understanding 
that the husband had executed a bond securing some income on specific property.
66
)  
By the mid 17th century, private deeds of separation were being drawn up by conveyancing 
lawyers to enable couples to separate, so far as possible, with a degree of independence. Such 
arrangements recognised the increasing importance of contract law and an encroachment on 
church law. In this way, ‗An officially non-divorcing society could devise its own quasi legal 
instruments to cope with the fact of irremediable marital breakdown.‘67 So we can see the 
professional players as agents for change ahead of the law. 
 
The fate of children of married couples was dependent on the father. Although private deeds 
of separation sometimes gave custody of a child to the mother, these were not necessarily 
accepted by the courts, and a father‘s inherent power over his children could not be abrogated 
by a separation deed.
68
 Applications by women to the High Court for writs of habeas corpus 
for the return of their children on separation rarely succeeded. Mothers could not even 
interfere with the power of a testamentary guardian who had been appointed by the deceased 
father. Although the court might exercise its own power over the guardian to award custody 
to a mother, this was extremely rare.
69
 It was not until the Custody of Infants Act 1839 that 
the Court of Chancery was able to transfer the custody of children aged under seven years to 
their innocent (that is, non-adulterous) mother. Under the Custody of Infants Act 1873, the 
High Court could award custody to a mother, even if guilty of adultery, of a child aged up to 
age 16; from 1881 the courts could make such order as they thought fit. It was not until 1925 
that the child‘s welfare became a feature in the court‘s decision making.70   
 
Even where a wife may not have been completely deterred from seeking a separation by the 
prospective loss of her livelihood and children, there were few remedies available, as the 
ecclesiastical courts interpreted the ground of cruelty narrowly. In 1790, Sir William Scott, 
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the judge in the Court of Arches, explained this strictness of the rule: the duties of marriage 
could be overcome by the duty of self-preservation in a situation where a wife was in 
immediate threat of physical harm, but any lesser harm did not amount to cruelty sufficient to 
obtain a separation order.
71
 (This remained the basis of the law until cruelty became a ground 
for divorce in 1937.
72
) 
 
As the volume of business in the ecclesiastical courts diminished during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, they came under increasing attack for inefficiency. There are complex reasons for 
the decline; dissatisfaction with the courts‘ wider operations probably led to them losing their 
matrimonial jurisdiction.
73
 Outhwaite wrote that, although records immediately following the 
Restoration in 1660 are poor, there appear to have been more prosecutions for specifically 
religious matters than crimes related to ‗sexual lapses‘ such as bastardy or defamation.74 This 
indicates a social change in attitude toward the power of the Church in regulating private 
moral behaviour, as the functions of Church and State increasingly separate: ‗By 1830 the 
policing functions of the English ecclesiastical courts against the laity had virtually 
disappeared.‘75 A decrease in the rate of actions relating to probate and payment of tithes, 
together with the restrictive nature of sentencing and lack of reform of procedure all 
contributed to the decline.
76
 
 
Before dealing with the fate of the church courts‘ matrimonial jurisdiction, the separate 
parliamentary process will be considered. 
 
MARITAL SEPARATION AND PARLIAMENT - DIVORTIUM A VINCULO 
MATRIMONII (FREEDOM FROM THE BOND OF MARRIAGE 
 
Parliament‘s authority to grant a divorce was derived from the powers it inherited from Rome 
in the Reformation: a power to issue ‗no more than the pre-Reformation Papal Decree‘.77 The 
limitations of the separation a mensa et thoro could cause problems for the wealthiest 
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families if suspicions about a wife‘s associations cast doubt on whether a true heir of the 
blood line was guaranteed. A landowner who had not produced his own male heir might 
therefore need to obtain a declaration of the illegitimacy of his wife‘s children, as well as an 
opportunity to re-marry and continue the family line. The importance of patrilineal descent 
was recognised by the development of a divorce process by act of Parliament, available only 
to very few men.
78
 The ground was adultery, and the Act dissolving the marriage would 
include a clause allowing the husband to re-marry. It is remarkable that only about 160 years 
ago, the dissolution of a marriage was of such public concern that the legislature had to be 
harnessed to examine the individual relationship in question.   
 
The remedy appeared in the late 17th century. Procedurally, the readings of bills for divorce 
took a similar form to a full court trial, with the possibility of stiff cross-examination by the 
Lord Chancellor himself. The first bills to be accepted were from  men of high rank, who had 
obtained a separation in the church court, and who could claim a danger of their family 
inheritance passing to illegitimate children. Standing orders introduced in 1798 and 1809 
eventually stipulated requirements: proof of adultery by two witnesses; a previously good 
relationship between the couple with no evidence of adultery or cruelty by the husband; a 
separation a mensa et thoro and a successful criminal conversation action with no evidence of 
collusion, all of which were subject to cross examination. Stone called this a panoply, 
intended to reassure any parliamentarians who worried that divorce undermined society and 
disadvantaged women. Being unavailable to the lower orders, any rise in the number of bills 
could be used as grounds for attacking the degeneracy of the ruling classes.
79
 For complex 
ecclesiastical law reasons, although some type of divorce was made available in most 
European countries during the Reformation, this had never been settled in England.
80
 Simple 
divorce on the grounds of mutual incompatibility was introduced in France shortly after the 
revolution, and applied for at a rate alarming to the English, already fearful of social disorder 
in Europe.
81
  
 
Despite the trappings of scandal, once the facts were established, a bill for divorce could be 
passed almost automatically. Some petitioners had influential friends in either House who 
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could secure them a dispensation from cross examination; connivance and collusion became 
more blatant. By the mid 19th century about half of petitions were brought by professional 
men rather than solely members of the aristocracy.
82
   
 
The double standard whereby only a man could petition on the sole ground of adultery was 
further promoted by standing orders requiring a clause forbidding the wife from re-marrying.  
The consequences for most divorced wives may have been punishment enough. The grim 
position of a wife following a church court separation was replicated, regarding their children 
and their finances. However badly a father might have behaved, he was in sole control of 
whether his children ever saw their mother. Some women divorced by Parliament did have 
opportunities to retain some money. The reading of the bill for divorce could include 
representations by an officer known as the ‗ladies‘ friend‘ who was to ensure financial 
provision was included. Some women had their own connections amongst parliamentarians 
who would argue for a good financial settlement. A deed was normally drawn up before the 
bill was submitted, otherwise a wife could lose all of her marriage portion (dowry), pin 
money (an allowance for her personal expenses) and widow‘s entitlements.83  
 
As far as parliamentary scrutiny was concerned, the fate of women and children depended on 
individual connections, their welfare being of little significance in the public sphere. This 
hardly changed until the Married Women‘s Property Act 1882, probably the greatest 
achievement of Victorian feminism, bestowed autonomous legal capacity on women, which 
allowed those who had some property of their own the possibility of economic 
independence.
84
 It was a far greater step toward equality of men and women than the reform 
of divorce law.   
 
There were four exceptional cases where women were successful with petitions, between 
1801 and 1857. Two were ‗aggravated‘ by incest, one by bigamy and another by cruelty and 
bigamy.
85
 Women were further discriminated against by the rise of the action for criminal 
conversation, premised on a wife‘s body and reputation being owned by her husband. 
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ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES AT COMMON LAW – CRIMINAL CONVERSATION  
 
A husband could pursue a civil suit through the common law courts for damages, assessed by 
a jury, for criminal conversation against a co-respondent in adultery. Although this was a 
separate legal action to the two types of separation, a marriage could end through a 
combination of all three. 
 
When dealing with separations, courts had to make judgments about whether or not a 
matrimonial offence been committed, in order to reach a decision. The ecclesiastical courts 
and JPs had been able to punish crimes of adultery and fornication, but as already discussed, 
by the late 17th century the church courts‘ capacity to apply their moral code weakened, 
while JPs‘ priority was the financial maintenance of illegitimate children. Adultery, 
previously punished by public confession, fines, the stocks or whipping, was effectively de-
criminalised.
86
  However, the common law courts, Kings Bench and Common Pleas, revived 
ritualistic public spectacle by extending the tort of trespass to criminal conversation, known 
as ‗crim. con.‘  The husband and the co-respondent were the only parties to the action, and 
juries (made up largely of city merchants) made speedy decisions for often very high sums in 
damages. The 1809 standing orders had made a crim. con. judgment a step in the process of 
parliamentary divorce, but findings had no effect in the church courts, which did not accept 
common law proceedings as evidence.  
 
The number of crim. con. actions grew rapidly, from ten in 1740, to 75 in 1790. Stone argues 
that this phenomenon does not necessarily reflect an increase in the rate of adulterous 
behaviour by wives, because courts were happy to encourage a proliferation of crim. con. 
actions for other reasons.
87
  Firstly, common law judges were trying to attract more business 
by promoting the principle that monetary compensation should be available for any tort. 
Secondly, the growth of the nation-state encouraged a change in attitude toward resolving 
issues by law rather than violence.
88
 A re-definition of male honour reflected the move from 
an ‗honour and shame society‘ to a commercial one, where litigation became the acceptable 
mode of revenge.
89
 Prevailing theories of the sanctity of property and contract increased the 
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importance of securing patrilineal descent, and continued the double standard of behaviour 
between men and women, necessitated by fear of the consequences of a wife‘s adultery.  
 
Thus, in a rationalised and legalised society, courts adapted their functions to quantify the 
level of hurt, humiliation and disgrace of the cuckolded husband into financial redress. The 
high levels of damages that could be awarded, and a successful action assisting with divorce, 
were instrumental in achieving the goals of the protagonists.  
 
Although parliamentary divorce proceedings were conducted in a circumspect manner that 
attracted little public attention, the details of crim. con. actions were relished by the popular 
press.
90
 According to Stone, Lord Kenyon, appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1788, was so 
influenced by moral panic about promiscuity in the upper classes and fears of social 
breakdown (as in France) that he ‗converted a private civil action into a public criminal 
one‘.91  Kenyon sought to curb dissolute behaviour by encouraging even higher levels of 
damages, and he personally prosecuted crim. con. actions with extraordinary rhetoric. So the 
action developed from one of a private claim for financial recompense to a means by which 
the judge and jury was encouraged to set punitive levels of damages against the defendant, 
irrespective of his means.
92
  Thus we can see those working in the courts behaving in 
response to popular appeal, without any change in the substantive law. 
 
Despite the incentive of a high financial return, by the early 19th century it was recognised 
that these cases were largely based on collusion, for pragmatic reasons rather than satisfying 
outraged family values, and that damages awarded were not always being collected. 
(Sometimes the damages paid for the subsequent divorce bill). Outhwaite‘s more recent 
analysis agrees with Stone‘s, that debate on the mid 19th century reforms acknowledged 
crim. con. as ‗embarrassing‘.93 The legal action between two men could involve serious 
injustices against the wife, who had no voice in the proceedings and was powerless to 
respond to any allegations being made.
94
 Debate in the Lords raised the question of whether 
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the law could be reformed so that an adulterous husband could also be punished, but this was 
too thorny an issue to go very far.
95
  
 
The rise of the companionate marriage with its child-centred household and structural 
isolation of the family unit from kinship and society has been well documented.
96
 Victorian 
domesticity attributed a different type of value to women; rather than as mere property, 
married life began to symbolise support and companionship.
97
 Engels argued in 1891 that 
capitalism depended on the surrender of women to the patriarchal family unit; the 
indissolubility of marriage originating in economic relations.
98
 Therefore the function of the 
wife in western society as ‗head servant‘99 whether rationalised as economic or 
conceptualised as contributing to social order, could justify a claim on her by the husband. As 
the division between commercial and domestic worlds became more marked, a seducer was 
seen as a home wrecker in a wider social sense, rather than merely a trespasser against the 
individual husband. The crim. con. action exemplifies the interface between the public and 
private realms with which family law was beginning to struggle.  
 
Stone attributes the longevity of the crim. con. action, invented by common lawyers, to it 
being a legal device that was ‗.. twisted to suit the needs of the key participants in the 
process: the elite males who were the plaintiffs, the barristers, and the judges who staffed the 
courts.‘100 For 200 years, the action served to address moral panic; support wealthy men in 
enforcing their proprietary position over women and children; facilitate divorce and re-
marriage; punish the wrong-doer, and generate fame and wealth for the lawyers involved in 
highly publicised cases: 
These radical changes in the latent functions of the action, made to satisfy the leading 
participants, are enough to explain why it survived until 1857. But no-one can argue 
that this was the most functional and economical way to achieve the desired ends.
101
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PROCEDURAL REFORM – MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT 1857 
 
So far, we can see little, if any, sign of the protective function of courts identified in Chapter 
One. The courts did not challenge patriarchal values nor the legal and physical capacity of 
husbands to ill-treat or confine their wives and children. Even a woman experiencing serious 
violence at the hands of her husband had little recourse to court for a remedy, other than the 
magistrates binding him over.
102
 The common law had no interest in family relationships that 
did not come within the ‗twin rubrics of property and breach of the peace.‘103 Graveson lists 
four questions facing the reformers: replacing the ecclesiastical courts‘ long entrenched 
jurisdiction; providing women with more than their limited remedies in equity; whether 
divorce should be available to the poor; and the Church‘s opposition to remarriage.104  
 
The sanctity of marriage as a theological construct was reinforced by the power of the Church 
and its bishops in the House of Lords. The double standard regarding adultery, to protect 
patrilineal descent, was bolstered by reference to biblical authority.
105
 While the ecclesiastical 
courts held the jurisdiction for matrimonial causes, bishops and their officials resisted change. 
Similarly to the way the crim. con. actions were manipulated to suit the lawyers and juries 
who managed that process in the common law courts, the church courts could hold 
themselves accountable to their institutional values, rather than to the parties before them. 
Although marital causes were ‗secularised‘ in the mid 19th century, this was procedural 
change only. The law did not adapt to recognise any change in the values of family life.  
 
So, although it may appear that systems embedded in the lifeworld of the religious era 
changed to suit modernity in 1857, they did not effectively break from the past. During the 
process of change, players in the system coped by manipulating court systems for their own 
purposes. Stone claims that there was little relationship between the manifest function of the 
courts, based on theology, and their latent functions in enabling those who had sufficient 
wealth and power to retain their social position and avoid scandal.
106
 Nevertheless, the central 
tenets of religion and class division were retained.  
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Stone calls it ‗indefensible‘ that parliamentary divorce was restricted to a handful of wealthy 
males for more than 150 years.
107
 In retrospect it is hardly surprising that this was so, while 
the population was largely respectful of religious teaching and women were economically 
dependent on men. As it became known in the public sphere that the legal process paid little 
respect to the principles of morality it was supposedly upholding, the debate could begin. 
There were fractures between the lifeworld and systems, although differing views on what 
these were. Benthamite reformers were calling for large scale overhaul of all court structures 
and some were concerned to advance women‘s interests.108 Lord Lyndhurst, who had chaired 
the preceding select committee led arguments in Parliament to equalise the status of husbands 
and wives in divorce law.
109
 Although the Finer Report refers to ‗leading personalities of the 
times‘ making repeated reference to the inequality between the sexes and the classes in 
publications and parliamentary debate and evidence to committees, it produces no record of 
Parliament considering class issues in access to justice.
110
 Indeed, Stone claims there was 
‗nothing in the Parliamentary debates of the 1850s which shows the slightest awareness of 
these [social inequality] problems.‘111 Shanley notes that several Lords and Bishops spoke 
against divorce being available to the poor, as this would lead to mass immorality.
112
 
Graveson comments that the Commons, recently reformed, would never have favoured a bill 
that maintained divorce as the privilege of the rich; it was the Spiritual Peers who opposed 
cheaper divorce as encouraging immorality amongst the poor.
113
 Stone and Outhwaite both 
paint vivid descriptions of the Bill being forced through both Houses against a plethora of 
delaying tactics by its opponents, including evangelicals, Roman Catholics and bishops.
114
  
 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (MCA 1857) was designed to move matrimonial disputes 
to the civil courts. It was one of a series of reforms to unify and rationalise the administration 
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of the law.
115
 The ecclesiastical courts‘ jurisdiction was predominately  probate; thus we can 
see the first divorce courts envisaged narrowly as part of a mechanism for settling property 
matters, in contrast to the wider functions of family justice today. As Cretney explains of the 
Act: 
 
Its origins certainly do not lie in any concern for abstract justice. Rather they lie in the 
pressing need, highlighted by the growth in personal wealth associated with 
industrialisation, to get rid of the ramshackle probate jurisdiction exercised by 350 or 
so ecclesiastical authorities and replace it with a more efficient system of dealing with 
deceased‘s  property.116 
 
 
Outhwaite‘s history of the ecclesiastical courts notes that their dwindling business had 
reduced their efficiency.
117
 They were subject to increasing criticism from 1660 through to 
the 18th century, reflected in contumacy
118
 and weak sanctions for non-attendance. Records 
suggest that petitions to Parliament about the courts‘ powers arose from individual 
circumstances of delay and frustration rather than ideology. For example, in 1733 an irate 
father brought a case against clergymen who performed a dubious marriage ceremony for his 
17-year-old daughter without his consent; his dissatisfaction with the progress of his 
complaint was one of the drivers of a series of bills to reform clandestine marriage and 
church court procedures.
119
 Most complaints related to probate or to discipline of the clergy, 
rather than matrimonial causes.
120
 The first appears to reflect an increasing disconnection 
between wider sections of society which were beginning to have an interest in cost-effective 
administration of probate, and the system that was being preserved by the Church courts.  
The second may have come about through weakening of leadership in the Church, increased 
secularisation, or both. In any event, as society grew more affluent and more individuals 
encountered the legal process administered by the Church, the less satisfactory and more 
ossified the systems became.    
 
The marital jurisdiction did attract some complaints as well. Separation a mensa et thoro 
effectively condemned many families to live in uncertain or illegal situations. Nor were 
parliamentary processes highly regarded, being described by one of the MP in to Commons 
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in 1835 as a scandal, disgrace, a cause of jest and merriment, and an expensive farce.
121
 Many 
sources quote the sardonic judgment delivered by an Assize Court judge in 1845 advising an 
impoverished deserted husband that he need only spend £500 to £600 in a series of actions 
that would endure for one or two years, repeatedly proving his case.
122
 Divorce was available 
in Scotland from 1573 so there were cross-border difficulties, and some lawyers were also 
unhappy about the scandals associated with crim. con. cases and collusion.
123
 
 
According to the Royal Commission set up in 1850, the cost of a typical parliamentary 
divorce was £700 or £800 or, if contested, some thousands of pounds.
124
 The Commission did 
not recommend any change in the substantive law, but proposed an administrative 
reorganisation to abolish all the ecclesiastical courts and transfer their probate and 
matrimonial jurisdiction to secular courts.  
 
Initially, the majority of matrimonial business was to be handled by the Court of Chancery, 
but instead new courts were established in London.
125
 This suggests that commentators are 
correct that there was no intention to widen access to divorce; a de-centralised system would 
have been available to far more couples. Those who harboured fears of the lower orders 
becoming uncontrollable and irresponsible succeeded in denying them the personal freedom 
available to the wealthy.
126
 
 
Nor did the Act itself bring major improvements for women. The new Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes Court could award child custody and visitation rights; a woman was able 
to be party and therefore defend her reputation in the new action for damages that replaced 
crim. con.; and grounds for divorce were extended to include the ‗aggravating circumstances‘ 
of desertion and mental cruelty. Husbands, however, could obtain a divorce on the grounds of 
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adultery alone, until the Matrimonial Causes Act 1923. The lobbying on behalf of women 
which succeeded in making divorce (restricted as it was) available to them has been seen as a 
step in progress toward property reform.
127
 Poor women still had access to justice only 
through JPs.
128
 Soon, legislation introduced from 1878 would mean that JPs were dealing 
with thousands of cases per year awarding maintenance to beaten or deserted wives, 
discussed below.  
 
Expectations of the volume of court business were low. The Lord Chancellor thought the 
proposals inefficient because matrimonial causes needed judges of the highest quality but 
there would be insufficient business to occupy a court full time.
129
 (It had been argued during 
the passage of the Bill that if probate was successfully transferred, but divorce was not, the 
small amount of work retained by the church courts would not have maintained a group of 
ecclesiastical lawyers.)
130
 Divorce was tried by in an inquisitorial manner by three judges; 
appeals could be taken to the Court of Appeal and from there to the House of Lords. 
Separation a mensa et thoro became a decree of judicial separation in the High Court.   
 
Reconsidering Graveson‘s four questions, above, it can be seen that systems were changed to 
address the problems of Church control mainly to better serve the interests of upper and 
middle class men with, possibly, incidental improvements for some wives and children. The 
implementation of the MCA 1857 ‗opened no floodgate‘131 having little effect on the 
majority of the population, divorce being obtainable only at considerable financial cost. 
Although:  
 
‗…several hundred middle-class men and women were moved every year from the 
categories of the eloped, the deserted, the privately separated, or the judicially 
separated, to the category of the divorced…the number of people involved remained 
statistically minute.
132
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By 1880, the number of annual average decrees was still only 277; by 1900 it was 500.
133
 For 
the majority of the population, regulation of family relationships remained a matter for the 
local JPs. 
 
THE GROWTH OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE: 
16th-19th CENTURIES 
 
THE POOR LAWS 
 
The domestic jurisdiction of magistrates courts, established in 1878, had its roots in the poor 
law system, originating in the mid 16th century.
134
 The main aim was to reduce the number of 
paupers dependent on the parish, ‗a subject with which the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
authorities were almost morbidly obsessed.‘135 The Finer Report described the poor law as 
the means through which the public supported those who were unable to support themselves, 
but then sought reimbursement by imposing legal liability upon their relatives in accordance 
with Tudor notions of kinship.
136
 These obligations of kinship were manifested as relatives of 
any person unable to work being required to support them at a rate set by the local JPs, or pay 
a penalty of £1 a month.
137
 JPs also oversaw the building and maintenance of ‗houses of 
correction‘ for vagrants and the local unemployed to maintain themselves.138 
 
Taking a more positive line, Skyrme describes the extension of the criminal and 
administrative role of the JP to social and economic functions under the poor laws as ‗the 
beginning of social services‘.139 The poor laws provided work for the able bodied and relief 
for the destitute.  Conceding that the Tudor policy was based on failure to enforce the 
repression of vagrancy, he finds evidence of some JPs taking a humanitarian attitude toward 
their administration of the system rather than merely trying to contain expenditure. Although 
the ‗strongest incentive for the legislation was the necessity to remove a pressing danger to 
society rather than a spirit of charity‘ Skyrme calls it ‗the greatest social achievement of the 
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age and a landmark in the history of JPs. It confirmed them as the focal point for local 
administration in a system of government which was to last until the nineteenth century.‘140  
 
Beneficiaries had to establish a right of ‗settlement‘ or connection to the parish; this was one 
reason why proving marital status was so important to wives and mothers.
141
 Churchwardens 
and annually-appointed parish overseers set a poor rate, collected it and distributed it to the 
deserving poor. Their duties included setting work or obtaining apprenticeships for 
abandoned children; this ‗constructive principle of [child] care remained unaltered in our 
legislation for 347 years‘, according to Heywood.142  
 
Affiliation proceedings remained within the magistrates‘ remit until abolished by the Family 
Law Reform Act 1987 (although transferred to elected boards of poor law guardians for a 
short period, 1834 to 1839).
143
 The policy was one of punishment and enforcement against 
both parents, with no explicit regard to a child‘s welfare.144   From 1844, a mother of 
illegitimate children could herself bring a case against the putative father in the petty 
sessional court.
145
 Although women were usually reluctant to do so, pressure was applied, 
and ‗the fundamental principles and procedures underpinning the bastardy jurisdiction, 
established in the mid-Victorian period were still firmly in place when the Finer Committee 
reported over 100 years later.‘146  
 
There was no common law obligation on a parent to financially support their children (unless 
they had entered into a contract to pay, for example, for their education). All obligations to 
maintain children came within the poor law legislation. Wikeley concludes from the 
extensive historical literature that the parish had a duty to maintain the deserving poor, rather 
than the poor having any right to relief or active role in negotiating it.
147
 When this ‗multitude 
of practices‘ across parishes was consolidated into what could be described as a system in 
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1834,
148
 it was on the basis of ‗less eligibility‘ that ensured that a pauper could never be in a 
better financial position than a labourer.
149
 
 
Clearly the JPs‘ function here was one of social control, but this necessitated an element of 
protection. Women, children and the infirm would have faced starvation without the poor 
laws. Despite the Church imposing moral responsibilities on the family form, it could not, it 
seems, provide for the survival of the vulnerable without the law-making powers of the JPs, 
who appear to have achieved legitimacy through a mixture of amateurism and localism.            
 
JPs’ OTHER POWERS TO REGULATE AND PROTECT THE FAMILY    
 
For a brief period during the English Civil War, JPs acquired extended powers in domestic 
matters. Of course, the ecclesiastical courts were temporarily abolished; civil ceremonies 
conducted by JPs were the only legal form of marriage from 1653-1657, and JPs also 
pronounced on the validity of a marriage. There were even proposals for marriage formalities 
to include a clause allowing divorce by either party on the ground of adultery.
150
 Uncertainty 
about the church courts‘ jurisdiction continued well after the Interregnum, and private 
separation deeds became more common, with evidence of JPs improvising when asked to 
endorse agreements.
151
   
 
In the longer term, JPs‘ functions regarding family relations were administering the poor law 
and powers associated with the criminal law, for example binding over a violent or cruel 
husband to keep the peace. The ecclesiastical courts and JPs both addressed the punishment 
of sexual delinquency.
152
 As discussed above, along with the ecclesiastical courts, they had 
been able to punish miscreants for fornication and adultery, but this corrective function 
gradually fell into disuse by the mid 18th century. Some JPs were also clergymen. We can 
see a picture of societal values being enforced through medieval and early modern structures; 
with adjudication integral to local communities, in both church and lay courts, undertaken by 
the men who concerned themselves with moral and economic control of family life.  
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The Finer report is extremely critical, throughout, of the JPs‘ involvement in family matters 
having accidentally emerged from the early criminal and poor law jurisdiction. The 
Committee‘s disapproval reflects the Fabian perspective of some of its members, but in the 
face of evidence of the inefficiency of the administration of maintenance orders, their 
complaints are not entirely ideological. Wikeley justifies these criticisms in his recent work 
on child support.
153
 
 
Most families who came into contact with the earliest family courts were affected by JPs, not 
judges. It is therefore interesting to briefly look at the type of person who became a JP, the 
nature of society‘s expectations of them, and the way this might influence their application of 
the law through their own courts. Furthermore, we should try to evaluate how much the JPs‘ 
role in local justice and services, exercised over eight centuries, is reflected or appropriate in 
the 21st century administration of family law.  
 
JPs were largely unpaid and therefore had to be wealthy men. (Stipendiary magistrates were 
introduced in 1792, as discussed below.) The 1361 statute required JPs to be ‗one lord and 
with him three or four of the most worthy in the county‘, ascribing a measure of financial, as 
well as moral, worth to those who were also seen to have integrity to be charged with keeping 
the peace.
154
 From 1439, a minimum income was stipulated for eligibility.
155
 This parallels 
the way in which wealthier witnesses‘ testimony was valued in the ecclesiastical courts, and 
the jurors selected in crim. con. actions. Property qualifications were abolished by the Liberal 
government in the early 20th century, although of course only a narrow band of society could 
afford the time to undertake JPs‘ duties. 
 
At the height of their influence, early in the 19th century, JPs were ‗the effective rulers of the 
land‘.156 Holding combined functions as judges, administrators and police, they governed the 
country through the quarter and petty sessions and also influenced the government through 
political channels. Their civil functions were analogous to the modern public services 
undertaken by local authorities. exercising all aspects of local government, backed by 
enforcement powers, including trade; shipping; agriculture; liquor licensing; gaming; 
                                                 
153
 N Wikeley, Child Support: Law and Policy (Hart, Oxford 2006) Ch 4; to be discussed further in Chapter 
Four 
154
 F Milton, The English Magistracy (OUP, London 1967) 6-7; See also A Shepard and J Spicksley ‗Worth, 
Age and Social Status in Early Modern England‘ (2011) 64(2) The Economic History Review 493–530  
155
 18 Hen. VI c. 11 (1439) 
156
 T Skyrme, History of the Justices of the Peace Volume 2 (Barry Rose, Chichester, 1991) 37 
92 
 
hunting; weights and measures;   bridges; highways; gaols; vagrants and gypsies They even 
set local prices and wages, thereby being responsible for the local economy.
157
  
 
In petty sessions, even a ‗single Justice‘ could exercise a broad range of functions in his own 
home. The more serious quarter sessions were attended by the Lord Lieutenant, most 
magistrates, sheriffs, coroners, bailiffs, and poor law overseers. There was also a jury of at 
least 12 men.
158
 Given the number and social position of those in attendance, and the breadth 
of the JPs‘ duties, the quarter sessions must have taken a dominant role in local affairs. 
Justice meted out to defendants in such a public way fits well into Foucault‘s concept of 
spectacle in early modernity.
159
    
 
Although it can be said that JPs were more influential than the local aristocracy or churchmen 
during the 18th and early 19th centuries, the bench probably comprised almost all of the local 
nobility, bishops and some of the leading gentry. Almost all secular and ecclesiastical peers 
and about half of MPs were JPs.
160
 Their historical importance was described by C. A. Beard 
in 1904: 
… chosen from the strongest and most stable elements of the gentry … they possessed 
that intimate knowledge of local persons and conditions which facilitates efficient 
administration; but … they never secured enough corporate independence to endanger 
the cohesion of the national system. England‘s early national unity and internal 
administrative uniformity were in a large measure due to the institution of the justice 
of the peace.
161
   
 
JPs may have administered their duties regarding paupers, workhouses and vagrants harshly 
but centrally-imposed systems were harsh in themselves. Furthermore, their position as local 
employers and landowners could not leave them impartial.
162
 Skyrme admits that the JPs 
applied overt class discrimination in being far more lenient with their own class than the 
lower orders, but believes that, in general, the number of inadequate or corrupt JPs was low. 
He cites various instances of JPs‘ philanthropy and compassion, giving guidance and advice 
to individuals in the community.
163
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It has been suggested that JPs‘ performance during the height of their power was, on balance, 
effective in their administrative duties but variable in their application of draconian criminal 
law. Their reputation began to decline in the 18th century as blatantly political appointments 
became widespread. This was resisted by those already in place, partly to maintain the 
integrity of the role, but ‗combined with a good deal of class and party prejudice‘.164  
 
The police courts‘ jurisdiction over most of the population of London, the Middlesex bench, 
was exercised by professional stipendiary magistrates from 1792. Eventually, the Home 
Office assumed the running of prisons and new corporations took over local government in 
the bigger towns.
165
 By the end of the 19th century, local administration in the shires had 
been transferred to elected county councils. County courts were established in 1846 although 
small debt enforcement and all family matters remained within the JPs‘ jurisdiction.  
 
In 1888, Maitland described magistrates as ‗cheap, pure and capable‘ but ‗doomed, sacrificed 
on the altar of the spirit of the age‘.166 He was unduly pessimistic. JPs have proved 
indispensible, primarily because of their ‗cheapness‘. 
 
Attempts are now made to diversify the profile to better reflect society. Judicial statistics are 
kept on the gender, age, ethnic make-up and disability status amongst the magistracy. In 
2009, although gender balance was about equal, only 4 per cent were aged less than 40; and 
49 per cent more than 60.
167
  
 
In the 19th century, JPs outside London still tended to be appointed mainly from the gentry, 
but the property qualification was abolished by the incoming Liberal government in 1906, 
and within a few years included ‗working men with a first hand knowledge of the conditions 
of life amongst their own class.‘168 The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 allowed the 
selection of women.
169
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The magistrates courts‘ powers from the late 19th century will be covered in the next section. 
 
THE FURTHER ENTRENCHMENT OF THE DIVISION 
 
THE HIGH COURT: 19th-20th CENTURY 
 
As noted above, in the decades following the 1857 Act, divorce petitions to the High Court 
were very rare. A series of social reforms introduced by the Liberal government included 
setting up a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Gorell to enquire into law and administration 
in divorce, matrimonial causes and applications for separation orders, with particular 
reference to the ‗poorer classes‘. Gorell was an immediate past President of the Probate 
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court, and known for his reformist views, 
similar to those being publicised by an influential pressure group, the Divorce Law Reform 
Union.
170
 At that time, the High Court was dealing with 800 divorce petitions annually, while 
the magistrates were dealing with 15,000 applications for matrimonial orders.
171
 The 
Commission reported in 1912 on the lack of capacity in the PDA to deal with even this small 
number of petitions, and the inequality of a process which served only those who could afford 
to travel to London.
172
 There were only about 15 cases being heard annually under the poor 
persons‘ procedure.173 (Applicants might be eligible for fee exemption, but relied on their 
finding a barrister and solicitor charitable enough to support them free of charge.
174
)   
 
Although the majority of Commission members wanted to decentralise the High Court 
jurisdiction to enable local sittings, they opposed the idea of extending divorce jurisdiction to 
the county court because of reluctance to entrust cases to registrars.
175
 (These were local 
solicitors who fulfilled judicial roles on a part-time basis, and whom the Commission felt 
would be ill-equipped to adjudicate on divorce.) Cretney says that there was a perceived risk 
of conflict of interest if a local solicitor was judging a case with which he was familiar and it 
was generally accepted that the seriousness of divorce required the expertise of barristers 
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‗even for the poorest persons.‘176 This contrasts oddly with the value placed on local JPs. 
Instead, the Commission proposed that a small number of county court judges be selected for 
appointment as Commissioners of Assizes.
177
   
 
In other ways, the Gorell Report was progressive. It studied foreign jurisdictions and noted 
that few were as limited geographically, expensive, discriminatory (against women) and had 
such restricted grounds for divorce as in England and Wales.
178
 It argued for gender equality, 
widening the grounds for divorce, as well as decentralising the procedure for the benefit of 
parties with limited financial means. The debate on procedural questions seems to have fallen 
into abeyance with the outbreak of war, and none of these reforms proceeded until many 
years later. The poor persons‘ procedure was improved slightly in 1914, but was still very 
restricted: in 1918 only about ten per cent of applications were granted.
179
   
 
The disruption to family life caused by both world wars in the 20th century led to an 
immense rise in the number of applications for divorce; re-settling returned soldiers and 
shattered families was a priority.
180
 From 1914 a backlog of petitions built up to the extent 
that emergency action had to be taken, with some of the Law Lords stepping in to deal with 
up to 1,500 cases in one term.
181
 The rate of divorce increased by six times between 1913 and 
1921, and the Administration of Justice Act 1920 adapted the assize system in an attempt to 
cope. The assize courts‘ High Court divorce jurisdiction was extended to all cases which used 
the poor persons‘ procedure, and all undefended petitions.182   
 
Cretney comments that changes in procedure can have a greater impact than reform of 
substantive law. This administrative change, on grounds of expediency, completely 
contradicted the principle that the highest standard of specialised adjudication and 
representation was required in undefended divorce cases: 
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The truth was that a large proportion of divorce work was to be discharged, not by 
the Division specially maintained in London for that purpose, but by the common law 
judges on circuit sitting in isolation up and down the country. 
183
   
 
Presumably, the expense of taking a contested case to London reduced the number of 
defended petitions. In 1933 it was officially noted that the 1920 Act had probably unwittingly 
effected a fundamental change.
184
 Cases conducted in London decreased to the extent that 
proposals were made to dispense with the PDA and transfer divorce work to the Kings 
Bench. However these did not proceed, and extra judges were eventually appointed to the 
PDA in anticipation of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937.
185
 
 
Rationality was pursued at the expense of moral rhetoric; divorce was such a serious legal 
procedure that it could not be undertaken by solicitors, but rather than extend the capacity of 
the specialised divorce court, non-specialist judges straight from the Bar were deemed 
suitable. The courts were functioning according to entrenched professional perceptions and 
boundaries, not in response to the Gorell Report concept of ‗human needs‘. Thus there has to 
be serious doubt as to whether the courts were promoting the values and needs of the parties 
or a self-serving bureaucracy. In Habermas‘ view, when administrative systems are 
prioritised for their own sake, they are uncoupled from the lifeworld that give them 
meaning.
186
   
 
Whatever its contradictions, the new undefended divorce procedure was cheaper and quicker 
for parties, even if some High Court judges found the hearings tedious.
187
  Real reform was 
achieved when the Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 gave equal status to women in that they 
could petition for divorce on the sole ground of adultery. This also had the effect of creating 
the legendary ‗hotel divorce‘ whereby an apparently adulterous scene could be staged by the 
husband, then used as evidence to procure a divorce.
188
 Collusion was still a bar on divorce, 
so a petition could only succeed if the court was presented with a ‗wronged‘ wife, whatever 
the truth of the breakdown of the marriage. Practitioners and the public were becoming 
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increasingly aware of the disparity between the law which was meant to be upholding 
morality, and the legal practice that encouraged or relied on immorality, if not bordering on 
perjury.
189
  Campaigns by the famous lawyer, author, and backbench member of parliament, 
A.P. Herbert, brought reform in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1937, which extended the 
grounds for divorce to include desertion, cruelty and unsoundness of mind. There was still a 
heavy evidential burden on the parties, and entanglement with a lengthy court process, but the 
rate of applications increased by 50 per cent almost immediately.  One reason was that 
proven grounds for separation in the magistrates court could be used as evidence for 
divorce.
190
   
 
The arguments between those who call for a more humane divorce law and those who 
attribute family breakdown to the availability of divorce continue.
191
 It is however notable 
how little attention the courts paid directly to children until relatively recently.  
 
Children in the High Court  
 
Childhood is a construct that changes over time, with a number of models having been 
identified in the 18th and 19th centuries, which accordingly influence policy.
192
 According to 
Pollock and Maitland, the legal age of an ‗infant‘ originated in the custom of a knight‘s 
tenant reaching majority at the age of 21.
193
 The age of majority may have been relevant to a 
child who would attain status or property. In contrast, under the 19th century ‗New Poor 
Law‘, a father‘s liability ended when the child was seven.194  
 
The only exception to the absolute right of a father with regard to the custody of his 
legitimate children at common law and equity was the status of the monarch as parens 
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patriae.
195
 Until the fusion of law and equity in the High Court in 1875 this was exercised by 
the Court of Chancery. Wardship, whereby the court controls the exercise of parental 
responsibility,
196
 was a specific aspect of the inherent jurisdiction, although not explicitly 
distinguished until the effect of the Children Act 1989 on wardship made this necessary. In 
theory, any child could have been warded, but in practice only wealthy children without 
parents or legal guardians would have been, because their value lay in the property to be 
administered to support them.
197
 (By the early 20th century, the wardship process was being 
manipulated to settle disputes in some cases by a parent settling a nominal amount of money 
on their child and then making the application.
198
) 
 
Fox Harding identified the exercise of wardship jurisdiction in the 19th century with a laissez 
faire/patriarchy model of child care, exemplified in the infamous Agar Ellis cases of 1878, 
which featured disputes over the children's religious upbringing and the wishes of a 16-year-
old to spend time with her mother. The court reinforced the absolute rights of the father, 
despite the wife‘s lawyers arguing for her own and the children‘s interests to be taken into 
account. The court refused to see the daughter, and referred to a father‘s ‗sacred‘ rights and 
duties, which could ‗never be exercised as well‘ by a court.199 Cretney cites correspondence 
between senior lawyers as late as the 1920s, expressing disbelief that a court could ever 
decide a question on a child‘s upbringing against a father‘s wishes.200    
 
The Custody of Children Act 1839 removed the total presumption in favour of fathers, 
enabling courts to award custody of a child under seven to its mother (extended to 16 years 
by the Child Custody Act 1873) and also award access rights throughout their childhood. 
However, the judiciary were expected to decide in favour of the father if possible.
201
 Children 
were hardly mentioned in the debate leading to the MCA 1857, as fathers‘ rights to exclusive 
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control and guardianship were otherwise unchallenged.
202
 However the Act gave the PDA 
discretion to make orders as to custody, education and maintenance within divorce 
proceedings.  
 
The invisibility of children in the higher courts is demonstrated by Freeman, tracing the 
earliest reported family law cases (Probate and Divorce reports) to 1865, in which year there 
were five cases relating to children, two of which were legitimacy cases concerning property. 
The other three were settling issues about custody of children. He found very few reported 
cases specifically about children in subsequent years. Even in 1925 there were none reported 
in the Divorce Court, and one in Chancery on issues of legitimacy and inheritance where the 
child was made a ward of court.
203
  
 
It was in 1925 that the campaign to end the ‗monstrous legal fiction‘204 of a mother having no 
rights regarding her child‘s upbringing led to the Guardianship of Minors Act, which 
introduced the statutory basis of the child‘s welfare being ‗first and paramount‘ when courts 
determined such matters, ending the supremacy of the father‘s wishes. This principle had 
been developed by the Court of Chancery, according to the House of Lords in 1970 in J v 
C.
205
 Lowe argues that this equitable principle was applied only to wards, and that in the 
common law a parent-centred approach was invariably taken, prior to the 1925 Act.
206
 He 
disagrees with Pettit‘s assertion,207 that the welfare principle was applied in all cases 
involving children‘s upbringing since 1925. The provision was interpreted narrowly until J v 
C established that the child‘s welfare applied both to disputes between parents, and involving 
third parties, and was universally applicable across the family jurisdiction.
208
 It was not until 
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the passing of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1973 that both parents were accorded equal 
authority regarding custody, upbringing and property of their children.
209
  
 
The courts‘ adoption powers should also be mentioned briefly here, because they were 
introduced in both the High Court and magistrates courts by the Adoption of Children Act 
1926. (The latter were heard by the JPs on the juvenile panel.) It is remarkable to note how 
recently JPs were deemed competent to adjudicate in adoption hearings while divorce had to 
be retained by the High Court. The earliest adoption of children was not legally recognised as 
there was no formal process until the 1926 Act, which remained the substantive law until 
1949.  The poor law guardians had been able to assume parental rights, and arrange to board 
out children who were orphaned or deserted. There was some social pressure after the First 
World War to regularise this process but the 1926 Act required only minimal examination of 
consent and welfare issues by the court. It was not until the Houghton Committee reported in 
1972 that the courts were called on to view adoption as an ‗integral part of the legal 
framework for dealing with children in need.‘210    
 
MAGISTRATES COURTS: 19th-20th CENTURY 
 
The creation of a divorce court in 1857 was ‗of very little value to anyone outside the 
property classes. The great majority of wives whom their husbands abandoned or maltreated 
had to make do with such relief as they could find in the poor law or the criminal law.‘211 
However, the JPs‘ protective functions were considerably extended toward the end of the 
19th century. 
 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 gave JPs powers to make orders in favour of wives for 
non-cohabitation, maintenance, and custody of children aged under ten, in cases where a 
husband had been convicted of aggravated assault.  This was extended by the Married 
Women (Maintenance in the Case of Desertion) Act 1886 and consolidated by the Summary 
Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, adding grounds of desertion, aggravated assault, 
persistent cruelty or wilful neglect. The Licensing Act 1902 extended this to the husband 
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being a habitual drunkard. We can see how this jurisdiction is based in the criminal law, but 
the historical background to the 1878 Act does reflect wider social issues. 
 
An article in 1878 by journalist and campaigner, Frances Power Cobbe, ‘Wife Torture in 
England’, concluded that punitive action against perpetrators of violence was ineffective in 
preventing women from being recurrent victims, but that a better remedy would be to ‗give 
the wife the power of separating herself and her children from her tyrant‘.212 Despite her plea 
to those in influential positions to address this social ill, she did not suggest extending divorce 
to those too poor to take High Court proceedings. She conceded that wealthier women were 
privileged by the accessibility of divorce on grounds of cruelty, but her solutions were 
grounded in the class structures of her time. Nevertheless, she recognised gender inequality 
as a factor in the degradation of working class women subject to repeated violence: 
 
To a certain extent this marital tyranny among the lower classes is beyond the reach 
of law, and can only be remedied by the slow elevation and civilisation of both sexes. 
But it is also in an appreciable degree, I am convinced, enhanced by the law even as it 
now stands…the position of a woman before the law as wife, mother, and citizen, 
remains so much below that of a man as husband, father, and citizen, that it is a matter 
of course that she must be regarded by him as an inferior.
213
 
 
So Power Cobbe attributed the ordeal of poorer women partly to the patriarchal society to 
which all women were subject, but she had to put her concerns into terms with which 
members of parliament could deal: ‗to save decent working class women from brutal 
husbands.‘214 The article is still largely credited with the introduction of the 1878 Act.215 The 
Finer Report describes a bill going through Parliament on the powers of the Queen‘s Proctor 
as ‗casually‘ amended to include new powers for the magistrates court. This consolidated the 
dual jurisdiction, still evident nearly a century later, for ‗the same human predicament‘.216 
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Behlmer notes that Parliament had not grasped that it was ‗lodging potentially broad 
matrimonial jurisdiction in the lowest criminal courts.‘217  
 
The magistracy had started to become professionalised. In the provinces, the appointment of 
stipendiaries was welcomed by existing JPs in preference to having to accept nominations of 
men who had created their wealth through trade, but the dual system grew haphazardly, with 
a stipendiary being appointed in some comparable cities but not others.
218
 Clerks were 
appointed to advise the bench, regularised by the Justices Clerks Act 1877, which established 
posts for legally qualified clerks in each petty sessional area.  
 
There was no limit on the number of JPs on the bench until 1938; prior to this, an interesting 
case could attract large numbers.
219
 Quarter sessions customarily involved the presence of all 
those notable in the community. This illustrates the paradox between the history of public 
trial as spectacle,
220
 and family privacy. It appears that once certain boundaries of behaviour 
were crossed, any right to privacy disappeared and the family were subject to the public gaze. 
Even the upper classes were not immune from publicity in Kings Bench crim. con. actions, 
which  attracted large audiences, but the middle classes were unlikely to be directly involved 
at either end of the spectrum. 
  
The Gorell report shows an awareness of the tension between criminal and family 
proceedings: 
….there is serious objection to a court, whose main duties are of a criminal character, 
entertaining applications, which are of a civil nature, concerning the domestic 
relations of men and women and their children, applications which if granted, may 
produce the practical although not the legal dissolution of the marriage tie…The 
evidence satisfies us that the general administration of the Acts is not satisfactory 
where these cases are dealt with by lay magistrates.
221
  
 
The Committee was dissatisfied that summary remedies were the only ones available to the 
poor. Its report recommended that JPs should retain jurisdiction where immediate protection 
or financial support was needed, but a separation continuing for more than two years would 
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make the case transferable to the High Court.
222
  These recommendations were not 
implemented, and it is difficult to see how the PDA would have coped with this volume of 
matrimonial cases.  
 
Writing in the 1960s, Milton doubted whether magistrates courts outside London were ever 
known as ‗police courts‘,223 but their common physical proximity to police stations can 
hardly be ignored. Evidence presented to the Gorell Commission, earlier in the century, 
constantly used this term; and Skyrme noted that it was not conducive to obtaining full 
evidence of intimate matters.
224
  This taint of criminality in the origins of the domestic 
jurisdiction was abhorred by the Finer Committee, but in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, JPs were sometimes relied on for compassionate assistance.
225
 They were seen by 
some as a source of advice and support, not just as a punitive power.
226
 By Victorian times, 
there was strong ethos of ‗saving‘ the poor from becoming criminals.227  
 
Granting a summons under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895 was 
discretionary, and magistrates could become quite pro-active in the proceedings. Cretney 
describes a history of tension between magistrates‘ perceptions of their role as therapists 
trying to preserve the family, and that of adjudicators trying to enforce people‘s rights. The 
zealous reformer, Claud Mullins (Metropolitan Police Magistrate, 1931-1947), exemplified 
this dichotomy, attempting to launch private bills to reform domestic procedure and enforce 
investigation, advisory and reconciliation duties on the JPs.
228
 This campaign attracted 
criticism from law officers such as the Chief Magistrate and the President of the Family 
Division. In the words of the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Sankey, in 1934, investigation into 
parties‘ private lives and the offering of advice would ‗confer upon a court of law functions 
of a non-judicial, advisory and patriarchal character which are difficult to reconcile with the 
purposes for which a court exists.‘ 229 
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The Harris Committee (established in 1936) did not agree with the Gorell Commission‘s 
doubts on the capacity of the magistrates courts‘ domestic jurisdiction; these were the courts 
for working people of whom the JPs had local social knowledge.
230
 Its recommendations led 
to several improvements by way of the Summary Proceedings Domestic Procedure Act 1937: 
domestic proceedings were to be heard separately from criminal cases; the probation service 
was given a specific conciliation function;
231
 the bench was to consist of only three JPs, 
including a man and a woman; cross examination was curtailed; and public attendance and 
press reporting were restricted.
232
  The Committee report makes many prescient points about 
the distinction between the court‘s adjudicative and therapeutic functions.233  
 
Between the Gorell Commission in 1912 and the Denning Commission in 1947, statute 
incrementally bestowed powers on JPs almost equivalent to those of the High Court, apart 
from actual dissolution of a marriage.
234
 By the end of the period covered in this chapter, the 
magistrates had jurisdiction in separation, maintenance and affiliation, with an overlapping 
jurisdiction with the High Court and county courts under the Guardianship of Infants Act 
1886 and the Adoption Act 1926.  Skyrme describes the magistrates‘ matrimonial 
jurisdiction, until legal aid was introduced in 1949, as amongst its most time-consuming. He 
points out that with the nature of maintenance orders being so variable, the total owing under 
such orders at any one time far exceeded the fining powers of JPs in all other matters.
235
   
 
The Guardianship of Minors Act 1925 extended to the magistrates courts, with a consequent 
increase in the number of applications by women about their children; their only previous 
avenue being the expensive one of wardship.
236
 However, sources on the magistrates‘ role 
with regard to protection of women from violence are rather scarce after all the activity at the 
end of the 19th century, and indeed it seems that public concern about domestic violence 
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virtually disappeared until the 1970s.
237
 In contrast, children were beginning to become more 
visible, as Ellen Key‘s ‗century of the child‘ dawned, bringing views about a child‘s agency, 
rather than as merely a subject of good and evil.
238
   
 
Children in the magistrates courts  
 
A number of women‘s pressure groups took private concerns into the public sphere in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. Links have been made between Victorian feminism and the 
gradual awareness of children‘s rights to have their welfare considered. Protecting children 
from neglect and abuse was more acceptable to institutions than protecting women, but 
feminists were promoting both.
239
 This influenced the development of legislation that began 
to override traditional deference to privacy, such as the Prevention of Cruelty to and 
Protection of Children Act 1889 (‗the children‘s charter‘) by which a magistrates court could 
remove children whose parents were convicted of cruelty and place them with a relative or 
other fit person.
240
 The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was 
founded in the same year. Prior to this legislation, the only recourse to protection had been 
for the child by his or her ‗next friend‘ to sue the parent, or for the poor law guardians to 
prosecute.
241
  The Custody of Children Act 1891 (the ‗Barnardo‘s Bill‘) authorised charitable 
institutions to retain custody of children ‗rescued‘ from abusive parents, who would have to 
prove themselves fit before the JPs to obtain an order for their return.
242
 The fact that 
legislation had to be introduced to protect children from cruelty at the hands of their own 
parents, and that it was opposed, illustrates the strength of the laissez faire paradigm in that 
period.
243
 
 
With loss of their administrative functions, the criminal law became JPs‘ mainstream work. 
Until the mid 19th century, criminology was based on rational choice theory and the 
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functions of criminal justice were deterrence, retribution, and accountability. The age of the 
offender had no bearing on the process. From the mid 19th century, children were re-
conceptualised as undeveloped; deviance might be corrected by training, so separate custodial 
institutions and reformatory schools were established.
244
 These schools existed in most 
counties by the late 1850s, run either by magistrates or charities, and taken over in 1860 by 
the Home Secretary.  
 
JPs were at the vanguard of reform. In 1905, some towns began to set up their own less 
formal courts for young offenders. The Children Act 1908 then established the separate 
juvenile court system: those under 16 were to be tried in separate courts from adults; there 
were restrictions on imprisonment; and proceedings were to be held in private. The concept 
was seen as innovative and progressive: ‗The juvenile court was soon firmly established as an 
outstanding feature of the magisterial system, and it inspired enthusiastic admiration 
throughout Britain and overseas.‘245  
 
Magistrates courts were agencies that rescued as well as punished children; the 1908 Act is 
seen as a turning point in child welfare.
246
 Children now had some rights independent of their 
parents. Public attention had been drawn to the numbers of children being brought up in 
abusive or neglectful situations by the poor state of health of many young men signing up for 
the Boer War.
247
 The welfare and criminal jurisdictions co-existed, albeit that hearings were 
held at separate times or in separate rooms. However, the juvenile court compared favourably 
with the poor law, under which about 20 times more children were in public care than by way 
of court order.
248
 When women became eligible to be appointed as magistrates in 1919 they 
were welcomed as more naturally suited to adjudicating on welfare issues, bringing to cases 
their ‗sympathy, experience and maternal instincts‘.249 (Although it was not until 1954 that 
there were sufficient women JPs to ensure that there was always at least one on the bench.
250
) 
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The pendulum has swung between punitive and welfare approaches to youth justice ever 
since.
251
 In 1927, the Moloney Report considered the treatment and protection of young 
offenders.
252
  The subsequent Children and Young Persons Act 1932
253
 was accompanied by 
Home Office guidance stressing that mechanisms available to courts for treatment of 
delinquents and children in need should be closely assimilated. This Act made significant 
changes in the structure and power of the juvenile courts: magistrates were to be chosen from 
a specialist panel; court procedures were to be made simpler and less intimidating; rights of 
attendance by third parties were further restricted, as was press reporting; and powers of local 
authorities probation officers were extended so that offenders could be committed to their 
care. The court also had powers to place a child in an approved school, even if they were not 
charged with any offence. A duty was placed on magistrates, whether a child was an offender 
or in need of care and protection, to ‗have regard to the welfare of the child or young person 
and ... in a proper case take steps for removing him from undesirable surroundings, and for 
securing that proper provision is made for his education and training‘.254 
 
Heywood identifies this as the moment that child care shifted from the poor law to local 
education authorities.
255
 The grounds for welfare intervention were lack of parenting; being a 
victim of criminal abuse; and not receiving a consistent education. A parent could initiate an 
application if their child was beyond their control.
256
  
 
Limited figures available indicate a significant increase in the number of children who came 
within the protection of the courts following the 1930s legislation. However, the degree of 
care appropriate was sometimes difficult for JPs, still usually older men, to assess: ‗It was no 
easy matter for the court in such cases to decide where the balance lies between parental 
autocracy and filial autonomy.‘257 Fox Harding sees the progression from the 1908 Act to the 
1932 Act as an example of the protective values perspective in practice. The state became 
more interventionist and although children‘s physical well-being was prioritised, the integrity 
of the family unit was devalued in comparison to the laissez-faire philosophy of the 
                                                 
251
 J Fionda, 'Youth and Justice' in J Fionda (ed), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart, Oxford 2001) 80 
252
 Home Office: Report of the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders (Cmnd 2831, 
1927) 
253
 Consolidated in the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
254
 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 21 
255
 J Heywood, Children in Care: the development of the service for the deprived child  (3rd edn, Routledge, 
London 1978) 126 
256
 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 10 
257
S Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century (OUP, Oxford 2003)  669 
108 
 
preceding century.
258
 By the late 1930s, the Home Department inspectors‘ reports were 
beginning to question whether the balance between mechanistic training and education 
solutions, and preventative work with families, was right.
259
 Until these issues were 
addressed in the immediate post-war years, the juvenile courts were the decision-makers in 
child protection.  
 
Before moving away from the JPs‘ pre-war jurisdiction, the early stages of a further emerging 
duality, between the courts‘ justice and welfare functions, will be considered. Further to 
references to Mullins and the Harris Committee above, this is exemplified in the role of 
probation officers in the magistrates courts.  
 
The Probation Service 
 
The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 gave magistrates courts powers to discharge a convicted 
defendant on his undertaking to keep the peace, and present himself for judgment. In 1887 
the Probation of First Offenders Act was the first statute to specifically refer to ‗probation‘, 
introducing this as a national system in England and Wales. In the United States, six states 
had by 1900 appointed paid officers to advise the courts, report to the police and visit 
probationers, and the American model appealed to reformers here.
260
 The Probation of 
Offenders Act 1907 gave magistrates an option to place an offender on probation when the 
court ‗thinks that the charge is proved‘ but the circumstances of the defendant or the nature of 
the crime made punishment inappropriate.
261
  
 
The 1907 Act was widely drawn, to give courts powers to commit an offender to an officer 
who would ‗advise assist and befriend and endeavour to find employment‘ for them, and 
report back to the court on their conduct. More than 8,000 untrained part-time officers were 
appointed in 1908. However, it was not compulsory for JPs to appoint probation officers until 
the Criminal Justice Act 1925 established probation committees.  
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Traditionally, the probation movement is traced to a letter written in 1876 by Frederic Rainer 
to the founder of the Church of England Temperance Society, sympathising with prisoners in 
London courts, and enclosing a donation of 5 shillings toward someone who would attend the 
courts to assist with preventing defendants‘ further slide into criminal activity and 
imprisonment. This was the first step in establishing the Church of England Police Court 
Mission. Vanstone‘s recent history of the service disagrees with orthodox accounts that trace 
its origins from the missionaries and pressure for penal reform in a homogenous movement 
motivated by humanity and Christian principles. He argues a synthesis of influences and 
pressures at the end of the 19th century: the emergence of individual psychology and political 
and societal concerns about the maintenance of social order. The reformative ideal was an 
essential element in the goal of the dominant elite of achieving social order based on 
deference and reconciliation.
262
 The court could rely on the probation officer in both criminal 
and domestic proceedings because he had a holistic view of the family in question.
263
 
 
For Vanstone, the value context of the origins of probation included panic about public 
disorder associated with the changes of industrialisation, as well as the later more enlightened 
groundswell of humanitarianism motivating penal reforms and concern about imprisonment 
of children. The Mission promoted individualist solutions based on rescuing, converting and 
saving drunkards. Magistrates torn between harshness and leniency relied on the missionaries 
to identify those deserving of mercy, who could achieve divine grace. This ethos developed 
during the 1920s- 1960s into one of diagnosis and assessment of suitability for supervision. 
The probation service developed a model of offending as a psychosocial disease, susceptible 
to expert diagnosis and treatment, but still clung to its roots in religious inspiration and 
missionary zeal.
264
 We will see this reflected in the family jurisdiction, but historical sources 
on the officers‘ input into matrimonial cases are sketchy until the advent of divorce court 
welfare.
265
  
 
The Harris Committee reported in 1937 that most officers were still appointed from the 
Mission, although there was inconsistency amongst the probation committees as to the 
                                                 
262
 M Vanstone, Supervising Offenders in the Community: A History of Probation Theory and Practice 
(Ashgate, Aldershot 2004) vii 
263
 N Rose, ‗Psychiatry as a political science: advanced liberalism and the administration of risk‘(1996) 9(2) 
History of the Human Sciences 1-23 
264
 M Vanstone, Supervising Offenders in the Community: A History of Probation Theory and Practice ( 
Ashgate, Aldershot 2004) 10-16 
265
 Discussed in Chapter Four 
110 
 
numbers and remuneration of officers appointed.
266
 Its report expressed an anxiety to restrain 
the ‗zealous officer… actuated by personal convictions as to the sanctity of the marriage 
tie‘267 Although conciliation should be within the remit of the officer, not the court, the 
officer needed to differentiate between the circumstances of his criminal and matrimonial 
clients:  
 
The parties to matrimonial disputes are adults, and for the most part they approach the 
Court because they desire to obtain relief from a situation which appears to them 
intolerable. Anything that looks like forced conciliation, depriving them of their rights 
could aggravate the situation.
268
  
 
The Committee presented figures demonstrating that large numbers of applicants to the 
domestic courts were diverted from making an application by seeing the clerk or probation 
officer. It looked at 6,222 applications and found that only 1,776 went to hearing, with only 
919 orders made.
269
 This appeared to the Committee to stem from the probation officers‘ and 
clerks‘ views of themselves as being more effective at saving marriages than the JPs. Its 
disapproval suggests that reconciliation was not, at that time, viewed as a cost-saving 
exercise. Rather, this represents an ideological conflict between law and welfare, which will 
be seen to be a recurring theme in family courts. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Chapter One, the current manifest functions of family courts were identified as dispute 
processing and protection, with latent functions of influencing behaviour and implementing 
social policy. During the extensive period covered in this Chapter, different courts had 
different functions. Ecclesiastical courts‘ functions were to verify and adjudicate on marital 
status, according to canon law. As adherence to religious custom faded, these systems were 
insufficient to meet the needs of the wealthy and powerful, and so the King‘s Bench and 
Parliament acquired functions which enabled a small number of couples to divorce. These 
were subsumed into the High Court in 1857 with little adaptation of systems to accommodate 
the wider population, hence functioning as a means of maintaining social order. The JPs also 
maintained social order through their administration of the poor laws and the criminal law, 
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with meaningful links to their communities. This duality however persisted for far too long, 
earning trenchant criticism by the 1970s.   
 
The modern term ‗family justice system‘ includes specialist judges; magistrates; lawyers; 
social work practitioners; as well as court users. This is now ostensibly focused on achieving 
the best outcomes for children, a different picture to that which appears in this chapter, but 
awareness of the courts‘ history can help explain the problems that beset them today. 
 
Family privacy – a man‘s home as his castle – did not figure as a moral value until Victorian 
times.
270
 Families had little privacy: most lived in overcrowded conditions and even the upper 
classes were subject to continual observation by servants. Non-intervention was based not on 
personal privacy but on retaining patriarchy and social order. The closed nature of 
ecclesiastical courts and the publicity of crim. con. hearings are the basis of the current 
confused law on publicising family court proceedings. 
 
Couples did not have to be deterred from applying to courts, because so few could afford to 
do so. Nevertheless, those who were caught up in the magistrates‘ domestic jurisdiction were, 
by the pre-war period, discouraged from utilising the law. The tension between psycho/social 
and legal remedies had begun.   
 
Children of divorcing couples were invisible; children who were a potential threat to social 
order were dealt with in juvenile courts, not yet split between offenders and victims.  
 
These were the dualities that existed around the 1930s and 1940s. As the next chapter will set 
out, the advent of the welfare state following the Second World War introduced the discipline 
of social administration, later known as social policy. The state recognised that families had a 
right to welfare. Family courts, as agents of the state, are instrumental in enforcing or 
advocating social policy. As policies change, our demands on the courts also change. The 
major shift in the 1940s in the relationship between citizen and the state has led us to believe 
that we can turn to the judicial system to protect the rights of family members. It is now 
acceptable to consider the welfare of the formerly ‗hidden‘ child as an object of public 
concern. One element of welfare provision, the availability of legal aid, had a dramatic effect 
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on the operation of courts, but it was introduced into a court system built on a long heritage 
of religious and class division.  The systems continued for their own sake, with decreasing 
connection to families‘ experiences and values.    
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SOCIAL POLICY AND CHILDREN 
 
The historical overview in Chapter Three draws largely on the analysis of Stone and the Finer 
Committee that the latent functions of the courts in family cases were the protection of class 
divisions and vested interests. That argument could still be made today, when the regulation 
of social order is accepted as part of a legitimate citizen-state agreement to protect economic 
interests – the pacification of class conflict.1 The functions of family courts were identified in 
Chapter One as processing disputes and protecting vulnerable family members, underpinned 
by latent functions reinforcing the relationship between law and social policy. Social policy 
developed with the advent of the welfare state in the 1940s. This chapter, the second in the 
historical overview, considers what the courts did and why, during this shorter but fast-
moving time frame. This chapter is divided into four broad time periods:  
 
1. Post war 
2. 1960s – 1970s 
3. 1980s - 1990s 
4. 2000 - 2011. 
 
Social policy relating to children has been conceptualised differently throughout these 
periods. While it can be agreed that society wants to invest in its future citizens, perspectives 
change on what sort of citizens we want.
2
  
 
Lorraine Fox Harding has identified four value perspectives which have influenced child care 
policy (the first of which was touched on at the end of Chapter Three): 
 
1. Laissez faire. This developed from patriarchy to the importance of the psychological 
tie between parent and child and the predominance of the mother as psychological 
parent.
3
 The state and its decision-making agencies, including courts, are distrusted 
and policy is dominated by arguments for by-passing, rather than improving, them.
4
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2. State paternalism and child protection. This envisages a wide interventionist role for 
the welfare state on behalf of the child, which mandates public expenditure.  
3. Defence of the birth family. The effects of class, poverty and deprivation are 
recognised as keeping some parents powerless. Supporters of this view want state 
intervention but in order to support the whole family. Decision makers in the courts 
and other agencies represent the middle class imposing their own values on families 
which, if properly supported and resourced, can look after their children better than 
substitute care.   
4. Children‘s rights and children‘s liberation. A call for more participation and self-
determination for children and young people. Fox Harding raises the question of 
whether notions of rights and duties are too legalistic for family relationships: ‗It may 
be argued that a precise calculus of rights and duties in such an intimate setting is not 
usually possible, and, if attempted, could result in destructive conflicts.‘5 However, 
she notes that excluding rights in the name of love and care within relationships can 
lead to repression and exploitation. 
 
Fox Harding concluded in the early 1990s that child care policy was an ‗uneasy synthesis‘6 of 
these four perspectives. Since 1997, we have seen more explicit interventionist Labour policy 
planks of the eradication of child poverty, with emphasis on the paid work ethic.
7
 (Although 
in 2011 we appear to be on the cusp of a return to emphasis on laissez-faire.) Social policy 
evolves through attempts to resolve social problems.
8
 However, identifying a social problem 
involves making a value judgment, not merely an observation.
9
 Although perceived social 
problems of delinquency and the ‗underclass family‘ are not new10, complexity has increased 
in the context of globalisation: the decline of traditional male employment; the impact of drug 
abuse; and the resettling of refugees, many with children traumatised by their experiences. 
Another major development is the recognition of both the prevalence and effects of domestic 
violence.  
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It is in this context of fluidity during the past 60 years that the family courts have been 
expected to meet changing expectations of justice, but systems have not always connected 
with those expectations. It will be seen that objections to using a court to enforce rights and 
duties on family members recur, but that formulating and implementing policies to address 
this have little chance of achieving more legitimacy if they are not produced through open 
and rational processes. 
 
THE POST WAR PERIOD: SOCIAL POLICY AND THE COURTS    
 
The introduction of legal aid in 1949 probably had more impact on family courts than any 
other event. Furthermore, the post-war period was one of increased parental aspirations for 
their own ‗baby boom‘ offspring and a consensus on new protective legislation for 
disadvantaged children, which set the tone for preventive work with those families seen as 
dysfunctional. It was thought that these were the homes that produced both neglect and 
juvenile delinquency, policy in the 1950s and 1960s following the third perspective above.
11
 
However, the split jurisdiction described in Chapter Three remained, as graphically described 
two decades later in the Finer Committee Report.  
 
The Finer Committee‘s remit was ‗to consider the problem of one-parent families in our 
society‘12 This was a ‗problem‘ because the welfare benefits system in the 1960s was still 
premised on a male-breadwinner family model from the 1940s. Although the Committee‘s 
recommendations were not implemented, its report helps to explain the development of 
family courts both before and since it was published.  
 
The Finer Report details the legacy of courts which had not adapted to the demands of a new 
citizen-state relationship. It identifies an obsolete, discriminatory system that was maintained 
for its own sake, no longer anchored in the lifeworld of norms and values, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, above.  
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THE DUAL JURISDICTION: HIGH COURT 
 
Divorce petitions were heard only in the High Court; problems with its workload 
immediately after the war were considered in reports from the Denning Committee,
13
 and the 
Rushcliffe Committee.
14
 
 
The Denning Report and divorce  
 
In 1945, the Lord Chancellor complained that divorce was becoming so easy that soon it 
would possible to obtain one in the post office,
15
 a prediction that has never completely 
materialised, although since the 1970s most of the paperwork can be completed through the 
post. The truth was that the High Court could not manage demand. In 1946, the same Lord 
Chancellor
16
 appointed a Committee chaired by Mr Justice Denning, with WTC Skyrme
17
 as 
Secretary, to examine the administration of divorce and nullity law, with a view to producing 
procedural reforms ‗in the general interests of litigants‘. Its terms of reference were limited to 
the legal process, specifically on the assumption that the grounds of divorce were to remain; 
the reforms were to address costs; delay; venue and reconciliation. (This remit is remarkably 
similar to that of the current Family Justice Review.
18
)   
 
The Denning report is notable for devoting a full section of five pages (out of 34) to 
‗Children and Divorce‘. It cites the principle that a child‘s welfare is the court‘s first and 
paramount consideration because ‗no subject had caused the Committee greater concern‘.19 
Thus the Committee members saw beyond the administrative imperative to underlying social 
unease about children‘s experiences of parent separation. The principal defect in a system 
poorly fitted to meet children‘s needs was the lack of separate independent representation, 
meaning that ‗the welfare of the children is subordinated to the interests of their parents.‘20 It 
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was concluded that although saving marriages was of utmost importance to society, parents 
who were divorcing had forfeited the exclusive right to determine the future of the children.
21
   
 
The report conveys a major shift in perceptions of laissez faire policy and the functions of 
family courts. Here, the private family unit is disrupted through the parents‘ own actions and, 
as a consequence, their relationship with each other and with their children moves into the 
public sphere, where court welfare officers should attempt reconciliation and report on the 
children‘s welfare to the court. No longer is the court process designed solely for adults who 
are deemed capable of healing any psychological damage caused to children and the impact 
this may have on wider society. The Committee acknowledged that the state had a duty 
toward children whose parents had failed to fulfil their joint responsibility in maintaining the 
stable family unit.
22
 
 
Assuming such responsibility had major implications. The growth in the number of post-war 
petitions was overwhelming the number of judges and court buildings in London.
23
 In 
retrospect, the obvious solution was to delegate work to the county courts, because it was 
unacceptable for JPs to grant divorces. Although county courts had been established since 
1846, they had previously been thought unsuited to family matters.
24
 The Denning 
Committee agreed that allowing county courts to adjudicate would denigrate the importance 
of marriage. Apparently a strong case was made on behalf of barristers to retain the work in 
the High Court.
25
 The Committee‘s solution was to appoint all local county court judges as 
‗commissioners‘, which accorded them High Court judge status when conducting divorce 
hearings. From 1947, almost all ‗High Court‘ divorce was therefore actually administered by 
county court judges. The plan succeeded in that the county court judges were able to meet the 
caseload demand in the 1950s, but long-term savings in legal aid were not apparent.
26
 
 
By the 1950s, these judges dealt with about 27,000 divorce petitions annually, about ten 
percent of which were defended. Two thirds of the cases were being heard outside London, 
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all in public, and witnesses could be cross examined.
27
 (Progress toward the ‗post office 
divorce‘ will be discussed in the next section.) 
 
The Denning Committee saw the granting of the decree as still a matter of public interest but 
it looked more deeply into the experience of divorcing couples. The report speaks in warm 
tones of the probation officers‘ work in the magistrates courts and recommended that a ‗Court 
Welfare Officer‘ be available to give advice and guidance to divorcing parents about the 
children‘s welfare.28 This would be part of the role of a new Marriage Welfare Service that 
should ‗evolve gradually from the existing services and societies just as the probation system 
evolved from the Court Missionaries‘.29 These existing services included probation, the 
Forces welfare sections, and voluntary organisations.
30
 Although this proposal was not 
immediately taken up, a probation officer was appointed to the Divorce Division in 1950,
31
 
an arrangement which Cretney believes formed the basis for the Morton Report 
recommendation in 1956 that a court welfare officer be appointed in each divorce town. 
Murch, however, wrote that the practice grew on an ad hoc basis in courts where there was 
co-operation between the local judge and chief probation officers: ‗It is not entirely clear why 
these enquiries were undertaken by the probation service rather than by the Official Solicitor 
except that in the provinces it might have been considered cheaper.‘ 32  
 
The Denning Committee recommended that a welfare officer have access to ‗every petition‘ 
and also report to the court in any case, including future reports, if required.
33
 It seems 
unlikely that the Committee anticipated the rate of divorce staying at its wartime level as this 
would have created an enormous workload for welfare officers. This recommendation for a 
universal service confirmed a perception of the deviancy of divorce, justifying public 
attention. The Committee was, however, careful to distinguish between the child of the 
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divorcing couple and the ‗deprived child‘, who needed the ‗day to day supervision‘ of local 
authority children‘s officers.34  
 
The retention of this expensive judicial model of divorce was the impetus for the introduction 
of legal aid, entitlement for those who could not afford lawyers to call on the state for 
financial assistance.  
Divorce and legal aid 
 
The poor persons‘ procedure35 was taken over by the Law Society in 1926 and was being 
used by more than a third of divorce petitioners by the late 1930s.
36
 The Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1937 had triggered an increase in the divorce rate,
37
 but it was the ‗major casualty of the 
war on the home front...the number of homes broken and ruined...by infidelity‘ that made the 
introduction of legal aid so urgent.
38
  
 
In 1942, the Law Society and War Office had established a Services Divorce Department 
which employed about 100 qualified and unqualified staff processing between 3,500 and 
4,000 petitions annually. The morale of non-professional soldiers was recognised as a crucial 
factor toward victory, so speedy resolution of matrimonial difficulties became a public duty, 
but there was a shortage of lawyers. The Department appears to have worked efficiently, but 
by 1945, with solicitors coming back to work, the Law Society did not want to maintain a 
salaried service, and it was wound down.
39
  
 
Statutory entitlement to legal aid was based on the recommendations of the Rushcliffe 
Committee that the financial burden of divorce for people who could not afford it should be 
shifted from solicitors to the state; the aim was to provide financial assistance on a means-
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tested basis as an entitlement for citizens, not just help for the poor; and the solicitor-client 
relationship was to be the same as if paying privately.
40
  
 
Legal systems needed to adapt to meet the changes in the lifeworld. In the debate on the 
Legal Aid and Advice Bill, the consequences of lack of access to divorce were described as 
‗law and public opinion dangerously drifting apart‘. Introducing legal aid was integral to the 
concept of social security in rebuilding post-war society.
41
 The subsequent 1949 Act provided 
for legal aid and assistance across civil and criminal courts (although not at magistrates level 
until the 1960s).
42
 The most common reason for an individual to become involved with the 
courts was because of relationship breakdown. In Parliament, it was claimed in 1945 that the 
forces were submitting 900 applications a month to the Poor Persons Committee, of which 
97% were matrimonial.
43
  
 
Paradoxically, upholding the institution of marriage was at the heart of the legislation, to 
prevent it falling into disuse and disrespect. In retrospect, it may appear odd that this urgent 
drive to regularise relationships was not resolved by simplifying divorce procedures to reduce 
the cost of lawyers, but legislators thought that the symbolism of legal formality could not be 
dispensed with. It is arguable that expensive systems may have served those operating them 
better than those they were intended to serve; but on the other hand, perhaps families sought 
security in maintaining the concept of the traditional status of marriage.  
 
Twenty years later, just prior to the 1969 reforms, 83% of legal aid cases were still 
matrimonial (although this figure includes magistrates cases).
44
 There has been a substantial 
drop in this proportion since then. The divorce rate reached a peak in 1947, then fell slightly 
until 1971.
45
 Of the current legal aid budget of about £2billion, more than half is spent on 
criminal law, with about £580 million on advice and representation in family matters.
46
 
(However, the Legal Services Commission reported in 2010 that average cost per case was 
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increasing twice as fast as the increasing volume in private law, and five times faster in 
public law.
47
) 
 
The cost of legal aid has been a primary factor in much of what has happened in the family 
courts since. For example, in 1976 the government noted that costs to the Legal Aid Fund of 
matrimonial cases were rising rapidly: £7.5 million more than the previous year.
48
 This led 
directly to the extension to all undefended cases of the ‗special procedure‘ by which divorce 
petitions were merely read by a district judge and certified for a decree. It is generally 
believed that this radical change was introduced to save money.
49
 The special procedure 
effectively transformed divorce to an administrative procedure, without parliamentary or 
public discussion of the private needs of families nor the wider public interest in divorce.
50
 
This mere change by the Rules Committee is said to have reduced the legal aid budget by 
£6m that year. There was some justification for reform; Elston et al found that proceedings 
were degrading and ineffective in protecting children, as well as expensive.
51
 It seems likely 
that the majority of parties would have preferred simpler and cheaper methods, and one hopes 
that the research was influential, but the contrast between the ease of changing these rules and 
the difficulty in changing the grounds of divorce is remarkable.  
 
Although current expenditure on legal aid cannot be accurately broken down
52
 the dissolution 
of marriage and civil partnerships is now a largely administrative procedure for which legal 
aid entitlement is minimal. Instead, legal aid is increasingly directed toward the courts‘ 
protective function, which originated in the JPs‘ courts. 
 
THE DUAL JURISDICTION: MAGISTRATES COURTS  
 
Families in the magistrates courts – domestic jurisdiction 
 
The impact of relationship breakdown or poor parenting was regularly seen in the magistrates 
courts. The only civil law protection against domestic violence, until it was ‗rediscovered‘ in 
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the 1970s, was provided by magistrates‘ orders which enabled women to live apart from, but 
still be maintained by, their husbands.  Children at risk were dealt with in separate juvenile 
courts.
53
  
 
Magistrates in the 1940s were able to grant remedies for a spouse seeking separation and 
maintenance and/or custody of children aged under 16. The Denning Committee reports only 
briefly on this jurisdiction: provided divorce proceedings had not begun, cases might come 
before JPs under the 19th century Acts and the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925. Although 
the county courts had concurrent jurisdiction for the 1925 Act it was primarily used in 
magistrates courts. Proceedings were limited in effect because the upper limits for 
maintenance payable were very low, but there were advantages for the parties and the court 
being assisted by a probation officer.
54
  
 
In the 1950s, the number of maintenance orders was still high: about half the number of 
divorce decrees, despite the availability of legal aid for divorce. One reason that the wife 
might be reluctant to seek divorce was the difficulty in enforcing maintenance if the husband 
re-married.
55
 The grounds for an application were broadly similar to those for divorce, but a 
woman could also complain of wilful neglect to maintain. This was seen as less heinous than 
a ground for divorce; it was a product of ‗the immaturity of young couples and the failure to 
realise the responsibilities of marriage and parenthood, rather than from matrimonial 
offences‘.56 This was the material distinction between the jurisdictions – the gravity of 
matrimonial fault belonged in the superior courts while the lower orders were patronised as 
merely irresponsible. The authoritative figure of the probation officer
57
 was no doubt key to 
reforming these feckless youths. Attempts were made to hold domestic courts separately from 
criminal, and the Central London Domestic Court was established in 1952, but if the husband 
attended, the case was conducted as ‗a trial … like any other‘.58 The requirement for 
magistrates‘ written reasons to be recorded, and the right of appeal to the High Court were 
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seen as adequate in settling higher points of law and maintaining consistent practice.
59
 What 
sounds like humiliating experiences for the parties were at least held in private and subject to 
reporting restrictions.
60
 
Magistrates - Juvenile Courts  
 
The juvenile courts have been described as a ‗kind of welfare agency‘ prior to the war 
because of a virtual absence of any other child protection agencies.
61
 The post-war period 
saw attention focused more on the social aspects of juvenile criminal proceedings and the 
need to remove young people from the atmosphere of the criminal court, coinciding with the 
expansion of social services departments. Under the Children Act 1948 s 5, a local authority 
had to accept a child placed with them on a ‗fit person order‘, made under Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933.  
 
The first enquiry into the care of children living away from home, the Curtis Committee, was 
influenced by the findings on the death of Dennis O‘Neill, a 12-year old boy brutalised by the 
‗carers‘ who were being paid by a local authority to house him on their farm. There was 
wider concern about the myriad of arrangements made for a staggering 124,900 children 
‗deprived of a normal home life‘, only 26,414 of whom were placed under court orders. 
Many of these arrangements were unsupervised by any agency.
62
  (In contrast, about 70,000 
children are now looked after by local authorities and subject to regimes of regular review.
63
) 
  
The Children 1948 Act transferred responsibility for children‘s welfare from the poor law guardians, 
approved schools and voluntary organisations to new local authority children‘s departments, with 
trained children‘s officers. It reflected contemporary theories about the importance of attachment 
relationships, and recognised the harmful effects on children of separation from their families. 
Children who were deprived of a normal home life were to be cared for, as much as possible, as those 
who lived with their own families. The children‘s officers came from a variety of previous experience 
and professions, and were enthusiastic about their new role in this era of optimism. The Act has been 
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described as ‗unmatched for its humanity in our legislation‘ in furthering the best interests of 
children.
64
  
 
Splitting juvenile and adult criminal proceedings at the beginning of the 20th century was 
motivated by a mix of humanitarian and controlling concerns.
65
 While this perhaps allowed a 
more holistic view of young offenders being children with welfare needs,
66
 it had the 
disadvantage of associating children in need with the criminal system. The JPs were drawn 
from a specially elected juvenile panel, although it was not until the mid 1960s that 
specialism became strictly required; the panels sometimes consisted of those who had the 
time available.  
 
The magistrates may well have been in a position to represent the norms of the local 
community in dealing with children who were in need of help, but many children were taken 
into public care without any judicial process.
67
   
POST–WAR PERIOD - CONCLUSIONS 
The courts were still stuck in a dual system polarised by the stigma of divorce and crime. The 
availability of legal aid was undoubtedly a pivotal point in the history of the family courts as 
the volume of divorce work could not have been maintained without it. Although legal aid 
was originally envisaged as integral to the welfare state, it can easily be rationed or directed 
to have quite dramatic effects on the courts, in attempts to save money, without taking the 
risk of open public discussion about divorce.  
 
Although outside its remit, the Denning Committee did make some tentative suggestions of 
divorce by consent,
68
 and the issue was looked at again in 1956. A Royal Commission (the 
Morton Commission) reviewed the history of the effects of matrimonial legislation, but failed 
to agree on the issue of maintaining the concept of the matrimonial fault. The Church was the 
most influential supporter of retaining the matrimonial offence, referring to its biblical 
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origins, and insisting that any easing of individual hardship by making divorce easier would 
be outweighed by the damage to social order.
69
 
 
The emphasis on local authorities‘ responsibilities to provide high quality alternative care for 
neglected children encapsulated in the Children Act 1948 gave way during the 1950s to 
preventive work, keeping birth families together. This culminated in the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1963, which set out a duty to promote children‘s welfare explicitly by assisting 
their families to prevent them going into public care.
70
  The role of the magistrates was 
largely confined to the juvenile court, where practice was little changed until 1991.
71
  
 
1960s AND 1970s: PROGRESS AND REFORM 
 
Eventually, objections to reducing the grandeur of the divorce court were overcome by 
pragmatism, when the Matrimonial Causes Act 1967 provided for all divorce and nullity 
proceedings to begin in the county court, only transferable to the High Court if defended. 
Again, anticipated public savings did not materialise, and the ‗special procedure‘72 was fully 
in place by 1977. Thus, although a divorce is not literally available over the Post Office 
counter, it can now be obtained by posting a series of completed forms, with almost all 
divorce work in the country undertaken by district judges.
73
 Although the incremental moves 
toward a fully administrative system of obtaining a decree are economic, they probably do 
reflect changing social attitudes toward accepting divorce. 
 
DIVORCE REFORM  
 
The intention of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 was to remove the requirement in every case 
for an investigation into the grounds for divorce. The traditional view that there was a public 
interest in private decisions made about divorce had been undermined by practical pressures 
as well as ‗the permissive society‘ of the 1960s.  
 
It should be noted that Finer did not attribute the ‗problem‘ of one–parent families to access 
to the divorce court, pointing out that comparative statistics on de facto marital breakdown 
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had not been historically available. Although quoting a fourfold increase in the number of 
divorce petitions in the preceding 20 years, ‗We do not know whether this means that more 
marriages are breaking down or whether more breakdowns are coming to court.‘74   
 
As the debate moved on from Morton toward the 1969 reform, the Finer Report expressed the 
conundrum in terms of pragmatic court practice, focusing on the disassociation between 
behaviour and religious and moral concepts of guilt/innocence and punishment/reward:  
 
There was nothing to be found about breakdown in the grounds of divorce as enacted 
by Parliament. But the reality was that thousands passing through the divorce courts 
were obtaining consensual decrees under a system in which they were theoretically 
prohibited. Over 90 % of petitions were undefended … a certain reluctance among the 
judiciary to preside over the expenditure of large sums of public money in heavily 
contested cases in which three parties or more … might all be legally aided although 
the outcome might be plain almost from the start. In all these circumstances, many 
responsibly minded people, whether conservationist or reformist in the attitudes, 
shared a common anxiety over the factitiousness of the law they saw in operation.
75
 
 
This gap between reality and the version that the divorcing couple had to take to court 
stemmed from law relating to an era when forensic examination of a marital separation was 
not only legitimate but also logistically possible. Post-war, the increased incidence of 
relationship breakdown was of course a problem of public concern, but the intimate details of 
individuals were not. Furthermore, a court enquiry no longer made economic sense. The 
system struggled to align legally and actual broken marriages without the requirement of 
expensive investigations. 
 
This is another example of a legal system disconnected from the lifeworld of experience 
falling into disrepute. By the mid-1960s, the Church reversed its position by recognising that 
‗the present system has not only cut loose from its moral and juridical foundations: it is, quite 
simply, inept.‘76 So, the law was amended to address the expense and immorality of court 
processes which no longer served the popular understanding of the obligations of marriage 
and family life. In Habermas‘ terms, the systems evolved to serve the changing lifeworld.   
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The Divorce Reform Act 1969 modernised divorce law into a process which enables 
individuals to legally end a marriage in a more honest manner, with a view to moving on to 
the stability of remarriage and a reconstituted family.
77
 The Law Commission famously 
stated that the objective of divorce law should be to buttress rather than undermine the 
stability of marriage but where a marriage had irretrievably broken down, ‗to enable the 
empty legal shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness, and the minimum bitterness, 
distress and humiliation.‘78 The problem is that when parents separate, it is the fragile shell of 
co-parenting that needs to be maintained with fairness, minimising the negative emotions of 
all the family. And then, as the Finer Report states: ‗The stability of the family …depends in 
part upon a machinery which enables spouses whose marriages have failed to establish new 
unions.‘79 
 
THE FINER REPORT: A ‘FAMILY COURT’ 
 
The Finer Committee was active between 1969 and 1974, contemporaneously with the 
introduction of the Divorce Reform Act 1969. The Committee‘s remit was to address the 
problems of poverty, social isolation, and discrimination in employment faced by single 
parents. National insurance benefits were only available to lone parents who were widows, 
but it was estimated that a million children lived in lone parent households in the UK. The 
Committee was heavily Fabian and determined to relieve the poverty of these families. 
Previous attempts to find a way for single or separated mothers to be eligible for benefits 
were ‗trapped within the iron framework of the fault principle inherited from the canon 
law.‘80  Only an ‗innocent‘ wife could be maintained by a ‗guilty‘ husband, and most could 
only pursue this entitlement through the magistrates courts, which adjudicated on the reason 
for the separation, whether maintenance was payable, and how much.  
 
The Committee identified three separate legal systems regulating the maintenance of 
separated or unmarried parents and their children, namely the divorce law; the magistrates 
courts; and welfare benefits based on the poor laws. Even post-1969 divorce reform, the 
magistrates courts were still the domain of the poor. The Committee was appalled by the 
systemic failure of the magistrates courts and benefits agencies to provide a reasonable 
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service to lone parents: it talked of a ‗… stage army [of unsupported wives and mothers] 
being marched as if they were separate companies between the magistrates court and the 
supplementary benefits office, with each of these institutions pretending they have nothing to 
do with each other.‘81  The Committee found it indefensible that the principles of the 1969 
Act, implemented in the superior courts, did not apply in the magistrates courts, which still 
operated a 19th century policy of providing ‗police court protection for the lower orders in 
their matrimonial troubles‘.82    
 
Two sets of reforms were proposed on the Committee‘s findings that one-parent families 
suffered from particular financial hardship and deprivation. The first was reform of 
matrimonial law and the courts, and secondly a different relationship between the courts and 
social security agencies. The assessment of maintenance should be undertaken by the 
department and there would cease to be any connection between matrimonial behaviour and 
payment of maintenance to a dependent spouse and children.  
 
Removing the administrative function from the courts would then pave the way for a unified 
family court. Interestingly, the concept of ‗a family court‘ had originated in a white paper on 
youth justice in 1965,
83
 but the Committee was cautious about the diverse and vague 
(although enthusiastic) notions that had been put to it in evidence.
84
 It was however 
determined to abolish the matrimonial jurisdiction at magistrates court level and to unify the 
exiting fragmented jurisdiction, incorporating the resolution of other disputes associated with 
marriage breakdown, such as child custody and occupation of the matrimonial home.
85
 The 
Committee set out six criteria which a new family court should satisfy, in order to ‗command 
the confidence and respect of the whole community‘86:  
1. An impartial judicial institution regulating rights of citizens and settling their disputes 
according to law 
2. A unified institution in a system of family law applying a non-discriminatory uniform 
set of rules to all parties 
3. Organising its work to facilitate conciliation between parties in dispute87 
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4. It would have professionally trained staff to assist the court and parties in all matters 
requiring social work services and advice 
5. Working in close relationship with the benefits agencies 
6. Organising all procedures and services with a view to assisting and earning 
confidence of its users.
88
 
 
None of the Finer proposals were implemented. The usual explanation is that an economic 
crisis forced the government to reduce public expenditure to meet conditions imposed by the 
International Monetary Fund. An increase in standard benefits payments was central to the 
Finer plans.
89
 However, McGregor (one of the main authors) was sceptical about cost being 
the sole factor, citing a demarcation dispute between the Home Office and the LCD and the 
lack of a proper examination of judicial and accommodation resources.
90
 Critical theorists 
thought that the recommendations as a whole challenged patriarchy by undermining women‘s 
dependence on men.
91
   
 
Nevertheless, the Finer Report was a watershed in the discourse on marital breakdown and 
divorce. It reflected emerging ideas on the role of conciliation and linked together a number 
of social policy issues in the public focus. It galvanised independent out-of-court mediation 
and influenced the probation service to adapt to a new model of conciliation, and has been 
credited with influencing most of the progress and improvement made in the next 25 years.
92
  
Despite the strong emphasis in the report on the court being a judicial and not a therapeutic 
service, the call for more conciliation was not, however, embraced by all lawyers; some saw 
it as a potential erosion of rights, especially the rights of the less powerful.
93
      
 
Shortly after the Finer Report, and possibly influenced by it, the Australian government 
created the Family Court of Australia, which was lauded by Finer‘s supporters in England 
during the 1980s.
94
 However the ‗unified‘ Family Court of Australia has jurisdiction in 
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private law applications only; child protection is the province of state-run courts. This 
dichotomy is proving troublesome in Australia, as will be discussed in Chapter Five. The 
Finer Committee‘s recommendations for a new court covered the matrimonial, financial and 
child custody jurisdictions. Amidst the detail, there are few references to local authority 
services. The possibility of the new court welfare service for ‗matrimonial clients‘ being 
operated by local authorities is mooted. Nevertheless, it is concluded that a new independent 
service is to be preferred over probation (because of its association with the criminal law) and 
local authorities (where the level of expertise of social workers and the outcome of the 
Seebohm reorganisation were not trusted).
95
 Although there is a reference to local authorities 
having a potential conflict of interests, this is not explained.
96
 The fact that adoption orders 
could be made in juvenile courts seems to be disapproved of, but no recommendation is made 
regarding this.
97
 
 
Secondly, the report is explicit that juvenile crime must be excluded.
98
 It concedes that care 
orders
99
 were frequently made in connection with matrimonial troubles and family 
breakdown: ‗It would thus far seem logical‘100 that the new family court assumes this 
responsibility. However, one of the grounds for a care order was that a young person had 
committed an offence, and so the issue was deferred by the Committee ‗for future careful 
attention‘.101 This is the only reference in the report to public law cases, which suggests that 
these were not within the vision of a ‗unified‘ court. Subsequent discussion of the Finer 
proposals confirmed a focus on ‗the problems of separating couples‘ rather than the 
‗anomalous, fragmented and confusing‘ law relating to children.102  
 
The report ignores child protection and domestic violence. Its recommendations for 
conciliation assume that children‘s interests will somehow be met alongside adults‘. It does at 
least recognise a nexus between matrimonial breakdown and local authority intervention, but 
it appears very unlikely that the Finer Committee envisaged proceedings between the state 
and the family as within the family court‘s jurisdiction. The social problem of the single 
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parent, created by young people in need of guidance and advice on birth control and by 
marital breakdown, was an economic one; the children themselves were not demonised.
103
 A 
Finer ‗family court‘ was devoted to disputes between parents and family members; child 
protection would have been left with the magistrates, replacing one duality with another. 
 
THE MAGISTRATES’ FAMILY JURISDICTION AFTER DIVORCE REFORM  
 
In the 1960s, most custody and maintenance disputes were heard in the magistrates courts 
and even about one third of adoption applications.
104
 The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 
had made applications financially accessible to a far wider section of the population than 
previously and led to a significant use of the court system to settle parental disputes, probably 
unintended when the legislation was passed but utilised to meet social need.
105
  However, it 
was not until the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 that a mother who had committed a 
matrimonial offence could apply for maintenance for children ‗without the history of the 
matrimonial breakdown being paraded through the courts.‘106  
 
Paradoxically, the financial implications of custody disputes greatly exceeded JPs‘ other 
powers, if calculating the total payable under a maintenance order over its duration. Debt 
recovery was usually within the remit of the county courts but maintenance orders made at 
any level of court were enforced by magistrates. They might also have to apply more 
complex case law than county courts. So, although the make-up of the bench was 
predominately non-lawyers, they had not inconsiderable powers. Some magistrates thought of 
themselves as members of the community, who gave individual advice and reassurance, as 
‗unofficial advisers to the people of their neighbourhood.‘ 107 However, Dingwall and 
Eekelaar seem to have been swimming against the tide of opinion in arguing for the value of 
magistrates‘ localised, community-based approach to dispute resolution.108  
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The work declined in the 1970s, following divorce reform. Cases drifted to the county courts 
partly through solicitors‘ preference and partly because of a lack of interest by some 
magistrates panels.
109
 There was a deal of poor press with regard to the competence of 
magistrates in all types of child proceedings in the early 1970s.
110
 This reflects the pattern of 
the ecclesiastical courts losing legitimacy during the 19th century as their workload and 
expertise declined.
111
  
 
Most magistrates court users came from the lowest socio-economic classes, although divorce 
was applied for by a representative cross-section of society.
112
 In 1973, the Law Commission 
agreed with Finer that the development of two systems had led to anomaly and inconsistency 
and sympathised with pressure for their integration.
113
 However, McGregor later commented 
that the Law Commission working party was dominated by Home Office officials who 
opposed any reduction in the jurisdiction of magistrates ‗which they appeared to treat as the 
private property of their office.‘114 
The 1973 Law Commission report does incline toward saving the magistrates, identifying 
different objectives for the divorce and magistrates courts: the latter did not deal with the 
consequences of a change of status but with marriages that had not broken down, and may 
not do so.
115
 Accordingly, it criticised the contrast between the two jurisdictions since the 
Divorce Reform Act 1969 because: 
The court of last resort (i.e. the divorce court) can give relief without evidence of a 
matrimonial offence, whereas the court offering first-aid cannot. Is this sensible, when 
one of the objects of the law is to encourage reconciliation – or, at the very least, 
settlement of family disputes without rancour in court or bitterness afterwards?
116
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The Commission recommended that the magistrates courts retain jurisdiction of the 
obligation to maintain. This remained until the transfer of the maintenance function to the 
Child Support Agency in 1993, when the assessment and recovery of financial support across 
most of the population was removed from the judicial system into an administrative one.
117
  
 
In the 1980s, McGregor wrote that, despite the availability of legal aid, the Finer Committee 
had found that: ‗the firmly entrenched habit of going to the magistrate‘s court was sustained 
by the social assumptions of local solicitors, probation officers and social workers‘,  and that 
the welfare benefits agencies ‗went on herding‘ their clients into the summary jurisdiction.118 
He continued to argue for the abolition of the summary domestic jurisdiction, citing support 
from eminent members of the higher judiciary, professional and political associations.
119
 
Szwed confirmed that there was an almost universal desire to end the magistrates‘ domestic 
jurisdiction.
120
  Just prior to the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978 
being passed, the jurisdiction was ‗dying of inanition‘ because of increased public awareness 
of the county court jurisdiction as well as the dislike of taking matrimonial cases to ‗a court 
of petty crime‘.121 Furthermore, there was pressure on the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission by the Lord Chancellor‘s Department to stop encouraging their clients to use the 
courts, attempting to save £3m on legal aid costs. Paradoxically, there was a growing role for 
magistrates‘ courts in enforcing maintenance orders made by the higher courts; McGregor 
had no hesitation in condemning this on efficiency and moral grounds.
122
   
 
Writing in 1983 on ‗The changing image of the Magistracy‘, Skyrme allocates only a few 
paragraphs to the magistrates courts‘ civil jurisdiction which was ‗often overlooked‘ and 
would be ‗better off‘ in the county courts.123 His interpretation of the failure to implement the 
Finer recommendations was simply that circuit judges had more than enough to do already.  
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PROTECTING CHILDREN BEFORE THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 
 
Divorce court welfare 
 
It was noted earlier that the Denning Report commended the work of the probation service 
and wanted it extended to the divorce courts, and that this began in the 1950s. The work of 
the divorce court welfare officers was largely unrecorded until the late 1970s.
124
 Disputes 
over custody and access were rare, possibly about 6 per cent of divorcing couples.
125
  The 
judge could call for a welfare report if he was not satisfied with the arrangements for children 
as set out in the divorce petition,
126
 but in a sample of divorcing couples in Murch‘s study in 
the early 1970s, use of this provision was inconsistent and rare. The researchers criticised the 
lack of inquiry into some very serious cases.
127
 The judges‘ options were so limited, that 
advising on services was probably a better use of resources.
128
 A supervision order could be 
ordered only in exceptional circumstances.
129
 Even when a report was ordered, parents tended 
to accept advice from a solicitor as less stigmatising than from a divorce court welfare 
officer.
130
  This, Murch believed, reflected the Finer Committee‘s view that the legal 
professions conceptualised parties as the subject of rights, not as patients requiring 
treatment.
131
 Parties were not entitled to read the officer‘s report, which was relayed to them 
by their solicitor;
132
 and a strong moral line was sometimes taken against the parent who was 
‗at fault‘.133 Officers undertook enquiries of other services without the parents‘ knowledge or 
consent. Many parents were uncomfortable with the officer being identified with criminal 
justice.
134
 However, most parents in the study valued the officers‘ assistance for families to 
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adjust to their post-separation circumstances more than their investigative role, and though 
that the judge did benefit from some social work input.
135
  
 
The problem was that welfare reports were ordered in only the most extreme cases, usually if 
another enquiry was under way. Thus, the very ordering of a report singled out the family in a 
negative way.
136
 It may well be that once parents found themselves in this ‗deviant‘ category, 
they submitted without protest to the investigations and advice of the authoritative figure of 
the probation officer.
137
  However, Maidment found little sign of active judicial decision-
making; no statistics were kept on  custody and access disputes but from empirical studies 
she estimated that 94 per cent of parents agreed arrangements and that in a contested case the 
court extremely rarely disturbed the status quo; in other words, the child stayed where they 
were.
138
 
 
Murch described the post-Finer role of the probation service and family courts as a shift from 
‗marriage saving‘ (reconciliation) to ‗child saving‘.139 Unusually for that time, he saw the 
officers as potential advocates for children,
140
 but most officers worked within the parents‘ 
rights paradigm in Fox Harding‘s characterisation.141  For example, use of systems theory 
whereby the officer sees the family as ‗the client‘ rather than addressing rights or needs of 
individuals was popular.
142
 The conflicts between law and social work, exemplified by the 
court welfare service are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
Wardship 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the welfare principle originated in the wardship 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Although by the mid 19th century, the requirement for 
                                                 
135
 M Murch Justice and Welfare in Divorce (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1980) 65 
136
 E Elston, J Fuller and M Murch, 'Judicial Hearings of Undefended Divorce Petitions' (1975) 38 (6) Modern 
Law Review  609 at 637 
137
 M Murch, ‗Seebohm: A Painful Dilemma for Probation‘ (1969) 15(1) Probation 18-23; C Lasch, A Haven in 
a Heartless World (Norton & Co, New York 1995) 16  
138
 S Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce: the law in social context (Crook Helm, London 1984) 61; J 
Eekelaar and E Clive Custody after Divorce (Oxford Centre for Sociolegal Studies 1977) paras 13.14; 13.22-
13.30 
139
 M Murch Justice and Welfare in Divorce (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1980) Ch 12 
140
 M Murch Justice and Welfare in Divorce (Sweet & Maxwell, London 1980) 161-164;  although the 
occasional practitioner also took this view: H Bretherton, ‗Court welfare work: practice and theory‘ (1979) 26 
Probation Journal 3 
141
 L Fox Harding, Perspectives in Child Care Policy (2nd edn. Longman, London 1997) 70-108 
142
 C Clulow and C Vincent, In the Child’s Best Interests? (Tavistock, London 1987) 
  138 
the child to own property had been dispensed with, it was common until the 1940s for 
wardship cases to commence with a nominal sum being settled on the child. Its use grew 
from the early 1950s and the rate increased in 1971 when jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Family Division, which could be accessed outside London.  Legal aid was available, with no 
need to create a financial settlement, and applications were being made by some parents in 
predictably unsuccessful attempts to curb their children‘s behaviour. However by the mid 
1980s, 40 per cent of applications were by local authorities because wardship was more 
flexible than taking care proceedings. Challenges by individuals against local authorities were 
less successful. The numbers of children made wards rose from 622 in 1971 to nearly 5,000 
in 1991. As well as the jurisdiction being less restrictive for local authorities, Lowe and 
White attributed this popularity to an increased awareness that children‘s welfare was not 
necessarily synonymous with parents‘ wishes; the High Court‘s willingness to oversee the 
actions of lower courts and local authorities, and increased mobility of families leading to 
higher occurrence of international abduction.
143
 
 
The Law Commission made various proposals to regularise wardship without abolishing it, 
and the restriction in the Children Bill was met with some dismay, as the expertise of the 
High Court would be lost in complex cases.
144
 Section 100(2) removed the eligibility of a 
local authority to apply for wardship, the premise being that care proceedings would now be 
sufficient. It was envisaged that most, if not all, care cases would be heard by magistrates.
145
 
 
Magistrates: Domestic proceedings and juvenile courts 
 
The magistrates‘ domestic jurisdiction was protective as well as punitive. Children were 
indirectly taken into account when making protective orders for mothers because the grounds 
for applications included cruelty to or failure to maintain children. However, rather than 
taking children‘s experiences into account, the efforts of probation officers were still directed 
toward improving adult relationships by addressing ‗marital difficulties‘ with psychodynamic 
casework in the 1960s.
146
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Despite this apparent marginalisation of children in probation officers‘ matrimonial work, 
their social work practice was based on a holistic view of the client and his/her 
relationships.
147
 Magistrates sat in criminal, domestic and juvenile courts.  Summary justice 
did not completely compartmentalise crime, unhappy home conditions and children‘s 
welfare. While one might surmise this could provide scope for workable solutions to family 
problems, the structures were not designed to help. This was partly because the Children and 
Young Persons Bill 1969 had originally been drafted to transform the juvenile courts into a 
welfare-based jurisdiction, but was amended after a change of government from Labour to 
Conservative.  
 
Increased local authority responsibilities for children
148
 culminated in the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969 which changed the courts‘ power to make a ‗fit person order‘ into 
powers and duties for local authorities to initiate care applications. In contrast to care 
proceedings today, parents were not parties; appeals were rare; and the JPs did not have to 
give reasons for their decisions. Furthermore, local authorities could make resolutions of 
assumption of parental rights regarding children voluntarily in their care, without recourse to 
any court, an administrative power which raised doubts about natural justice. A parent did 
have a right to appeal to the magistrates, but other family members could be left in ignorance 
and the High Court would not necessarily exercise its wardship jurisdiction if there was a 
dispute.
149
 One or more of seven conditions had to be met to grant a care order, and the child 
had to be shown to be in need of care and control. The conditions could be categorised into 
three groups: neglected and abused; troublesome and truanting; and the juvenile offender.
150
  
The troublesome concept of risk of harm was not included; this was one reason that wardship 
was used as an alternative method of protecting children from future harm.  
 
The legislation became muddled because prosecution of juvenile offenders was not replaced 
by care proceedings as originally intended.
151
 Instead, young offenders had lost some 
                                                 
147
 N Rose, ‗Psychiatry as a political science: advanced liberalism and the administration of risk‘ (1996) 9(2) 
History of the Human Sciences 1-23 
148
 L Fox Harding, Perspectives in Child Care Policy (2nd
 
edn, Longman, London (1997) 101 
149
 M Hayes,‗Removing Children from their Families before the Children Act 1989‘ in G Douglas and N Lowe 
(Eds), The Continuing Evolution of Family Law (Family Law, Bristol 2009) 
150
 M Hayes, ‗Removing Children from their Families before the Children Act 1989‘ in G Douglas and N Lowe 
(Eds), The Continuing Evolution o f Family Law (Family Law, Bristol 2009) 87 
151
 S Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century: A History (OUP, Oxford 2003) 695-696 
  140 
procedural safeguards and children in need of care were ‗in the shadow of the poor law.‘152 
However it was generally assumed that magistrates courts were the right level of forum for 
care cases. (This was confirmed by Lord Mackay in the debates on the Children Bill in the 
1980s.
153
) Eekelaar wrote that the magistrates were well-placed to make decisions about 
balancing child protection and family autonomy, in an effective system of institutional checks 
and balances.
154
 Building on their empirical study, Dingwall and Eekelaar argued in 1990 that 
magistrates were better able to arrive at decisions (without interference from the High Court) 
that were in the best interests of children, by applying common sense values in cases where 
legal issues rarely arose.
155
  
 
Another institutional check was the guardian ad litem. Access to representation had been 
improved with the introduction of the role of guardian ad litem by the Children Act 1975, 
now assumed by Cafcass and Cafcass Cymru.
156
 (If a guardian was appointed for the child, 
this also entitled the parent to legal representation.) This tandem model of legal and welfare 
representation was described by Salgo, a German family law academic, as ‗superior – except 
for the costs – to all other solutions‘ but he conceded that costs could not be easily compared 
across jurisdictions because ‗no other country takes this difficult task as seriously as the 
English system.‘157 As the children‘s rights paradigm158 grew in influence, availability of a 
separate, independent voice for the child was increasingly valued. Like many aspects of 
social policy it was, however, introduced on a wave of moral panic and a public enquiry into 
the death of a child who had been in care.
159
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1960s AND1970s - CONCLUSIONS 
 
The reform of divorce law and the attack on the dual jurisdiction by Finer reflected a loss of 
confidence in both the Church and the state. Criticism from the left saw the welfare state 
located in patriarchal and class structured capitalism. The focus on the state and an 
assumption that it can solve problems unconsciously defines problems in the state‘s own 
terms, upholding the status quo. This places faith in the welfare professional and excludes the 
experience of individuals who might find such an approach oppressive.
160
 Welfare provision 
was criticised across the political spectrum; ‗patriarchal, able-bodied and race-blind ideology‘ 
and ‗authoritarian paternalism‘ producing ‗a loss of self respect, passivity, and clientism, 
rather than an ethic of participation.‘161 Habermas sees the welfare state going beyond 
pacifying class conflict to impose a complex web of both giving and taking away 
freedoms.
162
 
 
The male breadwinner household was no longer the norm, and family life had been invaded 
by ‗the school, the helping professions and the peer group‘.163 Although the process of 
obtaining a divorce became more straightforward, more questions were being asked as to the 
suitability of the court setting for family cases, exacerbated by the illogical and overlapping 
jurisdiction; calls for a ‗family court‘ continued in the 1980s.164 In 1984 the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Hailsham, announced a re-examination of the idea and set up a committee of civil 
servants to examine the feasibility and options. This committee stated that it ‗was widely held 
that structural change and  
rationalisation would provide a better framework‘ but emphasised that any change would 
have to be cost neutral.
165
  The consultation was to have been followed by a report to 
Ministers to ‗enable them to decide whether to proceed with new arrangements and, if so, in 
what form‘ in anticipation of Lord Woolf‘s civil justice review. Appendix II to the paper 
illustrates the complexity of court arrangements at that time, with 11 pages taken up listing 
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the respective courts‘ jurisdiction. This fragmentation was partly addressed by the elements 
of unification of the Children Act 1989. 
 
1980s and 1990s: ‘PRIVATISATION’ OF FAMILY LAW? 
 
While the divorce reform legislation passed at the end of the 1960s may have restored the 
legitimacy of the courts by bringing the law into line with the reality of relationship 
breakdown, it has been shown that changes brought in administratively, with little discussion 
in the public sphere, may have been more influential in modernising processes.  The gradual 
de-legalisation of divorce has occurred almost by stealth, as substantive reform has proved so 
difficult.   
 
Three major pieces of legislation brought the courts‘ functions under scrutiny during this 
period: the Children Act 1989; Child Support Act 1991 and the Family Law Act 1996. All 
were subject to considerable debate in the public sphere about their implications on people‘s 
private lives and on the public interest. During this period of rolling back the welfare state, it 
was acknowledged that public expenditure was an issue, but ideological debate was also 
heard. Much of this centred on the role of the state in regulating family life, couched in terms 
of public and private.      
 
SUCCESSFUL REFORM? CHILDREN ACT 1989 
 
Shortly after the 1989 Act was passed, Cretney described it as signifying the law‘s ‗retreat 
from the private realm of family life.‘166 Lord MacKay, the Lord Chancellor, introduced the 
bill as follows:  
 
The government is anxious to make it clear in the Bill that families should generally 
be left to sort out matters for themselves, unless it is shown that without an order the 
child‘s welfare will suffer.167  
 
However, rather than the state completely withdrawing, it was intended that local authorities‘ 
powers and duties under Part III would enable services to be provided to support children‘s 
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upbringing within their families.
168
 The state‘s role in both prevention and intervention was 
redefined. The rediscovery of child abuse following several public enquiries between 1974 
and the mid 1980s had resulted in ‗a need for greater reliance on individual rights firmly 
located in a reformed statutory framework where there was a greater emphasis on 
legalism.‘169 Children would not find themselves in care without an application having been 
made to court; local authorities could not bypass statute by using wardship.
170
 Dingwall and 
Eekelaar commented that care proceedings thus became a more forensic open contest, but the 
‗rule of optimism‘ remained intact amongst social and health workers.171 (Their empirical 
work, pre-Children Act, had identified a tendency for welfare professionals to hold 
assumptions about parents‘ natural love for their children, explain away evidence to the 
contrary, and take the least interventionist approach to child protection.
172
) The principle of 
parental responsibility not only meant that children retained a legal relationship with their 
parents while in care, but also a relationship with both parents, intended to obviate the need 
for court orders for most separated couples.   
 
Integrating the laissez faire and birth families‘ rights paradigms, the Act is still seen as 
effective, although there has been a series of augmentations since 1991. The resilience of the 
Act may be attributed to the extensive consultations and reports that drew on political and 
professional support and human rights principles.
173
 Its principles and reform of court 
structures have arguably brought flexibility and better integration of court provision for 
children than the establishment of a specialist Family Court did in Australia.
174
  
 
The unification of family courts was largely achieved through absorbing the magistrates‘ 
matrimonial and child care functions and applying the welfare principle across public and 
private law. Family proceedings were separated from youth justice by the Criminal Justice 
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Act 1991, which renamed juvenile courts as youth courts.
175
 Care and domestic proceedings 
were transferred to the new family proceedings courts (FPCs) under the Children Act 1989. 
All public law applications were to start in the FPC. The child at risk of offending came 
within the new statutory definition of a child in need,
176
 but the concept in the 1969 
legislation that the court would consider the young offender‘s welfare needs was lost.177 
 
The success of the Children Act 1989 is often attributed to the extent of Law Commission 
deliberation, evidence and consultation, but it was influenced by a range of developments. 
There were three Law Commission working parties on private law aspects from 1984; wide 
consultation; and a report in 1988. In public law, most of the recommendations of an 
interdisciplinary working party in 1985 were accepted by the government in a white paper. 
Other influences were three child death inquiries; the recognition of children‘s autonomy 
reflected in the Gillick case; and the European Convention of Human Rights.
178
   
 
The immediate impact of the Act on the courts was a reduction in applications, but initial 
fears that the ‗no order principle‘179 would reduce the level of the courts‘ overview where this 
was necessary to promote children‘s welfare, were short-lived. Nor were care proceedings the 
sole province of the magistrates; by 1996, there were complaints of delay caused by too many 
cases being transferred up.
180
 As Masson concludes, if the Act was indeed intended to make 
the courts residual, this has failed in both public and private law cases.
181
 
 
FAILED REFORM? CHILD SUPPORT 
 
The Finer Committee‘s proposal to remove lone parents‘ claims for financial support from 
the courts to a wholly administrative system was revived to form the basis for the Child 
Support Agency. The level of public expenditure on supplementary benefit escalated 
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enormously in the intervening years.
182
 Neither the Department for Social Security nor the 
courts were more than ‗half-hearted‘ in extracting maintenance for children.183 While some 
commentators saw the economic imperative as far more important to government than issues 
of legal status or sexual morality,
184
 others saw an attempt to reinforce a dichotomy between 
maintenance/fatherhood and care/motherhood.
185
 Within a few months of the Prime Minister 
announcing in 1991 that the government was investigating better ways to collect child 
maintenance, she was advised by the relevant department that this would have considerable 
resource consequences and require careful study. Nevertheless, within another two months 
she announced that the Child Support Agency was to be established; the Act was passed just 
nine months later.
186
 There was only a six-week period for public consultation and the 
responses were never published.
187
 The state had made a ‗sideways shift‘ into interference in 
family life, with about 10 million people subject for the first time to dealing with the social 
security system.
188
 At its inception, the CSA dealt with a far wider clientele than the JPs had 
done. As has been well-documented, the agency was as inefficient and unpopular as widely 
predicted. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to resort to court action.
189
 In 2008 most of 
its functions were allocated to new Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission, which 
promotes the making of private agreements.  
 
There may have been widespread public acceptance of the principle that parents should 
provide realistic financial support for their children, but not the systems introduced in 1993, 
that were widely criticised from almost all quarters.
190
 While the ‗ideal speech situation‘ 
would be particularly hard to achieve on this topic, because communication is dominated by 
the powerful, a period of genuine public consultation might have prevented disastrous 
outcomes.    
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DISAPPEARING REFORM? DIVORCE AND THE FAMILY LAW ACT 1996 
 
Although there is little public demand now for change in the ground for divorce, both 
practising and academic lawyers remain dissatisfied with the artificiality of the five ‗facts‘.191 
Dingwall and Eekelaar wrote in 1988: ‗Many of the cumbersome aspects of divorce 
procedures derive from the political difficulty of introducing divorce by consent.‘ They 
thought that humiliating procedures were unavoidable until the substantive law was reformed 
to remove all elements of fault.
192
 The law relating to marriage and divorce attains legitimacy 
by reflecting the value we accord to marriage – as an institution to be preserved (in the public 
sphere) or a personal preference (in the private). Although child care policy is increasingly 
being disentangled from one of upholding marriage, politicians still cling to the declaration 
that children are best brought up by married parents. The impact is that reform of the law of 
divorce seems ever remote, but the idea that there is any public interest in legal investigation 
of individual relationship breakdown is anathema to leading academics, as well as the 
professional bodies.
193
 This was why there was such disappointment when the attempted 
reform by the Family Law Act 1996 failed. 
 
Ezra Hasson analyses the two critical purposes of the Act as a duality at the heart of the law 
of marriage and divorce. The concept of no-fault divorce, following Law Commission 
recommendations,
194
 had been placed within a set of legal mechanisms designed to encourage 
couples to stay together, the latter being introduced during progression though green and 
white papers. Attempts to address the concerns of those who took a moral regulation line of 
idealising marriage resulted in compromise.
195
 Furthermore, Hasson shows a disconnect 
between the discourse at policy level and that at street level, where the majority take a more 
service oriented approach, wanting no-fault divorce together with flexible opportunities for 
information and mediation.
196
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Not only did the government back up its rhetoric promoting information and mediation, pilot 
schemes were funded and evaluated before the legislative changes in divorce were 
implemented. As has been well-documented, the anticipated changes in behaviour and 
outcomes did not occur.
197
 In June 1999, the Lord Chancellor announced that the provisions 
would not be implemented following disappointing findings in the evaluation of the impact of 
the piloted processes on either of the two objectives of saving marriages or reducing conflict 
in divorce.  What had been welcomed by many, and distrusted by others, as the state 
withdrawing from private matters, foundered on the failure of the extra-legal alternative to 
achieve the legitimacy of the existing system.
198
 
 
RUSHED REFORM? UNIFICATION OF COURT WELFARE SERVICES  
 
The family courts‘ functions were again subject to reform from 1998, with proposals to 
restructure their welfare advice services.
199
 The family court welfare service, still run by the 
probation service, and the guardian ad litem panels, paid for by local authorities, were both 
subject to some inconsistencies in service delivery because of the large agencies within which 
they were located.  Despite this, they were greatly valued by the courts and the momentum 
for change came from external factors. Systems that served the interests of children and 
families in the court setting became dominated by self-serving mechanistic solutions to 
demands of the criminal justice system; the reorganisation of the probation service 
precipitated the plan to combine the support services for family courts in 1998. The 
consultation paper called for a period of three to five years to establish the new service but it 
was operating from April 2001; the abridged timeframe has been cited as a ‗serious 
misjudgement‘, leading to subsequent failure.200 
 
Generally, practitioners were in favour of a combined service. The historical split between 
social work and probation basic training was seen as increasingly obsolete by those in 
probation who wanted to continue to work with families, and felt that they had more in 
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common with guardians ad litem than with the increasingly punitive probation service.
201
 
They were now moving toward the children‘s rights paradigm, and the separate structures 
represented another example of a historical duality that had outrun its course.   
There were also fears that the plans were resource-led and that professional autonomy was 
threatened.
202
 It is understood that most respondents to the consultation paper favoured a flat 
decentralised structure, linked to the Department of Health. The service was however set up 
as a highly bureaucratic centralised agency of the Lord Chancellor‘s Department in April 
2001.
203
 (The responses to the consultation were not published). An opportunity for a service 
to evolve into a system grounded in the lifeworld of practitioners‘ knowledge and experience 
and was lost.  
Joan Hunt speculated that the UK‘s ‗fairly crude and arbitrary distinctions‘ between the level 
of representation of children in public and private law might disappear, and that a more 
differentiated approach based on an assessment of individual needs would evolve, although 
that was not imminent and the respective roles needed to be carefully mapped and integrated. 
She also raised the question of the purpose and function of the new service: was it to be 
primarily a service for courts or for children? The consultation document indicated the 
former, twinned with recognition of the growing movement for children‘s advocacy as well 
as more empathetic services for parents in the late 1990s.
204
   
On the other hand, there was potential for the greater numbers of private law cases to 
dominate the service, at the expense of representation of children in public law.
205
 In 2005, 
Cafcass policy explicitly switched emphasis and resources from public law to private law 
cases.
206
 In subsequent years, increased awareness of emotional harm being caused to 
children witnessing domestic violence has led to more duties being placed on Cafcass officers 
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to assess risk.
207
 Inevitably, net-widening spreads resources more thinly and reduces 
protection for those children already suffering harm.
208
 The pressures on the Cafcass budget 
have led to the present situation, where the guardians‘ input is circumscribed and managers 
attempt to exert more control over them.
209
  
In 1999, Hunt and Lawson wrote, 
We strongly urge that [managing the professional autonomy of the practitioners] is 
given full and open-minded consideration by all those involved, making use of 
modern ideas about management and organisational cultures.
210
 
If their recommendation had been followed, the system may have had a better chance of 
meeting the needs of children and the courts.  
 
1980s and 1990s - CONCLUSIONS 
 
Apart from the influence of the ‗marriage idealists‘211 on the fate of the Family Law Act 
1996, the state‘s interest in regulating adult relationships continued to fall away during this 
period. Family policy instead recognises that, with the birth of a child, social, economic and 
legal implications all spring up.
212
 By considering the contrast in public discourse when each 
of the four pieces of legislation above was introduced, we can see that undistorted 
communication and transparency of process give the courts a better chance of achieving 
legitimacy than systems based on vested interests, misinformation and short-term economic 
gain. Although commentators on the Children Act 1989 and the Family Law Act 1996 spoke 
in terms of public and private, the dualities imposed by historical court structures, and those 
emerging between law and social work; court-based and external mediation, all contributed to 
the current functions of dispute processing and protection.     
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The Children Act 1989 aimed to build a new consensus and, remarkably for family policy, 
there were no major political disputes on the Bill in Parliament. There was little media 
coverage, other than the high profile issue of emergency placements in the context of the 
Cleveland scandal. Parton suggests that perhaps the legislation was just too complex for the 
media to bother with. He observed that there was a great deal of lobbying, but concludes that 
it is difficult to know how much effect this had.
213
 Smart may well be correct in suggesting 
that the discourse was dominated by the professions.
214
 In retrospect, however, the resilience 
of the Act suggests that it has been more effective in helping the courts‘ functions meet 
expectations than legislation that was formulated with less opportunity for rational 
communication.
215
 
 
FAMILY COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 21st CENTURY  
Social policy (originally termed social administration in relation to the welfare state) has been 
recognised in theory and practice since the 1940s.
216
 In the 1990s, it was claimed that (unlike 
most of Europe) the UK did not have an explicit family policy.
217
 This changed during the 
Labour government administration,
218
 during which the state acquired a complex relationship 
with families of expectations and responsibilities.
219
 During the 2010 general election 
campaign, the respective family policies of all three main political parties became 
fundamental and ‗a potential electoral battleground.‘220  
Social policy is not always distinct from broader areas of state activity that impact on 
children‘s well-being, particularly economic policies.221 Fiscal policy can manipulate family 
forms,
222
 as recently attempted with a proposal to give ‗tax breaks‘ to couples who marry.223 
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Historically, fragmented departmental responsibility for policy about children was cited as 
evidence of UK family policy being at the ‗implicit‘ end of the spectrum.224 Since the 
Seebohm reorganisation in the early 1970s, responsibility for children in need has passed 
from one government department to another, a series of structural reorganisations described 
by Jean Packman as: ‗endemic – a chronic condition without hope of a cure‘.225 In 2001, 
responsibility for children‘s wellbeing moved from the Department of Health into Education, 
emphasising the state‘s interest in investing in children as a future resource, not in the here 
and now.
226
 (In the current consultation on the Family Justice Review, the public was 
presented with a decision already made between civil servants that the court welfare services 
now in the Department for Education will be subsumed by the Ministry of Justice.
227
)  
Social policy is formulated when a social problem is identified, and principles such as justice 
and fairness are applied to address it. Its objectives are often frustrated by an ‗implementation 
gap‘ between intention and effect.228 This is more likely the less communication and 
consensus is achieved before the policy is introduced. In particular, policies that make little 
sense to front-line practitioners are less likely to achieve their objectives.
229
 Applying 
Habermas‘ ideas, a more explicit family policy should help bring issues affecting children‘s 
private lives that are in the public interest into the public realm for open discussion. This can 
lead to better informed policy, so that our systems are serving our needs.  
 
Provision of legal aid was intrinsic to the welfare state and ‗fundamental to the development 
of an inclusionary form of citizenship‘,230 but by 2004 was being described as residual. At a 
minimum, it is critical that citizens have access to legal advice and representation where they 
encounter issues about the boundaries of citizenship rights, because the law must provide a 
                                                 
224
 P Daniel and J Ivatts, Children and Social Policy (Macmillan, Basingstoke 1998) 4 
225
 Jean Packman,  ‗From Prevention to Partnership: Child Welfare Services Across Three Decades‘ (1993) 7(2)  
Children & Society cited by P Daniel and J Ivatts, Children and Social Policy (Macmillan, Basingstoke 1998)  
203 
226
 B Featherstone, ‗Rethinking Family Support in the Current Policy Context‘ (2005) 36 British journal of 
Social Work 5-19; C Piper, Investing in Children: Policy, law and practice in context (Willan, Cullompton 
2008)  (Responsibility for children‘s care and education in England was held by the Department for Education 
and Skills since 2001; subsequently by the new Department for Children Schools and Families in 2007, which 
was renamed the  Department for Education in 2010.) 
227
 Stated by Keith Towler, member of the Family Justice Review Panel, at a consultation meeting, Cardiff, 31 
May 2011.  
228
 M Hill, Understanding Social Policy (Blackwells, Oxford 2003)  90-91 
229
 M Lipsky, Street-level bureaucracy: the dilemmas of the individual in public services (Russell Sage, New 
York 1989) 
230
 H Sommerlad ‗ Some Reflections on the Relationship between Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the 
Reform of Legal Aid‘ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 345-368 at 348 
  152 
safeguard against the exercise of arbitrary authority on the part of the state or organisations 
too large to care about the consequence.
231
 Although current proposals would curtail access to 
legal aid in such circumstances, family law has been identified as bearing a large proportion 
of reduction in services.  It is easier to justify withholding public expenditure for services 
when the Lord Chancellor is able to say: 
It cannot be right that the taxpayer is footing the bill for unnecessary court cases 
which would never have even reached the courtroom door, were it not for the fact that 
somebody else was paying… a more targeted civil and family scheme… will 
discourage people from resorting to lawyers whenever they face a problem, and 
instead encourage them to consider more suitable methods of dispute resolution.
232
 
 
To see whether a court is or is not ‗a suitable method‘ for resolution of a problem about a 
child‘s future, we need to think about how they now function.  
TOWARDS A FAMILY COURT 
 
The Finer Committee was less impressed by the clarity and consistency of arguments for a 
family court than by the enthusiasm of its proponents, and was therefore prescriptive about its 
own plan.
233
 Although the unified family court was not ‗built‘, many of these aims have been 
fulfilled since 1974. The range of powers available to judges and magistrates under the 
Children Act 1989 unified the processes and outputs for children rather more than the Finer 
Committee had envisaged.
234
 In the succeeding decades the county courts and family 
proceedings courts have also become more integrated, with unified procedural rules finally 
introduced in 2011.
235
  
 
Recent statistics indicate that there were about 109,000 family applications to county courts 
and 46,500 to magistrates in a year.
236
 However, the Court Service reports slow progress in 
managing the estate and combining courts.
237
  Its Annual Report in 2009 highlights the new 
combined Manchester centre,
238
 and the 2008 Report refers to a Unified Family Service 
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Programme,
239
 but this is not referred to in the two subsequent reports. The aim was to co-
locate hearing centres and administrative centres for flexible deployment of resources and to 
provide a simpler more accessible service for families.
240
 However it was conceded in 2005 
that it will be rare for there to be funds available for new buildings.
241
 Just as McGregor 
lamented the lack of statistics and failure of the relevant government departments to get to 
grips with estates and infrastructure 30 years ago,
242
 so the Family Justice Review notes a 
lack of management  information and physical space on which to base plans for a unified 
service.
243
  
 
FUNCTIONS OF FAMILY COURTS 2011 
 
The formulation of social policy is often triggered by the ‗sensitising impact‘ of pressure 
groups that bring a social problem to public attention.
244
 Unfortunately, a discourse skewed 
by motivations based on economy or power can prioritise some issues over others, or even 
identify a problem that barely exists. An example is the ‗popularist juggernaut‘ of the fathers 
rights movement over the past 20 years.
245
 The risk of a gap between policy formulation and 
implementation is exemplified by the passing of the contact enforcement provisions of the 
Children and Adoption Act 2006 before any research was commissioned to enquire as to 
whether enforcement of contact was a genuine social problem or merely a high profile 
campaign by a vocal minority.
246
 To date, the Act appears largely ineffective in reducing 
conflict or demands on the courts.
247
 
 
Since the Finer Committee idealised a ‗family court‘, the focus of court applications has 
shifted from finance to residence and contact, in a policy context of increased anxiety over 
childhood, as a site for ensuring the future.
248
 These applications are now preceded by 
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obtaining information from the police and other agencies to ensure any potential risks are 
identified before there is any judicial input into the case. This has become one of the main 
functions of Cafcass, which now processes checks on 180 applications per day,
249
 far from 
the ‗advice and support service‘ that was envisaged when it was established.        
 
Care applications no longer turn on the ‗common sense‘ of the magistrate,250 as about two 
thirds are now heard by higher courts. Pronouncements about the ‗draconian‘ nature of a 
decision to remove a child from their parents and the low esteem in which social workers are 
held have led to a lack of confidence in the FPCs.
251
 It does appear anomalous to have an 
amateur system and it is doubtful that the non-professionalism of JPs is often seen as 
‗restoring participants rights to their own conflicts‘.252 The cheapness of unpaid magistrates 
makes it very difficult to envisage a viable alternative. An inquiry by the Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Gardiner, in 1965 concluded that the England and Wales legal system was cheaper than 
20 similar jurisdictions because so many cases were heard by JPs.
253
 
 
Even in the higher courts ‗cases decide themselves under the weight of expert reports and 
parental concessions.‘254 The Family Justice Review proposal to reduce court scrutiny of care 
plans by local authorities
255
 echoes Dingwall and Eekelaar‘s view prior to the Act that most 
care proceedings did not require ‗legal‘ decisions at all, but Masson suggests that the courts 
have taken ownership of them to the extent that they are now being conducted like 
wardship.
256
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
To this day, politicians still support the image of the nuclear family headed by two married 
parents. There was a shift from 1997 to targeting investment in services to improve the future 
of children.
257
 The present government recently criticised policy ‗focussing almost 
exclusively‘ on children, signalling a move back to promoting marriage.258 Although much 
was written in the 1980s about resisting the imposition of fixed family forms, Freeman notes 
that inclusivity is relatively recent.
259
  
 
A specialist family court was once seen by many as the clear solution to the flaws in the 
family justice system. However, ten years after implementation of the Children Act 1989, 
Cretney commented: 
  
Non-lawyers may doubt the significance of what may easily seem to be low-level 
management of the court system; but one remarkable (and rarely noticed) fact 
suggests that there has indeed been an important change. This is that right down to the 
debates on the 1989 Act no discussion on family law was complete without the 
invocation of the so-called ‗family court‘ as a necessary (and often sufficient) 
response to the problem under review. Yet a decade later (whilst court structure and 
procedures remain a matter for debate) this simplistic response has become rare.
260
 
 
Although the idea of the unified court has been revived in 2011, this is peripheral to the 
overriding response to the current ‗problem under review‘ - to ease the administrative burden 
on the state by taking families out of the court system altogether.
261
 As Masson comments: 
‗what was once a novel idea to bring real improvement to family justice is being presented as 
the end result of process of administrative  decluttering.‘262 This was not the view of the Finer 
Committee which, although encouraging conciliation services, saw these as integral to a court 
which promoted the right of access to justice.
263
  
 
By the 1990s, most people saw the failure of a marriage as a normal hazard of life, not a 
token of social deviance damaging the reputation of the parties. As Dingwall and Eekelaar 
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put it: ‗if the parents‘ character remains unblemished‘ there was no justification for 
investigating their fitness to take decisions about their children‘s welfare.264 Although parents 
were not always the best judges of what is in their children‘s interests, they added, ‗welfare 
can be a more insidious form of social control than law, although it is always a fine judgment 
as to whether its enticements to conformity may not be preferable to outright coercion.‘265 
The family was exalted as the last refuge of privacy, at the same time as needing expert 
intervention by the ‗guardians of health and morality‘.266  
 
The family courts sit within this paradoxical social policy context, exercising their functions 
of dispute processing and protection. By acknowledging both the historical and ongoing 
dualities in the lifeworld and the systems that should support it, policy and practice might be 
developed to improve services for children and families. The discourse is however 
continually dominated by the maintenance of self-perpetuating systems and distorted by the 
most powerful voices.    
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A comparison of the family courts in England and Wales with those in Australia is a logical 
step in analysis of the courts‘ functions because Australia has often been cited as an exemplar 
in having a ‘family court‘ and, more recently, in promoting alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR). However, as this Chapter shows, a comparison also reveals further aspects of duality.  
 
As enthusiasm gathered for a unified family court following the Finer Report, the 
establishment of the federal Family Court of Australia (FCtA) in 1976 appeared as a bold and 
exciting venture into a new era of resolving family disputes.
1
 Instead, the failure of the FCtA 
to achieve legitimacy during the past 30 years exposes flaws in the Finer model, which 
excluded capacity for child protection. Secondly, the vision of a combined legal and welfare 
approach to dispute resolution struggled for acceptance. Dissatisfaction expressed in 
Australia has led to successive attempts to de-legalise proceedings. Alternative dispute 
resolution has developed from ‗alternative‘ mechanisms to explicit removal of decision 
making from the public arena of the court to extra-legal arrangements. The history of the 
Australian system is one of constant tension between the functions of dispute resolution and 
protection.   
 
In retrospect, there was little that was ‗unified‘ about the Finer ‗family court‘ which may 
have ended one type of class division between users of the magistrates and county courts but 
perpetuated another. This division, between the child who needs protection and the child 
whose parents can come to reasoned settlement of their own relationship difficulties and keep 
the child safe, is exacerbated by a structural separation of public and private law in Australia. 
This reinforces a perception that child protection is a parochial issue, whereas divorce and 
separation belong to a higher, universal system of obligations and rights. Families in private 
law disputes have for 30 years attracted an enormous amount of public attention and 
intervention by policy makers, largely centred on the functions of the FCtA. In this way, the 
private interests of families have a public face. In contrast, state court proceedings, whereby 
parental rights can be transferred to a public body, receive little public attention. In Australia, 
‗private law‘ has a public face that ‗public law‘ does not. 
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Australian family law is rooted in 19th century English society but as will be seen, recent 
reforms were intended to be a bold move away from the common law.
2
 Although arguments 
in the UK for abolishing the fault ground of divorce often cite this as a source of increased 
hostility,
3
 30 years of no-fault divorce in Australia has not eliminated post-separation 
conflict, nor even demonstrably reduced it. Neither has the automatic right of fathers to 
parental responsibility, irrespective of marital status, stopped anguish about the lack of 
paternal involvement with children.
4
 The troubled history of the FCtA regulating no-fault 
divorce since 1976 gives no support to advocates of similar reform here. Indeed, with no 
possibility open to one partner to establish domestic abuse as a fact leading to the 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, her chances of redressing the power imbalance on 
separation and asserting herself in consequent legal proceedings are reduced. The no-fault 
philosophy became embedded as ‗the central tenet of all issues involved in family law‘5, 
discouraging any acknowledgement by the court of the effects of violence on the child, 
because violence was ‗disqualified‘ or ‗contextualised‘ to make it irrelevant to property and 
children matters.
6
  
 
In contrast, there is nothing approaching the high profile of care and adoption cases, where 
children are removed from their families, as seen in England and Wales. There is the 
occasional moral panic, for example emergency intervention by the federal government in 
2007 following the Northern Territory child abuse scandal.
7
 There are fewer reported cases 
and, it seems, little media interest in state intervention, or lack of it, in comparison to the 
UK.
8
 Generally speaking, child protection proceedings do not feature in the public arena, and 
child protection systems may be less accountable than in the UK. It is only recently that a 
national perspective has been taken on child protection, with the government elected in 2007 
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proposing a national framework, stating that ‗national leadership is required for this 
important policy area.‘ At the same time it reaffirms that individual states remain responsible 
for individual case decisions.
9
 
THE COURTS’ JURISDICTION REGARDING CHILDREN IN AUSTRALIAN 
FAMILY LAW  
 
As the (then) Australian Family Court Chief Justice, Alastair Nicholson, and his Senior Legal 
Adviser, Margaret Harrison, wrote in 2000: 
 
What amounts to ‗family law‘ for particular purposes is dependent on our century-old 
Constitution, rather than on any popular understanding or acceptance of the term.
10
 
 
This statement goes to the heart of the unique feature of the Australian family justice system, 
which not only inherited English legal traditions but has embedded a structural separation 
between ‗family law‘ in the federal Family Court and child protection proceedings in state 
courts. This operational separation is premised on an obsolete distance between public and 
private law and is arguably no longer sustainable. Systems devised to serve a former stage in 
the evolution of the lifeworld have become ossified as existing for their own sake, and not 
modified to reflect modern norms.    
 
Australian law derives its jurisdiction from an Anglo-Celtic/Christian-Judaeo societal 
model,
11
 and it is only relatively recently that Australia emerged from the ‗cultural cringe‘, 
whereby home-grown ideas were assumed to be inferior to ‗the intimidating mass of Anglo-
Saxon culture‘.12 Australia did not experience the same extent of social upheaval as Europe in 
the second World War, nor face the ‗five giants‘ that post-war British social policy sought to 
overcome. There is, for example, no universal free health service.
13
 Family support services 
are primarily provided on a fee-paying basis by third sector organisations.  However, the 
strong cultural links of a substantially shared heritage between Australia and the ‗mother 
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country‘ have produced similarities in social policy.14 The population is predominantly of 
western European descent, and policy has followed other western-style democracies, 
following a pattern of withdrawal of state supported public service over recent decades. A 
comparison of key indicators of wealth, education and well-being shows Australia as similar 
to other western countries.
15
  The UK and Australia are now both classed as mid-ranking in 
the league of child poverty in first world countries.
16
 This chapter will show that post-war 
debates about functions of family courts in Australia mirror those in England and Wales. The 
postmodern crisis of legitimacy identified by Habermas in Europe applies to other western 
style countries such as the US and Australia, which have also undergone a loss of certainty 
about the state-citizen relationship, fragmentation and globalisation.
17
 Family justice systems 
in Australia are similarly de-stabilised by the evolution of family form since its family law 
and jurisdiction were systematised at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
Australia‘s Federal Constitution was agreed when its six original colonies formed a 
Commonwealth at the beginning of the 20th century.
18
 The Commonwealth obtained powers 
to regulate marriage, divorce and matrimonial causes, and related parental rights, and custody 
and guardianship of children.
19
 The states had co-existing powers which they all (apart from 
Western Australia
20
) referred to the Commonwealth in 1975. Divorce law had already been 
unified across the states,
21
 but the jurisdiction remained vested in the individual states‘ 
Supreme Courts until 1976. (At the beginning of the 20th century, private rights were still 
normally regulated within states‘ jurisdiction, but a uniform approach was preferred in 
matters of establishing personal legal status. The prospect of an individual recognised as 
married in one state but unmarried in another was to be avoided.
22
) Child protection and 
adoption, and some disputes between unmarried couples, remain in the states‘ jurisdiction.  
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Nicholson and Harrison explain the legacy from an era when neither ‗aberrant‘ family forms 
based on de facto
23
 unions nor state intervention in families to deal with violent behaviour 
could be sanctioned because the status of marriage transferred rights over property and 
children, together with a belief in family autonomy and non-interference from external 
supervision.
24
 When the Constitution was written, the only role envisaged for legal regulation 
of the family was that of decisions on marital status. Consequently the Australian system, 
inherited from the certainties of a past age, struggles to cope with postmodern fragmented 
family forms. 
 
There is a long-standing substantive difference: the abolition of fault-based divorce by the 
Family Law Act 1975 (FLA). Divorce law originating in the respective colonies‘ enactments 
between 1867 and 1873 was modelled on the English Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857. 
Despite the procedural changes in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, the legal grounds for 
divorce remained complex and similar to the English law, until the FLA was passed by the 
short-lived progressive federal government of the early 1970s. This simultaneously 
introduced no-fault divorce (the ground is irretrievable breakdown of marriage proved by one 
year‘s continuous separation) and established the FCtA.  
 
Although direct reference to the Finer report has not been found in the Australian literature, it 
seems likely that this was an influence. The first Chief Justice of the FCtA, Elizabeth Evatt, 
worked as a research assistant for the Law Commission in England in the late 1960s to 1973. 
She was a member of a family well-known in Australian public life, which had for 
generations supported the Australian Labor Party.
25
 According to Star, she was skilled in 
social science research, McGregor‘s field. The incorporation of a family counselling service, 
appears to reflect the Finer ethos.  
 
The FCtA has jurisdiction in all states except Western Australia. Its operations are de-
centralised into local registries. In accordance with the constitutional position, it originally 
dealt only with disputes relating to marriage, but eventually assumed jurisdiction over 
children of de facto couples from the states‘ courts in the late 1980s.26 As the number and 
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social acceptance of de facto families increased, the distinction between unmarried and 
married parents was removed and about half of applications to the FCtA now relate to ex 
nuptial children.
27
   
 
It was always envisaged that the FCtA would be part of a wider system of consultations and 
research. The FLA established the Family Law Council (FLC);
28
 this was shortly followed by 
the Australian Institute for Family Studies (AIFS) in 1980, which commissions and produces 
research on social policy including child protection. The FLC reports that 80 per cent of its 
recommendations since 1976 were accepted by government.
29
 AIFS recently produced a 
substantial report on the 2006 reforms.
30
 The continuing importance of these bodies reflects a 
higher regard for the relationship between law and evidence-based policy than we find in the 
UK.   
 
Nicholson and Harrison maintain the advantages of a specialist family court: family cases are 
a low priority in a generalist court, cannot be protected from resource problems, and the 
quality of judicial decision making is lower.
31
 They believe it is the inherent unpopularity of 
family law that makes the specialist court a target for criticism; accusations of gender bias by 
disaffected individuals; the use of discretionary powers of the court; and the disinclination of 
judges to specialise in family law. These issues were expounded throughout Star‘s earlier 
history of the Court.
32
 Judicial discretion has since been severely curtailed by successive 
legislative amendments, largely to placate the fathers‘ rights movement.33  
 
Unlike the Children Act 1989 provisions whereby an unmarried father has to be proactive to 
obtain parental responsibility, fathers in Australia have had greater legal rights to parenthood 
than those in England for some time.
34
 An unmarried father starts with the same parental 
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rights as the mother, unless paternity is disproved.
35
 Dewar has described the model of joint 
parenting envisaged by the FLA (as amended in 1995) as ‗co-operative‘ in contrast with the 
English model as ‗independent‘. This was linked to the FCtA retaining a more protective and 
interventionist role in settling parental disputes under the FLA than courts applying the 
Children 1989.
36
 Although both Acts had been influenced by the fathers‘ rights movement to 
introduce ‗automatic legal co-parenting after separation‘, the reality was that most day-to-day 
caring of children was still undertaken by women.
37
 These private arrangements rarely come 
into the public realm until parents separate. Laws based on notions of equality that did not 
exist in the intact family can raise expectations unrealistically to feed the remarkably high 
level of dissatisfaction expressed by men‘s groups toward the FCtA, discussed below.  
 
A founding judge of the FCtA wrote optimistically in 1980 that the 1975 Act was ‗modern, 
pragmatic and responsive to the mainstream of what Australia thinks about marriage and its 
failure.‘38 Unfortunately, its success is questionable, its remit having been continuously 
reviewed and amended in the last 30 years. The abolition of matrimonial fault has not 
dismissed pervading notions of blame, injustice and judgments about marital behaviour.
39
 
Most seriously, the risk of harm to children can be minimised.
40
  The ongoing struggles of the 
FCtA may be symptomatic of problems with the legislation, but as an institution its 
credibility was undermined by the introduction of a Federal Magistrates Court in 1999.
41
 Far-
reaching reforms have been brought in since 2006, previous attempts having been seen as 
failing to address public dissatisfaction. The operations of the FCtA were attacked in a well-
publicised and lengthy essay as recently as 2005, just prior to the new reforms taking effect, 
and it remains to be seen whether this habitual criticism will cease and demands for constant 
scrutiny, debate and policy change ever be met.
42
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SEPARATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS: PRIVATE  AND 
PUBLIC LAW 
 
In contrast, children at risk of abuse and in need of state protection (and their parents) are 
almost invisible. It could be argued that the Australian equivalent of care proceedings is not 
even ‗family law‘. Comprehensive family law textbooks mention the state courts briefly, only 
to illustrate the fragmentation of the system.
43
  In 2000, Australian family law courses were 
said to deal ‗merely with the law of marriage, divorce and … ‗ancillary‘ matters (that is, 
property and children)‘.44 A substantial contribution by AIFS and others has since expanded 
family law studies, concerned mainly with power-relations between adults, family violence 
and recognising new family forms, rather than the law operating in the state courts.     
 
A utilitarian argument could be made that prioritising private law engages with the interests 
of more children, by enabling far wider support of, and investigation into, families in dispute, 
in comparison to the relatively low number of children subject to state care. Could 
intervention at the stage of family breakdown prevent children needing the attention of child 
protection agencies? More public interest in early intervention and family support in ‗private‘ 
family crises can be advocated if we conceptualise relationship breakdown as a life event 
from which recovery of balance can be restored.
45
 The problem is that the FCtA jurisdiction 
excludes children who are at a risk, but never come before a court in a private law dispute 
because they are not subject to competing interests of adult family members. These children 
are hidden from public view. The interests of families in private disputes have a higher 
profile than those whose cases come before the state courts. Furthermore, it appears that state 
child protection agencies are less pro-active than those in the UK.  
 
A further distinguishing characteristic of the Australian family court system is its response to 
the needs of marginalised indigenous people.
46
 This is a peculiarly Australian social problem 
of discrimination, although related to wider problems of diversity, pluralism and 
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fragmentation.
47
 Children in these groups are disproportionately represented in the state 
courts. There is a general legislative requirement that the court consider the child‘s cultural 
background in determining their best interests;
48
 this is supplemented by a right for children 
with indigenous heritage to maintain a connection with their culture, and be supported in 
developing a positive appreciation of it.
49
  
 
In the examination below of the Magellan Project, it will be seen that the FCtA has improved 
powers regarding physical or sexual abuse of children, but most child protection concerns 
arise because of neglect. This brings us back to the question as to the extent that a public 
interest in the private lives of children is necessary to protect their welfare and enforce their 
rights. At federal level, the FCtA continues to struggle to prioritise the position of children in 
the context of adult disputes.
50
   
  
Similarly to England and Wales, the family courts are now separated from the majority of 
child support disputes, following the establishment of an autonomous administration system 
by the Australian child support agency.
51
 Advice on parenting and financial disputes is better 
integrated than here; for example the Family Relationship Centres have direct telephone lines 
through to the agency.
52
 
 
Although federal courts do not have jurisdiction in public law, it has been recognised since 
1992 that amendments to the FLA in 1983
53
 confirmed an inherent welfare jurisdiction 
similar to that of the Family Division of the High Court in England and Wales, for example in 
giving consent to medical treatment.
54
 An attempt in 2003 to extend this parens patriae 
jurisdiction to the rights of children imprisoned in immigration detention centres brought the 
Chief Justice into conflict with Government policy, and was reversed by the High Court.
55
 It 
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has been argued that the parens patriae jurisdiction allows essential representation of the 
interests of young people in disputes with their parents, the state or the medical profession
56
 
but in practice it applies only to the latter. 
 
FURTHER FRAGMENTATION WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATES COURT  
 
In the late 1990s the FCtA asked for a number of specialist magistrates to be available to 
assist with its workload.
57
 Instead, a separate Federal Magistrates Court (FMC) was 
established, which has an overlapping jurisdiction with the two federal courts (civil and 
family) although most of its work has always been family proceedings.
58
  The FMC has 
jurisdiction in divorce, smaller property disputes and parenting orders;
59
 appeals go to the 
FCtA. The federal jurisdiction is shared between the two courts according to the complexity 
of the case and, possibly, the parties‘ ability to pay a higher level of costs in the FCtA.60 The 
FMC has been found to be dealing with a substantial proportion of cases which featured 
serious violence issues.
61
  
 
By 2008 the FMC was dealing with about 80 per cent of family applications.
62
 It shares 
premises and dispute resolution services with the registries but is separately staffed. Quite 
why a second layer of judiciary, dealing with lesser matters more expeditiously, required an 
entirely new layer of court, with a separate administrative structure, is unclear. It has been 
suggested that the decision was politically motivated, FCtA judges were unpopular with 
Parliament, and the Attorney General had differences of opinion with the Chief Justice at the 
time on thorny policy issues, as mentioned above.
63
 The new court was intended to handle 
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more routine cases that did not require the full panoply of the FCtA, which could ‗focus on 
more complex matters appropriate to a superior court of record‘.64  The closeness of the 
functions of judges and magistrates is exemplified by the fact that the current Chief Justice of 
the FCtA, Diana Bryant, was previously the first Chief Federal Magistrate in the FMC from 
2000-2004. The decision to set up the FMC was not without its critics. In 2002 Harrison 
claimed that the FMC‘s separate administrative structure had increased overall federal 
expenditure.
65
 Nicholson described ‗numerous opportunities for duplication, confusion and 
wastage‘ despite the fact that personnel in each court attempted to co-operate.66 Management 
and administration began to be centralised in 2008 and in late 2009 the government 
announced the merger of the FMC into the two Federal Courts.
67
 This has not yet been 
achieved. 
 
The FCtA and FMC cover all of Australia except the state of Western Australia, which 
instead established its own Family Court of Western Australia (FCWA). Although the FLA 
1975 s 41 provided for family courts to be set up by all states, only this state used the 
provision, possibly because others were reluctant to take on long-term financial responsibility 
for a new layer of courts.
68
 Historically, Western Australia has tended to develop separate 
systems because of the geographic distance from the population centres in other states. Cases 
in the FCWA are decided under the FLA 1975, and it therefore has a parallel jurisdiction to 
the FCtA.  
 
CHILDREN’S COURTS OPERATING IN AUSTRALIAN STATES AND TERRITORIES  
 
When the states referred their powers to regulate family cases to the federal government, they 
specifically excluded children‘s welfare, retaining child protection functions at state level.69 
These split responsibilities have led the Australian Law Reform Commission to comment that 
state and federal intervention to protect family members:  
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…is beset by inconsistencies in policy, duplication of services and gaps in services. 
Agencies that are so disposed are able to play a waiting game ‗standing off‘ and 
hoping another agency will assume responsibility for a particular child‘s needs.70 
 
A FLC report following public consultation in 2000 conceded that the jurisdictional overlap 
resulted in ‗duplication, gaps, ambiguity, unintended consequences or confusion in 
responsibility‘ and that ‗classification of matters into private and public law categories may 
be somewhat meaningless‘ because of the frequency of violence in family disputes and 
parental disputes in child protection. Case studies showed that the welfare of some children 
was being compromised.
71
  
 
FAMILY VIOLENCE AND CHILD ABUSE  
 
This split jurisdiction causes trouble in cases where a protection order is made by a state-run 
magistrates court and a parenting order is made by the FCtA. An order for contact made by 
the FCtA takes priority over a protective order in state proceedings. The situation can arise 
where a parent seeks protection from violence by applying to the state court, while the violent 
parent applies at federal level for contact. Research studies have found widespread confusion 
and risk because these systems are not interdependent.
72
  
 
Provisions under FLA 1975 s 68 that allow orders at state and federal level to be made 
consistent are not routinely used. Studies have shown that parents, police and lawyers are 
confused by the overlap and misunderstand the provisions. Negotiating and implementing 
contact agreements while negotiating and enforcing protection orders is particularly 
problematic.
73
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Similar problems arise with cases of direct child abuse, as spelt out in a study by Kelly and 
Fehlberg of child protection cases that had been dealt with both in the FCtA and in either the 
Victorian or ACT state courts. Their most significant finding was that more than two-thirds 
of the child protection applications to the state courts were settled by a viable carer being 
identified who was willing to apply to the FCtA, so that the application to a state court led to 
a FCtA application. At this point the state agency would often withdraw. Unfortunately, these 
‗private‘ applications might not proceed, or might fail, but by that stage the protection 
authority had dropped out of the picture, and matters remained unresolved, with local files 
closed, and the child remaining in or being returned to the original situation.  
 
Kelly and Fehlberg identified a number of reasons for this movement of cases from the state 
courts to the FCtA. The nature and duration of orders made at state level vary, but FCtA 
orders were seen by agencies as quicker to obtain and more durable. Once a viable carer has 
been found, the child is no longer deemed to be at risk of significant harm, and protection 
agencies rarely play a formal role in the FCtA proceedings. This adds to the workload of 
FCtA, which has to investigate child protection concerns without the evidence that would be 
available to a state court. Another disadvantage identified for the potential carer was their 
having to bear the costs of the court case. Their findings therefore support the perceptions of 
dodging responsibility expressed above.  
 
Communication between the two courts was found to be poor, with examples of inter-parent 
disputes at the FCtA level running in parallel with protection agencies applying to state 
courts. The inter-action between the two courts can also originate at FCtA level, when it 
notifies a state authority of a child protection issue arising in a case, but commonly no action 
was taken in response. The protection authorities more often themselves referred cases to the 
FCtA, which was then unable to rely on the support of the state department in resolving 
issues that were no longer being heard by the children‘s court.74 In their sample, children‘s 
court orders often included a direction to the approved carer instructing them to seek a FCtA 
order, although there was not necessarily any follow-through by any agency to ensure this 
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happened. Although their data is now more than ten years old, it appears that this movement 
of child protection cases from a public to private responsibility continues.
75
 
 
Kelly and Fehlberg‘s findings pre-date the dilemma now evident in public authorities in 
England and Wales promoting kinship care, without the level of financial support a child 
would receive in local authority foster care. The emphasis in the Care Matters agenda to 
place children with family or friends and avoid care applications
76
 is a private solution to a 
public problem, but as these cases in Australia demonstrate, they are not necessarily durable 
solutions. In both Australia and in England and Wales, where the public duty to protect 
children means they have to be removed from home, this duty is increasingly being privatised 
into a search for placement where the State can withdraw not only its resources but also its 
professional support.
77
 
 
The FLC consultation on the split jurisdiction originally set out to examine overseas 
jurisdictions, but it was decided that this would be ‗unlikely to have relevance to the 
Australian experience‘.78 This may be because of the thorny constitutional problems, rather 
than a disinclination to look abroad, because comparative methodology was employed in 
Harrison‘s 2007 report on less adversarial trials, where particular attention was paid to the 
German inquisitorial model.
79
  
 
The 2002 final report made a number of recommendations to address the danger to children 
who were not being protected because of the separation of Commonwealth and state 
responsibilities. It called for a new federal child protection service that would investigate 
matters referred by the FCtA in cases where allegations of serious child abuse were likely to 
be contested in proceedings and there was unlikely to be independent evidence available to 
the court.
80
 Secondly, the FLC recommended changes in the law to allow an early decision to 
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be taken in such cases as to which court would hear the entire case.
81
 Neither of these were 
implemented and they are now being re-visited by the Australian Law Reform Commission.
82
  
 
WHY DID THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA FAIL TO GAIN LEGITIMACY? 
 
The introduction of no-fault divorce brought a vast increase in the volume of petitions (more 
than doubling in the first year), unmatched by resources, a situation exacerbated by political 
arguments.
83
 The progressive government which introduced the FLA 1975 was in office only 
between December 1972 and November 1975 and the new Court was therefore actually 
established under the succeeding conservative government. Senior figures in the new 
government had argued strongly against the Act and in a new era of financial stringency, 
allocating the financial resources originally earmarked for the FCtA was out of the question.
84
 
 
Administrative confusion and delay were utilised to support ideological criticism of the Court 
and no-fault divorce by pressure groups representing both men‘s and women‘s groups and 
religious fundamentalists.
85
 Typically, the Court‘s supporters complain that funding 
restrictions have caused delays throughout its history,
86
 but Star attributes the failure to the 
over-idealistic vision promoted by the promised ‗helping court‘ which led to unrealistic 
expectations. No system can entirely neutralise the experience of family separation, and 
intervention cannot be timed to coincide with a stage at which parties are rationally planning 
their future arrangements. In particular, the sudden removal of fault left the new court unsure 
as to its legal functions. Now there was no innocent party, it was not clear whom the court 
was meant to be ‗helping.‘87  
 
Thus, we can see a classic example of the gap between formulation and implementation of 
social policy.
88
 The initial lack of financial and ideological commitment to the ideals of the 
FLA led to both professional and public resistance to change; the new Court was undermined 
from its inception and has never fully recovered from its poor image. The policies may have 
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emanated from rational public discourse, but if the complexities and contradictions of 
people‘s life experience of marriage and divorce are not served by systems that can adapt to 
that lived experience, the solutions imposed by the State will not be accepted as legitimate. 
When debate is dominated by the loudest voices,
89
 the openness (in Habermas‘ terms) of the 
forum is in doubt.     
 
The ‗helping court‘ was not a vision shared by lawyers or their clients, who retained an 
attachment to adversarial law.
90
 The unrealised utopian expectations of the FCtA  were 
exploited by religious groups and those who complained of gender bias. Journalists were able 
to report on estranged fathers with unfair child support obligations, chaotic scenes in 
unsuitable premises staffed by harassed and overworked personnel, and a barrage of criticism 
from lawyers resistant to change.
91
 Most complaints in the first years were about financial 
relief on divorce. Delay and pressure on litigants was endemic.
92
 At this stage, cases 
involving children were not singled out for criticism, and about two thirds of custody 
arrangements were agreed early in the proceedings, with half of the rest being settled by a 
counsellor. Of those cases that did get to court, in about half the custody of the child was 
awarded to the father.
93
  
 
Only five judges were initially appointed to the FCtA, and their tenure was uncertain. Their 
salaries remained at a lower scale than their counterparts in the Federal Court for about 20 
years; having a consequent dampening effect on all salaries in the FCtA. A perception that 
the FCtA held less status than other courts was reinforced by its being headed by a woman as 
the first Chief Justice.
94
 The scarcity of judicial time led to enormous delays, but the judges 
(although dedicated to the reforms) maintained traditionally adversarial procedures and were 
reluctant to devolve matters to the counsellors.
95
 When one considers the pressures the 
judiciary were under to maintain the reputation of the court, it is not surprising they clung to a 
level of formality to give the proceedings legitimacy.  
 
                                                 
89
 See, for example,  R Graycar ‗Law reform by frozen chook: family law reform for the new millennium‘ 
(2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 737 
90
 L Star, Counsel of Perfection: the Family Court of Australia (OUP, Melbourne 1996) 118 
91
 L Star, Counsel of Perfection: the Family Court of Australia (OUP, Melbourne 1996) 112-118 
92
 J Wade, ‗The Family Court of Australia and Informality of Court Procedure‘ (1978) 27 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly  820-848 at  834-5 
93
 L Star, Counsel of Perfection: the Family Court of Australia (OUP, Melbourne 1996) 128  
94
 L Star, Counsel of Perfection: the Family Court of Australia (OUP, Melbourne 1996) 104-106 
95
 The counsellors‘ functions are discussed below. 
 174 
In one article published early in the Court‘s history, an apparent lack of precision in applying 
the substantive law enshrined in the FLA was attributed to: lack of court time and facilities; 
pressure of public opinion, the vagaries of measuring human welfare; the lack of case law and 
the imprecision of some terms in the Act itself.
96
 As Ingleby wrote some years later, the FCtA 
had ‗something of an identity crisis‘, stemming in no small part from its ostensible 
‗informality‘.97 
 
THE INFORMAL COURT – IDENTITY CRISIS  
 
The FLA originally provided that matters were to be held in closed court, where lawyers and 
judges would not wear traditional court gowns and wigs, and would proceed without undue 
formality.
98
   
 
Writing in the very early days of the FCtA, Wade pointed out that court procedures cannot be 
‗informal‘ to the extent of being formless, but that the requirement of s 97(3) that matters 
proceed ‗without undue formality‘ raised the question of what was ‗undue‘. What is really 
envisaged when people aspire to an informal court is not a complete loss of form, but a 
change in attitudes and values of the participants that transforms the court into a more 
accessible and sympathetic venue. Such perceptions of the extent of informality will vary 
amongst individuals.
99
 This desire to change the court experience into one grounded in 
common-sense, rather than dominated by excessive legalism and exclusive terminology, 
reflects a loss of faith in a system which has become disconnected from the lifeworld of 
family, upholding rules of procedure for their own sake, instead of recognising them as  a 
flexible mechanism to serve value-based law.
100
  
 
The non-robing provision was intended to make the court less intimidating,
101
 but it clearly 
irked other judges. In 1976, the High Court took an opportunity to express displeasure with 
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the informality of the closed court, citing Scott
102
 and emphasising the necessity of open 
justice to prevent abuse and maintain public confidence in the judicial system. In particular, 
the way in which court formalities could be publicly observed was essential to the character 
of the court, to distinguish its processes from those of administrative officials: ‗To require a 
court invariably to sit in closed court is to alter the nature of the court.‘103 This illustrates that, 
from the outset, the concept of the informal, shop front, helping court was not universally 
accepted as a legitimate means of access to justice.  
 
Furthermore, s 121, as originally enacted in 1975, prohibited publication of anything related 
to FCtA proceedings.  A Joint Select Committee report published in 1980 concluded that a 
lack of access prevented scrutiny of the Court‘s work.104 Sections 97 and 121 were duly 
amended in 1983. Under s 97, proceedings are held in open court, with wide discretionary 
powers for the judge to exclude individuals, or restrict attendance to the parties only. The 
proscription against robing was removed in 1988, and judges and lawyers all now wear 
formal court robes.
105
 What the judge wears continues to be highly symbolic in discussions 
on reform.
106
  
 
In the 1970s and 80s, media coverage of the FCtA had been ‗overwhelmingly negative‘, 
partly because newspapers had regularly reported salacious details of divorce proceedings 
before the 1975 Act, and the imposition of a ban was resented.
107
 As will be seen in Chapter 
Six, the legislative objectives of privacy are understandable, but in this context it led to 
complaints about lack of scrutiny of decision making.
108
 Unfortunately the result was that the 
media could only report adversely on the externally unprepossessing premises, with anecdote 
from aggrieved parties and lawyers about what was happening inside.  
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Following the crisis of public anger and the series of violent attacks on courts and judges, the 
premises were refurbished in the late 1980s.
109
 The original plan had been for the registries to 
be established in accessible venues such as shopping centres, but the violence (which 
included a bombing incident that injured a judge and killed his wife) led to stringent security 
precautions being built in.
110
 
 
Media discontent about reporting restrictions remained until an ‗exhaustive‘ report published 
in 1997 concluded that more openness would further the administration of justice by the 
FCtA, but an absolute ban on identifying parties in matters relating to children should 
remain.
111
 Section 121 was duly amended.
112
  
 
Ingleby encapsulated the dilemma by describing the Court as suffering from an identity crisis 
in trying to establish itself as a specialist jurisdiction with features of protecting children‘s 
welfare, informality and the concept of the ‗helping‘ court.113 He asked whether the FCtA 
was a family organisation with the trappings of a court, rather than a court with specialist 
jurisdiction. This goes to the heart of the legitimacy of any court in the family justice system 
– is it a welfare or a legal service? For Ingleby however, the identity problem was highlighted 
by the closed court debate, and the potential benefits of demystification.
114
  
 
Section 97(3) remains: that cases should proceed without undue formality, nor be protracted.  
One of the first FctA judges, Justice Watson, referred to its proceedings as being ‗not strictly 
adversarial but more in the nature of an inquisition followed by an arbitration‘ but was 
chastised by the High Court as not being entitled to dispense ‗palm tree justice‘.115 
Nevertheless, Watson continued to refer to proceedings as inquisitorial, and R v Watson was 
later distinguished as applying only to property matters, when it was acknowledged that in 
cases relating to children the overriding principle of children‘s best interests applied to both 
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procedural and substantive issues, and that such proceedings were not ‗strictly adversarial‘.116  
Harrison concludes that the FCtA has gradually emphasised the ‗less adversarial‘ nature of 
children matters, while not entirely dispensing with traditional process.
117
 The ‗adversary 
system‘ was a label used by Wade 30 years ago and repeated by Harrison, as meaning one 
where the judge plays a minimal part, and is under a duty to make a decision on the evidence 
before him or her, not to discover the truth.
118
  Wade suggested that ‗a lingering suspicion 
that lawyers have a vested interest in words and disputes‘ might lead to the conclusion that 
they should be excluded altogether.
119
 Such a suspicion has lingered on, and influenced the 
development of the Less Adversarial Trial model.  
 
 THE FAMILY LAW REFORM ACT 1995  
 
By the 1990s, parenting disputes were attracting more adverse attention than property cases, 
leading to the Family Law Reform Act 1995 introducing more directive shared parenting 
principles in the FLA. It has since been claimed that the 1995 Act was not ‗reform‘, in that it 
did not respond to any identified legal problem, but only to relentless propaganda by fathers 
claiming bias against men by the FCtA.
120
   
 
Despite the promotion of ADR, it seems that publicity given to the new law led to an increase 
in litigation, rather than relieving non-resident parents‘ distress, as Parliament had intended.  
The number of contact applications nearly doubled between 1994 and 2000.
121
 Rhoades‘ 
view in 2000 was that the 1995 Act encouraged increased litigation by fathers who expected 
a 50-50 shared parenting order, exacerbated by weak provision for primary dispute 
resolution.
122
 Despite re-branding to ‗primary‘ dispute resolution, ADR was still not the first 
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port of call.
123
 She commented that court orders were more prevalent in Australia than 
England and Wales because of the ‗settlement culture‘ engendered by s 1(5) Children Act 
1989. At that time, litigation was still the preferred method of resolution in Australia, only 
partly countered by reductions in legal aid eligibility.
124
  
 
Despite the FCtA being ‗opened up‘ in 1983, the promotion of primary dispute resolution, 
and the ‗pro-contact‘ paradigm introduce in 1995, the FCtA remained unpopular. Public 
dissatisfaction was taken up by policy-makers concerned about the decline in father-child 
relationships to lay the ground for yet more change, in both ADR and adjudication, 
introduced by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006, 
following a parliamentary enquiry. 
 
‘EVERY PICTURE TELLS A STORY’: THE PARLIAMENTARY ENQUIRY 2003 
 
Regina Graycar explains how anecdotes repeated in the Australian media have influenced 
policy change, possibly more than research findings or official government statistical data 
have. She attributes this to the gendered nature of the discourses that characterise federal 
family law, retaining the Constitutional founding fathers‘ conception of family –
‗anglocentric, nuclear, male-focused and heteronormative‘.125 Her observations are pertinent 
to the background to the 2006 Act, prefaced by claims by fathers‘ pressure groups to have got 
the Prime Minister on their side when he identified a ‗hot button issue in the electorate‘, 
announcing that the government was ‗looking to alter that [custody awarded to one parent] so 
the presumption is that it will be a shared arrangement…‘.126         
Disappointment that the 1995 Act had failed to deliver ‗equal parenting‘ was followed by a 
large-scale Parliamentary enquiry, Every Picture Tells a Story.
127
 Studies indicated that about 
30 per cent of children were still losing contact with their fathers.
128
 The government was 
therefore not swayed entirely by unsubstantiated opinion, although Nicholson believes that 
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complaints directed at the FCtA were by small groups of ‗disaffected men‘ who had been 
given far more political attention than they warranted, and who could claim credit for 
parliamentary enquires that raised more questions than answers.
129
  
Parkinson and Smyth however found that there was a significant level of genuine 
dissatisfaction amongst mothers wanting more father-child contact, using household survey 
data that was not confined to pressure groups.
130
  They attempt to analyse the paradox in 
fathers and mothers both complaining of too little father-child contact and suggest that 
professionals may try to fit all families into ‗standard packages.‘131 They suggest that making 
‗final‘ orders is anachronistic; harking back to a time when custody was won by one party 
with the other having to accept ‗reasonable access‘. This recalls Davis‘s description of the 
main function of family court welfare officers in England being to mollify the ‗classical 
loser‘.132 These findings support the drive to rid family dispute resolution of its adversarial 
elements - the winner-loser triad discussed in Chapter One. 
The 2003 enquiry accepted the public perception of courts being too adversarial, 
pathologising parents, creating delay and expense.
133
 Strenuous arguments for a presumption 
of equal parenting by men‘s groups assigned blame for weakness in the 1995 changes to 
gender bias in the legal profession and the judiciary. Rhoades describes how the Committee 
‗played to the gallery‘ by endorsing views that equal parenting was a social reality rather than 
aspirational, and that the FCtA was expensive and divisive. She was therefore somewhat 
surprised by the compromise reached in the final report, rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach 
while trying to address both men‘s calls for equality and women‘s for safety.134 Instead of a 
presumption of 50-50 time spent with each parent, the report recommended equal shared 
                                                 
129
 A Nicholson, ‗Sixteen Years of Family Law‘ (2004) 18 Australian Journal of Family Law 131   
130
 P Parkinson and B Smyth, ‗Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with father-child contact arrangements in 
Australia‘ (2004) 16 Child and Family Law Quarterly 289 at 301 
131
 P Parkinson and B Smyth, ‗Satisfaction and dissatisfaction with father-child contact arrangements in 
Australia‘ (2004) 16 Child and Family Law Quarterly 289 at 303 
132
 G Davis, ‗The Halls of Justice and Justice in the Halls‘ in R Dingwall and J Eekelaar, Divorce Mediation and 
the Legal Process (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 104 
133
 R Hunter, ‗Close Encounters of a Judicial Kind: Hearing children‘s ―voices‖ in family proceedings‘ (2007) 
29 Child and Family Law Quarterly 203 
134
 H Rhoades and S B Boyd, ‗Reforming Custody Laws ‘ (2004)  18 International Journal of Law Policy and 
the Family 119 
 180 
parental responsibility.
135
 This was implemented by the Family Law Amendment (Shared 
Parental Responsibility) Act 2006.  
 
Whether this drive toward legal ‗shared parenting‘ will lead to a cultural change in disrupting 
traditional gendered patterns of care, remains to be seen.
136
 A statistical review in 2004 found 
that mothers spent more time caring for children than fathers, even when both were working 
full-time; the average time for mothers in couples being double that of fathers.
137
  
 
The enquiry heard 166 witnesses in public hearings and received over 1,700 submissions. 
Although its remit was to investigate equal parenting, the Committee took on the entire 
family law system, and paid more attention to personal complaints about the adversarial 
system, than to presenters of empirical research. Its primary concern was responding to the 
perceived need for fathers to continue a post-separation relationship with their children
138
  
The inquiry concurred with public perceptions that judges encouraged adversarialism and 
allowed courts to take too long, in contrast to ‗good‘ dispute resolution practitioners.139   
 
Radically, the Committee hoped to remove judges almost altogether, concluding in emphatic 
terms:  
 
…only a new non-adversarial administrative tribunal specifically established for 
determining disputes about future parenting arrangements will bring about any real 
change to the current domination of lawyers and courts in family disputes.
140
 
 
The report consequently recommended a new Families Tribunal, that would use a multi-
disciplinary panel of lawyers, mediators and child psychologists to make binding decisions in 
family cases. Parties would have no right to legal representation, expert witnesses, or 
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interpreters, who could be called solely at the discretion of the Tribunal.
141
 As Wade 
predicted thirty years ago, the lingering suspicion of lawyers had finally manifested itself in 
plans for their removal.
142
 
 
It is not entirely clear why the government rejected the Committee‘s recommendation for a 
new tribunal; the official response merely stating that the purposes of reform would be better 
served by community-based advice centres.
143
 Possibly it would be unconstitutional for 
serious cases where a parent might be deprived of parental rights to be decided by an 
administrative tribunal.
144
 A tribunal would only partly replace the federal courts and 
therefore add to the layers and possibly the expense of the system. Breaches of orders, a 
significant aspect, would still have had to be dealt with by courts.
145
   
 
THE FAMILY COURT AND THE 2006 ACT 
 
The government subsequently planned a multi-million pound reform programme on post-
separation parenting, including child support.
146
 None of this money was directed at courts or 
legal representation.
147
 The Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 
2006 avoided the introduction of a presumption of shared residence, and instead aimed to 
assist more fathers to remain involved in parenting; to reduce reliance on lawyers and to 
reduce the effects of conflict on children. ADR is now compulsory, through Family 
Relationship Centres or other family relationship services, before a court application is 
issued; hearings are preceded by counselling by family consultants within the court structure; 
and those cases that still remain are subject to a new form of judicial management, the Less 
Adversarial Trial.  
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A re-casting of the image of the FCtA might have been expected since the retirement of 
Alastair Nicholson and appointment of Diana Bryant (formerly the Chief Federal Magistrate) 
in 2004. At the time of her appointment she was described as ‗apolitical‘, ‗unpretentious‘ and 
‗not expected to be outspoken like Chief Justice Nicholson‘148 But, even following the 
intensive inquiry, the FCtA continued to attract opprobrium, with an 80-page polemic by an 
academic historian, John Hirst in 2005. It is notable that this essay elicited responses from, 
amongst others, all three Chief Justices of the FCtA, past and present.
149
  
 
Cases that are not diverted, and remain to be adjudicated, are now subject to considerably 
more legislative direction than in English law. Parkinson contrasts the brevity of the s 1(3) 
Children Act 1989 welfare checklist with the voluminous lists for consideration to be applied 
in the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006.
150
 Although the 
aim is to dispense with lawyers, the law has become increasingly more complex.
151
 Judicial 
discretion has been severely curtailed. The majority of separating parents who do not require 
a judge to determine arrangements negotiate in the shadow of increasingly prescriptive laws 
detailing  Parliament‘s intentions, directed as much at legal and mediation advisers as they 
are to judges.
152
 Unjust outcomes can result from flaws in the legislation or lack of legal aid 
to pursue a case, not only from judicial process.
153
   
 
The Committee‘s aversion to the Court was instrumental in establishing an explicit   
diversionary policy with a compulsory pre-court procedure, buttressed by investment in a 
network of providers, the FRCs.  Since July 2007 an application for a parenting order can be 
made only after obtaining a certificate from a registered dispute resolution service that an 
attempt at resolution has been made. Primary dispute resolution was re-named ‗family 
dispute resolution‘.154 The purpose is to agree a Parenting Plan, that can be endorsed by the 
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court. There are exceptions to this requirement in the case of violence or child abuse; the 
AIFS evaluation found that these exceptions were poorly understood.
155
  
 
If a case proceeds to court, parties must attend a process of family counselling with the 
family consultant, who prepares a report.
156
 The meeting is not privileged, and the consultant 
gives evidence. Consent orders or court decisions can be made, but it is expected that most 
cases will be agreed and will not proceed past the resolution stage. Revisions of case 
management processes since 2001 have separated each case into an initial ‗resolution phase‘ 
and, if necessary, a ‗determination phase‘. If a matter remains contested, a case assessment 
conference is held to ensure all evidence is available.
157
 The aim then is to dispose of the 
matter as a less adversarial trial.  
 
The Children’s Cases Project and Less Adversarial Trials  
 
‗The lighter, more contemporary and more fuel-efficient vehicle.‘ 158 
 
This description of Less Adversarial Trials (LATs) symbolises a progressive 21st century 
approach to family justice, throwing off the heavy, anachronistic and resource-consuming 
chains of the past. There is pride in the new streamlined vehicle, but closer examination 
raises questions as to whether this serves families‘ needs or, instead, economic systems.   
 
By the late 1990s, a culture of non-compliance with FCtA directions had become entrenched, 
with high levels of late filing and contumacy.
159
 The consequent strain on judges led to new 
rules in 2004 imposing better case management on lawyers. At the same time, the numbers of 
unrepresented litigants were rising. Litigants in person tended to be more likely to present the 
judge with volumes of material that dwelt on past events, and call witnesses who could not 
assist the court, lengthening the proceedings and causing further deterioration in 
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relationships.
160
 It seemed that only a wholesale rejection of the adversary system was going 
to make the Court viable. 
 
The Children‘s Cases project (CCP) laid the foundation for the LATs.  The CCP began in 
New South Wales following a Practice Direction in 2004 by Chief Justice Alistair Nicholson, 
whereby a non-adversarial approach to parental disputes was piloted by judges in two 
registries. At the time of the 2003 parliamentary enquiry, Nicholson conceded that, despite 
the lengths to which the FCtA had gone to simplify procedures and encourage early 
resolution, the whole system relating to children needed an overhaul to focus attention on 
outcomes at an earlier stage.
161
 A study tour was undertaken by members of the judiciary to 
learn more about the European inquisitorial approach, paying particular attention to the 
German model. Watson had claimed in the early years ‗the judge makes decisions using the 
adversary process only when it is finally necessary,‘162 relying on informal surroundings and 
dispute resolution by the counsellors and registrars. This approach failed to gain legitimacy, 
as discussed, but neither did the return to formality appease the critics. 
 
Although the 2003 inquiry accepted that lawyers are aggressively adversarial, this is not 
universally agreed.
163
 In any event, legal aid had been restricted to such an extent that a 
significant proportion of litigants represented themselves. A less technical approach might be 
required to meet the needs of the self-represented litigant rather than to deflect the over-
litigious lawyer. Supporters of the non-adversarial approach cited civil law reform in England 
and Wales, namely: ‗ the argument for the universal application of the full blooded 
adversarial approach is appropriate only if questions of cost and time are put aside.‘164  
 
The CCP was used where the primary dispute resolution stage had failed, and required pro-
active judicial intervention. Parties who elected for the project agreed to the suspension of the 
rules of evidence, and to talk directly to the judge.  The objective was to achieve better 
outcomes in terms of the child‘s wellbeing, with an underlying belief that prolonged 
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proceedings aggravate the conflict between parents, are not child-focussed and do not assist 
future co-operative parenting.   
 
There are two linked evaluation reports on the CCP: the first by Jennifer McIntosh 
(McIntosh) the second by Rosemary Hunter, with McIntosh (Hunter).
165
 Hunter‘s report 
raises more questions than McIntosh‘s, and has not been published in full. McIntosh 
monitored progress of 45 cases following the CCP, and a control group which followed the 
traditional procedure. Her report summarises findings of the new procedure as ‗no further 
harm‘ to the adult relationship and to the children‘s adjustment. In comparison, the control 
group did not experience the court process as constructive, and some reported increased 
antagonism. She acknowledges that at that stage there may have been different characteristics 
between the group which elected for one scheme or the alternative. 
 
When Davis studied family proceedings in England in the 1980s, he concluded that the court 
process had so little influence on the outcome, that the real test of its effectiveness was the 
parties‘ own experiences of it.166  These early findings by McIntosh indicate that applying 
such a test might produce a positive result from the CCP. However, the report points out that 
the specialist approach by the family court judge is a ‗loss of judicial impartiality.‘167  This 
suggests that judges could be more interventionist and directive than families might always 
be prepared to accept. The LAT hearing is described as a ‗structured discussion‘, led by the 
judge.
168
  
 
Hunter compared 168 finalised CCP cases with the same number of non-CCP cases (part of 
this sample was used in the McIntosh report). The FCtA website states that she: 
  
…similarly found that as a less adversarial and more child focused process, the CCP 
had the potential to assist parents to parent more cooperatively. 
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Professor Hunter also found that the CCP pilot resulted in a faster court process, and 
parties who had participated in CCP were generally more satisfied with that process 
than parties whose dispute was determined using a traditional adversarial approach.
169
 
Hunter stressed the limitations on generalising from the research sample. The CCP pilot 
involved participation by consent and a high degree of judicial and administrative attention. 
Take-up of the scheme was low;  parents in the sample had fewer issues in dispute than the 
control group, and were less likely to be repeat litigators. Hunter does attribute the positive 
outcomes of the cases to the streamlined process, rather than the lesser complexity of the 
cases, but asks whether the LAT system will be as successful when it is applied universally, 
beyond this atypical sample.
170
  
The LAT approach is premised on setting aside conflict and mending the parental 
relationship but a case will not make progress unless any issues of domestic violence are 
identified and addressed at the very beginning of the process. In these types of cases, Hunter 
argues, the emphasis must shift from avoiding conflict to ensuring the safety of children and 
the abused parent. Considering the prevalence of allegations of abuse heard in the FCtA, the 
LAT system will be reliant on systems that can effectively ascertain this at the earliest 
stage.
171
 The process is assisted by an enhanced role for the independent representative 
(child‘s solicitor) and the family consultant. Hunter found that parents listened seriously to 
the consultants because of the authority given them by the judge, and generally the 
consultant‘s contribution was seen positively. There is however an impact on resources; the 
early involvement of the consultant was building up backlogs of work.  
 
Hunter‘s findings agreed that parents‘ satisfaction was higher than in the control group. 
However, she made important caveats: the rate and sustainability of agreement rate was not 
as high as expected; the sample was unlikely to be representative of the majority of families; 
and the speed at which the CCP cases were dealt with cannot be replicated through the 
system. There were therefore doubts as to whether the benefits of CCP reported by McIntosh 
in expedited proceedings would be achieved to the same extent when all cases that resist 
primary dispute resolution became LATs conducted by all FCtA judges, not just those who 
were setting aside special time and commitment. Neither the impact of LATs on judicial time, 
                                                 
169
 <http://www.familycourt.gov.au/presence/connect/www/home/about/less_adversarial_trials/> 
Last accessed 9 April 2008. 
170
 R Hunter ‗Child-related proceedings under PT VII Div 12A of the Family Law Act: What the Children‘s 
Cases Pilot Program can and can‘t tell us‘ (2006) Australian Journal of Family Law 227 
171
 R Chisholm, Family Courts Violence Review (Attorney General of Australia, 2009) 
 187 
costs, legal aid, nor lawyers‘ practice could be predicted from the pilot. Consequently, Hunter 
questioned how far the findings about parental satisfaction could be generalised.  She 
expressed particular concern about the lack of guidance on judges interviewing children. 
Overall, she found considerable diversity in judicial case management, drawn from the 
broadness of the legislation.  
 
The CCP pilot ended in December 2005, to be immediately succeeded by LATs.
172
 This is 
now applied in all FCtA registries and the FCWA, although the FMC claimed its procedures 
already complied.
173
 The aim is that the judge is in control of proceedings rather than the 
parties (about 40 per cent of whom are litigants in person
174
) or lawyers.  
 
Harrison‘s paper on LATs had claimed them as the answer to the problem that the common 
law requires an adversarial hearing, reliant on a contest on the evidence presented by two 
equally powerful voices. Such a system was not designed for cases involving children, 
especially when one or both parties do not have the means to purchase robust representation. 
The FLA was drafted in the belief that legal aid funding was an essential component.
175
 Nor, 
of course, can such a system always take into account the child‘s own views. In any event, 
the proportion of cases that reach a judge are declining: just over 14,500 applications for a 
court order were made to all three Federal courts in 2008-2009, a reduction from nearly 
19,000 the previous year, and 84% of these were heard in the FMC.
176
 The solution of LATs 
is therefore directed at a small proportion of the population.  
 
The evaluation of the 2006 reforms included a brief study on the LATs which validate the 
questions Hunter raised; the team found that although there was an improvement in the way 
court decisions focussed on the child, the LATs were hampered by increased delay; resource 
restrictions and variations in judicial case management.
177
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From family counsellors to family consultants 
 
The role of family consultants as in-house experts has developed from that of family 
counsellors under the original 1975 Act.
178
 Family consultants now appear to be highly 
valued by the courts and the public, although like others in the system are subject to resource 
constraints.
179
 Although they can feel frustrated by the limited nature of services to which 
they can refer families with ongoing problems, generally consultants‘ posts are rewarding 
both in terms of remuneration and job satisfaction.
180
  Hunter has observed that they are held 
in higher esteem than Cafcass officers are in  England and Wales.
181
 
 
Family counsellors used to undertake a two-stage function prior to the LAT. One counsellor 
would offer privileged mediation in the resolution phase and then a second would provide 
non-privileged assessment and reports.
182
  This has been expanded in the LAT into a longer-
term relationship between one consultant and the parties, and their children.
183
 Their work is 
more focused on high-conflict resolution, because the bulk of pre-court negotiations have 
been assumed by community services. Rather than a receptor of all the issues families 
previously brought to court, the consultant is now a more specialised facilitator, child 
advocate and provider of independent information to the court.
184
 The court can also order 
counsellors to supervise its orders. 
 
The consultant now has more responsibility for reporting on risk.  In 2002, the FLC had 
published a report, Family Law and Child Protection, observing that ‗the Family Court‘s 
counselling and mediation services are designed to promote conciliation, not fact-finding‘.185 
This was in the context of the FCtA‘s struggle to address child protection in its decisions on 
parenting disputes, because a family counsellor was not expected to make a judgment about 
allegations of abuse. In the English courts an officer would have been expected to ask the 
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court to refer the question to the local authority for an investigation, or to make a finding of 
fact before s/he proceeded to negotiate contact.    
 
Some members of the judiciary, dedicated to the ethos of the FCtA in its early days wrote 
fulsomely of the family counsellors.
186
 In 1999, Truex commented that the notable difference 
in English courts was the lack of the multi-disciplinary and educative functions which in 
Australia ‗…under one roof benefit those who work there and the families they serve.‘187 
Initially however, some judges were dubious about the role of the counsellor, and were not 
obliged to follow their recommendations.  
 
Harrison wrote that this emphasis on settlement and recognition of the skills of non-legally 
qualified professionals distinguishes Australia from other common law jurisdictions. Reports 
by the family counsellors were a modification of the adversarial system because they are 
directed by the court, not by the parties, and the report writers were seen as distinctively 
expert witnesses on behalf of the court, rather than called by one party or the other.
188
 This is 
not quite accurate; English courts would not accept that welfare officers are partisan, and rely 
heavily on their reports. Indeed, if the judge or magistrate decides against the officer‘s 
recommendation, they are obliged to give their reasons.
189
 While it seems that the social work 
professionals in Australian courts are valued more highly than their counterparts here, 
Cafcass officers are also neutral, not called by a party. 
 
The retention and increased specialism of an in-house welfare team has added value to the 
conciliator/reporter in an increasing disparity of perception between Australian officers and 
their English equivalent in Cafcass.
190
 Hunter explains:  
 
In Australia it is more common to trust family reporters and distrust judges, while in 
England and Wales, CAFCASS officers are distrusted but there seems to be greater 
trust reposed in judges… report writers in England and Wales tend to be seen as 
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operatives of the welfare state, whereas in Australia they are seen as skilled 
professionals.
191
   
 
As Murch had observed years earlier, parents‘ perception of the professional status of the 
adviser is crucial.
192
 Although the English service was transferred from probation into the 
Lord Chancellor‘s Department in 2001193 this did not appear to have changed the public face 
of the officer from the Foucauldian controlling family technician to the acceptable quasi-legal 
professional. On the other hand, much as the unpopularity of the Australian court rests with 
the poor image of the judiciary, it seems unlikely the counsellors were immune throughout its 
most turbulent years. They are only mentioned incidentally in the literature. As Star describes 
their progress, it has taken many years for family consultants to achieve the level of 
recognition described by Hunter. Just prior to the 1995 Act it seemed that ‗the melding of 
lawyers and counsellors into a working unit‘ seemed even more unlikely than 20 years 
earlier.
194
 Relationships had been riven with industrial strife, and there was conflict not only 
between counsellors and judges (described by one judge as ‗brimstone and treacle‘195), but 
between layers in the court hierarchy. 
 
Hunter‘s view is substantiated by a senior judge, Jennifer Boland who points out that expert 
witnesses are rare in parenting disputes because of the ‗expert report‘ prepared by the 
consultant. External experts are more likely to be called on in property matters.
196
 The 
terminology is significant; Cafcass officers, like local authority social workers are not called 
‗experts‘ in English courts, where the term refers to independent expert witnesses.197  
 
A probable reason for the difference in perception is that Australian practitioners have a 
wider professional background in either psychology or social work. Employment criteria for 
family consultants include postgraduate qualifications and considerable knowledge and 
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experience in child development, assessment and conflict resolution.
198
 In contrast, Cafcass 
practitioners must be registered as social workers, a profession with a low public image.
199
  
 
The family consultant‘s role has been augmented by a ‗child-inclusive primary dispute 
resolution process,‘200 known as the Child Responsive Program (CRP). This was 
implemented nationally in January 2008 after being piloted and evaluated. The program 
allows the family consultant to work on a case at the resolution stage, to provide earlier and 
better screening and support for parents. Brief assessments of the psychological adjustment of 
children, their attachment relationships and their feelings about different care options are 
summarised by the family consultant and discussed in an all-party meeting. The family 
consultant remains a ‗constant presence for that family, to assist the parents to reflect on and 
plan for the child‘s needs‘. The consultant can refer parties to community resources and 
facilitate implementation of orders. McIntosh Bryant and Murray concluded that parents who 
heard their own child‘s story through the consultant were better able to protect their children 
from the effects of conflict.
201
 The evaluation report found that the intervention diverted 40% 
of cases away from litigation, with a 73% rate of durability of arrangements.
202
     
 
CHILD PROTECTION IN AUSTRALIA 
   
As has been mentioned, the FCtA faces another challenge, posed by the Constitutional 
separation of powers. The strain of the artificial division of public and private law has not 
only contributed to the troubles of the past decades, but continues to threaten the new 
reforms, because of the effects of the split jurisdiction in child protection.  
 
Australian policy lies within the ‗child protection orientation‘ of western countries such as 
the UK and the US, rather than the ‗family service orientation‘ of countries in northern 
Europe.  The former share historical roots in the child rescue movement of the late 19th 
century, with Australia establishing its own societies for prevention of cruelty to children. 
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Social work started to become professionalised in the 1940s and was assumed by state 
agencies during the 1960s and 70s.
203
  All states have legislated to make reporting child abuse 
mandatory.  
 
The FCtA accrued powers relating to marital causes through the states referring these powers 
to it. This left the states with residual powers to regulate actions taken by child protection 
authorities. They also retain responsibility for criminal prosecutions relating to offences 
against, or committed by, children. All states operate statutory child protection duties which 
aim to promote the best interests of children but, since the 1990s, state provision of youth 
services has been rolled back, and resources in child protection agencies reduced.
204
 Referrals 
have however increased.
205
 It appears that only about one fifth of referrals lead to any action 
by the agency concerned.
206
 This notification rate in the mid 2000s was almost nine times 
higher than in England.
207
 This may be an effect of mandatory reporting.     
 
Alistair Nicholson has (subsequent to his retirement as Chief Justice) described the children‘s 
courts as ‗grossly under funded to the point where it is impossible to obtain reliable statistics 
from them because their funding is insufficient to enable them to collect them.‘ Some cases in 
the FCtA featured child protection issues which had never been drawn to the attention of the 
authorities. He believed that figures indicating the rate of child abuse were likely to be too 
low.
208
 Reports on the jurisdictional overlap have identified resource shortages in the 
agencies as a primary factor in decision making in the Federal courts.
209
 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the eight different systems meant it was ‗…difficult to generalise 
about child protection law in Australia‘, because there were different definitions and 
characterisations of child abuse as a social problem, so policies and legal responses varied 
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across the jurisdictions. Parkinson attributed variations in the rate of reported abuse across the 
states to definition, rather than to incidence. This was particularly evident in the variation of 
reported emotional abuse.
210
 However, legislative reform over the past few years appears to 
be drawing the systems closer together. 
 
In comparing the eight systems in 2005, Bromfield and Higgins found the greatest 
discrepancy in intake procedures. However, case management systems were quite similar 
across Australia in terms of planning, assessment and review.
211
 This would suggest that, 
once a child has been accepted as in need of protection, the children‘s courts in all states 
would be hearing about similar care planning options.   
 
A threshold test must be passed in each state jurisdiction to justify intervention to protect 
children. This is worded slightly differently in respective legislation. As discussed below, it is 
restricted to a risk of future serious harm, unlike the Children Act s 31 including in the 
grounds for a care order that the child ‗is suffering or is likely to suffer significant harm‘. In 
an international comparison, Hoyano and Keenan were still unable to discern a single 
‗Australian approach‘ to child protection law. However, statutory provision in five states 
incorporates a principle of ‗least intrusive intervention‘, prioritising the child‘s need to 
maintain identity and continuity.
212
  
 
Despite the fragmentation of laws and practice, all states favour returning children to parental 
care or placing with the extended family, rather than adoption.
213
 Certainly, Bromfield and 
Holzer‘s detailed report for a National Approach to Child Protection Working Group in 2008 
makes little reference to permanent removal from parents, and notes that permanency 
planning is a relatively new concept in Australia, with more emphasis in state legislation on 
early intervention and reunification, and more general guidance on stability and continuity of 
care.
214
 
 
A striking feature of child protection in Australia is the disproportionate over-representation 
of indigenous children. The rate of children accommodated away from home, either 
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voluntarily or following a court order, rose by 104% between 1996 and 2007, but the rate of 
placement of indigenous children was eight times greater than for non-indigenous.
215
 
Although indigenous children make up only 3.6% of the child population, they make up 22% 
of children placed out-of-home. All states observe the Aboriginal Child Placement Principle, 
that indigenous children in care should be placed within the child‘s extended family; within 
the child‘s own indigenous community; and, failing that, with other Aboriginal people.216  
There are increasing difficulties finding enough adults who are the right cultural match.
217
  
 
Reasons for this over-representation have been summarised as: socio-economic 
disadvantages; the legacy of removal policies; more scrutiny of indigenous families by 
welfare departments; law being formulated in terms which fail to account for the distinctive 
nature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander society;
 
and pervasive notions of assimilation 
in child welfare, from policy and planning to casework and child care.
218
 Mandatory 
reporting may also be a factor.
219
 Over-representation in the child care system does not 
necessarily reflect actual incidence of abuse, but may indicate a higher level of welfare 
services expenditure that needs to be justified by categorising families needing support.
220
  
Perhaps policy toward indigenous children is located in Fox Harding‘s third policy category 
(the defence of the birth family),
221
 in an attempt to direct resources to redress some of the 
disadvantages of the indigenous population. 
 
In the 1990s customary practices may have been seen as neglect through ‗traditional 
Eurocentric child protection eyes‘. Thorpe‘s research in Western Australia showed that the 
most likely outcome of an investigation was out-of-home care for an indigenous child, 
whereas this was the most unlikely outcome for a non-indigenous child. 
222
 Hoyano and 
Keenan conclude that the recognition that the use of powers to remove children have in the 
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past been over-used with indigenous families has resulted in policy changes toward making 
this the last possible resort, and presumptions of children staying with their primary 
caregivers, supported by social workers if necessary.
223
  
 
The question therefore arises as to whether little public attention is paid to the operation of 
the children‘s courts because Australian society does not value children of disadvantaged 
parents, or just because these courts are rarely likely to make orders which enable the State to 
permanently remove a child from his or her parent‘s care. In comparative studies published in 
2000, Parkinson points out that coercive intervention through the children‘s courts is low in 
Australia, for example in New South Wales, when 45% of referrals were substantiated, only 
5% proceeded to a court order.
224
  
 
In common with the UK, Australia is increasingly becoming a globalised, mobile and multi-
cultural society that ‗results in a multiplicity of concurrent, and sometimes contradictory, 
values, lifestyles and practices‘ that impact on children‘s upbringing.225 Law will not be 
accepted as legitimate if it is based on the narrow values of one culture,
226
 and Habermas 
would see a loss of legitimacy giving rise to new social movements. As long ago as 1995, 
Alistair Nicholson (then Chief Justice) said 
 
The traditional Anglo Saxon model of dispute resolution – and alternatives to it – may 
be unsuited to the beliefs and customs of newly arrived and indigenous peoples – yet 
we obviously neither can nor should provide an array of law within laws, or a variety 
of differing principles for different groups.
227
    
 
However, both law and policy in Australia differentiate between indigenous peoples and 
other ethnic groups, because of a consciousness of the continuous and collective failure to 
integrate families into mainstream services. Reluctance to remove indigenous children from 
their families can be attributed to the shame of discredited past policies, but it seems that the 
Aboriginal placement principle may be influential throughout the whole of the child 
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protection system.  Rather than the cultural relativism Nicholson warned against, non-
intervention appears pervasive. 
 
It is difficult to find any indication of concerns about the cost and length of child care 
proceedings in Australia, in contrast to current attention being paid in England and Wales to 
legal aid, case management systems in the courts, and the use of expert evidence.
228
 Although 
Hoyano and Keenan, in their evaluation of the use of expert evidence say ‗controversies over 
the probity of expert testimony are not limited to England‘, they refer to only one other 
example, in Canada.
229
 Within the FCtA, family consultants are deemed ‗experts‘, and the 
cost of their services can be controlled. In children‘s courts, the absence of a threat to families 
of being irrevocably separated by a court decision seems to have kept the nature of 
proceedings relatively cheap and uncontroversial. Certainly, they do not feature publicly to 
the extent that FCtA cases do. In the absence of large-scale evaluations such as AIFS in 2010, 
we lack comparative data on outcomes for children in care proceedings in the English and 
Australian systems.  
 
It is notable that the recent documents published on Australian child protection systems do 
not refer to the role of the courts. Each state has a children‘s court, some of which are 
combined with the youth offending jurisdiction. Unlike the UK, all magistrates are salaried. 
The range of types of order is too large to be summarised here but there will be some 
discussion of the effects. The state agencies encourage family group conference-type 
arrangements.  
 
The law of adoption is retained by the state Supreme Courts.  The background to the law is 
very similar to English law. States introduced adoption legislation around the 1920s, followed 
by reform because of social changes and the decline in children being available for 
adoption.
230
 Despite the lack of reported cases on adoption, the Family Law Council notes in 
its 2007 Annual Report that adoption is among a number of nationally controversial issues.
231
 
However, media coverage indicates an interest in same-sex adoption and inter-country 
adoption rather than stories of permanent removal from parents. The concept of adoption 
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from care seems unfamiliar, and Hoyano and Keenan suggest that fostering is the preferred 
option.
232
 Recently published figures indicate that adoption is rare: of 412 adoptions in 2009-
2010, 54% were inter-country; 31 % by family and friends and only 15% were cases of 
‗stranger adoption‘.233  
The functions of state courts come under little scrutiny; the power of the FCtA to make a 
parenting order that may result in loss of contact between a child and parent is seen as far 
greater.  This could be because private law disputes affect more people and a wider cross 
section of society, parental separation being a classless phenomenon. Hence the more 
articulate and powerful in society have the means and the motivation to take matters into the 
public realm. It may also be because the majority of children subject to public law orders are 
indigenous. The lack of an expert witness industry and adoption targets may also be factors. 
The criteria for significant harm can be assessed by a state magistrate without relying on 
precedent set by a court at the level of the UK Supreme Court. For a number of reasons, the 
families in the public realm are ‗invisible‘ and do not contribute to the discourse, while those 
in the private realm are able to make contributions in the public space.   
 
The next section will consider the way in which the courts‘ protective powers have 
increasingly been recognised as inadequate, because the distinction between public and 
private family matters is not one that accords with people‘s experience. Despite the lack of 
attention to public law in the sense of child protection at state level, this has been one of the 
most significant concerns about the Federal courts during the last 20 or so years, repeatedly 
raised in research, practice and evaluation.  
 
THE MAGELLAN PROJECT : ‘Where public and private law intersect’  
 
The evaluation of the Magellan Project identifies its role ‗where public and private law 
intersect‘ in the FCtA.234 When the FLC investigated this intersection between 1998 and 
2002, the ‗Magellan list‘ operated in Victoria only. The scheme has since been extended by 
all-state agreement. New South Wales was later in agreeing than the others, and provided the 
control sample for the evaluation. The acceptance of the Magellan Project shows how 
consensus can be reached on agreed values, protecting children, and adapting the system to 
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tackle the faultline of the public-private separation. It is an impressive achievement. This 
section will cover the development of Magellan and the extent to which it is meeting the 
needs identified in the FLC report. 
 
THE FAMILY LAW COUNCIL REPORT: ‘FAMILY LAW AND CHILD PROTECTION’  
 
The report published in 2002 explained: 
 
‗There is no greater problem in family law today than the problems of adequately 
addressing child protection concerns in proceedings under the Family Law Act. 
Council‘s research and consultations on this issue indicate that the problems in the 
present system are very serious indeed. Reform is urgently needed, and will require a 
commitment from governments both at State and Federal levels, to deal with the 
systemic problems which arise, in no small measure, from the allocation of 
responsibility between State and Territory authorities, and the Federal government, 
under the constitutional arrangements existing in Australia.‘235  
 
Thus the FLC encapsulates the major difficulties caused by the structural division in 
Australia between public and private law which hinder the protective function of the FCtA.. 
The first problem is the court‘s limited jurisdiction in proving abuse. Findings about 
allegations of sexual abuse are not to be made, unless necessary in making a decision in the 
child‘s best interests. Resolution of an allegation against a parent was subservient and 
ancillary to the decision to be made about the child. The test was solely whether there was an 
unacceptable risk of abuse in the future.
236
 As explained extra-judicially by a former FCtA 
judge: ‗…because the emphasis is on the child and unacceptable risk, it is usually neither 
necessary nor desirable for a trial Judge to make positive findings of abuse.‘237 The principle 
was extended in later cases to other types of child abuse and to domestic violence.
238
 Despite 
this restriction, there was a popular (probably mythical) theory that false allegations of sexual 
abuse were rife in the court.
239
 
 
A second difficulty was the ‗pro-contact culture‘ introduced in 1995.240  (This has since been 
compounded by the 2006 Act). Harrison feared that the 1995 Act encouraged judges to make 
contact orders in risky situations, based on her observation that the rate of suspended or 
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discharged contact orders since the change had not risen at the same rate as the rate of 
reported abuse.
241
   
 
Similarly to the line taken in the FCtA cases, state legislation does not require the protection 
agency to act if a child has been abused, but rather if s/he is at risk of future abuse, because 
there is no parent able and willing to protect them. This rules out any power to intervene in an 
inter-parent dispute, because there will be one parent expressing their wish to protect the 
child from the other.
242
  
 
The FLC concluded that the FCtA must be in a position to receive information about abuse 
and that the only solution was a new investigation service to investigate allegations.
243
 This 
was because the protective duties of state agencies did not correspond with the protective 
function of the court. Under FLA 1975 s 67, any officer in the court has reasonable grounds 
for suspecting that a child ‗has been abused, or is at risk of being abused‘, is under a duty to 
notify the state welfare department, although they have only a discretionary responsibility to 
make a referral if they suspect the child is subject to ill treatment or psychologically 
damaging behaviour.
244
 The court can request the intervention of the state authority in any 
proceedings, but the Act states that the officer ‗may‘ intervene, in which case he or she will 
be made a party.
245
 The FLA imposed no duty on the state agency to respond to the court‘s 
referral; nor were matters reported as abuse necessarily interpreted as such under state 
legislation.  
 
Whether or not a notification arising out of proceedings was investigated by child protection 
authorities depended on a number of factors, including: the seriousness of the reported 
concern and competing demands upon scarce resources.
246
 The FLC attributed this to the 
FLA definition of child abuse under s 67 being wider than that used in state legislation. 
Neither a notification of historical allegations that a child had been abused, nor an allegation 
of ‗non-serious‘ abuse, met the states‘ legislative requirement to intervene only if there is an 
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existing risk of harm.
247
 If both parents are dysfunctional, judges have to order residence with 
the parent who is the ‗least worst option‘.248 
 
The FLC concluded that state agencies could not be expected to provide an investigation and 
reporting service for every allegation of abuse which came to their attention pursuant to the 
notification requirements of the FLA: ‗The mission of child protection authorities is governed 
by their legislation. That legislation does not require them to be an investigatory service for 
all allegations of abuse which may be notified to them.‘249  
 
A separate but linked problem is the impact on children of family violence. Australian 
research reflects findings in other jurisdictions on the impact of inter-parental violence on 
children‘s emotional development, and as an indicator of direct child abuse.250 Brown‘s 
research confirmed that the FCtA had become: 
…a major forum for the resolution of family violence issues, with child, spousal, and 
other family-related violence becoming a major component of the court‘s workload - 
its core business, in effect. Furthermore, the Family Court was being used as an 
integral part of the child protection system by parents, other family members, and the 
child protection services themselves.
251
 
The latter point relates to the trend identified by Kelly and Fehlberg for state agencies to 
direct cases into the FCtA, discussed earlier.  
 
This presented a major difficulty for the FCtA because it was known that family violence was 
prevalent in the most intractable cases. A report by Brown and colleagues in 1998 showed 
that, although only a small proportion of total applications to the court involved family 
violence, by the stage of the pre-hearing conference, this proportion rose to a half.
252
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Furthermore, the FLC found that notifications of child protection issues arising out of FCtA 
proceedings were not always taken seriously by the state child protection authorities, which 
tended to interpret them as part of a litigation strategy by parents.
253
   
The FLC report therefore concluded that the Court needed its own investigation facility, a 
new federal child protection service, to assist it in arriving at the decisions in the child‘s best 
interests. Secondly, the FLC also wanted state child protection authorities to be able to take 
the lead in resolving child protection concerns arising in the course of parenting disputes, by 
amending the law to allow children‘s courts to make FLA parenting orders where these 
would resolve the child protection issues. Both of these measures were intended to bring an 
end to the existing duplication and allow matters to be dealt with by one court. 
 
Unfortunately the FLC recommendations appear to have been overtaken by the government 
response to the anti-Family Court lobby and the 2003 enquiry. The FLC‘s view that the 
public/private dilemma was the most urgent to be addressed was lost amongst the evidence to 
the enquiry, discussed above. Evidence was given about family violence - figures presented 
to the enquiry by the court showed that 67% of judicially determined cases in the first half of 
that year had involved allegations of abuse.
254
 Just prior to the 2006 amendments to the FLA 
coming onto effect, another study found high levels of prevalence and severity of allegations, 
with almost half the cases in its sample of applications that reached judicial determination 
containing allegations of violence.
255
 An analysis of international and Australian research in 
2007 found variations in the rate of abuse issues in applications from two to six per cent, 
although this increased to 23% in highly conflicted cases, with the rate of proved falsely-
made allegations at one to two per cent.
256
 
 
Parliament came to a compromise between the 50-50 lobby and safety concerns in response 
to the 2003 enquiry.  The court will depart from equal parenting time if there are issues of 
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violence that impact on the amount of time to be spent with each parent.
257
 The problems 
created by this presumption were investigated in 2010; the report concluded that it should be 
modified as it places children at risk because the practices and procedures of the courts are not 
encouraging victims to disclose family violence.
258
 The Attorney General accepted ‗a false idea 
had taken hold in the community that fathers were entitled to a 50-50 time split‘.259 The 
Australian Law Reform Commission published a report in late 2010 containing 187 
recommendations
260
 and amending legislation to place more weight on protection from harm 
was initiated in 2011.
261
 
 
FROM MAGELLAN LIST TO MAGELLAN PROJECT 
 
The Magellan List was initiated in the Melbourne (Victoria) Registry in 1998. The project 
applied to all parenting disputes where there were allegations of ‗serious physical or sexual 
abuse‘ of children. The FCtA initially referred the case to Victoria‘s child protection agency 
for investigation, with a report due back within five weeks. The difference between the 
Magellan report and the standard state report (if indeed one was provided) was that the 
Magellan report detailed the department‘s actions and views, not simply an outcome of the 
investigation as ‗substantiated or ‗unsubstantiated‘, because the latter does not give the FCtA 
the evidence it needs to resolve the case in the child‘s best interests.262 If this did not lead to a 
safe agreement, the court would order a report from a family consultant and hold an informal 
pre-hearing review followed, if necessary, by a formal trial of the issues. A lawyer was 
appointed for the child, funded by Victoria‘s legal aid system. Although exact cost 
comparisons were not possible, the indications were that the total cost of legal aid was less 
than average for this type of dispute. One aspect described as ‗critical‘ was the ‗un-capped‘ 
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legal aid funding available to every child, and to those adults who were eligible on means 
tested grounds.
263
  
 
The project was seen as successful by families and the courts.
264
 This led to a 
recommendation that Magellan be extended nationally.
265
 By 2005 it was extended to FCtA 
cases originating in all other states, and evaluated in 2008. The evaluation report found that 
cases on the program were settled more quickly and less resource-intensively than other 
similar cases (although some families interviewed found difficulty in obtaining therapeutic 
services for their children).
266
 The report concluded that Magellan was an effective case-
management response to allegations of serious abuse against children. Cases took an average 
of seven months to complete, four month less than the non-Magellan average.
267
 
 
All cases where a question about serious child abuse arises, on which the court requires 
information before it can make a decision, are now known as ‗Magellan cases‘. In this way, 
the FCtA is able to meet its enhanced public responsibility in what came before it as a private 
matter.  
 
The Magellan evaluation report emphasises the dichotomy between public and private 
aspects of the court systems. It differentiates the role of the FCtA to resolve private law 
issues in children‘s best interests from that of child protection departments and criminal 
courts to protect children. The intersection of these functions requires a system to coordinate 
information when trying to resolve private family law disputes. It is based on the legal 
presumption that it is in the best interests of children to know and have a relationship with 
both parents, with the paramount need to be protected from harm. Higgins acknowledges the 
context of awareness of both the seriousness of abuse and the difficulty in proving it, because 
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‗the private nature of this type of criminal behaviour results in a lack of evidence to the 
criminal standard of proof‘.268 
 
However, there are some shortcomings. Magellan does not relate to the majority of children‘s 
court cases, which are brought on grounds of neglect, nor does it use a wider definition of 
abuse to include the impact of domestic violence.
269
 Rather, it concentrates on what is termed 
‗serious‘ abuse; sexual abuse or extreme physical cruelty. Significant risk factors do not 
expedite an investigation or short-term protection plan unless they are specifically identified 
as coming within the Magellan category. This leaves the emotional and physical well-being 
of a wider number of children unprotected.
270
  
 
Kelly and Fehlberg‘s study of cases that were heard in both the Victorian Children‘s Court 
and the FCtA between 1997 and 1999 showed that only a very small minority of children in 
Magellan cases were already subject to applications to the children‘s court. These few tended 
to be teenagers with behavioural problems, whereas most cases initiated in the children‘s 
court related to young children at risk of abuse.
271
 These findings suggest that by the stage 
that evidence of risk was available to the FCtA from older, troubled children, this had rarely 
come to the prior attention of child protection authorities. The exceptions were when the 
FCtA case had been instigated by a child protection agency which had identified a viable 
alternative carer for a young child. Higgins‘ 2007 evaluation does not include any data about 
the age profile of children in Magellan cases.   
 
There is still a statutory duty on personnel in the Family Court to refer less ‗serious‘ matters 
to the child protection agency, which presumably (in the absence of a Magellan direction) is 
still unlikely to investigate. Research in NSW found that children and their mother who were 
referred to child protection authorities were unlikely to receive protective intervention or 
support.
272
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As Hunter points out, a judicial decision is the only proper outcome of a child abuse 
allegation.
273
 It is therefore not compatible with the Family Dispute Resolution model. 
Secondly, Magellan cases are not considered compatible with the Less Adversarial Trial, 
because this relies on a relaxation of rules of evidence.  
 
IS MAGELLAN AN END TO FRAGMENTATION? 
 
Brown stated in 2003 that the FCtA was to be congratulated on being the first court 
internationally to introduce a specialised programme for children in contact and residence 
disputes where child abuse allegations had been made.
274
 Certainly the evaluations do 
indicate that there has been remarkable progress in the ten years since she wrote that more 
than 77% of referrals from the FCtA to state agencies resulted in responses of ‗no action‘.275 
The primary success is however the mechanism whereby child protection referrals are dealt 
with more expeditiously, and produce reports that are helpful in planning safely for children. 
Over-stretched children‘s services departments in England and Wales are also unlikely to 
prioritise referrals emanating from family disputes, seen as matters of private law.  However 
we do not have the same structural problem; a court hearing a Children Act 1989 s 8 
application can make findings on allegations of child abuse and domestic violence and their 
impact on the child. It could therefore be argued that a Children Act s 7 report suffices. 
Where Magellan does appear to have notable advantages is the speed and efficiency of a 
process based on recognition of the expert status of the family consultant and the availability 
of legal aid to all children and parents. Thus, a process designed to address fundamental flaws 
in the Australian court system may be helping that minority of children who are subject to 
serious abuse gain access to better integrated multi-disciplinary process than here. A child on 
the Magellan list is allocated a family consultant, who is seen by the court as an expert, as 
well as an independent lawyer. On the other hand, the range of ongoing therapeutic options 
available is limited. 
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One aspect that is difficult to reconcile is that the Magellan Program is still described as 
adversarial, and outside the LAT structure. This is because the judiciary do not accept that a 
finding of abuse can be made on hearsay evidence.
276
 Given that such a high proportion of 
cases that reach the adjudication phase involve abuse allegations, it is difficult to see how the 
LATs can be used effectively. Oddly, there is no reference to this in the exception to 
Magellan in Harrison‘s 2007 blueprint for LATs.277 Furthermore, some judges see Magellan 
as the ‗poor relation‘ of the LAT and CRP, which can put more emphasis on the child‘s needs 
through the intensive work by the family consultant.
278
  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The FCtA has been the focus for continuous attacks since its formation. At one extreme were 
the bombings and murders of the early 1980s, for which no-one has ever been charged, so it 
is still not known if they were random attacks by aggrieved litigants or organised sabotage. 
The Court was the subject of 11 parliamentary enquiries and referrals to the Australian Law 
Reform Commission between 1997 and 2006.
279
 Its judgments have also been subject to a 
number of constitutional challenges taken to the High Court, and the FLA itself has been 
subject to more amendments than any piece of Australian legislation apart from tax and social 
security law.
280
 Judicial discretion has been incrementally circumscribed since 1975. There 
has been a shift from public complaints about finance and property matters to parenting.  
 
It is evident from Star‘s history that the FCtA was denigrated as less than a ‗black letter‘ 
court. To counteract this, the refurbished buildings became, if anything, more traditional, 
with a re-introduction of formal court dress and traditional seating arrangements.
281
  The 
brave attempt at the ‗helping court‘ produced wistful or envious reactions from the post-Finer 
campaigners in England.
282
  It would however seem that, on balance, the legislative 
unification of public and private law within the civil courts under the Children Act 1989 has 
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been more successful than the Australian venture. The reforms here had the advantage of not 
being associated with divorce law reform and its attendant controversies. Specialist judiciary 
and legal professions have become established in both jurisdictions, alongside an acceptance 
of a dedicated social work service. However the reverse perceptions identified by Hunter of 
the value of judges and lawyers on the one hand, and the non-legal adviser, on the other, 
seem to have become entrenched.  
 
Since 1975, the legislation has become so complex that even lawyers find it difficult to 
understand and explain to their clients. The Court, rather than successive legislators, appears 
to have taken the flak. Paradoxically, the increase in complexity has been accompanied by a 
drive to marginalise lawyers. The aim is a cultural shift away from seeing parenting disputes 
as a legal issue. Most cases are to be kept out of court, and most of those that remain are 
LATs. The victory of the social sciences over the law would appear to be irreversible, but this 
has been backed by investment in high quality alternative services.
283
 The Family Justice 
Review Panel is enthusiastic about the way FDR is working in Australia,
284
 but this seems 
almost pointless when there is no intention to spend a similar amount of money in investing 
in an alternative system.  
 
Ingleby examined the problem of the fragmentation of the Australian court system as a 
number of sources of normative order: the different levels of government order and the 
various social formations that make up other systems of ordering such as families, schools, 
and other relationships.
285
 Fehlberg and Behrens‘ textbook features a pervading theme of 
fragmentation in Australian law and policy.
286
 While other jurisdictions are also fragmented, 
the Australian constitution structure appears a permanent barrier to cohesion. 
 
The FLC summarised options for reform to address the split jurisdiction in 2002:
287
 
 
1. A unified court at federal level. This would be politically cumbersome as amending 
the Constitution can only be done by referendum; only 8 out of 44 Commonwealth 
referenda have been passed.
288
  
                                                 
283
 To be discussed in Chapter Seven  
284
 Family Justice Review, Interim Report (Ministry of Justice, 2011) Part 5 
285
 R Ingleby, Family Law and Society (Butterworths, Sydney 1993) 
286
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287
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2. Devolving all the FCtA powers to the states 
3. Cross vesting, where the FCtA would have jurisdiction in any case which raised 
issues at both federal and state level. This was held unconstitutional in 1999.
289
  
 
This chapter has shown that the relegation of child protection at state level has produced a 
different set of problems to those in English law. The Magellan scheme is a huge advance but 
has its limitations. With the policy emphasis so definitely in favour of diverting cases away 
from the FCtA, it seems unlikely that the structure will ever be adapted to allow child 
protection cases to get into the hands of the higher judiciary. The 2010 Law Reform 
Commission report contains 187 recommendations, including new compulsory duties on state 
authorities to provide reports to the FCtA and powers for the FCtA to make orders placing 
children in state care.
290
 However, the first stage, of agreeing a common interpretive 
framework for defining and addressing of violence, is still awaiting Parliament.
291
     
 
In England, the Children Act 1989 brought together private and public applications within 
one court system, with unifying principles that theoretically place children in both types of 
proceedings under the same lens. At present, care proceedings can only (with some 
exceptions) be applied for in the family proceedings court, and divorce can only be granted in 
the county court, reinforcing the class disparity identified in the Finer Report. A combination 
of factors, including the public preferring to avoid using courts associated with criminal cases 
and solicitors preferring the administration of justice by the professional judiciary has 
resulted in a decline in private law application to the magistrates. In Australia, the FCtA 
acquired jurisdiction in private law from state courts through legislative provision. As we 
move toward a unified court structure in England and Wales, we may achieve a less 
fragmented family justice system here than Australia.  
 
Thirty years after the introduction of no-fault divorce and the ‗helping court‘, the Australian 
family justice system had not achieved greater legitimacy than the English system. The 
establishment of a specialist family court seems, if anything, to have focussed political and 
public distrust on those who worked within it.  The result, from the 2003 Parliamentary 
                                                                                                                                                        
288
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289
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enquiry, is a substantial policy investment in a range of alternative dispute resolution 
services. These have not suffered the lack of funding and support that the FCtA experienced 
at its inception. 
 
The unpopularity of the FCtA was reflected in questions about its constitutionality in its early 
days; and Fehlberg and Behrens suggested that the relentless diversion now pursued by the 
Australian government could meet the same fate. They thought that a challenge might be 
made to the High Court on the grounds that federal judicial power must be exercised with due 
procedural process lacking in the LATs.
292
 It seems that family court proceedings have gone 
full circle back to the informality that caused such confusion in the Court‘s early days. 
However, the new model benefits from a sounder infrastructure than the FCtA had in the 
1970s and should be better placed to fulfil aspirations; it may not attract the same level of 
opprobrium. The legitimacy issue has been called into question by Crowe.
293
 If the new 
model has consensual support based on an open policy-making process, it may satisfy 
Habermas‘ ideal speech situation, and have a strong grounding in norms and values. Such a 
position of strength would make it more resistant to the inevitable individual cases of 
grievance than the previously weak model.       
 
The FCtA became the symbol for anything that was ever perceived as wrong in Australian 
family law: no-fault divorce; fathers‘ feelings of loss of control; mothers‘ fears for their own 
and their children‘s safety; and an extended wrangle over child support. These are 
acknowledged by some within the Court as intrinsic to the ‗blunt instrument‘ of the law when 
dealing with relationship breakdown and disputes over family property and parenting 
arrangements.
294
 The reasons that the FCtA became the target included its initial lack of 
resources, the hostility of the legal establishment and the ever-increasing momentum of 
complaints fostered by pressure groups and the media. All of these brought considerable 
pressure on politicians, evident in continuous policy review that restricted judicial power.  
 
In retrospect, we can see that, although the radical nature of the FLA 1975 had some 
grounding in citizens‘ lifeworld of experience and moral attitudes, its intentions were 
undermined by the systems of economics and power that had become separated from its 
                                                 
292
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values. This is a pattern repeated in welfare-state capitalism. The question now is whether the 
replacement of the discredited 1970s ideal will be more stable. Despite some reactionary 
voices,
295
 no-fault divorce and the current child support mechanism do now appear to 
accepted. By 2004, only ‗some of the religious right and the men‘s groups still hanker after a 
return to it [the pre-1975 position]‘.296 A consensus also appears to have been achieved 
regarding the resolution and determination stages of the private law disputes. The test will be 
whether the gender issues, and a growing recognition of children‘s rights, are more 
effectively addressed.  This will depend largely on the quality of the professionals entrusted 
with the resolution stage, and a freedom from bureaucratic target-setting in the determination 
stage.       
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THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY 
 
Hearings in family courts are usually held in private, and there are legal restrictions on what 
information about these cases can be reported or shared. This can lead to accusations of 
‗secret‘ courts, not properly accountable to the public. This perception was one element in the 
distrust of the Family Court of Australia in its difficult early years, only partly resolved.
1
  
Allegations of secrecy have recently moved to the forefront of campaigns by the media and 
by pressure groups that criticise the family courts in England and Wales. This development 
has been reflected, a little, by professional concern about a lack transparency in process, but 
to a greater extent by policy makers, leading to a succession of consultations and reforms 
since 2004.   
 
The law here is complex, but the main issue is that in almost all cases, publication of any 
information about family proceedings (unless specifically allowed by the court) is contempt 
of court, under the Administration of Justice Act 1960 s12.  Furthermore, publication of any 
details that may identify that a child is subject to an application under the Children Act 1989 
is, under s 97 of that Act, a criminal offence. As will be seen in this Chapter, high profile 
campaigns and the lengthy series of consultations in the past seven years have not changed 
that position.   
 
Does the law protect privacy as a value or right accorded to children and families, or does it 
conceal what should be in the public domain? The problem of secrecy is relevant to this 
thesis for three reasons:  that it is such a loudly vocalised complaint about the system; the 
extent to which private family problems are relevant to the public domain; and the way in 
which the discourse on ‗transparency‘ fell so far short of the ideal speech situation. While 
Habermas‘ theories would suggest that court systems should be as open as possible in order 
to achieve legitimacy, it will be seen that the very process that should have been a rational 
debate on the balance between privacy and publicity was obfuscated and unsuccessful.  
 
Since the growth of communication technology during the 20th century, individuals sense the 
intervention of the state in their family lives and may be unwilling to accept decisions seen 
not just as resolving disputes about specific families, with their own particular problems, but 
as an exercise in state power imposing collective norms in the name of the wider public. The 
                                                 
1
 Discussed in Chapter Five  
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rise of individualism and the erosion of professional status have contributed to a more 
questioning attitude to traditional institutions. Assumptions that details of proceedings should 
be private have therefore been challenged. Dissatisfaction with the courts extends beyond 
parties who were aggrieved by outcomes of cases, to a general public questioning of the 
legitimacy of the court system.  
 
This Chapter will explain the law on publicity of family court proceedings; compare secrecy, 
privacy, confidentiality, transparency and openness; discuss children‘s rights to privacy; and 
finally the recent reforms.
2
  
 
At the time of writing, only one step in the promised reform process has been implemented, 
and references to hearings held ‗in private‘ still apply, although since 27 April 2009, it is 
easier for journalists to be present at private hearings.
3
 The terms ‗in chambers‘, ‘in camera’ 
and ‗in private‘ tend to be used interchangeably in cases and statute. In camera refers to the 
judge or magistrate ordering the court to be closed to the public for the whole or part of the 
hearing. A hearing in chambers may be held in the judge‘s chamber or in the court room, but 
wigs and gowns are not worn and there is a wider right of audience to solicitors and 
paralegals.
4
 The practical effects, of excluding the public, are the same.
5
  
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW IN ENGLAND AND WALES  
 
Traditionally, matters before the court affecting wards of court were seen as ‗truly private 
affairs‘6 as part of the protective parens patriae jurisdiction. At the beginning of the 20th 
century it was also recognised that children brought before JPs should have some protection 
from the public gaze.
7
 The idea of shielding cases involving children extended across social 
class; even those from deviant families deserved a degree of protection, perhaps with an eye 
on improving the prospects of rehabilitation. There were long-held assumptions that details of 
families in trouble were not matters of public interest.  
 
                                                 
2
 Where indicated, some legislation has been amended by provisions in the Children Schools and Families Act 
2010 which are not yet implemented, so the original provisions are still in force. 
3
 Family Proceedings (Amendment) (No 2) Rules 2009 SI 2009/857, now Family Procedure Rules 2010, Part 27 
4
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993) 12  
5
J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 72-80 
6
 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 
7
 Children Act 1908 s 111 
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The law was reviewed in detail in by a LCD consultation paper in 1993, and was set out in 
tabular format in a DCA consultation paper in 2006.
8
 The following sections set out the law 
relevant to cases involving children, beginning with who can attend court and then explaining 
what can be publicly reported. 
 
ATTENDING COURT HEARINGS 
 
It is still recognised that it was a family law case, namely a nullity petition brought by Mrs 
Scott in Scott and Scott in 1911, that produced the definitive enunciation of the common law 
position regarding the conduct of proceedings in public, proclaiming the principle of open 
justice.
9
  
 
In Scott, the House of Lords recognised only three exceptions to the general rule that courts 
should sit in public. These were proceedings relating to: wards of court; persons of unsound 
mind, and matters of trade secrets. There was no power to sit in private merely if the nature of 
the evidence (in this case, regarding the husband‘s alleged impotence) was unsavoury or 
indelicate. Lord Haldane cited the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 s 46 as ending the practice 
in the ecclesiastical courts of obtaining evidence in marital causes through examination in 
private.
10
 Section 46 required all witnesses to be sworn and cross-examined in open court. 
Consequently, although the PDA had granted Mrs Scott‘s decree in camera, it had no 
jurisdiction to do so, and her subsequent distribution of a transcript was held by the House of 
Lords not to be in contempt of court.  However, Jaconelli points out that the ratio is limited; 
none of the six judgments addressed the question of whether a member of the public could 
have attended the hearing, and neither of the parties contested the validity of the decree. 
Furthermore, some of the judgments suggested that if it had been correct practice to hold the 
hearing in camera, then Mrs Scott‘s circulation of written details would have been 
contempt.
11
 Although the case is cited as authority for the court doors to be open, the 
application was actually Mr Scott‘s attempt to have Mrs Scott and her solicitor committed for 
contempt because she gave copies of the transcript to a few relatives.
12
  
 
                                                 
8
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993); Department for Constitutional Affairs Confidence and confidentiality: Improving transparency 
and privacy in family courts (2006 Cm 6886) 80-89 
9
 [1913] AC 417 
10
 As noted in Chapter Three 
11
 Although actions similar to Mrs Scott‘s would now amount to an offence under the Judicial Proceedings 
(Regulation of Reports) Act 1926. The law relating to reporting proceedings is dealt with below.  
12
 J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 6-7 
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In 1967, the High Court, hearing an application for a declaration of legitimacy, noted that 
legislation
13
 had been introduced to remedy the situation regarding nullity in Scott, but as no 
similar legislation existed in respect of legitimacy hearings, the judge did not have 
jurisdiction to hear proceedings in chambers, even where this lack of privacy would 
reasonably deter the litigant from pursuing her remedy.
14
  The fact that the mother was 
bringing the action on behalf of her two infant children, and had said she would withdraw the 
application if the court was not cleared, did not accord them similar protective consideration 
as wards of court, nor to assert their rights as litigators.
15
 There is evidence in the judgment of 
judicial concern about the potential harm to the children, and the judge did ask anyone 
present who was not directly concerned to leave. One wonders whether any onlookers were 
prurient enough to withstand the force of this judicial request.   
 
From 1857, divorce cases had been conducted in open court, although judges would 
occasionally attempt to obtain evidence in private, when witnesses were unable to face a full 
courtroom. There was apparently no authority for them to do so, and the practice was 
probably not widespread.
16
 The impact of publicity on the social standing and careers of 
parties, especially co-respondents, could be disastrous. The requirements for proof of adultery 
provided ready material for newspapers.
17
 Reporting restrictions introduced in 1926 and the 
widening of the grounds for divorce to those which do not involve scandalous narratives have 
reduced the attraction for press and public.
18
  For the past 30 years, undefended divorce 
petitions have been processed by the district judge reading the papers under the ‗special 
procedure‘, with only the decree being pronounced in open court.19 These rules differentiate 
between a routine administrative procedure and a matter to be tried. If the divorce is defended 
(which is now virtually unknown) evidence is to be heard in open court.
20
  
 
Applications under the Children Act 1989 (to the county court or High Court) are heard in 
chambers unless the court otherwise directs.
21
 This was declared compatible with Article 6 
                                                 
13
 Although nullity proceeding are still held in open court, evidence relating to sexual relationships is heard in 
private (now s 48(2) MCA 1973)  
14
 B (otherwise P) v Attorney General [1965] 3 All ER 253  This type of case may also now be heard in camera: 
s. 60(4) Family Law Act 1986 
15
 J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 169  
16
 J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 193-194 
17
 Chapters Three and Four above 
18
 J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 195 
19
 Family Procedure Rules 2010 r 7.20 
20
 Family Procedure Rules 2010 r 13.19 
21
 Family Procedure Rules 2010 r 27.10 
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ECHR in 2002.
22
 The two exceptions contained in Article 6(1) reflect the themes of 
safeguarding the privacy of the parties to an action, and ensuring that publicity will not act as 
a deterrent to the administration of justice.
23
 Since April 2009, accredited members of the 
media can attend these hearings, unless the judge rules against this.
24
  
 
The press had been allowed to attend family proceedings courts (FPCs) before 2009, although 
magistrates had a duty to exclude them from any Children Act proceedings if they considered 
it ‗expedient in the interests of the child‘.25 In contrast to the higher courts, the default 
position was that the press could be present, and if they were, a decision had to be made by 
the magistrates before they could be excluded. Attendance by the wider public is restricted to 
‗any other person whom the court permits who are deemed to have adequate grounds for 
attendance‘.26 It has been suggested that this latter category would include researchers and 
trainee lawyers.
27
 This system originated in the establishment of the juvenile courts in 1908, 
when it was felt that young people‘s cases should be heard in a less public arena than the full 
magistrates‘ court.28 Despite this, FPCs were rarely attended by the media.29 
 
Adoption cases are also heard in private.
30
 Appeals on children and adoption matters can be 
heard in private but decisions are usually given in open court. As oral evidence is rarely given 
in the Court of Appeal, the conduct of appeals is within the control of the judiciary to greater 
extent than the lower courts, where witnesses are present. The Supreme Court is open to the 
public; sessions are filmed and judgments are placed on its website.  
 
In Clibberry v Allan in 2002, the Court of Appeal distinguished between the power of the 
High Court to exclude the public from any type of family proceedings, in order to provide ‗a 
measure of privacy‘, from the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 s 12, 
which dealt with ‗a measure of confidentiality‘. In other words, there may be advantages of a 
private hearing other than preventing publicity. Butler Sloss P. stated that there was no 
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 B v UK [2002] 2 FLR 261, [2002] EHRR 19 
23
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24
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25
 Magistrates Court Act 1960 s 69; Children Act 1989 s 97 
26
 Magistrates Courts Act 1980 s 69(2)  
27
 N V Lowe ‗Publicity in Court Proceedings concerning Children‘ (1981) 145 Justice of the Peace  256 cited in 
Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation paper 
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 As discussed in Chapter Four 
29
 HC Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Family Justice  the Operation of the Family Courts Revisited (HC 
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objection to family courts hearing cases in private and excluding the public where the 1991 
Rules permitted them to do so.
31
 
 
Both Scott and Clibbery and Allan concerned a party legitimately present who then reported 
on proceedings, rather than the problem of parties being aware of strangers in the court room. 
Nevertheless, these are the leading cases on the question of who can attend. This gives the 
impression that concerns about attendance only, rather than attendance linked to onward 
transmission of information, are usually resolved.  
 
To summarise: until 27 April 2009,
32
 the court rules allowed family proceedings to be held in 
private, with discretion to allow members of the public in. The press were entitled to attend 
FPCs. Since April 2009, they can also attend county court and High Court hearings (other 
than adoption).
33
 Courts have always been able to lift these restrictions on application. Limits 
on who can be present in the courtroom potentially restricts the information which can then 
reach the public domain, but there are separate laws relating to reporting or sharing 
information. As will be seen, this distinction means that giving journalists the right to attend 
court has not led to substantially increased or improved publicity about proceedings. 
 
PUBLICITY ABOUT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
A range of statutory restrictions on what can be reported from the family courts has 
developed over the past 80 years. These will be summarised chronologically in this section. 
Before the mid-19th century, matrimonial actions in the ecclesiastical courts were held in 
private, and divorce by Act of Parliament was rare.
34
 Actions for criminal conversation could 
attract enormous amounts of publicity, and press reporting has long been viewed as a social 
problem.
35
 Although there is some evidence of concern about the impact on the children of 
the parties,
36
 the predominant fear was the corruption of public morals by the ‗penny 
dreadfuls‘. This is expressed by Jaconelli as an awareness that the newly literate working 
classes were being provided with salacious information about those who were supposed to be 
                                                 
31
 [2002] EWCA Civ 45, [2002] 1 FLR 565 per Butler Sloss P at para 50  
32
 Accredited press representatives may attend hearings (other than adoption).  This is explained in the later 
section on consultation on reform.  
33
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34
 Chapter Three above  
35
 L Stone, Road to Divorce (1990) Ch 9; as discussed in Chapter Three 
36
 S Cretney ―Disgusted, Buckingham Palace…‖: Divorce, Indecency and the Press, 1926‘ in Law, law Reform 
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their social superiors.
37
 His view is substantiated by Cretney‘s research into the origins of the 
Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926.
38
 
 
Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 
 
This Act introduced the first restrictions on reporting. Section 1(1)(b) restricts the publication 
of details in divorce or nullity proceedings by making it unlawful to ‗print or publish‘ 
anything other than names, addresses and occupations of parties and witnesses; concise 
statements of matters in which evidence has been given, legal submissions and the court 
judgment. There are exemptions for the law reports and professional publications. The policy 
behind the 1926 Act is explored in an essay by Cretney, whose description of the struggle 
between the moralising upper class and the press barons, foreshadows the current polarisation 
between those appalled by what they see as a gutter press and the nature of much of the 
coverage in formerly venerable institutions like The Times and the BBC.
39
 Cretney concludes 
that the Act has been largely ineffective.
40
 A recent example is the lack of any action being 
taken in response to breaches of the Act with widespread publicity about Paul McCartney and 
Heather Mills‘ divorce case (where there was a young child of the family) while it was 
ongoing.
41
  
 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
 
Where children are involved in non-criminal proceedings, any court may make an order 
under Section 39(1) Children and Young Person Act 1933 directing that no newspaper report 
reveal identifying details of any child concerned in the proceedings. This has recently been 
used to protect the identities of children in inquest and judicial review proceedings.
42
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 J Jaconelli, Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 196 
38
 S Cretney ―Disgusted, Buckingham Palace…‖: Divorce, Indecency and the Press, 1926‘ in Law, law Reform 
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40
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Although it is listed in the 2006 table
43
 of relevant legislation, it is not used in family 
proceedings because of the blanket provision of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, 
discussed below.  
 
Magistrates Courts Act 1980 
 
Restrictions on reporting family proceedings in magistrates courts are contained in the 
Magistrates Courts Act 1980 s 71.
44
 This makes it unlawful for the press or broadcast media 
to publicise anything beyond a strict list of particulars. The effect is that evidence cannot be 
reported, although the nature of the case, points of law and the decision can.  
 
Therefore, although the press can attend FPCs, the details they can report are restricted in a 
similar way to the 1926 Act. There are no reported cases on the working of this section. 
Applications to the FPCs under the Children Act 1989 and Adoption and Children Act 2002 
are however subject to further restrictions under section 97, discussed below, and to the 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 if the hearing is held in private. The cumulative effect is 
that very little can be reported about children in the FPC, unless allowed by the magistrates. 
 
Administration of Justice Act 1960 
 
All court hearings held in private are subject to the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (AJA 
1960) s12. This states that publication of information about proceedings held in private is not 
contempt of court unless they were: within the inherent jurisdiction; were brought under the 
Children Act 1989 or Adoption and Children Act 2002; or related to the maintenance or 
upbringing of a minor.
45
 Otherwise, unless expressly forbidden by the court, what is heard in 
private can be published without being in contempt. Family proceedings which don‘t involve 
children may be held in private but may still be reported.
46
 
 
Section 12 appears under a Part of the 1960 Act headed ‗contempt of court, habeas corpus 
and certiorari‘, clearly an administrative provision.  The purpose of the section was to clarify 
                                                 
43
 Department for Constitutional Affairs Confidence and confidentiality: Improving transparency and privacy in 
family courts (Cm 6886, 2006) 80-89 
44
 This is still in force, although repealed by the Children Schools and Families Act 2010, not yet implemented.   
45
 Administration of Justice Act 1950 s 12(1), still in force although repealed by the Children Schools and 
Families Act 2010, awaiting implementation.  
46
 Clibberry v Allan [2002] EWCA Civ 45, [2002] 1 FLR 565 (Discussed above) 
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that publishing details of matters heard in private was contempt of court only in certain 
circumstances.
47
 Parliament‘s intention was to remove confusion identified in a report on the 
existing law of contempt, rather than impose new restrictions.
48
 It has been emphasised that 
the intention and effect of s 12(4) is that publication is only in contempt of court if it would 
have been so, prior to the 1960 Act.
49
 
 
The judge has an unfettered discretion under s 12 to grant leave to release information.
50
 In 
wardship, the judge was to have the child's interests in the forefront of his considerations, as 
well as the public interest, in ensuring that frankness prevailed by preserving confidentiality, 
but the public interest in using information in other proceedings and ‗all the circumstances of 
the case‘ would be considered.51  
 
However, in 1992, Waite J expressed the view that the primary purpose of the privilege of 
confidentiality was not that it belonged to the child, but ‗to protect the court in the exercise of 
its paternal functions‘.52 Moriarty‘s evaluation of the law (prior to the Human Rights Act 
1998) concludes that s 12 protected the confidentiality of proceedings, and only incidentally 
the child.
53
 Waite J‘s statement on wardship:   
 
The mere status of being a ward of court does not confer on a child any right, as such, 
to have its affairs cloaked in secrecy. The privilege of confidentiality is that of the 
court, not of the child, and the primary purpose of that privilege is to protect the court 
in the exercise of its paternal functions.
54
 
 
was applied by the President, Sir Stephen Brown, to a FPC decision to allow disclosure of the 
guardian‘s report to a family centre.55 However, Connell J alluded to s 12 having an 
additional function because ‗it is usually not in the best interests of the child for the nature of 
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the disagreements between those close to him and the problems which those disagreements 
create in his young life to be exposed to public view.‘56     
 
It was also argued before the Court of Appeal more recently in Clayton v Clayton that s 12 
was to be narrowly construed to safeguard the integrity of the court process itself, an 
argument impliedly accepted Potter P, in his judgment.
57
 In Medway Council v G and others, 
the President allowed an agreed summary of concluded care proceedings to be published by 
The Times, because the paper had already been publishing ill-informed claims about a contact 
dispute that led to the child being subject to a care order.
58
 Full judgments were also 
published in these cases, both of which had involved international abduction; the identity of 
the child in Medway could still be protected but the child in Clayton had been subject of a 
widely publicised search. In both cases, the court was attempting to strike a balance between 
limiting the amount of publicity to which the respective children were being exposed and the 
accusations of secrecy being made by some of the parties and the organisations supporting 
them. 
 
Section 12 prevents the publication of judgments and restricts discussion of the facts and 
evidence in the case, but does not in itself prevent publication of the names of the parties, the 
child or the witnesses In Kelly v BBC a 16-year-old ward of court wanted to give an interview 
to the BBC.
59
 Munby J explained the limits of s 12 as protecting the privacy and 
confidentiality of documents on the court file, and what has gone on in the court room. It did 
not prevent publication of the fact that wardship proceedings are on foot, nor prevent 
identification of the parties or even the ward, nor reporting on the ‗comings and goings of the 
parties and witnesses‘, nor anything happening in the court precinct, outside the room where 
the judge is conducting proceedings. However the section cannot be seen in isolation because 
it inter-relates with the other statutory reporting restrictions discussed here.  
 
Children Act 1989  
 
Section 97(2) created an additional offence (originally applicable only to the FPCs but 
extended to other courts): 
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No person shall publish any material which is intended, or likely, to identify: 
(a) any child as being involved in any proceedings before [the High Court, a county 
court or]  a magistrates court in which any power under this Act [or the Adoption 
and Children Act 2002] may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any 
other child; or 
(b)  an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings60  
 
The provisions of s 69 and s 71 Magistrates Courts Act (discussed above) are now subject to 
s 97.
61
  
 
Consequently, the media can report certain limited details but none which might identify a 
child. The court may lift these restrictions wholly or partly, if satisfied that the welfare of the 
child requires it. 
62
 The position has always been that the media could apply for permission to 
publish parts of evidence, for example if journalists were shown court documents by parties 
during an investigation.
63
 In Clayton v Clayton, the Court of Appeal ruled that s 97 ceased to 
have effect at the end of proceedings, so continued protection of identity requires an 
application for an injunction at the end of the hearing.
64
 
 
According to the 1993 LCD report:  
 
The various provisions are presumably cumulative in their effect so that if 
proceedings are lawfully heard in private and if reporting is covered by one of the 
provisions in section 12, then it will be a contempt of court to publish even those 
details which the statutory provision would allow.
65
 
 
This has been disputed on the basis that it is confusing to try to interpret the law as 
cumulative, when s 12 demarcates contempt while s 97(2) creates a criminal offence.
66
 There 
were practical problems with this accretion of legislation, because it took Munby J 34 
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paragraphs to explain it in 2004.
67
 It is reasonable to find that recent consultation papers call 
for a rationalisation of the law.
68
  
 
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS AND SHARING INFORMATION RELATING TO FAMILY 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
The previous section dealt with reporting court cases and making information available in 
court reports, the press and broadcast media, and generally in the public arena. The 
provisions of the AJA 1960 s 12 and Children Act 1989 s 97 apply to disclosing information 
about cases in the sense of publishing or reporting them to the general public. This chapter 
has raised the question of whether restricting who attends court and what is said about the 
case protects the parties or, alternatively, the process. Another aspect of the legal controls 
was that, until recently, they applied very strictly to sharing information with third parties for 
specific, perhaps supportive purposes. It is this aspect of the legislation that has proved 
easiest to reform.  
 
Under Family Proceedings Rules 1991 r 4.23, access to court documents was strictly limited, 
so that leave of the court had to be obtained if papers were needed by anyone other than a 
party, their lawyer, the guardian, the legal aid authority, a court welfare officer or an 
instructed expert. This meant that leave had to be obtained for example in police 
investigations, 
69
 or by a social services department after a mother had made admissions to a 
guardian ad litem,
70
 a guardian‘s report for the court to a local authority family centre,71 or a 
Cafcass officer to social services.
72
 It is now obvious that this situation posed serious 
obstacles to information sharing amongst agencies charged with protecting children. 
However, the 1993 LCD consultation did not identify this as an issue; it dealt only with 
access to documents as a source of wider publicity.
73
   
 
The issue of communication of court documents came to a head in March 2004 when the case 
of Kent County Council v B highlighted the practical and probably unintended effects of the 
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legislation.
74
 A solicitor acting for a mother in care proceedings had passed on information 
about expert evidence in the case to her sister, an MP who was at that time Solicitor General; 
she in turn passed this on to the Minister of State for Children.  This occurred during an 
urgent government review into care cases which turned on medical evidence following 
allegations of over-reliance on medical experts in criminal proceedings.
75
 In a lengthy 
analysis of the law relating to access to family court documents, Munby J concluded that the 
solicitor‘s actions amounted to ‗publication‘ within the meaning of s 12 and found her guilty 
of contempt.
76
 In his view, ‗publication‘ covered almost any form of communication about 
the case and s 12 applied, whether or not the child was identifiable. 
 
This judgment increased awareness that the law might prevent constituents obtaining 
assistance from their MP when family proceedings were involved.
77
 Furthermore, the right to 
representation by a lay adviser or McKenzie friend (a growing trend because of reduced legal 
aid, and a service often provided by fathers‘ groups) in family cases was uncertain because 
court documents could not be shared.
78
 Other problems identified were the inaccessibility of 
case files for research purposes or professional matters such as complaints investigation by 
the Law Society. Even a parent who consulted a close relative for help was technically in 
breach.  
 
Following the judgment, the Department for Education and Skills put forward proposals to 
amend s 97 (2) so that a criminal offence would only be committed by publishing identifying 
material to the general public, and AJA 1960 s 12(4) to clarify that it would not be a potential 
contempt to publish information that is authorised by court rules. The courts would retain 
their jurisdiction to authorise, or restrict, disclosure of information in individual cases.  Both 
these sections were amended by the Children Act 2004, and a consultation paper was issued 
in December 2004 to formulate the details of the new rules, with the responses published in 
July 2005.
79
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The relevant legislation was amended to allow disclosure by parties in family proceedings to 
groups such as McKenzie friends; mediators; counsellors, and close family members, for the 
purposes of support and advice.
80
 Court documents could also be disclosed to MPs and some 
other elected representatives, the police and professional regulatory authorities.
81
  
 
FPR 1991 r 4.23 was repealed in October 2005 and replaced by rule 10.20A which 
introduced a complex matrix of what and to whom information could be given. The 
provisions were lengthy, but the Court Service produced a helpful leaflet for the public 
setting out what could and could not be shared. When the provisions were extended under the 
Family Proceedings (Amendment) (No.2) Rules 2009/857 rule 4(b) in April 2009, the leaflet 
was not republished. This suggests that while the 2005 reforms helped clarify the law, the 
same might not be said of the 2009 reforms.   
 
This process during 2004-2005 can be seen as a successful exercise in public consultation in 
that it led to reform of arcane rules. It was the precursor to a series of further less satisfactory 
consultations on the wider and more controversial issues of access to and reporting of the 
courts, under the banner of ‗transparency‘.82  
 
THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
 
The law on attending and reporting court proceedings was affected by the Human Rights Act 
1998, as Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are relevant. As 
already mentioned, family hearings being held in private is not incompatible with Article 
6(1).
83
 
 
Parents, children and witnesses may have competing rights to privacy under Article 8 and 
various parties might claim the right to freedom of expression under Article 10.  
(Although media interests are more correctly described as rights of information, rather than 
expression.
84
) 
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Prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998, freedom of speech usually 
outweighed other interests, apart from the statutory exceptions (as discussed in the preceding 
sections).
85
 The exception was where the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction, or in 
wardship cases, to take the child‘s interests into account.   
 
If the child was a ward of court, then the court‘s supervisory power was exercised to balance 
his or her interests with rights to free speech. In Re X (a minor) (wardship; injunction), the 
case of Mary Bell‘s baby daughter, a ward of court in 1984, the High Court had power to 
impose an injunction contra mundum, Balcombe J specifically referring to prevention of the 
harm that could come to the child if her parentage became known.
86
 However, we can see 
from this extract from his judgment (at 1426) that it is the court process that was the deciding 
factor, not the baby‘s position: 
I am satisfied that, without an order of the court, there is nothing which would prevent a 
newspaper, television station or radio station, or any other medium from publishing the 
present identity of Mary Bell, or of the child or of the child's father. The authority for 
that general proposition is to be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re F (a 
minor) (publication of information) [1977] 1 All ER 114 at 122, [1977] Fam 58 at 88, 
where Lord Denning MR said: 
'But none of those old cases considered the publication of information relating to a 
ward of court. There is no suggestion anywhere that it was a contempt of court to 
publish information about the ward herself, be it favourable or adverse, helpful or 
injurious to her. But there are cases to show that it was a contempt of court to 
publish information relating to the proceedings in court about a ward.' (Lord 
Denning's emphasis.) 
Scarman LJ said …at 93): 
'It is, I think, a necessary implication in all the speeches in Scott v Scott … that the 
cloak of secrecy was available to conceal from the world not the life story of the 
ward, but only so much of it as was properly to be regarded as the subject of the 
proceedings.' 
He followed that up, after referring to a statutory provision, with these words … at 99): 
'As I read the section [AJA 1960 s 12], what is protected from publication is the 
proceedings of the court: in all other respects the ward enjoys no greater protection 
against unwelcome publicity than other children.' 
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Moreover, the status of being a ward of court did not of itself prohibit publicity about the 
ward. In Kelly v the BBC
87
 a 16-year-old ward was permitted to give an interview to the BBC 
without court permission because he wanted to; under the court‘s ‗protective‘ jurisdiction, his 
welfare was to be balanced with his right of freedom of expression, but the former was not 
paramount. Only if the matter before the court involved the care or upbringing of the child, 
was his or her welfare paramount. This categorisation was made in Re Z (a minor) 
(identification: restrictions on publication); 
88
 the court‘s power was ‗protective‘ under the 
inherent jurisdiction but ‗custodial‘ only if the matter related to his care or upbringing. 
Although the child‘s welfare was paramount in ‗custodial‘ cases, care or upbringing was 
defined very narrowly and excluded the potentially damaging effects on a child of publicity 
about other family members.
89
  
 
Re Z clarified that the inherent jurisdiction to protect children from publicity was not 
restricted to wards.
90
 The child was not a ward of court, but both parents had obtained an 
injunction under the inherent jurisdiction protecting her against press intrusion, which the 
mother now wanted to vary to enable a TV programme to be made about the child‘s 
education. (Both had previously been featured in the media because the father was a 
government minister.) The Court of Appeal held that the mother‘s plans were within her 
exercise of parental responsibility under the Children Act 1989 and the child‘s welfare was its 
paramount consideration; it upheld the full injunction. 
 
The inherent jurisdiction to restrict publicity about children was overhauled in the light of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 in Re S (Identification: restrictions on publication).
91
 A 
psychiatrist‘s report warned that the young child in question was already at risk of mental 
illness and that publicity about his mother and deceased brother would be significantly 
harmful. The House of Lords was unanimous that earlier cases need not be considered 
because the jurisdiction to restrict publicity is now derived from Convention rights, but they 
applied a similar balancing exercise.  More weight is given to Article 10 if there is a question 
of restricting reports of a criminal trial (the child was subject to care proceedings but it was 
the detail of his mother‘s trial where his children‘s guardian sought an order for 
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anonymity.)
92
 This attitude reflects Jaconelli‘s view that the desirability of exposure of the 
criminal process is deeply-entrenched in our legal system.  It is unfortunate for the family that 
the House of Lords in this case considered the involvement of the child to be ‗indirect‘ as he 
was not seen as a victim, despite the clear evidence of the serious risk that publication posed.  
 
As discussed below, privacy includes the development of autonomy, not just being left alone. 
Indeed , the European Court has held that: 
 
Private life…includes a person's physical and psychological integrity; the guarantee 
afforded by Article 8 of the convention is primarily intended to ensure the 
development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings.
93
 
 
This means that serious consideration needs to be given to the lack of choice for a young 
child unable to manage the consequences of decisions that are out of his hands. In A Local 
Authority v W and others, 
94
 Re S was distinguished on the ground that the family had already 
been subject to publicity whereas in the later case the children might still be effectively 
shielded from any such fall-out. The President, Sir Mark Potter, did not accept the argument 
put forward on behalf of the newspaper that a photograph of the mother was essential to the 
public‘s understanding of the issues in the criminal case.95 
 
Apart from wardship and inherent jurisdiction cases, Children Act 1989 applications have 
also been reviewed in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. In a detailed review of the 
legislation in Norfolk County Council v Webster and others, Munby J allowed representatives 
of the media to attend and report on care proceedings in respect of a five-month-old child, 
specifically allowing the publication of the names and photographs of the child and his 
parents.
96
 Two of the factors considered in the balancing exercise between Articles 6, 8 and 
10 were the child‘s rights under Article 8 to keep his private life private by preserving the 
confidentiality of his personal data, and his rights under Article 6 to a fair trial by maintaining 
the privacy of the proceedings. It was submitted on behalf of the child, through his guardian, 
that media attention would be detrimental to the family and divert the parents‘ attention from 
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him at a crucial stage of the assessment. Munby J concluded that the risks to the child were 
speculative. In his view, there had already been considerable publicity which had not 
damaged the child and additional risks of exposure to further publicity were unlikely. Even if 
the existing order remained in place there was no guarantee it would effectively restrain 
publicity. Secondly, the restraints sought by the guardian would be a disproportionate 
interference with the rights of the applicants (the BBC and the Daily Mail). Furthermore, the 
parents were entitled to argue their case in their own name and not under a pseudonym; the 
release of the family surname having ‗little discernible effect‘ on the child.  
 
The case has a number of distinctive features: the parents alleged a miscarriage of justice; the 
matter had already had extensive press and television publicity at the instigation of the 
parents; and they themselves were asking for publicity to continue. In this context, Munby J 
stated that there was a need for the full facts to emerge in a way which would command 
public confidence in the judicial system. The judgment seems to assume that whatever facts 
might emerge about the parents, the long-term impact on the child‘s life of these being public 
knowledge weighed less in the balance than the risk of ongoing speculation. This case 
illustrates that the Convention fails to stop interests of adults and of the system being 
prioritised over those of the child. It seems that only in cases where young people are old 
enough to communicate their wishes to the court that their right to privacy will be accepted as 
including control over information.
97
  It is particularly worrying that the impact on care 
planning for infants is ignored.
98
 
 
The judgment in Re Z contrived to make the question of publicity one of parental 
responsibility and therefore subject to section 1 of the Children Act 1989.
99
 It has been 
argued that the courts were still keen to trump Convention rights with the welfare 
principle,
100
 but in the light of subsequent cases, this approach seems unlikely to be taken. 
The incorporation of Article 8 at least means that the privacy rights of the child, family and 
witnesses are now taken into account in decisions about publicity. Most children in court 
cases are aged less than five; they cannot articulate their rights. It will be argued below that 
children‘s privacy rights are to be taken as seriously as those of adults, but it will be seen that 
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they are being relegated in the clamour for publicity. First, the basis of  a legal right to 
privacy will be discussed. 
 
PRIVACY, SECRECY, OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY 
 
The debate about opening up the family courts is being conducted in the public realm but 
being skewed by the language used to suggest polar opposites: secrecy and openness. Rather, 
secrecy is at one end of a continuum from deliberate concealment through to complete 
openness. Secrecy is the term used by the media in direct contrast to openness but misses the 
shades of privacy in between. What this chapter is concerned with is firstly, the private nature 
of family life and children‘s rights to develop autonomy without adverse interference, and 
secondly, the extent to which the court system and professionals working within it need to be 
subject to public scrutiny.  This section therefore begins with privacy, moves on to secrecy, 
then looks at how these relate to transparency and openness.  
 
PRIVACY  
 
Legal and philosophical debate on privacy was intensive in the latter part of the 20th century 
and was bound up with protection of privacy by the law, necessitated by the development of 
advanced technological means of surveillance. There is no common law right to privacy, and 
the early literature is from the USA. The starting point is the famous article by two lawyers 
from Boston USA, Warren and Brandeis, published in 1890,
101
 prompted by Warren‘s 
objections to newspaper reports about his wife‘s social life and a family wedding.102 They 
perceived gossip about their personal lives as a type of assault. Their tone is dramatic: they 
feared for the health of the nation, because gossip dwarfs and usurps intelligent thought and 
aspiration, trivialising and belittling sensibility, enthusiasm and generosity. They called 
privacy the ‗right to be let alone‘.103 This definition has been subject to considerable 
discussion, refinement and expansion ever since.  
 
A tort of privacy was subsequently established in US law, and cited as the basis of a number 
of important US Supreme Court decisions on personal choice, such as Roe v Wade and 
Griswold v Connecticut.
104
 These confirmed the legal right to freedom of choice in abortion 
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and contraception respectively. Consequently, the right to privacy has considerable 
importance for women, despite its patriarchal origins in the Warren and Brandeis‘ ‗a man‘s 
home is his castle‘ concept, with its inherent danger of cloaking domestic abuse.105 
 
The US tort was based on protection from four types of interference: intrusion upon the 
plaintiff‘s seclusion or solitude; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; publicity 
which places the plaintiff in a false light; and appropriation for the defendant‘s advantage, of 
the plaintiff‘s name or likeness.106 This categorisation was incorporated into the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts but is subject to an inherent conflict with the First Amendment right to 
freedom of expression.
107
 This tension is now replicated in the English courts‘ application of 
ECHR Article 8, and responding media claims that the courts are inventing a law of privacy. 
 
The classic literature on morals and rights in privacy generated by Warren and Brandeis is 
compiled in a 1984 collection edited by Schoeman.
108
 The contributors are from disciplines 
of philosophy, law, and political science, reflecting the close links between the values base 
and legal rights. Warren and Brandeis‘ definition was a claim against unwelcome publicity. 
This was varied subsequently by writers who looked at control; for example, Fried saw 
privacy as: ‗the control we have over information about ourselves‘109 and Parker as: ‗control 
over when and by whom.. (we) can be seen or heard…by others.‘110 More recently, a British 
writer, Westin, has come to the fore as one of the leading authorities on the law of privacy. 
This moves us from privacy as protection within Prosser‘s four categories, which are still 
relevant in an age of ‗media saturation‘111 to the age of surveillance technology; this is where 
Westin specialises, and has produced the following widely quoted definition of the right to 
privacy as: 
…the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.
112
 
                                                 
105
 See J Inness Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (OUP, New York 1992); R Gavison ‗Feminism and the 
Public/Private Distinction‘ (1992) 45 Stanford Law Review 1-45; S Gallagher, A Man’s Home: Re-thinking the 
Origins of the Public/Private Dichotomy in American Law <http://www.historyofprivacy.net/>  Last accessed 3 
April 2011 
106
 W L Prosser (1960) ‗Privacy‘ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383  
107
 J Grant ‗Victims, offenders and other children: a right to privacy?‘ 1992 19 American Journal of Criminal 
Law 485; J Moriarty The Media and Children’s Privacy: Lessons from American Law Paper delivered to the 
Child Exploitation and Media Forum 1997, London 11 March 1997 
108
 FD Schoeman (ed), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (CUP, Cambridge 1984) 
109
 C Fried ‗Privacy [a moral analysis]‘ in FD Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1984) 209 
110
 RB Parker, 'A Definition of Privacy' (1974) 27 Rutgers Law Review 275-296 at 281 
111
 Munby J in Kelly v BBC [2001] Fam 59  at 76, 1 FLR 197 
112
 A Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Atheneum, New York 1967) 7   
 232 
 
 
These control-centred definitions cover both rights to be free from interference and spread of 
personal information and rights to self-regulation of communication and disclosure of 
information on one‘s own terms.113  They can be applied to a child‘s freedom from unwanted 
media coverage and freedom to present their own version of events, as in Kelly v BBC and Re 
Roddy.
114
   
 
From a Kantian perspective, privacy is a universal value, accorded to each person because 
s/he is an end in her/himself and an autonomous agent, not because of status. The underlying 
morality is that we must be able to control our privacy, ‗but in most developed societies the 
only way to give a person the full measure of both the sense and the fact of control is to give 
him a legal right to control.‘115 A legal right to privacy can follow only from the community‘s 
moral convictions of the good of its own members. Although it is necessary to impose 
boundaries on privacy, for example on one person‘s privacy to protect another‘s, this limits it 
only as a social right, and does not diminish its moral status.
116
 This accords with Goffman‘s 
theories on subjective feelings of autonomy and choice being essential to identity and 
inextricable from power relationships.
117
 The right to be let alone is therefore reconceived as 
a necessary status to reach informed decisions. This right seems especially applicable to a 
child who is developing his or her personality toward achieving moral autonomy.
118
 
 
The only essay in Schoeman‘s collection that specifically mentions children is Fried‘s 
‗Privacy [A Moral Analysis]‘ written in 1968, in which he explicitly includes children as 
‗persons‘ in the Kantian sense of possessing fundamental rights that cannot be overridden for 
utilitarian reasons. This principle of morality is the basis of the concept of justice and 
underlies concepts of love, friendship and trust, which depend on respect of the privacy of all 
persons, by state and citizen.
119
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Benn also moved on from utilitarian theories by seeing covert invasion of privacy as an 
assault on the dignity of the subject, even where they are not aware of it.
120
 An individual is 
compromised if he can be ambushed at any moment by knowledge held by others emerging 
without warning, or if decisions and judgments are being made about him on the basis of 
information he has not voluntarily shared.
121
 Privacy helps shield us from the views and 
criticisms of others, enabling us to develop our own ideas and become more self reliant.
122
  
 
Parties in court proceedings are vulnerable to the threat of uncontrollable publicity. 
Practitioners who work with children who are subject to care orders when they were too 
young to participate know that the information has to be disclosed to them in a timely and 
sensitive manner.
123
 This links to a utilitarian view of the adverse impact on the individual of 
discovering their history in the wrong way. Taking Benn‘s view, any decision made about a 
child would be a transgression on their moral rights if they were too young to control the 
information, but decisions must be made by professionals if parents are not keeping their 
children safe. Benn‘s theory reminds us  that we owe it to children to restrain our power and 
respect their right for us to keep our discussions about them to the minimum necessary.            
 
Writing in 1964, Bloustein saw the power and impact of the mass media as posing far greater, 
‗significant and everyday threats to personal dignity and individuality‘ than had been possible 
by gossip in previous eras. Therefore, in the US, the right to sue for defamation by ‗simple 
word of mouth or turn of the pen‘ has been succeeded by a right to privacy, essential to resist 
‗degradation of personality by the public disclosure of private intimacies.‘124  Also in the 
1960s, Goffman foresaw new techniques in data storage and retrieval allowing access to a 
person‘s remote and forgotten past, meaning we would be unable to change our own and 
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others‘ definitions of ourselves.125 This observation was prescient of the Facebook era; young 
people can be trapped by labels from their past.   
 
Singer‘s more recent review of privacy in the modern technological and social context, sees 
the loss of dignity, autonomy and respect by violations of privacy as undermining rational 
agency by slow degrees. In particular, he cites Rosen‘s use of the ‗synecdoche‘,126 where we 
remember one salient feature and confuse that with the whole identity, where not all the facts 
or the context are presented to us, or our small attention span prevents informed judgments.
127
 
Many of the current objections to media access arise from criticism of the ethics and 
standards of reporting; this will not be expanded on here. Whatever the standard of reporting, 
young people are themselves aware of the danger of individuals being judged on too little 
information.
128
  
 
The question is whether having control over information about oneself is privacy or secrecy. 
 
SECRECY  
 
Ethical concepts of privacy and secrecy were distinguished by Bok in Secrets, first published 
in the US in 1982 and cited by many writers as the principal work on this topic.
129
 Her 
opening words evoke the power of secrecy in a more dramatic way than is found amongst 
descriptions of privacy, and may explain why secrecy is the preferred emotive term used by 
the media and those campaigning for reform. 
 
We are all, in a sense, experts on secrecy. From earliest childhood we feel its mystery 
and attraction. We know both the power it confers and the burden it imposes. We 
learn how it can delight, give breathing-space, and protect. But we come to 
understand its dangers, too: how it is used to oppress and exclude; what can befall 
those who come too close to secrets they were not meant to share; and the price of 
betrayal.
130
   
 
                                                 
125
 C Fried ‗Privacy [a moral analysis]‘ in FD Schoeman (ed) Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1984) 221 n 18 
126
 From the term meaning a figure of speech which uses a part to describe the whole. 
127
 I Singer, ‗Privacy and Human Nature‘ Ends and Means (electronic journal, Aberdeen University), citing J 
Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Random House, New York 2000)  
< http://www.abdn.ac.uk/philosophy/endsandmeans/vol5no1/singer.shtml.> Last accessed 24 July 2011 
128
 J Brophy, The views of children and young people regarding press access to family courts (Office of the 
Children's Commissioner, London 2010) 
129
 S Bok, Secrets: on the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (OUP, Oxford, 1984) 
130
 S Bok, Secrets: on the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (OUP, Oxford, 1984) xv 
 235 
 
Bok explains privacy as the condition of being protected from unwanted access by others, 
whereas secrecy includes a trait of intentional concealment. These concepts can overlap in the 
private lives of individuals, where secrecy guards central aspects of identity and provides an 
additional shield, should privacy fail to protect. There is potential for greater overlap between 
the concepts within a group, than with individuals. Collectively, members‘ own sense of 
privacy blends with an enlarged private sense of the group and develops identities and 
boundaries of its own. Large scale secrecy that uses the language of privacy, with metaphors 
of personal space and sanctuaries, to personalise collective enterprises should not go 
unchallenged. Throughout the book, she highlights the greater danger of secrets held by 
organised groups in contrast with personal secrets shared by small numbers of individuals. 
 
Bok‘s work is therefore a useful point of reference for principles of what should and should 
not be revealed about court cases. Conflicts over secrecy are about the power to control the 
flow of information. We lack power if we have no capacity for secrecy or control over how 
others see us, but we can also lack power if we have no insight into what others might 
conceal. Consequently she believes it is a mistake to ascribe a value to secrecy; there are 
issues of both legitimacy and danger in control of openness and there should be no moral 
presumption either way. Arguments in favour of each must be considered. Secrecy linked to 
power means there must be accountability and safeguards because collective secrecy brings 
added opportunity for misuse of power and exercise of poor judgment.
131
  
 
Those who believe that the core function of the family justice system is to protect  vulnerable 
parties
132
 may see the media label ‗secrecy‘ being attached irresponsibly to matters which are 
better labelled ‗private‘. However, organisational secrecy is anathema to the spirit of the free 
press. The ethical position of secrecy set out by Bok can be extended to privacy. She would 
give more weight to arguments which favour individual control over secrecy and openness in 
personal matters, but believes that the exercise of collective power shifts the burden of proof 
on to those who exercise it.
133
 To return to the quotation above, secrecy can be used to 
oppress and exclude. We might empathise that most individuals feel powerless when 
confronted by a rank of professionals with their own codes, allied to large-scale systems, such 
as the courts.     
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Kelly, a psychologist, distinguishes between privacy and secrecy on the ground that the 
former is about unwarranted intrusion, whereas the latter shows a conscious awareness of a 
valid interest of others. She gives an example of HIV status being private but becoming a 
secret if it might be a danger to others, with the individual having to continuously process the 
information from their own point of view and that of others.
134
 In her research amongst 
university students she found that the most commonly kept secrets related first to sexual and 
romantic relationships and secondly to things that would make them look maladjusted, such 
as mental health problems, convictions of personal inadequacy and feelings of loneliness and 
failure.
135
 Of course, it is unsurprising that these are matters that would figure highly in a 
typology of secrets that average young people would want to keep. How difficult then will it 
be for young parents to work collaboratively with the authorities in improving their parenting 
and keeping their children safe, revealing and conceding their own inadequacies in court 
proceedings with journalists present? How will young people subject to proceedings cope 
with the knowledge that these details were made available to the public, and can probably 
still be found?  
 
Psychologists believe that keeping secrets is stressful, but that the key to relieving these 
stresses is finding an appropriate non-judgmental confidant, either personal or professional.
136
 
Unfortunately, the systemic split between specialist witnesses being called on to give expert 
advice to the court and the availability of confidential therapeutic assistance means that 
family secrets may not be addressed in the most positive way for the individuals concerned. 
Putting these in the public spotlight may bring some benefits to a victim through public 
acknowledgment of their suffering and the shaming of the perpetrator. However, individual 
cases would need to be dealt with sensitively; the time needed for parties to work through 
these issues may not fit with the 24-hour news timescale of the media. It is already evident 
that journalists cannot afford the time to sit through an entire case.
137
 
 
Campaigners for more publicity in family courts do not base their claim on exposing personal 
secrets, but on the secrecy of the system. As previous sections have shown, the law does 
protect the court as much as, or even ahead of, the parties. The rationale is that justice can 
                                                 
134
 AE Kelly, The Psychology of Secrets (Kluwer Academic, New York 2002) 3-5 
135
 AE Kelly, The Psychology of Secrets (Kluwer Academic, New York 2002) 7-15  
136
 AE Kelly, The Psychology of Secrets (Kluwer Academic, New York 2002) 216-217 
137
 J Rozenberg, ‗Why newspapers lack interest in court reporting‘ Law Society Gazette 26 November 2009 
 237 
 
only be administered if the parties and witnesses can speak frankly before the court, but this 
leads to suspicion. The dilemma is whether the law can be changed to separate out secrets 
into what are essentially private or of public interest.      
 
Bok explains that to deliberate, to reason, to seek to justify in public, are all ways of stating 
and testing views and making them open to inspection and criticism. Here, she reflects 
Habermas‘ theory of the ideal speech situation. Furthermore, Bok maintains that a 
government always has an interest in secrecy and the public always in openness,
138
 linking 
with Birkinshaw‘s argument for effective freedom of information.139     
 
CONFIDENTIALITY  
 
Even when Bok was writing in the early 1980s, professional confidentiality could not 
realistically be claimed as an absolute duty, ‗no longer what it was when lawyers or doctors 
simply kept to themselves the confidences of those who sought their help.‘140 The modern 
complexities of information-sharing are now reflected in detailed ethical codes of practice. 
   
Once we venture into the public arena of the courts, are we expected to forgo our right to 
privacy, in the interests of openness? When we consult a state-funded physician or social 
worker, we do not abandon our expectations of confidentiality. It is part of the ethos of the 
welfare state that citizens can engage with public services without being stigmatised. We can 
still expect a degree of confidentiality from professionals, but there is a danger that the most 
vulnerable families, in court proceedings, are deemed to have lost their rights of privacy, and 
those who advise them are compromised. 
 
Clark attempts a general definition of the ethic of confidentiality in social and health services 
as an undertaking offered that: 
 
…the personal information that the worker gathers about the client will not be 
communicated to other persons or organisations except with the client‘s consent and 
only insofar as strictly necessary for the agreed purposes of the work in hand.
141
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Lawyers and experts commissioned by the courts are also bound by professional codes. In Re 
Child X, applications were made by media organisations to report proceedings about a 
parenting dispute where the father was a celebrity. A child psychologist who was an expert 
witness had sought his professional body‘s advice, because he would not be able to follow his 
profession‘s ethical code of agreeing with the child what would be shared with others.142 
Expert witnesses foresee that parents will tell them less.
143
  
 
Clark sees confidentiality as a means to balance three rights: privacy, safety, and the public 
good. He distinguishes between private as ‗secluded‘ and private as ‗non-public‘ to argue that 
individuals who seek help from the public sector do not lose their rights to protective privacy. 
Professional decisions on compromise are made only when the rights of safety and the public 
good are also engaged.
144
  In the same way, we should resist attempts to remove privacy 
rights from individuals who enter the public arena of the courts. Most will not be there 
through their own volition, and those who have instigated proceedings might be denied 
access to justice and due process if they were discouraged by the prospect of undue publicity.  
 
On the other hand, it is difficult for institutions to maintain legitimacy if they are perceived as 
citing ‗privacy‘ and ‗confidentiality‘ to hide their decision-making processes. The question is 
whether ‗openness‘ is the only solution.  
 
OPENNESS 
 
Notwithstanding the House of Lords exemption of wards of court from the principle of open 
courts, the Scott judgments contain several references to the essential nature of open justice. 
For example, Lord Atkinson conceded that distress might be suffered by witnesses and 
parties, but the public trial is the ‗best security for the pure impartial and efficient 
administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect‘.145 
More dramatically, Lord Shaw quoted Bentham: ‗Publicity is the very soul of justice, it is the 
keenest spur to exertion and the sure of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge 
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himself, while trying, under trial‘146 Interestingly, Viscount Haldane justified the exclusion of 
the public from cases involving wards of court on the basis that the wardship jurisdiction was 
parental and administrative, rather than disposing of a question of law.
147
 This is an early 
indication of the view that resolving family disputes is not a judicial task. In that context, is 
‗open justice‘ relevant?148 Administrative decision making perhaps requires a different 
perspective.  
 
In the 1980s, Lord Diplock repeated that open courts discipline the judiciary to ‗keep the 
judges themselves up to the mark‘ and that ‗the evidence and argument should be publicly 
known so that society may judge for itself the quality of justice administered in its name, and 
whether the law requires modification.‘149 The media have been referred to as ‗trustees‘ and 
‗the eyes and ears of the public.‘150  
  
The call on the family justice system to be less ‗secret‘ reflects society‘s increased 
expectations that its institutions should be open, exemplified by the introduction of the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, which gives citizens a right to information held by a 
public body. Advice to the public on using the Act states that it:  
 
…gives people a general right of access to information held by or on behalf of public 
authorities. It is intended to promote a culture of openness and accountability amongst 
public sector bodies, and therefore to facilitate better public understanding of how 
public authorities carry out their duties, why they make the decisions they do, and 
how they spend public money. 
 
This guidance goes on to say: 
 
The Freedom of Information Act does not apply to courts and tribunals. This is 
because all information contained in 'court records' is exempt from disclosure under 
the Act by virtue of section 32. There would therefore be no point in making them 
subject to the Act.  
However, administrative information about courts and tribunals will be available from 
the government department that sponsors the court or tribunal in question.
151
 
In his text on the law of freedom of information, Birkinshaw explains that the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 was introduced in the wake of public dissatisfaction with the closed 
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nature of government decision making in scandals such as the Matrix Churchill and BSE 
inquiries and the Shayler trial.
152
  He wrote:  
 
The provision of information has always been at the centre of the relationship 
between government and society; provision of information has always been 
instrumental in the way government institutions have been created or allowed to 
develop. Such developments have occurred to fulfil public expectations in oversight, 
accountability, explanation or legitimacy for the exercise of power.
153
 
 
Thus in a modern democracy citizens expect their elected representatives to be accountable 
by full information being available, because to be informed is to be empowered.  
 
Birkinshaw calls on Habermas‘s ideal speech situation as a theoretical basis for freedom of 
information. The premise is that all participants in discourse have the same opportunity to 
debate and justify, according to reasoned argument without external pressure or domination.  
Even so, he concedes that secrecy or a quest for privacy may be essential to our individual 
development at times. He echoes Bok on the differences between protection of individual and 
collective privacy:  
 
Protection of an individual's confidentiality and privacy are often necessary to protect 
that individual's integrity and identity. Over protection of government information can 
be destructive of integrity and identity.
154
 
 
In Birkinshaw‘s view, Habermas would accept that there must be spheres of our personal 
lives that can legitimately be kept secret such as intimate relationships and medical facts. He 
is more concerned with sensitive negotiations and investigations in the public interest, 
commercial development of products because long-term planning and development would 
not happen if they were unprotected by laws of copyright and intellectual property.
155
 As 
discussed above, personal development also needs private space in which to flourish. 
 
Birkinshaw makes a very useful contribution toward understanding the ideal speech situation 
as a more tangible concept. There needs to be a balance between openness and secrecy in 
public life, but as we cannot be omnipresent during institutional decision-making processes, 
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we need to be confident that government policies on our behalf are being developed by 
rational communication. Therefore the ideal speech situation is satisfied where processes are 
seen to be even-handed and above board.
156
 Because citizens‘ resources are limited, the 
operations of government and agencies may need to be observed by the press and condensed 
into an accessible form. This can justify giving the press favourable treatment over members 
of the general public in attending certain types of court,
157
 and appears to be the thinking 
behind the 2006 consultation paper describing the media as the ‗proxy for the public‘.158    
 
Although disquiet about the level of administrative secrecy in the UK which led to the 
freedom of information legislation is acknowledged by Jaconelli in his critique, Open Justice, 
he challenges the assumption that ‗publicity is an unalloyed benefit in the administration of 
justice‘.159 He focuses on criminal trials, and the deep-rooted idea of a trial as a public 
spectacle in which press exposure now plays a large part in the punishment of the accused. 
He concludes that there is little empirical evidence that an open court leads to a higher quality 
of justice, or indeed what effect the degree of openness of proceedings has on individual 
behaviour.
160
 However, Jaconelli‘s work clearly illustrates the prevalence of a fundamental 
belief in the necessity of open courts, which he acknowledges is difficult to dislodge.      
 
We can conclude that what is required of court systems is that the public is confident that 
decisions are made within rationally-agreed frameworks. The correct term for this approach 
is not ‗openness‘ but ‗transparency‘. 
 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
‗Openness‘ and ‗transparency‘ are used interchangeably in the policy documents issued by 
the government on this topic.
161
 The latter term is a relatively recent one, apparently derived 
from European Union law, and they are not synonymous. The arguments for transparency are 
to enhance meaningful participation in democracy and to support the constitutional functions 
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of bodies charged with law-making or administrative oversight.
162
 The legacy of Habermas 
can be seen. EU institutions are required to demonstrate transparency in order to be 
accountable, and this has been described as an umbrella term for five values:  
 
1. Access to documents or information 
2. Knowledge about who makes decisions and how 
3. Comprehensibility and accessibility to the structures of the decision-making 
framework 
4. Public consultation 
5. A duty to give reasons.163   
 
Birkinshaw distinguishes access to information as one component of transparency; the latter 
‗entails conducting affairs in the open or (my emphasis) subject to public scrutiny‘. Not all 
business can literally be conducted in public; transparency is achieved through keeping 
observable records, providing reasonable explanations for decisions, giving adequate reasons 
for decision taken against individuals, making processes of law-making as accessible and 
comprehensible as possible. He summarises transparency as combating complexity, disorder 
and secrecy.  Although similar, openness goes further, beyond access to documents to 
opening up processes and meetings of public bodies to allow us to see government at work.
164
 
 
We can see from this wider analysis, that it is transparency that is required of family courts, 
not openness. It is the process in which we must have confidence; we do not need to see the 
personnel at work. In the same way, the health service is funded by the state, and there is 
public interest in knowing that surgery is correctly carried out, but we do not expect to 
personally observe the operation, nor to have it reported in the press.    
 
Birkinshaw argues that some cases which turn on Article 10, freedom of expression, are in 
truth about freedom of information. As Lord Steyn comments,  
 
…freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information and 
idea informs political debate. It is a safety valve … acts as brake on the abuse of 
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power by public officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance and 
administration of justice in the country.
165
 
 
Birkinshaw concludes that access to information confers legitimacy; we are only full citizens 
if we have information about the way power is wielded on out behalf. He wants freedom of 
information to be accorded status as a fundamental right but, as such, it will always be 
qualified. Therefore, claims that freedom of information can be used to invade privacy for 
salacious, profit-driven, reasons must be taken seriously, and laws drawn up carefully: ‗let the 
case for reform be made and justified publicly.‘166  In Lord Donaldson‘s words:  
 
…the public interest in investigation, publication and comment may in some 
circumstances override the right of individuals to confidentiality, but an 
understandable and sometimes reasonable desire to satisfy the public curiosity never 
can.
167
  
 
It is worrying that, in pursuing arguments for transparency in family courts, the consultation 
and subsequent legislative process failed to make or justify the case publicly, nor to identify 
the public interest.  This will be discussed after the next section, because the changes in 
policy must be seen in the context of the particular relevance of the right to privacy for 
children. 
 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS TO PRIVACY 
 
It has been acknowledged throughout this chapter that the privacy of adult parties and 
witnesses has been accorded some degree of legal protection, in accordance with rights based 
on the moral concepts of privacy, as well as the administrative requirements of the courts. It 
has however emerged that there is less certainty in asserting these rights for children and 
young people. The classic Warren and Brandeis definition reflects ideals of privacy embodied 
in the US political system for adult men, gradually extended to women. As recently as the 
1980s, when the views of Goldstein Freud and Solnit prevailed, it was acceptable to merge 
the child‘s interests with the parents in a family unit resistant to state interference.168 Even 
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now that children‘s rights are articulated, the problem remains that most children are 
powerless to enforce them.
169
 
 
Recalling that privacy rights consist both of being shielded (which can come within the child 
protection and welfare paradigms) and being in control of one‘s own personal information 
(which raise problems about children‘s participation), there are particular obstacles to 
enforcing children‘s rights. When the state interferes with family life because parents‘ and 
their children‘s rights are in potential conflict, it takes on a heavy responsibility for ensuring 
that the correct balance is struck.  
 
More widely than the court setting, increased awareness of the technological potential to 
invade children‘s privacy has raised concerns about insufficient attention being paid to 
obtaining their consent to information sharing.
170
 It should not be assumed that  young people 
growing up in a surveillance society are becoming accustomed to the idea that they have little 
control over their personal data. It has been acknowledged that children and young people are 
less resilient to embarrassment than adults; ‗children have their own standard for 
humiliation‘. Melton concluded in the early 1980s that ambivalence about the personhood of 
young people led to their privacy rights being marginalised in the US legal system.
171
 The 
Supreme Court in the 1990s recognised that young offenders and young victims required 
more protection because psychological damage from publicity could harm the rehabilitation 
process.
172
 Recent research in the UK found that young people faced an additional barrier to 
achievement if they were labelled as ‗care leavers‘.173  
 
Fundamentally, privacy is significant in children‘s development of a sense of themselves as 
separate from and connected to individuals and groups, to ‗feed back into their sense of self-
esteem and help define the ranges, limits, and consequences of individual autonomy within 
                                                 
169
 J Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009) 
12 
170
 T Dowty and D Korff, Protecting The Virtual Child: The Law and Children’s Consent to Sharing Personal 
Data (Action on Rights for Children, London 2009) 
171
 GB Melton, ‗Minors and Privacy: Are Legal and Psychological Concepts Compatible?‘ (1993) 62 Nebraska 
Law Review  455-493 at 493 
172
 J Grant, ‗Victims, offenders and other children: a right to privacy?‘ (1992) 19 American Journal of Criminal 
Law 485 
173
 The Prince‘s Trust, Looking beyond the label: public attitudes toward young people in care (The Prince‘s 
Trust, London, 2004) 
 245 
 
our society.‘174  While young, their capacity to set their own level of privacy is minimal but 
as they get older, privacy takes on meaning as active choice and is consequently an important 
marker of self-determination.
175
 These ideas follow Piaget‘s theories of moral development in 
children, and it follows that young children will not yet be in a position to make meaningful 
choices. However, it is not just a matter of short-term protection; we must consider the long-
term impact on children who will be affected in later life by the way they discover their life-
story, and the effect publicity had on planning for their care.
176
  
 
Moriarty also differentiated between a need to respect the privacy of adolescents and younger 
children, the former requiring protection while they develop moral autonomy but which for 
the latter may be meaningless or unnoticed. On the other hand, she believes the media have a 
role in ‗monitoring the rights of the vulnerable‘, who may need protection as individuals 
within their own family or in their relationship to the state.
177
  
 
In 1993, the LCD Review stated that it was ‗generally accepted wisdom‘ that publicity is 
harmful to children‘s welfare.178 This reflects the traditional view as expressed by Lord 
Donaldson, ascribing a child centred objective to AJA s 12: 
 
The family is essentially a private unit and this is particularly the case in relation to 
the children of the family. The accident that, usually through no fault of their own, 
outside agencies, whether the courts or local authorities, are called upon to intrude 
into the family unit in the interests of the welfare of the children should never of itself 
be allowed to deprive the children of the privacy which they should and would have 
enjoyed, but for that intrusion. This is recognised by Parliament and led to the 
enactment of s. 12.
179
 
 
In other words, few children choose to have their future arrangements settled by a court, 
whereas arguably their parents have forgone their full privacy rights by invoking the 
jurisdiction. Moriarty (in anticipation of the Human Rights Act 1998) saw this attitude as an 
outdated part of the parens patriae jurisdiction which she proposed replacing with an 
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approach based on children‘s rights to privacy alongside their rights to participation.180 Her 
work is an in-depth study combining media law and child law, which she saw, at that time, 
operating separately and potentially in conflict, with the basis of media law‘s freedom of 
expression failing to engage with child law‘s welfare principle and the inherent jurisdiction 
pre-dating children‘s participation rights. Since her work, the courts have had the opportunity 
to balance the Convention rights of freedom of expression with privacy. She cites Bloustein 
and Inness in support of her argument for children to be free of non-consensual media 
publication of personal details.
181
 Moriarty concluded that the law accorded children no right 
to privacy, only to protection.
182
 The cases suggested to her that AJA s 12 codified the 
common law to protect proceedings, not children.
183
  
 
Moriarty concluded that children do have a peculiar need for privacy, which should be 
acknowledged as a right, rather than being based on welfare and what she termed the 
‗publicity power‘ of the inherent jurisdiction. She believed that this right could be balanced 
with competing interests in open justice by delivering anonymised judgments in open 
court.
184
 (Her analysis thereby ignores the implications of lack of the child‘s control over 
what other are saying about them). She recommended an independent post holder who would 
act on behalf of children whose lives were or were likely to be exposed in the media. 
Moriarty‘s solution has the attraction of being available to any child being exploited by adults 
in breach of their privacy and/or participation rights, whether within or outside any court 
proceedings.  
 
Moriarty called anonymity the ‗identification solution‘, dividing the facts from the 
identification of parties.
 185
 She saw two disadvantages, firstly that the media make stories 
more effective by using names and pictures, and secondly the problem of ‗jigsaw 
identification‘ referred to in the Calcutt Report.186 In her case study of the Thompson and 
Venables case, she saw the naming of the two boys at the end of the case as a way that ‗the 
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media can reclaim them on behalf of the public, imposing its own supervision on them.‘187 In 
this way, identifying an individual is powerful and makes them an actor in the drama.  
 
George and Roberts point out that anonymity only keeps a person‘s identity secret, not 
information about their private lives.
188
 Unease has been expressed about details of children‘s 
lives being encapsulated on the internet, even by parents who do not name their children. 
Many newspaper columnists write about their own family lives, and their stories are no 
longer yesterday‘s newspaper wrapping today‘s fish and chips.  One suggestion has been to 
allow young people to have items removed once they are older.
189
 
 
Similarly to Moriarty, some members of the judiciary
190
 take the view that children who are 
too young to be what might be termed ‗rational choosers‘ have not yet developed a claim to 
privacy, and hence no enforceable right. This cannot be correct; although it is older children 
who will be affected by knowing people can read about and discuss their lives, and who may 
feel powerless and assaulted, younger children also have privacy rights beyond welfare. 
There is the danger of ‗ambush‘, discussed above. Furthermore, planning for the child‘s 
future may well be affected and his/her capacity for autonomy compromised before s/he even 
begins to strive for rational agency.  
 
It can also be argued that other effects of more publicity of court proceedings, such as delays 
while lawyers argue about what can be made public and increased reluctance for medical 
witnesses to give expert evidence, may well impact adversely on children‘s rights to a fair 
trial. These may be unintended consequences of policy at a time when policy emphasis is so 
strongly directed at reducing delay and expenditure.
191
 As the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child becomes more influential,
192
 the implications of Articles 3 (the best 
interests of the child); 12 (right to participate and be represented); 13 (right to information) 
and 16 (right to privacy) will need to be considered.      
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Although anonymity is not an answer in any event, it is not wanted by the media if they are 
writing about celebrities. The Editors Code states that: ‗Editors must not use the fame, 
notoriety or position of a parent or guardian as sole justification for publishing details of a 
child‘s private life.‘193 However, the media may argue that there is public interest in the story 
about the parents. Until recently the courts made no explicit distinction for children of 
famous parents. In Re Z, Ward LJ resorted to the welfare principle of the Children Act 1989 
to make a prohibited steps order preventing a child of a politician from being filmed in a 
documentary about her health and education needs.
194
 An indication of greater judicial 
sensibility toward children‘s rights was shown in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Limited where 
the Court of Appeal held that it was at least arguable that the baby son of the children‘s 
author, JK Rowling,  had a reasonable expectation of privacy, as would the child of a parent 
not in the public eye, and that the High Court judge had not paid sufficient attention to the 
fact that the appellant was a child. The law should protect children from intrusive media 
attention, in this case from being photographed in a public place.
195
 In Re Child X, the 
President, Sir Mark Potter, held that the law relating to attendance at court was to be applied 
in the same way for a child whose name would invoke media interest as for any other child. 
The only reason for media interest in the case was the identity of the father, but in the event, 
the media were excluded following evidence of the adverse effect publicity was already 
having on the child.
196
 
 
CONSULTATION ON LEGAL REFORM 
 
1989-2005 
 
Although objections to the closed nature of family courts have become vociferous only 
recently, there is a history going back to the time of implementation of the Children Act 
1989, when the courts were aware of the conflicting ideals of privacy and publicity after 
doubts raised by the Cleveland child abuse cases. Apparently, it was felt that the press had 
played an important part in questioning the evidence, being able to comment because the 
children were not wards of court.
197
 However, the 1993 LCD Review cites the Cleveland 
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Report as recommending an automatic ban on identifying children in family proceedings.
198
 
Another example of the benefits of publicity was raising awareness about a surrogacy 
arrangement that gave the impetus for the Warnock Committee on Human Sterilisation and 
Embryology beginning work in 1984.
199
   
 
There is no reason given in the 1993 Review as to what prompted it, apart from inconsistency 
in the law, nor is there any trace of what became of any responses to it. In 2004, Dame 
Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President of Family Division, mentioned that she did not know what 
had happened to it.
200
 The authors of the paper are unnamed, and it has not been possible to 
discover why nothing followed. Comment can be found in Clibbery v Allan where Thorpe LJ 
says:  
 
The result was an extremely thorough and scholarly paper. I believe that there were 
widespread responses to the consultation paper. Certainly the Family Division bench, 
of which I was then a member, submitted a paper supported by a substantial majority 
of the judges of the Family Division and the district judges of the Principal Registry. 
It is to my mind a matter of regret that the Government did not carry this initiative 
forward.
201
 
 
The 1993 Review gave three arguments in favour of open justice in the context of Article 10 
ECHR: enabling scrutiny of the administration of justice; enabling public discussion of 
matters of public interest that come before the courts and facilitating public knowledge of and 
interest in proceedings. For example, it cited Mrs Justice Booth in 1987 attributing ‗lax and 
sloppy advocacy‘ in ancillary relief hearings to the exclusion of the press.202 It noted that the 
question of what constitutes a question of public interest is a vexed one.
203
 The Review 
argued that law and practice was inconsistent, anomalous and fragmented. It concluded that 
the law should be rationalised, but that the current balance between openness and 
confidentiality was generally accepted and that change for its own sake was not 
recommended.
204
 
                                                 
198
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993) para 1.7 
199
 M Wright, ‗The Press, Children and Injunctions‘ (1992) Modern Law Review 857 
200
 HC Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Family Justice: The operation of family courts (HC 116, 
2005) Ev 13 Q46 
201
 Clibberry v Allan [2002] EWCA Civ 45, [2002] 1 FLR 565 at 96 
202
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993) para 3.6; see also J Jaconelli Open Justice (OUP, Oxford, 2002) 38 
203
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993) paras 3.3-3.11 
204
 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Access to and Reporting of Family Proceedings, a consultation 
paper (1993) para 5.9 
 250 
 
 
After 1993, individuals and organisations claiming to represent fathers‘ rights began to make 
complaints about secrecy. This is exemplified by Dr Pelling‘s long-running campaign for 
open hearings of his applications for section 8 orders. In 1997, Dame Elizabeth Butler Sloss 
summarised his arguments that principles of open justice obliged each court to hear each case 
in public as follows:  
 
…the right of the public to know what is going on, criticism of secret justice, the 
dangers of hearing cases in private without the scrutiny of the public and the press, the 
inability of litigants in person to get experience in conducting child cases, or to find 
out what the judge is like. He suggested they were rotten laws and a rotten use of 
discretion.
205
 
 
Nevertheless, she held that the court was bound by the rules to hold cases in private, with 
discretion to deliver judgments in open court if there were matters of public interest. Lord 
Justice Thorpe described Dr Pelling as an active member of a fathers‘ pressure group, and 
suggested that these concerns were not held by the wider public. In the following decade, the 
fathers‘ rights movement achieved a far higher profile.206 
 
In 2004, the government moved quickly following Kent County Council v B,
207
 to remedy the 
confusion about using information about a court case for narrower purposes, such as help 
from an MP or Mckenzie friend. Section 62 was added to the Children Act 2004 and the 
DCA issued a consultation paper, Disclosure of information in family proceedings cases 
involving children.
208
 The government response was published in July 2005.
209
 Fifty-seven 
responses had been received, generally in favour of enabling better advice and support for 
parties as well as for professionals who required access for research or regulatory purposes. 
The consultation was explicit that these relatively uncontroversial proposals were not 
intended to address disclosure to the media.
210
 
 
It would be wrong to attribute all complaints about restricted access to court proceedings to 
the fathers‘ lobby, although this is still dominant. Women‘s Aid drew attention to the 
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potential risk to parties in cases that were not subject to public scrutiny, claiming that, in five 
cases where children were murdered by a parent during a contact visit following a court 
order, the courts and professionals were escaping accountability because the facts of the cases 
could not be publicised.
 211
  Other pressure groups claimed that innocent parents were having 
their children taken into care. Members of the judiciary were tiring of being accused by 
conspiracy theorists. In a speech to lawyers in 2005, Munby J reiterated a point he had earlier 
made about one father in a contact hearing:  
 
Those who without justification attack the family justice system can all too easily do 
so by feeding the media tendentious accounts of proceedings while hypocritically 
sheltering behind the very privacy of the proceedings which, although they affect to 
condemn, they in fact turn to their own advantage. It is all too easy to attack the 
system when the system itself prevents anyone correcting the misrepresentations 
being fed to the media.
212
 
 
An increasing number of judgments were given in open court, in an attempt to dispel some 
potentially inaccurate perceptions. Where there had already been considerable, possibly 
unavoidable, publicity, the courts acceded to requests to lift reporting restrictions in order to 
redress to some extent the mis-information already in the public domain.
213
 Judgments in 
High Court cases which had not been in the news but where the judge wanted to bring 
attention to issues of public interest in contact disputes were delivered in open court without 
identifying the parties.
214
 Public awareness of such cases was influential in the campaign for 
the enforcement of contact provisions contained in the Children and Adoption Act 2006.   
 
There were indications in BBC v Rochdale MBC, that the High Court was giving serious 
consideration to young people‘s right to freedom of expression, even where this might pose 
problems in maintaining the quality of evidence required from professional witnesses. The 
social workers could not rely on the court to keep their identities protected many years after 
they had worked with children who were now adult and wished to speak to the media about 
their experiences.
215
 This judgment emphasised that such protection was accorded to social 
workers only where it was still necessary to prevent identification of children. The court 
noted the argument that there was a shortage of experienced social workers throughout the 
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country and that unwelcome publicity might be a further disincentive to working with 
children, but was not prepared to look more widely at the interests of those children. 
 
The Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs reviewing family courts in 2004 heard from 
a number of campaigners for more open courts as well as senior judges who hoped that 
reporting routine cases might banish the distorted views obtained from reading partial 
information about the more extreme situations that reach the higher courts.
216
 The Committee 
concluded:  
A greater degree of transparency is required in the family courts. An obvious move 
would be to allow the press and public into the family courts under appropriate 
reporting restrictions, and subject to the judge's discretion to exclude the public. 
Anonymised judgments should normally be delivered in public unless the judge in 
question specifically chooses to make an order to the contrary. This would make it 
possible for the public to have a more informed picture of what happens in the family 
courts, and would give the courts the 'open justice' which characterises our judicial 
system, while protecting the parties.
217
 
 
However when the issue was re-examined by the Committee in 2006, it heard evidence that 
the busy Inner London Family Proceedings Court, although already ‗open‘ was rarely visited 
by journalists. There had been a three-week ‗flurry‘ after the earlier Committee report.218 
 
These more complex complaints were not addressed by section 62, but further consultation 
on ‗opening up‘ the family courts was promised in spring 2006.219 Although the extent to 
which there was genuine public demand for more knowledge about courts was doubtful, the 
debate so far appears to have been relatively open and methodical.  
 
2006-2010 
 
The DCA (succeeded by the Ministry of Justice) issued three documents: a consultation on 
proposals in July 2006;
220
 a response, with new proposals in March 2007;
221
 and another 
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consultation on a third set of proposals in June 2007.
222
 The 2006 consultation paper stated 
that there had been a loss of public confidence in the family justice system.
223
 No evidence 
was provided about the numbers of people who do complain about their experience of family 
courts.
224
 Nevertheless, the Department aimed to end secrecy by implementing a series of 
proposals to make the law more consistent by lifting some of the restrictions on access to the 
courts. The most radical proposal was to allow, with some safeguards, media attendance and 
reporting of cases at all levels of court, as ‗proxy for the public‘.225 Overall, the impression 
was given of an attempt to address adult grievances, with little weight being given to the 
impact on children who are the subject of proceedings. For example, the section headed 
‗Protecting the privacy of families, especially children‘ in fact makes no reference at all to 
children.
226
 
 
The DCA did create a young people‘s on-line forum to accompany the consultation. but there 
was no mechanism to ascertain the age of those who posted responses. The Department 
recorded only 26 responses in its summary, giving quotes from two individuals, who both 
opposed allowing the media a right to attend hearings. The report concludes that the response 
rate was disappointing.
227
  
 
During the consultation process, the Minister for Justice stated categorically on several 
occasions that the family courts would be ‗opened up‘ to the media.228 It was therefore 
something of a surprise when the 2007 response to the consultation set out proposals to 
rationalise the law, without giving the media rights to attend court. Lord Falconer, then Lord 
Chancellor explained that the 2006 paper had invited participation by young people, and that 
the media would not be given automatic access to family courts because most responses, 
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especially from young people, were against it, and ‗children must come first‘.229 Instead, the 
Department was to take ‗a new approach‘ by providing better information about what 
happens in family courts, short of allowing the media to attend proceedings, concluding that 
the right balance was between providing more information about proceedings at all levels to 
users and the public and giving courts the discretion on who should be able to attend.
230
 
Further consultation consisted of four ‗tick-box‘ questions on disclosure and the decision in 
Clayton.
231
 Although it had been difficult to engage young people in the consultation, their 
views had been persuasive. 
 
Between June 2007 and December 2008, another change in direction occurred. The Secretary 
of State announced in Family Justice in View that his ‗balanced view‘ was that court rules 
should be changed to give media access.
232
 Although the paper refers to the Ministry taking 
into account 200 letters received, there is no analysis of this correspondence, unlike the 
breakdown given of respondents to the actual consultation questions in earlier publications. 
Apart from these 200 letters of unknown provenance, the only reason given by the Secretary 
of State for his having to re-balance his view was the campaign by The Times, which 
consisted of parents‘ complaints about social workers and medical expert witnesses. This 
sustained campaign included a week-long series of articles appearing in the paper in July 
2008.  
 
The Times was quick to attribute the Secretary of State‘s decision to itself, a claim which he 
has not contested. On 16 December 2008, in a story portentously headlined: ‗Family courts: 
What changed in the long walk to freedom‘, Camilla Cavendish wrote: 
 
Talking ahead of his announcement in the House of Commons, Mr Straw credited The 
Times with bringing the issue to his attention ―more graphically than it would 
otherwise have done‖. He said: "You have to deal with shedloads of issues in jobs like 
this…if something isn't a particular issue at the time, you don't go searching around 
for it. I commend The Times for running such a professional campaign.
233
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This suggests that the Secretary of State was unaware of the issue until drawn to his attention 
by The Times in 2008, despite his department and its predecessor having been consulting on it 
for over two years.  
 
Thus, policy on media access changed between 2006 and 2007, and back again in 2008. The 
inescapable conclusion is that public opinion was measured by policy-makers according to 
what appeared in the media rather than the sum of the evidence given to the Department over 
a period of four years. The consultation on ‗transparency‘ was opaque.    
 
In December 2008, in Family Justice in View, the Ministry proposed to: 
 
1. Change the law so that the media will be able to attend, unless the court decides 
against this. (This was achieved by way of the rule change in April 2009.
234
) 
2. Improve public information about how cases are decided 
3. Pilot anonymised family proceedings court and county court judgments on-line.235  
4. Give parties copies of the judgment at the end of the case 
5. Make reporting restrictions consistent across all family courts 
6. Protect children‘s identity, unless lifted by the court. (This was a restatement of the 
present law). 
7. Reverse the Clayton judgment  
8. Enable more access to support and advice by easing restrictions on sharing case 
details 
9. Consult on whether adoption hearings should also be open  
 
On the first day the media were able to take advantage of the rule, a change of residence 
application by a celebrity was transferred to the High Court to establish what could be 
reported, the judge commenting: ‗none of us have proper guidelines.‘236 A Practice Direction 
was issue by the President three weeks later.
237
  
 
Press reaction to the announcement in December 2008 was initially favourable and it was not 
until late March 2009 that it became clear that the rule change introduced in April 2009 
extended only to allowing journalists to attend. With the AJA 1960 and Children Act 1989 
provisions still in place, reporting was still prohibited without express permission of the 
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judge.
238
 In theory, the media could send in journalists to be ‗the eyes and ears‘ of the public, 
but in practice there were obstacles: they would need to know about the case in the first place, 
allow the time to wait for it to start and then sit through it, and then obtain leave of the judge 
to report on it, excluding any details that might identify the child.   
 
The proposal to reverse Clayton,
239
 elicited a campaign spearheaded by Mr Clayton, and 
supported by The Times, that aggrieved parties needed to be able to identify themselves in 
order to gain media attention.
240
 On 27 April 2009, the Lord Chancellor made a written 
statement to Parliament that he was now minded not to reverse Clayton, having had ‗time to 
reflect and reconsider‘.241  He made no reference to the consistent message throughout the 
consultation process that was in favour of extending s 97 to post-proceedings. Again, it can 
be seen that the public consultation has been superseded by another agenda, as there is no 
evidence of genuine public discourse.   
 
The following quotation is taken from a glossy ‗Young People‘s Guide‘, replete with 
photographs of cheerful teenagers, that was published with the 2007 Response by the DCA, 
which did indeed incorporate views from more than 200 young people. 
 
‗Q: Will children‘s views really make any difference? 
A: You bet. When you read through this guide you will see just how keen 
Government have been to hear what children themselves have had to say. 
REMEMBER: You are experts … ―Experts by experience‖ 242  
 
Only 30 per cent of young people who responded felt that the media should be allowed into 
family courts.
 243
 In retrospect, it can only be concluded that their views were ignored. While 
the 2008 proposals were taken forward in the Children Schools and Families Bill in 2009, the 
Children‘s Commissioner for England commissioned a study of young people‘s views on 
media access, in the hope of influencing Parliament. Unsurprisingly, almost all the young 
people interviewed objected to the idea of reporters in the courtroom (as already permitted 
since April 2009) and even anonymised information being published. They indicated that 
children were unlikely to speak frankly to health professionals once told that this was a 
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possibility.
244
 (Although the report was not referred to in the debates when the Bill was 
passed in April 2010, it has been cited with approval by Ministers and MPs in the current 
Select Committee enquiry into family courts, suggesting a reluctance to implement this part 
of the subsequent Act.
245
) 
 
The provisions in the Act were passed with minimal debate as part of the ‗wash-up‘ of 
legislation in April 2010 just prior to the general election. Eighteen bills were passed in just 
two weeks; the absence of debate on this matter was deplored by many MPs, one describing 
it as ‗scandalous‘ and ‗shabby‘.246      
 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS  
 
Brophy and Roberts produced a briefing paper on openness and transparency in other 
countries‘ family courts in May 2009 to inform the debate. They suggested that there was a 
myth that other countries‘ courts were less ‗secret‘, and pointed out that in comparable 
jurisdictions, the courts have very wide discretion in excluding attendance and there are strict 
rules against identifying parties.    
 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Family Court of Australia has also been subject 
to criticism by the media. Currently, court proceedings are accessible to the public and to the 
media, but there is also a great deal of investment in public information. There are very 
strong restrictions on publishing any identifying details however, with the result that a 
journalist can only run a story ‗so dull as to lack all public impact‘.247 Unfortunately, it is 
questionable whether this ‗open‘ court has achieved more confidence than those in England 
and Wales.
248
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A year after the law changed in New Zealand to allow media access to its Family Court, an 
evaluation of the impact found that there had been very little interest in attending or reporting 
cases. The media had access to hearings and documents, and the judiciary welcomed the new 
arrangements. The evaluation found that the judiciary were disappointed by the very low 
attendance at court and the limited nature of the reporting, which still drew more on anecdote 
than what could have been seen in court. Journalists had difficulty in finding newsworthy 
stories, partly because of a shortage of people and time to put in to the investigative task. 
Interestingly, some journalists felt uneasy about reporting on family cases. The researchers 
noted that the fathers‘ rights movement was still protesting about the court. The study 
indicates that the media, being driven by a commercial imperative are ill-equipped to fulfil an 
educative function.
249
      
 
Brophy and Roberts conclude that resources need to be invested in user-friendly information, 
outreach work and educational programmes to enable a more genuine appreciation by the 
public of the family court system. They suggest that this alternative approach has been 
ignored for resource reasons.
250
 While one might hope they are wrong, this would be further 
indication that policy is being driven by instrumental imperatives instead of offering a 
rational discourse. The former President of the Family Division warned that confusion in the 
reform programme would add to the pressure on resources and judicial time.
251
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The messages from other jurisdictions are that complaints about family courts do not go away 
when courts are ‗opened up‘. If children‘s identities are to continue to be protected, which 
has been reiterated at each stage the policy changed in England and Wales, it is inevitable 
that media interest will be limited. Journalists point out that stories need to be personalised 
and dramatised by names, and preferably photographs, to engage readers‘ interest.252 Courts 
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have accepted that a risk of identification sometimes has to be taken if the story is to have any 
chance of engaging the public.
253
 
 
Nevertheless, it must be right to simplify the law to make it consistent across all levels of 
court. Furthermore, there is an argument for transparency in court processes, to inform 
discourse in the public realm. Allowing journalists in to scrutinise decision making has some 
value in making the state and its agencies more accountable.
254
  For example, shortly after the 
rule change, one judge took advantage of it to publicise a resource shortage: Cafcass 
guardians.
255
 Narrowing the definition of the public interest in this way is unsatisfactory to 
the media, and possibly also to children who just do not think other people should be there, 
whatever the limitations.
256
     
 
Fundamentally, the moral claim to privacy includes protection from unwanted intrusion and 
also being enabled to develop autonomy. Therefore a right of privacy should be accorded to 
young children as well as those old enough to be aware of intrusion. The law has developed 
to protect process as well as individual people. Current policy is not taking children‘s views 
and needs into account nor has it taken account of indirect effect on resources. Decision 
making in the public sphere must be accepted as legitimate, but transparency is the correct 
term for what is sought, rather than openness. Exposure of personal details is not required for 
the ideal speech situation in the public sphere. On the other hand, communication was 
distorted in the consultation on reform and fell short of the ideal speech situation. 
 
The 2006 DCA consultation paper made several assertions about a loss of public confidence 
in family courts, but produced no evidence to substantiate this. Earlier research studies on 
court users‘ views did not feature complaints relating to publicising cases.257 The consultation 
process, as discussed here, was not undertaken free from distorted communication. A 
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challenge to the legitimacy of the court system would be met more effectively, Habermas 
would say, by a genuine attempt to engage public debate. Nevertheless, the sustained media 
campaign seems to have lodged in the public consciousness to the extent that secrecy is now 
perceived as a major flaw in the system. To remedy this, it should be possible for institutions 
to be open in their communication processes, while the individuals concerned may retain 
their privacy, or keep their own secrets. What we should be seeking is institutional 
transparency, not wholesale exposure.   
 
If we turn to the argument that the protective legislation was primarily used for the judicial 
process rather than the child, we find that the law has become no simpler,
258
 and there is 
potential for added cost and delay. The availability of expert witnesses may decline. The 
announcement by the Secretary of State in December 2008 was accompanied by comments to 
the media expressing his view that social workers and medical experts should not expect their 
identities to be protected, in the interest of professional accountability. The reluctance of 
medical expert witnesses to assist with court proceedings was acknowledged, but the 
implications were ignored.
259
 Some members of the judiciary now appear to be upholding this 
viewpoint. The President of the Family Division stated in May 2011 that the law allows 
medical expert witnesses to be named, provided this will not also identify the child, despite 
evidence brought by the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health of the negative impact 
this will have on the availability of expert witnesses.
260
   
 
This chapter has shown how opportunities for genuine public discourse about the functions of 
family courts were discarded in a blur of shifting value statements that make it difficult to 
identify the underlying motives. Whatever the motives were, the disposal of the issue in a 
rushed legislative timeframe gives the impression that it were politically expedient.  The 
result has neither appeased those who wanted the rules relaxed nor assisted families or the 
courts. 
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
In this chapter, the discussion returns to the subject of diversion from court, or ADR, raised 
in Chapters Four and Five. The Finer Committee‘s distaste for the physical indignity of 
parents being hauled up in ‗courts of petty crime‘1 has since been reconfigured into a new 
ideology of ‗courts‘ as an unwholesome mix of gender politics; secrecy; expensive lawyers; 
and scarcity of judicial resources. The conclusion is that we must avoid the use of a 
courtroom.  
 
The argument that a court is not the right place to resolve a family dispute creates more than a 
simple ‗law – not law‘ dichotomy. This chapter brings together the themes of diversion from 
court, how these developed and varied, and why they are attractive. The question to be 
answered is whether they are more likely to be accepted as more legitimate than the court.  
 
The term ‗alternative dispute resolution‘ (ADR) has been used in this thesis because it is 
commonly used to denote options other than an adjudicated outcome for the parties. Of 
course, there is usually more than one ‗alternative‘ to a judicially-imposed solution, so the 
term is not strictly correct, but again the tendency to fall into the pattern of dualities has 
produced a broad categorisation of either court or ADR. For the most part, ADR in family 
law refers to mediation, with lawyer-led negotiation and court-directed conciliation both 
lying somewhere across the ‗court – ADR‘ boundary.            
 
In the postmodern era we have a sense that values and patterns of behaviour in family form 
are changing rapidly.
2
 Yet instinctively we still felt that we should be capable of managing 
our intimate relationships. As discussed in the previous chapter, our privacy accords us the 
space to develop our autonomy and identity.  It is therefore with reluctance that we turn to the 
formality of the law and accept the juridification of family life.
3
 The law will assist us only if 
it meets our expectations in the lifeworld, with processes that reflect the sensitivity and 
dignity we attribute to our private lives. When the law moves away from these expectations, 
it begins to lose legitimacy. There is therefore an attraction in seeking less formal process-
driven solutions.      
                                                 
1
 Discussed in Chapter Four 
2
 Discussed in Chapter Two 
3
 J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Volume Two: The Critique of Functionalist  Reason (Polity  
Press, Cambridge 1987) 356-373 
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Rather than ‗law – not law‘, there are many threads in any blanket policy of diversion from 
court. The notion that court is the last resort is linked to, but is not the same as, the 
inappropriateness of the adversarial nature of proceedings. The court may ultimately be a 
system for enforcing the law,
4
 but that does not preclude an inquisitorial model. A family 
court could be either ‗a family organisation with some of the trappings of a court or a court 
with jurisdiction in family matters.‘5 There is already a range of alternatives; it is arguable 
that few are truly independent of courts, while others are acted out in the court arena. 
Tensions between the different professional disciplines involved create another duality, 
primarily between law and social work. When these options are examined, questions arise as 
to whether the alternative is more likely to be grounded in the lifeworld, reached through 
rational communication and hold more legitimacy than what is currently available. 
 
THE COURT AS LAST RESORT  
 
With regard to parenting disputes, the Finer Report claimed that:  
 
The court must not see the men, women and children with whom it is concerned as 
―clients‖, and still less as ―patients‖…but  the individual in the family courts must in 
the last resort remain the subject of rights, not the object of assistance.
6
 
 
Despite this fundamental principle being announced for its idea of a new Family Court, 
commentators were sceptical about the rise of therapism associated with the promotion of 
conciliation and a Family Court, as discussed below. This argument now seems to have been 
completely lost; the ‗rationing motif‘ has ensured that the court has indeed become the last 
resort of the deviant individual who cannot take responsibility for resolving his or her 
problems through alternative means. It is interesting to note the Finer Committee‘s use of the 
phrase ‗the last resort‘.  Do we now believe that parenting disputes are conducted by 
individuals with rights that are enforceable in the courts, or do we believe that they involve 
only disturbed and vulnerable people with social or health issues that are better resolved in 
the social work or NHS arenas than the court?  If the latter is now the consensus view, then 
alternative remedies have a chance of being better accepted. There seems to be a lack of 
acknowledgement of this development because once the existing filters of mediation and 
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solicitors‘ negotiation are exhausted, there is no coherent alternative therapeutic service. 
Instead, the ‗reasonable‘7 parent is successfully diverted to other services, while the minority 
intransigent group still goes to court.  
 
Perhaps the only explicit policy that labels the court user as dangerous is the gatekeeping role 
adopted by Cafcass since 2005, which now postpones any decision by a court until after 
initial safeguarding checks are undertaken.
8
  
 
On the other hand, with regard to care proceedings, the rights of parents to defend the 
application by the local authority have been preserved in principle as well as in practice, 
through the availability of legal aid.  The ‗court as last resort‘ paradigm is different here, as 
any reluctance to use the court is initially on the part of the local authority.  
 
A number of famous empirical studies have continued to find that social workers avoid 
applying to court. Prior to the Children Act 1989, Dingwall Eekelaar and Murray identified a 
‗rule of optimism‘ that persuaded welfare agencies that it was natural for children to be better 
off with their parents, despite evidence of abuse or neglect, than removed to state care.
9
  After 
the Act was implemented, Hunt et al  found that the emphasis in the Act on finding an 
alternative to compulsory measures had a strong impact on practice, particularly in the use of 
section 20 ‗voluntary‘ accommodation. Their research data supported a widespread 
perception that the ‗no-order principle‘ had resulted in the deferment of court action.10 The 
court process was seen as negative and full of hurdles, but coercion was covertly used, with a 
paradox of ‗enforced voluntarism and ambiguity of voluntary agreements.‘11 
 
More recently, the combination of increased court fees payable by local authorities, 
reductions in availability of legal aid providers, and the introduction of the Public Law 
Outline, together with government policies aiming to reduce the number of children ‗in care‘ 
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have arguably reduced the rate at which local authorities issued care applications.
12
  
Applications are rarely made before a long history of local authorities attempting to work 
with the family.
13
 The Public Law Outline was intended to save court resources by obliging 
local authorities to follow a prescriptive series of pre-proceedings actions, but to date this has 
not successfully reduced delay. It may even be extending the time that families engage with 
child protection systems, with social workers coercing parents into ‗voluntary‘ 
arrangements.
14
   
 
Most children ‗looked after‘ by the state, thus incurring considerable long-term public 
expenditure, are subject to s 20, not court proceedings. The motive is therefore not entirely 
economic. Avoiding court may well reflect a social work ethos of family support being 
preferred to compulsion. It may also stem from a reluctance to engage in a forensic 
examination of the local authority‘s actions. If a child is to be removed by the state from his 
or her parents against their will, however, there would be little argument that this was not an 
issue for a court. As Archard explains, the exercise of the right to raise one's own child is 
constrained by a duty to care for the child. The state must intervene if parenting fails, firstly 
because of a duty to safeguard its weakest citizens and also to preserve the continuity of the 
state.
15
  Transferring the right to raise one‘s own child to the state is morally only defensible 
through a court process, underlying the principles of human rights and the Children Act, but 
we must be confident that decisions made whether to use the court or not can stand up to 
public scrutiny.  
 
There is therefore a mix of economic and ideological motives in treating courts as the last 
resort, but removing family proceedings absolutely cannot be legitimate. If going to court is a 
negative experience, this should not prevent us asking why, rather than merely abandon the 
institution.
16
 When systems take on a life of their own and no longer serve the lifeworld, they 
                                                 
12
 P Welbourne ‗Safeguarding children on the edge of care: policy for keeping children safe after the Review of 
the Child Care Proceedings System, Care Matters and the Carter Review of Legal Aid‘ 20 (3) Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 335-358 (Although the rate has increased since 2008 in the wake of the death of Peter Connelly.)  
13
 J Masson, J Pearce and K Bader, Care Profiling Study (Ministry of Justice, 2008)  
14
 B McKeigue and C Beckett, ‗Squeezing the toothpaste tube: will tackling court delay result in pre-court delay 
in its place?‘ (2010) 40(1) British Journal of Social Work 154-169 
15
 D Archard, 'Philosophical Perspectives on Childhood' in J Fionda (ed), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart 
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can be adapted through discourse in the public sphere. Such a discourse should challenge 
assumptions that the adversarial nature of the court prevents it meeting families‘ needs.17  
 
ADVERSARIALISM 
 
Shapiro describes the triad between the two disputants and the judge as unstable, because the 
‗loser‘ of the case gradually also loses his or her perception of the process as achieving 
resolution and begins to see it replaced by an imposition of constructs of behaviour. The 
acceptance of adjudication depends on parties accepting this triad as a ‗common sense‘ 
solution but the likelihood of both parties continuing to accept this diminishes as one 
becomes aware that they might not ‗win‘. He argues that ‗common-sense‘ consensual 
justifications for a third party role in dispute resolution are more suited to mediation than 
adjudication.
18
 On the other hand, the legitimacy of ADR is open to question if it is not 
perceived to reflect the legal system.
19
 Our sense of justice is formed in the lifeworld, so if 
we see this slipping away, the systems lose their credibility, but ‗common sense‘ solutions in 
the lifeworld are sustained by an awareness of underpinning legal rights. Relying on the law 
does not always necessitate an adversarial forum.  
 
For some commentators, a court judgment that measures past behaviour against a normative 
standard to find winners and losers is impossible to justify in terms of family relationships.
20
 
Acceptance of divorce as largely an administrative process reflects the development that an 
investigative role in divorce is no longer legitimate. This leaves us with the adversarial role 
relevant only in cases where the courts‘ protective function is called on. The current legal aid 
proposals reflect that development, because parties in parenting disputes will not be entitled 
to legal aid unless there is a history of violence.
21
  
 
This does not mean that the courts are not adapting to a more inquisitorial way of working; 
adversarial practice need not be set in stone. Sir Nicholas Wall, the current President of the 
Family Division thinks that an adversarial approach is necessary only in a finding-of–fact 
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hearing, and that the family court judge, supported by lawyers, is customarily more 
inquisitorial than the traditional judge.
22
 Family lawyers have long been specialists in 
negotiation rather than confrontation.
23
 Codes of practice promote a ‗constructive, sensitive‘ 
approach.
24
 It is only when a finding is required in respect of domestic violence or child 
protection, that the court reverts to its forensic role. As the function of dispute resolution 
becomes more inquisitorial, only the protection function need be adversarial. The more ADR 
is promoted, the more likely the judge will be dealing only with cases where the protective 
function is invoked, at which point adversarialism and adjudication are unavoidable.  
 
It is more than ten years since s 8 proceedings were described as lacking  ‗adversarialism red 
in tooth and claw.‘25 A number of research studies show that lawyers primarily work toward 
settlement and see the court more as a structure within which to achieve an agreement than a 
battlefield.
26
 Self-representing litigants may be more rather than less inclined to press for trial 
than those who have lawyers. A consensual agreement is more likely to be achieved by 
involving lawyers in advising and negotiating, and confronting issues of violence and power 
imbalances than an approach that tries to ignore these issues and restrict access to legal 
services.
27
 It now appears that the ‗less adversarial trial‘ in Australia may in fact be taking 
longer and costing more than those with more traditional legal representation.
28
 Although 
Bailey-Harris and Dewar had earlier commented that the Australian courts were more 
investigative than those in England and Wales, Hunter found similar conciliatory approaches 
in both jurisdictions, prior to the Australian reforms in 2006.
29
 With regard to care cases, 
Pearce et al have also found that while lawyers respected their clients‘ rights in the context of 
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the possibility of the state sanctioning removal of their child, lawyers were skilled in 
negotiating the least damaging outcomes.
30
   
 
The adversarial model was explicitly rejected in the Australian jurisdiction.
31
 However, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, the less adversarial trial depends on an enhanced role for the 
children‘s representatives in both screening for cases which will require a hearing on the facts 
and in working intensively with parties to minimise conflict. Investment in staff development 
and recruitment is therefore required, if judges‘ and lawyers‘ participation is to be reduced 
and reconfigured. So the court would still be active, within the wider family justice system, 
with legal and social work professionals balancing the aims of reducing conflict and 
protecting vulnerable parties. It is only safe to marginalise adversarialism if the facilities exist 
for thorough multi-disciplinary analysis that can effectively combine the dispute resolution 
and protective functions. During a previous era of anti-adjudication, pro-mediation, Davis 
warned: ‗The legal processes should not be allowed to atrophy whilst we concentrate all our 
energies in developing extra-legal alternatives.‘32  
 
In the criminal justice system, it appears that civil law jurisdictions are becoming  more 
adversarial and common law jurisdictions less so, leading to what some commentators sees as 
convergence. However, Jackson argues that conceptualising proceedings in a ‗binary 
opposition‘ of adversarial and inquisitorial models is misleading. Instead, courts may be 
moving towards a new rights-based model of proof which he terms ‗participatory‘.33  
 
In contrast, the danger is that reducing adversarialism in family proceedings may be premised 
more on ADR saving money than it promoting families‘ rights or participation. Instrumental 
actions to adjust spending in the legal system may be dressed up as rational actions to help 
people adjust to post-separation parenting. In February 2011, the government introduced 
compulsory Mediation and Information Assessment Meetings with the headline: ‗more 
couples to be spared court battles‘. The announcement referred to figures that indicated that 
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mediation costs about one-fifth of a court case, and takes about a quarter of the time.
34
 In this 
way, the potential benefits of mediation to families in reducing conflict and expense, while 
speeding up resolution, are explicitly stated but the reduction in the court workload is only 
implicit.   
 
The effect of this change in policy is that every parent, not just those legally-aided, will 
normally have to attend a meeting to learn about mediation and obtain a standard form to that 
effect, before being able to apply to court under Children Act 1989 s 8. The announcement, 
with no consultation, was made a month in advance of the Family Justice Review report, 
which was based on many months‘ investigation and consultation.35 Separately, in the legal 
aid green paper, the government proposes to remove legal aid from almost all private law 
applications.
36
 There is therefore a prospect of mediation services being overwhelmed by 
demand. 
 
The tone of the Ministry of Justice announcement in February raises an obvious question: if 
mediation fits better with the lifeworld, and is more efficient, why is it underused? The 
history of conciliation and mediation features continuing questions about legitimacy and it is 
troubling that the evidence of previous attempts appears to be being ignored in the current 
drive for ADR.
37
  
 
CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION IN PARENTING DISPUTES  
 
The terms ‗conciliation‘ and ‗mediation‘ are sometimes used interchangeably to describe a 
third party facilitating, rather than adjudicating, a settlement. The way they have been 
employed over the past 50 years does however give clues as to the inherent and continuing 
tensions between different concepts and styles of ADR. These developments are manifested 
in the duality of law and social work, and the duality of  court-based and external 
conciliation.  
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CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
In 1979, Mnookin and Kornhauser published their famous article: ‗Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law.‘38 Its libertarianism and low priority given to children‘s welfare are now striking. 
They argued that ‗private ordering‘ was preferable to court determination of family disputes, 
although there was a public interest in ensuring private arrangements had some procedural 
safeguards. Although they rejected the concept of a state-run process of investigation of each 
stage of a divorce, neither did they advocate a ‗night watchman state‘ that would leave parties 
entirely unregulated. Separating couples in the US and England had the ‗formal power to 
make their own law‘ regarding financial settlement, because of an assumption that adults bear 
their own responsibility for access to justice, with which a court would not interfere.
39
 
Although under parens patriae, courts cannot be bound by parents‘ agreements about their 
children; research was cited to the effect that courts rarely set aside agreements.
40
  
 
Mnookin and Kornhauser gave four reasons for this minimal approach by courts (which they 
claimed perceived themselves as an agency for dispute resolution, not child protection): the 
state‘s limited resources for investigation; if there was a risk of arrangements not being 
approved parents might be disinclined to present the true picture; that ‗welfare‘ is 
indeterminate; and that the lack of post-order control by the court made it unrealistic to 
impose a solution against parents‘ wishes. 
 
If that was truly the courts‘ self-perception, it has been substantially reversed in that the 
protective function is now accepted. For example, the Family Justice Council said about 
cases where there has been a history of violence: 
 
 The “no order” principle set out in the Children Act 1989 is imbued in those 
working in the Family Justice System. If parents have reached an agreement, 
it appears that some members of the judiciary are hesitant to intervene 
robustly, even if it is clear that it would be right to do so… In appropriate cases 
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the judge will have to refuse to make an order despite parental agreement, if 
the statutory obligations [the welfare test] are to be fulfilled.41 
 
This has recently been emphasised in Australia because despite the legislation 
promoting settlement, „violence changes everything‟, to the extent that Dewar 
suggests that complete separation in legal process may be required between dispute 
resolution and protection.42  
 
Mnookin and Kornhauser described parents ‗bargaining in the shadow of the law‘ with the 
court as the ultimate safeguard. They theorised that negotiation depended on each party 
having a ‗bargaining endowment‘ to call on. Typically, the mother bargained from the 
position of having residence of the child while the father had the economic advantage. It was 
therefore more expedient for them to trade on their respective advantages than entrust a 
solution to court. (The underlying cultural assumption that contact and child support are 
linked may mean that bargaining accords with societal norms more closely than 
adjudication.) However, the transaction took account of a ‗legal endowment‘ of benchmarks 
and guides provided by legal rules – hence in the shadow of the law. This imagery has stuck; 
Dewar describes the 2006 change in Australian legislation to promote equal parenting as 
creating new perceptions in the shadow of the law that have redistributed the ‗chips‘ in 
favour of fathers.
43
 
 
Following Mnookin and Kornhauser, it can be argued that all parents make their post-
separation arrangements in the context of the existence of the family court. This is because of 
the courts‘ latent functions in influencing the behaviour of the wider community and 
implementing social policy. In contrast to fears of juridification, some opponents of the idea 
of a Family Court in England and Wales in the 1980s saw the colonisation of law by the 
behavioural sciences as ‗the triumph of the therapeutic‘,44 weakening the ability to resist the 
state‘s ideal of family form.45 An outline of the history of conciliation and mediation explains 
how this fear was founded. 
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EARLY HISTORY OF CONCILIATION  
Conciliation has been traced back to 18th century upper class family and neighbours trying to 
shore up failing marriages, and then resorting to facilitate agreement to avoid scandal while 
striving for some degree of fairness.
46
 Private separation often involved delicate negotiation, 
in contrast to the ‗patriarchal absolutism‘ of the common law courts.47 As we have seen, only 
a tiny minority of the population had access to a court, so few had the opportunity of an 
adjudicated verdict until the advent of legal aid in 1949. It would be unfair to describe the 
modern family judge as absolutist; indeed they tend to be portrayed as having little 
confidence in their own product.
48
        
Court conciliation was first undertaken in magistrates courts by JPs and their clerks, and then 
more systematically by probation officers.
49
 The ethos of the probation service could either 
support or clash with the court‘s view of its own functions.    Vanstone attributes the history 
of the probation service‘s work with offenders to an early evangelical humanitarian mission, 
the emergence of the study of individual psychology, and political and societal concerns 
about the maintenance of social order.
50
 During the early 20th century this crusading ethos 
was supplemented by psychosocial theories on identifying potential young offenders. 
Probation officers became individual caseworkers – bringing together ‗the home, the school, 
the court and the clinic, the playground and the street‘.51 The political imperative to maintain 
social order by reforming and repressing deviancy informed social work within the penal 
system; these same officers were undertaking matrimonial cases in the magistrates courts. 
Conciliation was relegated to the lower orders of society.  
Probation officers‘ tasks in marital causes were formalised by the Summary Proceedings 
(Domestic Proceedings) Act 1937.
52
 This was preceded by concern about the rising volume 
of matrimonial cases and the unsuccessful Summary Jurisdiction (Domestic Procedure) Bill 
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of 1934 which included Mullins‘ proposal for a special conciliation summons to bring the 
parties into court to try to resolve their differences. The court would have been put under a 
duty to investigate and advise the parties. Mullins was convinced that the courts needed to 
apply therapeutic measures but, as discussed earlier, his ideas were rejected.
53
 It was however 
recognised that the probation service had no statutory footing in family cases, and in 1936 the 
Harris Committee was established to enquire into ‗social services connected with the 
administration of justice in courts of summary jurisdiction, including … the application of 
conciliation methods to matrimonial disputes‘. The Committee reported that attempts at 
conciliation were widespread, although inconsistent. It rejected any blurring of the distinction 
between adjudication and social work. There was to be no statutory obligation on the court 
itself to provide conciliation; this was to be provided by the probation service.
54
 Cretney 
comments: ‗Mullins‘ dream of the magistrates court as the central point in a harmonised 
system of social work and legal provision was apparently dead beyond recall.‘ 55 He adds that 
the distinction between the functions of adjudication and welfare provision was upheld by the 
subsequent Denning and Finer Reports. (However Davis‘ research in the 1980s showed that 
many district judges were taking an active part in negotiating aspects of conciliation.
56
 ) 
 
The Harris Committee was deliberating in the context of a belief that juvenile crime was 
linked to an unhappy home background; this justified the probation service undertaking 
marriage conciliation work alongside its criminal remit in the JPs‘ courts.57 Donzelot‘s 
tutelary discipline
58
 appears to have been in full swing when family breakdown was linked to 
crime prevention, but not applied to the divorcing middle class. Divorce figures were also 
rising in the late 1930s; the Marriage Guidance Council was established in 1938. Then, of 
course, the war led to a steep increase in the rate of family breakdown. 
 
Lord Merriman, then President of the PDA, outlined a scheme in 1946 to extend the 
conciliation facilities available in the magistrates courts to divorce. He proposed referral of 
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all undefended divorces to multi-disciplinary tribunals, a ‗Commission of Conciliation and 
Inquiry‘, to investigate the possibilities of preventing marriage breakdown.59 This approach 
was conservative in purpose but, similarly to the 1934 Bill, radical in its call for a 
combination of legal and social work expertise. It was examined by the Denning Committee, 
which recorded that the ecclesiastical courts saw early attempts at reconciliation in 
matrimonial causes as part of their pastoral role.
60
 The Committee praised the marriage 
guidance and reconciliation work being undertaken by the probation service and church and 
welfare agencies, as supplemental to the obligation on the legal system to support marriage. 
There was even recognition that children are affected:  
The reconciliation of estranged parties to marriage is of the utmost importance to the 
State as well as to the parties and their children. It is indeed so important that the State 
itself should do all it can to assist reconciliation. 
61
 
 
Thus the Denning Committee envisaged a wider role for conciliation services.  
 
However, the Committee rejected the Merriman scheme because it could be initiated only 
once proceedings had begun and would still be too closely identified with the adjudication 
process. This would not achieve the same sort of success as confidential consultation with an 
independent professional. A new publicly-funded Marriage Welfare Service, separate from 
the judicial process, was recommended. This would ‗evolve gradually from the existing 
services and societies just as the probation system evolved from the Court Missionaries‘.62 
Those existing services included probation, the Forces welfare sections, and voluntary 
organisations.
63
 This evolved service was to have a broad role encompassing preparation for 
marriage; marriage guidance; and reconciliation. However, a new function would have been 
added which hints at a future role: these welfare officers would also advise on post-separation 
arrangements and report on the welfare of children.
64
  
 
Although no new service began, a probation officer was appointed to the PDA on an 
experimental basis in 1950,
65
 and in 1956 the Morton Commission recommended expanding 
this to appoint a court welfare officer in each divorce town, although in principle the 
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Commission maintained that parents must take continuing responsibility for their children‘s 
arrangements.
66
 The Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 introduced the 
requirement that the divorce judge be satisfied with arrangements to be made for the children 
of the family and made provision for powers to make orders regarding the care and 
supervision of children. This is the first time the legislation refers to a ‗welfare officer‘ and 
stipulates that this shall be a probation officer.
67
  
 
A major advance in the scope of conciliation was achieved when the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1963 reduced collusion with adultery to a discretionary rather than an absolute bar to 
obtaining a divorce. This enabled the court to allow agreements about children without the 
risk of an appearance of collusion between the parties.
68
 When the county courts assumed 
jurisdiction for divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1967 more officers had to be 
appointed; between 1961 and 1971 the number of welfare reports for all courts quadrupled. 
This service in the county court was however provided only at the request of the judge, not 
available to the parties on request.
69
 By 1981 Wilkinson estimates that one in five divorce 
cases involving children were assisted by welfare reports, but agreed with Elston et al‘s 
findings of variation.
70
 Indeed, in 1979 a practising welfare officer recorded her experience 
that judges and magistrates decide ‗on a whim‘ whether to try to resolve the matter 
themselves or refer it for a report.
71
  
 
The term ‗conciliation‘ in family courts was originally synonymous with reconciliation, but 
by 1974 the Finer Committee was able to clarify it was:   
…assisting the parties to deal with the consequences of the established breakdown of 
their marriage, whether resulting in a divorce or separation, by reaching agreements or 
giving consents or reducing the area of conflict upon custody, support, access to and 
education of the children, financial provision, the disposition of the matrimonial 
home, lawyers‘ fees, and every other matter arising from the breakdown which calls 
for a decision on future arrangements.
72
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Cretney described this definition as ‗the key concept it has become in reform proposals ever 
since.‘73 However, the term ‗conciliation‗ is less used now, possibly since it became 
associated with short-termism, lack of risk assessment and marginalising children‘s views in 
‗in-court conciliation‘.74   
 
Although Finer‘s recommendations were not followed, in-court conciliation became more 
widespread, alongside new out-of court services during the 1980s, as the desirability of ADR 
became articulated in terms of reaching better solutions and costing less money. In 1983, the 
inter-departmental committee which produced the Robinson report was directed ‗primarily‘ 
to analyse cost benefits, but emphasised the desirability of solutions being reached wherever 
possible by agreement rather than being imposed by judicial decision.
75
  
 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF IN-COURT CONCILIATION  
 
In the early 1970s, divorce welfare reports were ordered in only extreme cases, usually where 
some other enquiry was being made. The very ordering of a report singled out the family in a 
negative way.
76
  The judge could call for a report if he was not satisfied with the 
arrangements for children,
77
 but this was very rare; there was considerable disparity between 
judges as to whether they made use of the service, and in some courts there was virtually no 
service provided. There was evidence that some investigations were carried out in an 
intimidating and oppressive way.
78
 Parents were more willing to go to a doctor, lawyer or 
health visitor for help than an individual in a social work role. Being advised by a probation 
officer or social worker was ‗acceptance of a submissively dependent role, a consequent loss 
of self-respect or a decline in social status.‘79  
 
Murch described a shift from reconciliation to conciliation as ‗marriage saving‘ to ‗child 
saving‘, although James and Hay maintained that reconciliation had also featured a ‗child 
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saving‘ aspect in its aim of delinquency prevention.80 By 1988 however, Eekelaar and 
Dingwall wrote ‗the dominant influence is neither marriage-saving nor child-saving but cost-
saving. Again and again one is confronted by the struggle of civil servants, judges, and court 
administrators to cope with the pressure of a continuing rise in the demand for divorce.‘81 
They observed that ‗the language of accountancy becomes the only language of policy 
argument‘, excluding objectives of equality and justice.82  James and Hay summarise policy 
developments during the 1980s to demonstrate that this was consistently targeted to save 
resources rather than support practice.
83
 It is difficult to disassociate this history of promoting 
conciliation on economic grounds from claims that ADR better meets families‘ needs than 
adjudication.  
 
In 1985, the Booth Committee reported on procedure within terms of reference of achieving 
simplification as well as saving costs.
84
 It proposed a reduction in the number of court 
welfare reports by diversion into conciliation, which should become a standard step in 
divorce.
85
 The rationale was the same as often repeated in the succeeding 25 years:  parties 
should be given every opportunity and facility to come to an agreement before resorting to 
contested proceedings; conciliation encourages parents to take responsibility for their 
ongoing arrangements for children; and early access to conciliation may prevent positions 
from becoming entrenched. The Booth report added that counselling for ‗deep seated and 
complex emotional problems‘ should also be available - elsewhere. The Committee seemed 
wary of officers‘ time being lost to the court if they became too caught up in long-term 
therapeutic processes.
86
   
 
The change from idealistic concepts of rehabilitation to a more punitive approach in the 
probation service weakened the perceived link between upbringing and delinquency which 
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had justified its family court remit.
87
 A tension developed between the Home Office, which 
held responsibility for probation, and officers who wanted more attention paid to the scope of 
family court work. This central disinterest in the probation service‘s family court welfare 
function let it spread across the country with a shift from report-writing to conciliation, 
apparently with no statutory basis.
88
 Eventually, the ethos of working toward agreement 
pervaded casework, whether brief meetings at court or as part of a more extended report-
writing process. Services followed a referral from a court and, unlike external mediation 
services, meetings were not privileged, nor entirely voluntary. Some practitioners coerced 
couples into a series of joint meetings, determined to apply their skills to arrive at an 
agreement. Schemes varied in the extent of judicial control exercised.
89
 Despite the 
introduction of national standards in 1994,
90
 varieties of in-court conciliation developed 
inconsistently across the probation service until the late 1990s, highlighted by an early 
inspection of Cafcass, which categorised the many different models into nine  generic 
‗schemes‘.91    
 
Mainstream family court welfare tasks were reflected in Wilkinson‘s social work practice 
guide published in 1981. He saw the roles of reporter and conciliator as ‗interwoven, 
interdependent and indistinguishable‘.92 Officers relied on professional perspectives of 
parental capacity to change. On the other hand, Bretherton referred to the officer as 
‗spokesman for the child‘ and Murch saw the role as including children‘s advocacy.93 James 
and Hay however relate that during the 1980s it was generally accepted by officers that their 
duty was counselling adults rather than listening to children.
94
 Indeed, some articles 
appearing in the Probation Journal were categorical that children‘s views should be 
ignored.
95
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A ‗struggle for ―ownership‖ of conciliation and the definition thereof‘ ensued.96  Practice 
between probation areas was inconsistent; in Birmingham, for example, one family court 
welfare office simply produced court reports, while the other used long-term therapy, much 
to the annoyance of local lawyers. Eventually, cases that reached the Court of Appeal were 
subject to swingeing judicial criticism about the preoccupation with conciliation and lack of 
investigation. A reversal of policy was demanded.
97
 It seems that writing reports may have 
been more efficient than conciliation, where the latter consisted of long-term social work, 
presumably because this did not succeed in removing the cases from the legal system. James 
and Hay concluded that by the time they were writing in the early 1990s, the turmoil had 
been resolved, with social work principles of child-saving, problem resolution and adjustment 
to change informing the officers‘ primary function to provide information for the courts.98  
This was an optimistic view; the tensions continue, and it remains to be seen whether the 
latest attempt at diversion will de-clutter court listings.    
 
AFTER FINER: OUT-OF-COURT MEDIATION 
 
Out-of-court mediation developed in the 1980s in parallel to in-court conciliation; adding 
another layer by making a claim as a less system-driven alternative. The first family 
mediation service was established in Bristol in 1978, a response to the shelving of the Finer 
recommendations.
99
 Family mediation has been defined as a process in which an impartial 
third party assists a couple at any stage of separation or divorce to consider their options and 
communicate better to reach joint decisions on arrangements for children, finance or 
property. This was distinguished from conciliation because it is not part of the mediator‘s role 
to recommend a solution to the couple or to the court, nor to report to the court. The 
presumed result is that control remains in the hands of the parties.
100
 Thus, another duality is 
identified, suggesting that in-court conciliation was an alternative to an adjudicated decision 
but less respectful of parents‘ competence. Conciliation was provided more directly by the 
state, through the probation service, whereas mediation was seen as more progressive, being 
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indirectly funded through the voluntary sector. It is unlikely that the stigma of being 
investigated by a probation officer was ever entirely overcome, however specialised the 
family court services became.
101
  
 
It may be true that the in-court services were potentially more controllable by government. In 
1983, the Robinson Committee‘s recommended that government funding should be confined 
to in-court schemes because they were more cost-effective than out-of-court schemes.
102
 
Cretney wrote that the inadequacy of this claim was soon exposed, and that the only long-
term effect of Robinson was the linguistic distinction.
103
 As discussed below, this is 
questionable. 
 
Even out-of-court mediation was not universally accepted as genuinely enabling parties to 
take responsibility for coming to agreement. The idealised ‗Family Court‘ and mediation 
were referred to as ‗two current sacred cows‘ by Freeman in his introduction to a book of 
essays, State, Law and the Family, published in 1984.
104
  This book included a contribution 
by Bottomley, who concluded that articulating domestic disputes through ‗a jurisprudence of 
rights, obligations, due process and recognition of conflict of interests‘ might be more honest 
and beneficial to vulnerable individuals than diversion to mediation.
105
 Similarly to Davis,
106
 
she advocated improvement of the legal system from within.      
 
Whether the mediator intervenes less powerfully than the conciliator has been questioned. 
Roberts thought that, in any scenario, the mediator ‗transforms‘ the bilateral negotiation 
between the parties by clarifying issues and offering advice on the probable behaviour of 
other agencies, and therefore becomes partly in control of the outcome.
107
 Much has been 
written about mediators not being in a position to redress power imbalance between couples; 
in their critique Diduck and Kaganas conclude that mediation is premised on negotiations 
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‗unclouded by hostility‘.108  It is therefore entirely unsuited to high conflict relationships.  
The idea of replacing a legal process with a therapeutic one was seen as seriously eroding the 
civil liberties of women in general.
109
 
 
Mediation came into prominence when the Family Law Act 1996 placed it at the centre of its 
divorce law reforms. Services had grown haphazardly and lack of regular funding prevented 
planning. It seemed that with statutory recognition, family mediation would move into the 
mainstream. The introduction of mediation as the norm in divorce law recognised that 
divorce had changed from a public matter requiring legal intervention to one subject to 
private ordering, privatisation and de-legalisation.  
 
Bottomley had vividly expressed the suspicion that there was something insidious about 
mediation ten years earlier:  
What we are experiencing at the moment is a pincer movement. On the one hand 
family law is being squeezed out of the formal legal system on arguments of cost and 
on the other hand it is being enticed out with promises of more fruitful pastures 
elsewhere. … We need to recognise that the process of de-legalisation is not one of 
de-regularisation but is a shift from one form of social discipline to another. While the 
articulate middle classes will continue to buy the services of professional groups, 
other will become more and more the subjects of welfarism. Those who are the most 
vulnerable will be caught between the unequal power relations of private ordering and 
a familial ideology rendered benign by welfarism in informal dispute resolution.
110
  
 
These fears were revived in anticipation of the implementation of the mediation provisions in 
the 1996 Act.
111
 Although the mediation provisions of  the Act did not come into force, 
Diduck and Kaganas maintained their view that mediation continued to enforce an ideology 
of the family as a means of social control.
112
 They saw the focus on children as reinforcing 
the identification of women with motherhood, and the presumption of contact perpetuating 
the power of fathers. An imbalance of power between the parties precludes the weaker one 
being able to participate in the decision-making process because of fear, cultural reasons or 
guilt.
113
 To speak of family privacy and family autonomy in the context of ADR is to assume 
that the family is capable of making decisions as a unit, despite the interests and desires of 
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different family members being different, and possibly irreconcilable.
114
 Advocates of 
mediation in the 1990s saw it as reinforcing family against state control by upholding the 
freedom of individuals to make their own decisions.
115
 However, an ideology of non-
intervention in family life can reinforce oppression.
116
  
 
The Family Law Act 1996 divorce reform was abandoned, as has been well-documented. The 
reasons given range from the government‘s disappointment that immediate cost savings were 
not apparent, through to more fundamental flaws in the legislation which reflected perpetual 
factional struggles in family policy.
117
 If the latter interpretation is correct, this is an example 
of a gap between formulation and implementation of social policy. The proposals were 
piloted and evaluated, so there was considerably more scope for public discourse in the late 
1990s about the courts‘ functions than is apparent throughout most of their history. The 
reforms may indeed have proved unworkable and abandoning them the right course of action; 
the disappointment amongst lawyers was largely because of the retention of fault, rather than 
the loss of the ideal of mediation.
118
  In the long term, it is remarkable that the wealth of 
research evidence about information meetings and mediation was overlooked in the interim 
report from the Family Justice Review.
119
 
 
CONVERGENCE OF COURT WELFARE SERVICES 2001-2010 
 
In 2001, the welfare reporting and conciliation services of the probation service were 
combined with the services supplied by guardian ad litem panels and the Official Solicitor in 
representing children‘s interests in the family courts, to form the non-governmental public 
body, Cafcass.
120
 It was envisaged that these services had enough in common to provide a 
cohesive organisation that could serve the courts, children and families in both public and 
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private law proceedings.
121
  Indeed, an initial policy was the convergence of staff to develop 
skills to undertake casework across the previous boundaries. Within five years, it became 
apparent that the demands on the courts of contact and residence applications
122
 were so high 
that resources were prioritised to investigate child protection issues arising in those cases. 
Thus Cafcass has now acquired a significant proportion of the courts‘ functions. The sceptics 
in the 1980s might be appalled at this development, especially if Cafcass also starts to 
replicate the social policy functions of the court.  On the other hand, perhaps it does fit better 
with the lifeworld for social work practice to be applied to routine conflict resolution than the 
law, leaving judges to adjudicate only in the narrow band of cases where findings of fact 
regarding violence and abuse are required. This might be anathema to the Finer Committee 
which proposed a welfare service integrated in a family court which treated people as objects 
of rights not treatment, but the language of the Family Justice Review suggests just such a 
prospect, with Cafcass ‗subsumed‘ into a new Family Justice Service.123  
 
In 2007, Cafcass informed its officers that a new practice model, the Private Law Pathway, 
had been agreed with the judiciary, under which officers would interview the parties and 
investigate welfare issues before any court hearing, presenting a recommendation to the court 
on the appropriate ‗pathway‘ at the first hearing. It was stated that continuing casework 
would be required in only a small number of cases. However it appeared that the model had 
not been agreed by the judiciary, as was made clear in a speech from the President, 
reclaiming the courts‘ control.124  The present position is that the only action taken by 
Cafcass prior to the first hearing are risk assessment checks with the police and relevant 
authorities.
125
      
 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AUSTRALIA  
 
Another proposal from the Family Justice Review is the ‗information hub‘ based partly on the 
panel‘s observations of ADR in Australia.126 
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Divorce law had been unified across Australia in 1959, but contained 14 grounds for divorce, 
and procedures were excessively legalistic. This was the context of the creation of the federal 
Family Court under the Family Law Act (FLA) 1975.
127
 Harrison states that the Court was 
established in recognition of a range of extra-legal resources required by parties, with an 
emphasis on litigation as the last resort.
128
 Government policy was explicit that it was to be a 
‗helping court.‘ As already described, this lack of formality was a contributory factor to the 
Court‘s lack of legitimacy.129 One relatively successful aspect was the integral welfare 
service. 
 
WELFARE SERVICES IN THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA 
 
The FLA included provision for family counsellors (termed family consultants since 2006) to 
assist with psychological and social work expertise. They are qualified in social work or 
psychology, and the reports they prepare for the court are described as ‗behavioural science 
assessment‘.130 The original Court‘s structure included a chief justice; judges; registrars, and 
a director of counselling and welfare.
131
 Star identifies the driving force behind the new 
legislation as politicians who had practised as lawyers in labour relations and arbitration, who 
held strong beliefs in natural justice and equal rights to representation.
132
  However these 
ideals were not widespread amongst the legal profession.  
 
In her 2007 overview, Harrison distinguishes the FCtA from courts in other common law 
jurisdictions by its emphasis on settlement before litigation, facilitated by the family 
consultants. She states that other courts assume that disputes will be resolved by ‗trial and 
judgment‘.133 This may have been the case when the FCtA was established in 1976 but, as 
has been discussed here, hardly accurate for many years in the courts in England and Wales. 
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Harrison‘s report, subtitled a ‗bold departure‘, glosses over this, and implies that the non-
legal services have always been a successfully integrated function of the FCtA. The use of a 
family consultant as a ‗single expert‘ from the very early days of the Court has been 
described elsewhere as an outstanding contribution to reducing the complexity and cost of 
proceedings.
134
 The family consultant does indeed now appear to be highly regarded,
135
 but 
this was not always the case. 
 
Under the 1975 Act, the original in-court counsellors conducted both voluntary and 
mandatory meetings with parents in children matters, as well as writing reports for the court 
and providing information to parties about the courts‘ services. For example, group 
information sessions were provided by Court staff, including counsellors.
136
 The original 
legislation provided for court counsellors to be available to parties who either requested, or 
were ordered to attend, a conference to discuss the child‘s welfare, and to attempt to reach a 
solution.
137
 These discussions were privileged. The first counsellors came from a varied 
background including health, and created a new  service that focused on clients‘ needs, and 
how these could be met either by court services or other agencies, without institutionalising 
families within the court process, but in crisis intervention could be quite directive.
138
 Early 
court publicity materials however encouraged parties to see counsellors as being 
approachable and sympathetic, being able to offer a mix of marriage guidance and 
conciliation functions.
139
 At first, services could also be requested before any application had 
been made to court, known as ‗voluntary conciliation counselling‘. 
 
Alternatively, the counsellors could be requested to provide reports to assist the court in its 
decision making. However, it was clear that these reports were for assistance only, and there 
was no expectation that the court would necessarily follow their recommendations, unless 
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these accorded with other evidence.
140
 Although counsellors could be cross examined, it was 
not even clear whether parties had a right to see the report.
141
 Court welfare reports in the 
English courts may therefore have been more influential on outcomes.   
 
Despite the ideology behind the FLA, there was an initial lack of consensus about the extent 
to which the ‗helping court‘ encouraged alternative resolution. Judges felt that the 
counsellors‘ priority was to assist them in adjudication, rather than resolve issues 
independently. The envisaged relationship between legal and welfare professionals took 
many years to coalesce; Star identifies ideological tensions between the two branches, 
exacerbated by arguments over resources.
142
 In some of the registries, counsellors were more 
successful in expanding their conciliation role than others, but this had the perverse effect of 
adding to delay and cost.
143
   
 
The confusion about the role of the counsellors reflected the early conceptual uncertainty as 
to the level of formality of the FCtA.
144
 The first Chief Justice expected the judges and 
counsellors to work together on a mutual development of their shared powers.
145
 In 
retrospect, in our era of excessive managerialism in public services, this could be seen as a 
lack of leadership, but Star clearly admires the Chief Justice and accepts this as part of the 
idealistic ethos of the FLA. In 1983, the Chief Justice issued a practice direction requiring 
parties to attend a ‗counselling session‘ before starting litigation, but the different registries 
applied this inconsistently in the face of hostility from the legal profession.
146
  The conflict 
between their respective adversarial and conciliatory training, described by one judge as 
‗brimstone and treacle‘, is reminiscent of the conflicts between judges and probation officers 
in the English courts in the same period, discussed above. 
 
In 1995 the FLA was amended to oblige the court and practitioners to consider ‗primary 
dispute resolution‘.147 ‗Primary‘ dispute resolution was re-branded as such to counter the 
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impression that ‗alternative‘ dispute resolution was secondary in importance to litigation.148 
Primary dispute resolution comprised: financial conciliation conducted by a registrar; 
counselling in children‘s matters by the family counsellors; conciliation conferences 
conducted jointly by the registrar and a counsellor; and early mediation. (This has since been 
further re-branded by the 2006 Act as ‗family dispute resolution‘.149) 
 
The 1995 amendments extended the scope to offer primary dispute resolution to external 
agencies but most conciliation counselling was still conducted by the court counsellors, 
integrating early, voluntary and court-directed meetings. The average time spent by a couple 
in these meetings was a couple of hours.
150
  In 1996 the Attorney General caused a flurry 
with proposals to devolve all conciliation to community-based services, co-ordinated by a 
new government agency. The plan was to centralise ‗all non-judicial family law services‘ 
within the executive arm of government. He stated that:  
...the first resort for people with family problems should not be the court …placing 
the bulk of those non-judicial services in the community sector is one way we can 
encourage people not to put themselves and their children through the adversarial 
process.
151
 
 
Writing in 1997, Finlay et al were enthusiastic about this plan for less oppressive regulation 
of ‗the private sphere of family relationships‘.  They believed that a new agency would 
remove the inappropriate paternalism of the court from family disputes and reduce feelings of 
helplessness, as well as reducing the financial burden, at a national level, of a labour-
intensive structure.
152
 On the other hand, Harrison responded that a new bureaucracy would 
be unwieldy and less effective.
153
 She countered that the FCtA had successfully integrated 
judicial and social services within its functions.
154
 About two-thirds of parties attended 
voluntary early meetings; just under half were ordered to attend a conciliation session, and 
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only a small number were referred for assessment.
155
 Only if conciliation was exhausted 
without settlement did the case proceed to a report, which was used in evidence. She argued 
that the provision of both early voluntary sessions and court-ordered sessions at a later stage 
were effectively undertaken by the in-house service. Leaving adjudication as the FCtA‘s sole 
function would elevate litigation over primary dispute resolution.
156
 
 
The counsellors were not removed from the FCtA but funding was reduced over the years 
until facilities for mediation prior to application were provided only by community services 
and lawyers. In 2004 Nicholson wrote that community services were patchy, and less highly 
regarded by solicitors than the in-court service,
157
 but some of these formed the basis of new 
Family Relationship Centres.   
 
Family consultants (as they now are) remain an essential element in both the resolution and 
adjudication stages of court proceedings, especially in the less adversarial trial.
158
    
 
FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIP CENTRES 
 
As noted in Chapter Five, the parliamentary enquiry that preceded the 2006 legislative 
amendments sought to take action in response to the ‗Pathways report‘,159 which had found 
that separating parents were not always directed toward the most helpful remedies for their 
particular situation. The report proposed a gate-keeping service to enable families to follow 
the ‗pathway‘ that most fitted their needs: either self-help, supported or litigation. The 
litigation pathway was appropriate only where there were issues of child abuse, domestic 
violence, child abduction, or all other methods had failed to reach a settlement.
160
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At that time, only five percent of applications the Court received were actually adjudicated.
161
  
The aim of the 2006 Act was to promote ‗family dispute resolution‘ (FDR) even more 
strongly. FDR is now compulsory before an application can be issued to the court, with a few 
exceptions. Registered FDR providers include lawyers and mediators, but the government‘s 
commitment to the new scheme is embodied in Family Relationship Centres (FRCs), which 
are contracted out to voluntary organisations and centrally funded to provide a range of free 
and subsidised services, supplemented by telephone advice lines and internet resources. They 
have a wide role in family support, marriage guidance, and relationship skills as well as 
dealing with post-separation parenting. Although they give advice about law and court 
processes, they were intended as a social work, not a legal service, grounded in relationship-
building, not enforcement of rights. However, the information currently given to parties 
attending a Centre includes a suggestion that they may wish to bring their own lawyer.
162
 
 
The FRCs were intended to produce: 
…a long-term cultural change in the pathways people take to resolve disputes about 
parenting arrangements after separation...The philosophy is that post-separation 
parenting should not be seen in the first place as a legal issue.
163
  
 
Parkinson describes an anti-lawyer motivation in Parliament, which wanted to increase free 
access to a wider range of advice, for which lawyers were not necessarily the best qualified to 
assist. He saw FRCs as having five functions: information referral to strengthen relationships; 
education and advice for separating parents; assistance in resolving contact disputes; assisting 
grandparents; and advice on child support.
164
 However, Rhoades identifies a strong anti-
professional thread emanating mainly from the fathers‘ rights movement; a distrust of all 
‗experts‘.165  
 
 
Access to web-based Family Relationship Services, including information about FRCs is very 
easy.
166
 Family Dispute Resolution (FDR) is specified as a compulsory step for anyone 
wanting to apply for or vary a parenting order. A certificate must be obtained from a 
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registered provider that FDR has been attempted. The exceptions relate to consent orders, 
urgency or risks of violence or abuse.
167
 If the certificate states that no genuine effort was 
made, the parent can be referred back or have costs awarded against them. 
 
Joint dispute resolution meetings with FRC advisers are free of charge, up to three hours. The 
purpose is to negotiate post-separation parenting and agree a parenting plan, if possible. A 
means-tested scale of fees applies if sessions continue beyond the three hours. Problems 
encountered with existing contact orders or agreements can also be taken to the FRCs, 
possibly avoiding further court applications.  
 
There is not such a structural division between family courts and child support in Australia as 
in the UK. For example, guides for parents are jointly published by the Family Court and the 
Child Support Agency.
168
 The FRCs have formal links with local child support agencies to 
provide workshops, advice and information. Although the child support scheme has been 
unpopular since its inception, and has been subject to considerable reform, it is relatively 
more successful than systems in Britain and the USA.
169
 It had already developed methods of 
advising and supporting non-resident parents.
170
 This indicates a more holistic approach to 
family disputes. On the other hand, the FRCs do not assist in disputes over family property. 
 
It was anticipated that FRCs would remove much of the courts‘ workload, firstly because 
they would resolve the easier type of case which had previously been subject to a case 
assessment conference or court-ordered conciliation, and secondly because there should be a 
reduction in the number of cases that become highly conflicted. It was hoped that FRCs 
would help forge better lasting solutions by being able to listen to and respond to each party‘s 
narrative of events.
171
 This would however depend on a number of factors:  whether three 
hours in a FRC is as effective as negotiations ‗at the court door‘, and whether a significant 
proportion of parents and grandparents would consult a FRC at a stage before positions 
become entrenched. However, some mediators were wary of the prospect of compulsory 
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mediation.
172
 The premise was that FRCs would have little or no role to play in the types of 
cases which prevail at final hearing stage: those involving a history of violence and abuse. 
These are exempted from FDR and FRCs are obliged to operate complex screening risk 
assessment procedures.  Doubts were expressed as to how adequate and consistent these 
would be.
173
 The 2009 evaluation has now highlighted this as a major concern.
174
 
 
FRCs were integral to an explicit policy drive to reach agreement without litigation.
175
  The 
government favoured ‗parenting plans‘ over consent orders.176 Ten years ago, Bailey-Harris 
wrote that despite the promotion of agreement in the 1995 Act, Australian courts still 
subjected post-separation parenting to a greater degree of scrutiny than the Children Act 1989 
s 1(5) ‗no order principle‘ applied by courts in England. She believed that s1(5) had led to 
fewer consent orders being made, whereas the FLA as amended in 1995 still envisaged 
judicial oversight of both consent orders and parenting plans.
177
  Parenting plans had not 
become as popular as consent orders for a number of reasons,
178
 but Rhoades described the 
system as ‗built on a consent order culture‘ by 2002. Researchers found that consent orders 
were rife in cases where there had been an imbalance of power and incidents of violence.
179
 It 
seems that the judicial oversight observed by Bailey-Harris had little to offer the courts‘ 
protective function.  
 
Although Parkinson advocated the FRCs as a positive alternative to court, he thought there 
were associated benefits for their local communities and hoped they would avoid being 
overwhelmed as ‗divorce centres‘, which would exclude their wider functions of family 
support.
180
 Conversely, Eekelaar has commented that the FRCs‘ involvement in family 
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disputes imposes the will of the wider community on parties, while depriving individuals of 
legal protection.
181
 It is understandable that some may fear an ideological, homogenised 
model being enforced by FRCs, especially as they were introduced by a conservative 
government, much as the move to mediation in England in the early 1990s took place under a 
conservative administration. The 2009 evaluation suggests that FRCs are providing flexible 
need-focussed services to meet the needs of diverse family forms.
182
 
 
Hunter pointed out that restricting litigation to cases involving family violence, or intractable 
disputes, does not achieve a resolution in the child‘s best interests if there are other concerns 
about parenting capacity, for example because of substance abuse or disability. She suggested 
that this type of case should proceed by way of expert evidence to the court, not by out-of-
court negotiations restricted by legal aid rules about the prospects of success. She contrasted 
the benefits of early investigation in Magellan cases.
183
  However, as discussed in Chapter 
Five, Magellan only applies to cases of serious physical and sexual abuse, not to neglect or 
emotional abuse. It is presumably up to the FRC or family consultant to attempt to get the 
parent engaged with local support services.  
 
The evaluation was largely positive about FRCs, now used by about two thirds of parties, 
amounting to a cultural shift toward FDR away from legal services.
184
  Although many 
parties still used lawyers there was an overlap, with co-operation between professionals in the 
two services.
185
 Lawyers had concerns about the less adversarial trials, including increased 
cost and delay; inconsistent judicial practice and clients being disadvantaged by directly 
addressing the judge.
186
 Overall, the evaluation concludes that the use of FDR was broadly 
meeting the objective of achieving resolution outside court, but with reservations about the 
number of cases that were proceeding through FDR despite risks of violence and concerns 
about children‘s safety.  
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Attempts to de-legalise family disputes in Australia can claim a remarkable degree of 
legitimacy because of the rigorous ongoing research and evaluation programme, involving 
longitudinal studies of many thousands of families.
187
 Although English politicians praise the 
Australian FDR model and the Family Justice Review now recommends an on-line ‗hub‘,188 
this is unlikely to be viable without the intensive financial commitment made in Australia. 
The 2006 reforms may have begun with the ‗frozen chook‘ discourse, but developments now 
appear to be based on solid research evidence. As a result, a new bill before Parliament 
attempts to address some of the unintended consequences of the 2006 amendments, widening 
definitions of abuse and incorporating the UNCRC into federal law.
189
    
 
CONCILIATION/MEDIATION AND THE COURTS’ PROTECTIVE FUNCTION 
 
Mediation is promoted as a personal solution to an individual problem selected to by-pass 
legal rules. If mediation is enshrined in legislation, as it is now in Australia, it can no longer 
depend for its legitimacy on being consensual and voluntary. Like the law, it is sanctioned by 
coercion, and is therefore subject to the same theories of legitimacy as law.
190
  Hazel Genn 
has said, controversially, that mediators have no interest in justice or fairness.
191
 However, it 
is probably difficult to discern radical differences in approach between family lawyers‘ and 
mediators‘ current practice. The Australian experience shows us that out-of-court mediation 
can work, given a sufficient infrastructure, but it also emphasises the ongoing role of the 
court in undertaking the protection function. Engaging parents in court-directed negotiation 
by Cafcass bears little relation to mediation as envisaged in the 1980s, but more with social 
work intervention.  
 
In the early 1980s, Roberts wrote that conciliation/mediation was a ‗simple and attractive 
idea‘ but warned against vagueness. His lengthy analysis of the different models 
differentiated between an enabling negotiating process and a directive advisory style of 
mediation, with only the latter having any prospect of addressing the safety of children. It 
was wrong to pretend that this was joint decision-making based on the parties‘ own values 
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and preferences.
192
 Davis argued that there was a conflict between conciliation and welfare 
investigation, with a risk that preoccupation with a child‘s welfare undermines parents‘ 
authority, becoming authoritarian with imposition of value judgments.
193
 The increasing 
enthusiasm with which family court welfare officers were pursuing conciliation in the 1980s 
meant that they were focusing their work on the parents‘ disagreement instead of providing 
information to the court, conflict resolution instead of investigation.
194
 This type of practice 
strayed far from Mnookin and Kornhauser‘s assumption of parental competence, and the 
Finer Committee‘s demand for parties to be treated as rights-holders, not patients. It seemed 
that the ‗over-zealous‘ religious officer of the 1930s had been succeeded by the equally 
determined quasi-psychotherapist.  
 
Writing in retrospect in 2004, Davis identified three issues that had been debated for the past 
25 years: whether mediation is separate from legal processes; whether mediation is controlled 
by the parties; whether the mediator can seek to impose his or her expertise in the promotion 
of the child‘s welfare. He concluded that there were unlikely to be ‗right and wrong answers‘ 
but warned against mis-description of processes.  He singled out his residual concern, that the 
language of conciliation was still applied to fit ‗forms of intervention which rested on 
abstruse theoretical constructs which were never explained to the parents involved‘.195 In 
other words, officers were covertly imposing their own beliefs on families who had entered 
the court arena to resolve a dispute through the law, not to engage in therapy. The likelihood 
of Cafcass officers indulging their pet theories is now less, in view of their high caseloads 
and directive to assess immediate risk rather than capacity to change.
196
  
 
The evaluation of FDR in Australia found that although it was sometimes followed in cases 
where there were significant concerns about violence and safety, this did not necessarily 
mean that those parents would want to take a court-based pathway. The report recommended 
                                                 
192
 S Roberts, 'Mediation in Family Disputes' (1983) 46 (5) Modern Law Review 537 
193
 G Davis, ‗Conciliation: A Dilemma for the Divorce Court Welfare Service (1982) 29 Probation Journal 123-
128  
194
 AL James and W Hay, Court Welfare in Action: Practice and Theory (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel 
Hempstead 1993) 65-68 
195
 G Davis, 'A Research Perspective' in J Westcott (ed) Family Mediation Past, Present and Future (Family 
Law, Bristol 2005) 61 (An additional concern Davis did not mention is the lack of a mechanism for the child‘s 
views to be heard.) 
196
 HC Justice Committee, evidence given by Harry Fletcher, Napo, 1 March 2011 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmjust/518/11030101.htm>  
 295 
 
careful monitoring of screening and intake processes.
197
  This suggests a future problem for 
the English courts: if a Cafcass officer encounters risk, matters can be referred to a judge but 
a mediator‘s input will presumably be limited to certifying a dispute as unsuitable for 
mediation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current Family Procedure Rules 2010 interpret ‗alternative dispute resolution‘ as  
meaning ‗methods of resolving a dispute, including mediation, other than through the normal 
court process‘. There is a duty on the court, in all types of family proceedings, to consider at 
every stage whether ADR is appropriate.
198
 In private law proceedings, ‗conciliation‘ takes 
place at the First Hearing Dispute Resolution Appointment which includes a period for 
discussion with a Cafcass officer. The distinction between mediation and conciliation is 
thereby preserved, with the latter as part of the ‗normal court process‘. Following the attempt 
in 2008 by Cafcass to assume a role in decision making before matters had been listed before 
a judge, procedures now clearly locate conciliation within judicial oversight.    
 
As Davis commented, the lack of judicial confidence in the law‘s ability to deal with child 
disputes, together with the rationing motif, leads to a principal object of restricting, rather 
than supplying, a service – that of judicial determination.199 It may therefore appear odd that 
judges objected to Cafcass undertaking much more responsibility, but it appears they were 
anxious about the primary objective of deflecting parties being to reduce the workload of 
report writing.
200
      
 
However, Davis was correct that, progressively rationing resources means that   adjudication 
is ‗stigmatised as the last refuge of the obsessive and the intransigent.‘201 In parallel, 
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Bottomley‘s ‗jurisprudence of rights, obligations and due process‘ is a luxury available only 
to the wealthy.
202
  
 
This chapter has shown that there are several additional dualities to the ‗court – not court‘ 
duality of ADR. These are: adversarialism and negotiation; law and social work; forensic and 
therapeutic; court directed conciliation and voluntary mediation. Overall, the predominant 
shift is that the court‘s protective function has overtaken that of dispute processing. If dispute 
resolution no longer belongs in the court system, this will have to be justified in open 
exchange of evidence and ideas (including full disclosure and understanding of economic 
factors)if it is to have a chance of being more successful than current systems. 
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THE FUNCTIONS OF FAMILY COURTS – A HISTORY OF DUALITIES  
 
It is not claimed here that family courts in England and Wales have lost legitimacy to the 
point where they are dysfunctional, because clearly they do still function. Rather, I have tried 
to identify what lies behind the excessive criticism that family courts attract, to see whether 
their functions are worth preserving or could be more successfully undertaken elsewhere. In 
Chapter One, these functions were defined as dispute processing and protection, with latent 
functions of  interacting with social policy. The family justice system has been subject to a 
number of new initiatives during the period this thesis was written (2004-2011). The Family 
Justice Review has provided a fair overview, but there seems little prospect of more stability 
in the near future.  Change will have a greater chance of success if it is grounded in a 
recognition that our society has invested in a construct of childhood that needs support and 
protection. The anxieties generated by perceptions of failure to protect children and their 
parents are too great to risk the replacement of family courts with anything less than a system 
that is carefully and inclusively designed, and will consequently earn public support. 
Studying the history of the courts reveals that their administration of family law has been put 
under strain by a series of split systems which have borne little relation to the expectations 
and values of the society of the time. This series of dualities owes more to the embedding of 
practice to serve political and/or economic interests than to an emancipatory model of 
agreeing in a public space how best to preserve our private values. In this concluding chapter, 
I set out the dualities that have been identified and how far these have been addressed by 
public discourse. 
 
A significant theme running through much of the literature is the existence of a boundary 
between public and private in family law. Chapter Two examined how social theory on the 
public and private spheres could be applied to a study of family courts by distinguishing the 
public and private realms from the role of the state in relation to family life. This set out how 
social theory can be applied to the historical context of the courts and to the current problems 
of secrecy and the drive for ADR. In particular, aspects of Habermas‘ theories were 
discussed. These include the extent to which tensions between capitalism and the welfare 
state in the late 20th century can be explained by his idea of the colonisation of the lifeworld. 
This is relevant to conflicts between social welfare and legal solutions and the question of 
whether the court system follows social norms, or vice versa. Habermas argues that 
institutions are accepted as legitimate if they work on consensus arrived at through rational 
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discourse and undistorted communication. This level of discourse is not always found in the 
way social policy is formulated and applied. The concept of the ideal speech situation is 
highly relevant to publicity in courts and the transparency of policy formulation in claiming 
transparency in the courts. Furthermore, if there is a deeper crisis of legitimacy in the court 
system, the question is whether alternative dispute resolution is more or less legitimate than 
the court process. 
The historical development of the family courts was summarised in two separate periods in 
Chapters Three and Four, divided by the advent of the welfare state and social administration 
in the 1940s. Chapter Three provides the background to court systems into which social 
policy had to fit. The legacy from systems in the ecclesiastical courts and the role of JPs 
contributed to a fragmented court system based on religion and class, which imposed social 
order in the guise of morality. The interdependence of the patriarchal nature of private family 
life and retaining control of families in the public sphere was played out in the courts, where 
women and children‘s interests were relegated. For most of the population, the only 
protection to be found was within the JPs‘ criminal jurisdiction. 
In contrast, the well-being of children became a priority during the 20th century, and over the 
decades the legal focus has shifted from marriage to parenthood, and the socialisation of 
children. Again, this socialisation may be motivated by the aim to develop economically self-
sufficient and obedient members of society, but the UK now has explicit family policies, 
rather than relying on social order being enforced through the patriarchal family form. 
The upbringing of children is now central in policy applied by the courts when parents are in 
dispute with each other and/or with the state. This explicit family policy evolved only 
recently. Chapter Four outlined the post-war history of the courts, the connection with social 
policy and the increasing calls for a specialised family court or for the use of alternative 
means to address family breakdown. The impact of legal aid as integral to the welfare state is 
highly significant. Social policy brought family life into the public realm, and the nature of 
the relationship between citizen and state created new expectations of the courts. By the 
1970s, the burdens of the legacy of the original court systems were recognised in a call for a 
family court. In England and Wales, the Children Act 1989 unified many aspects of the 
courts‘ functions, especially in contrast to the structural separation in Australia, although 
Australia did establish a Family Court in 1976. Attempts to establish mediation as a plausible 
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alternative to family courts in England and Wales failed to win legitimacy, not even to satisfy 
cost-saving objectives.   
Chapter Five shows how the Australian court structure is fragmented by an artificial 
separation of public and private law. The specialised court failed to achieve legitimacy, 
which led to new policies prioritising extra-legal processes. In its earlier history, its 
reputation was also damaged by allegations of secrecy. The Australian system, despite the 
establishment of a Family Court, therefore exhibits similar problems to those alleged to apply 
to courts in England and Wales, and illustrates how difficult it is to maintain the division 
between public and private law when children‘s interests are brought to court. 
 
In the past few years, ‗secrecy‘ has been blamed for a lack of confidence in family courts by 
a wide range of critics, including government Ministers. Chapter Six is a case study on 
publicity in the family courts. The perceptions of secrecy and the call for openness in family 
court proceedings were examined, in the context of theories of privacy and the public sphere. 
These include: privacy as a moral value and as a right; comparing secrecy, privacy, 
transparency and openness; and concluding that transparency of process can be achieved 
without opening up private matters to damaging publicity. The question of whether we need 
an open court to achieve legitimacy has been posed on a flawed basis, denying genuine 
consultation on legal reform. While there may have been some value in an increased 
awareness of accountability by professionals, the domination of this discourse by vested 
interests makes it difficult to assess whether the courts would be more acceptable an 
institution if restrictions on publication of personal information were further relaxed.  
 
Chapter Seven drew together the themes of alternative processes to courts and the social 
welfare-legal conflict dating from the 1930s and more recently in Australia. The drive to 
deflect both private individuals and public bodies from using court processes has 
strengthened. This can be seen in terms of forcing private solutions on parties whose 
concerns might be in the public interest because they involve vulnerable children, and poses a 
contradiction for ‗open justice‘.  
 
It might be concluded that family courts, by the nature of the problems they are trying to 
resolve, are inevitably going to be a focus of discontent.  Rather than simply dismissing the 
issues in this way, narrowing them to the allegation of secrecy and the belief that the use of 
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an alternative process will lead to better outcomes for children and families, allows courts to 
be observed as trying to function in a context of policy confusion. The causes of the 
legitimacy crisis go deeper, to our continuing inability to agree on the public and private 
functions of the courts, but if time was given to meaningful consultation we might at least 
improve the chances of a workable solution. The problems of family courts are commonly 
expressed as arising from their being the site of a conflict between the public realm of state 
intervention and the private realm of private family arrangements. However the modern 
relationship between state and citizen depends on the boundary between public and private 
being crossed in the lifeworld to agree how the economy and the state will meet our 
expectations. The values held by individuals and society will not be upheld if the justice 
system is dominated by forces of market and power. A legitimate system can function when 
policies are agreed rationally in the public sphere. 
The dualities are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily mired in conflict, but their 
contradictions need to be carefully explored if systems can improve, rather than isolated 
aspects being seized on to support claims driven by money and power.    
 
DUAL COURT STRUCTURES  
 
The earliest records of the ecclesiastical courts through to the eventual introduction of 
divorce in the mid 19th century show that the ‗family‘ function of these courts was to uphold 
marriage as an institution that regulated behaviour and secured property and succession 
rights. The transfer of this jurisdiction from the church to the civil courts did little to improve 
the position of women or children. The parallel JPs‘ jurisdiction enforced intra-family 
obligations in order to protect the parish from having to maintain family dependents, who 
were unable to work for a living. Each system was allied to an economic imperative in 
upholding social order. Children became the objects of court decisions only if they were due 
to inherit wealth or were likely to become a burden on the state.  
 
Restricted access to divorce was preserved in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, which was 
attached to an administrative rearrangement rather than a reconceptualisation of the courts as 
a means of allowing people to escape unhappy relationships. The split jurisdiction that 
originated in the function of the ecclesiastical courts to adjudicate the status of marriage and 
the JPs‘ function to oversee law and order was of course condemned in the Finer Report 
published in 1974, on the grounds of class discrimination as well as its legacy of ineffective 
 302 
 
support for families. That Committee was in no doubt that the system was obsolete and unfit 
for purpose, although there are mixed views on why its recommendations were not 
implemented. Whether this was because they looked too expensive or would disturb 
departmental powers, the fact remains that the plans did not gain sufficient political support, 
and may indeed have been too radical in increasing women‘s economic independence to have 
gained popular support either. The impression is given that scope for development was 
quickly contained by messages or assumptions that the Finer vision was unaffordable.  In 
contrast, the removal of the child support function from the courts by the Child Support Act 
1991 followed considerable publicity and comment. Unfortunately the legislation was rushed 
and took little account of this, with the resulting system being unsatisfactory to almost all 
concerned. 
 
The Finer Committee‘s view of the ‗police courts‘ being inappropriate for dispensing family 
justice was shared by many through to the 1980s, but addressed to some extent by the 
combined jurisdiction under the Children Act 1989. It seems that this level of court was seen 
as appropriate for care proceedings, being closer to the community it served than professional 
judges. On the other hand, contact and residence applications were assumed to be attached to 
divorce in the county courts. The justice system as a whole is economically dependent on the 
supply of lay magistrates, but their continued use in family cases will always risk the 
preservation of a two-tier system predicated on class and status, rather than the complexity of 
the law being applied or the seriousness of the outcomes. 
 
Although divorce was once proclaimed to be a matter of such public interest that proceedings 
were conducted as full-blown trials, the shift toward the largely administrative system we 
now have was achieved through incremental procedural changes, not through parliament. 
Legal aid was introduced in 1949 because of the demands of divorce and is the factor that has 
dominated changes in the family courts ever since. Few of these developments have been 
informed by a public debate about the extent to which society agrees on supporting families 
whose relationships are breaking down.         
  
 The Children Act 1989 was drafted on the premise that public law proceedings would 
continue to occupy the magistrates while there would be more flexibility in private law. The 
last few years have seen a pragmatic acceptance of the idea of a combined family court, as 
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further developed in the Family Justice Review. However, its scope is seriously limited by 
the inadequacy of the infrastructure. 
Accidents of history are perhaps even more problematic in Australia, where the constitutional 
separation of powers has imposed an artificial barrier between private law/dispute resolution 
in the federal courts and public law/protection in the state courts.  
 
FUNCTIONS OF DISPUTE PROCESSING AND PROTECTION 
 
Despite the most strenuous efforts being made, for ideological or economic reasons, to stop 
people taking their dispute to court, substantive legislative reform would be required, here 
and in Australia, to remove disputes about children from family courts altogether. The 2003 
enquiry in Australia probably went as far as possible, in considering a tribunal for family 
cases. Taking the idea to its ultimate conclusion, child protection could become a matter for 
the criminal law only, with children being removed by the state only if it can be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that their parents have abused them.  Similarly, one parent would 
‗win‘ sole parenting control only if the other was proved guilty. Domestic violence could 
complete its emigration into the criminal law. There would be no need for a civil court to 
become involved in any disputes apart from property, and we would have a pure forensic 
system. This extreme change in the law would be  logical if courts are the wrong place for 
resolving family disputes, and care proceedings turn on experts‘ reports in any event.  
 
It would of course be possible only if we reverted entirely to the laissez faire paradigm. 
Children and vulnerable adults would not be adequately protected. In 2004, Cretney was still 
posing a ‗profound question: what is the legitimate role of the courts, which by definition 
embody the coercive judicial power of the state in what was traditionally regarded as the 
private realm of family life?‘1 The answer surely must be that while disputes might be 
processed (and even resolved) outside a court process, judicial authority functions as the 
power accepted by society to protect individual members of families.  
 
In today‘s courts, disputes are processed through a series of filters, some before an 
application is even made, such as the Public Law Outline in care proceedings; difficulty in 
accessing legal aid; the settlement culture that is now intrinsic in solicitors‘ practice. Once in 
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the court, private law cases are diverted by Cafcass, and there is an overarching duty in all 
cases at all stages to consider ADR; solicitors will be negotiating throughout. Parties fall 
away through attrition and while these processes are observable as functions, the extent to 
which they are dispute resolution is doubtful, even when a line is drawn under the case in the 
court record.   
 
Now that there is no investigation function for the court in divorce itself, and child support 
has been transferred to an administrative agency, disputes in private law centre on controlling 
aspects of parenting, usually articulated as a claim on the amount of time the child will spend 
with a parent or with whom they will live. With pressure and encouragement at every stage, 
most parents are persuaded that a failure to agree is a failure of parenting.  Only a small 
proportion ever reach the formality of an adjudicated hearing, and even then a judge or 
magistrate will be seeking a workable compromise rather than applying law to the facts.  
 
The formality of dispute processing has receded over the years in England and Wales, 
although increased for a period in Australia, in response to criticism of the court dealing out 
less than proper justice. In the 1970s, the Finer Committee insisted that parties were rights-
holders and that matters would be decided by a judge; in the 1980s mediation/conciliation 
were seen as threatening due process. Perhaps in a few years‘ time we will look back to see 
the notion of a judge or magistrate imposing the law on a contact dispute as absurd.  
 
There has been a cultural shift in Australia away from courts into ADR, and such a shift is 
greatly to be wished by the UK government. Whether it is achievable without the intensive 
economic investment made in Australia remains to be seen. The Australian experience 
highlights that the protective function has to remain with the court. 
 
Clearly the protective function is to the fore in public law applications, although negotiation 
and brokering agreement are involved in reaching an order, which may well involve the state 
withdrawing and the child being brought up by another family member. Although parties‘ 
rights to family life are safeguarded by legal representation, again the approach is more about 
problem-solving than adversarial. Such an approach utilises non-legal professional 
disciplines.  
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LAW AND WELFARE  
 
The term ‗behavioural science‘ covers social work and psychology but is not a familiar one in 
the UK.
2
 Broadly, it represents the input by non-legal professionals in the family justice 
system, including the social workers, probation officers, court welfare officers, guardians, 
family consultants and expert witnesses who assist the court in arriving at a decision. As has 
been seen, their functions are not always confined to investigation and reporting, but they 
also work with the family toward solutions. The history of court welfare in both England and 
Australia has shown that that judicial and behavioural science approaches can sometimes 
clash rather than coalesce. Public perceptions of other professionals are sometimes lower than 
of lawyers. During the 1980s, in particular, there was much criticism of the therapeutic 
colonising the law. Taking into account the courts‘ latent functions of applying policy and 
regulating behaviour, is there  still a danger of covert manipulation by those holding arcane 
theories? Resources are now  monitored to the extent that the most the parties are likely to be 
offered is ‗brief therapy‘, rather than indefatigable attempts to mend relationships. 
 
Nevertheless, we have arrived at a situation where it is justified to resort to court to protect 
children but dispute resolution which does not involve risk of harm is not a matter for judges. 
However the law and welfare paradigms continue to be interdependent. The evaluation in 
Australia has confirmed that it is not safe to make assumptions about which cases are safe 
and which not. Judges rely on assessments of parenting capacity and the impact on the child 
before they are able to make decisions about the state assuming parental responsibility. 
 
This leads to the point about privacy in the court: if family courts are applying behavioural 
science rather than the law, are they subject to the same principles of open justice as other 
courts?  
 
SECRECY AND OPENNESS 
 
Firstly, it cannot be ignored that the prospect of court proceedings being publicised may well 
deter some applicants. However, that would be a simplistic analysis of the political 
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motivation to ‗open up‘ the courts. Secondly, if there is a significant move to private 
ordering, presumably mediators will be bound by a duty of confidentiality but parties will not 
be subject to any sanctions if they complain to the press, revealing details about their 
children.      
 
It is commonly assumed that the campaign for ‗open‘ family courts is dominated by the 
media for commercial reasons. Looking beyond such an assumption, the courts as state 
agencies will achieve greater legitimacy the more transparent their decision-making 
processes. The increased frequency of published judgments, the Bailii pilot, and the higher 
courts‘ willingness to publish names of expert witnesses probably have an educative function 
and may improve accountability. This is at the cost of sacrificing the rights of children to 
privacy, which is not adequately protected by anonymisation. At a utilitarian level, it is also 
an unnecessary diversion of resources and will reduce the quality of evidence available to the 
court. The duality between personal privacy and publicity is more complex than between 
secrecy and openness, and it is disappointing that the rhetoric of ‗transparency‘ was not 
followed when the law was recently changed.   
 
ADJUDICATION AND ADR  
 
The feeling that families‘ needs and wishes are not recognised by the court system leads to a 
belief that ADR is necessarily better at matching these, but then there is a problem with ADR 
being taken over also by economic and power forces. Processes used to avoid court take 
different forms, but all of these raise questions about whether they are based on values or on 
instrumental rationality. Social work or community-based conflict resolution might mean 
more juridification of family law, rather than less.   
 
Arguments that the state should not intervene in private family life, and that private 
individuals should not be obliged to contribute through the cost of public services to help 
other people resolve their disputes, run through the justifications for promoting ADR. 
However, ADR is not truly less public. Mediators, Cafcass officers and the FRCs in Australia 
are being delegated some the courts‘ functions. These are now integral as a compulsory stage 
in dispute resolution, but one mediator is assumed to cost the state less than two lawyers and 
a judge. ADR may employ non-legal language but it no longer truly an alternative to the 
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‗coercive power‘ of the law. ADR and adjudication are connected in the same way as dispute 
resolution and protection.  
 
This is not a new issue. Maidment wrote in 1984 that ‗the encouragement of private ordering 
and the many virtues claimed for it nevertheless raise difficult philosophical issues for the 
professed concern of the law to protect the welfare of the child, which is embodied in the s 41 
declaration procedure.
3
 
 
While outcomes for children remain central to family policy, adjudication in both public and 
private law cases will still be required if there is a factual dispute about risk of harm. The 
public interest is engaged in trying to ascertain the truth.  
 
DISPUTE PROCESSING AND PROTECTION; PRIVACY AND ADR: 
CONCLUSION 
As Dingwall and Eekelaar pointed out in 1988, the practical objection to delegalisation was 
that ‗disputes are displaced from the courts but society must find a way of resolving them.‘4 
The courts‘ protective function has been found to be universal, exemplified in the recent 
Australian  report about the unintended consequences of legislation in marginalising family 
violence.
5
 
 
In the ideal speech situation we would contribute to a public discourse, open to all, free of 
restrictions and untruths. Of course this is a theoretical construct, but the further we fall short 
of that ideal, the less chance there is of policy being accepted as legitimate. Only when 
proposals to make courts more accountable through publicity are honestly examined for what 
they offer, can we arrive at consensus about children‘s privacy and transparency of process. 
Only when the extent of the economic imperative in the drive to ADR is recognised, can we 
arrive at a consensus about where the courts‘ current functions should be exercised.  
 
                                                 
3
 S Maidment, Child Custody and Divorce (Crook Helm, London 1984) 77 
4
 R Dingwall and J Eekelaar , ‗A Wider Vision‘ in R Dingwall and J Eekelaar (eds), Divorce mediation and the 
Legal Process (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 174- 176 
5
 R Chisholm, Family Courts Violence Review (Attorney General of Australia, 2009)  
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